fall 2007
Article
RAND Journal of Economics

The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules

By: Josh Lerner, Marcin Strojwas and Jean Tirole

Format:Print

Abstract

Patent pools are an important but little-studied economic institution. In this paper, we first make a set of predictions about the licensing terms associated with patent pools. The theoretical framework predicts that (a) pools consisting of complementary patents are more likely to allow members to engage in independent licensing and (b) that the requirement that firms license patents to the pool (grantbacks) should be associated with pools that consist of complements and allow independent licensing. We then empirically examine the terms of 63 pools, and show that licensing rules are consistent with these hypotheses.

Keywords

Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Patents; Rights

Citation

Lerner, Josh, Marcin Strojwas, and Jean Tirole. "The Design of Patent Pools: The Determinants of Licensing Rules." RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 3 (fall 2007): 610–625. (Earlier version distributed as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 9680.)