Publications
Publications
- June 2007
- American Economic Review
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market
By: A. E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver
Abstract
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.
Keywords
Organizational Structure; Size; Emotions; Human Needs; Health Care and Treatment; Health Testing and Trials; Infrastructure; Supply Chain Management; Fairness; Performance Improvement; Health Industry
Citation
Roth, A. E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market." American Economic Review 97, no. 3 (June 2007): 828–851.