SaleSoft, Inc. (A)

Das  Narayandas

Case | HBS Case Collection | May 1996 (Revised March 1998)

SaleSoft, Inc. (A)

Abstract

SaleSoft, a start-up firm, markets Comprehensive Sales Automation Solutions (CSAS) that automate a firm's sales, marketing, and service functions. Even though the product has received very favorable responses from prospects, product complexity and a long buying cycle have made it difficult for the firm to convert interest into sales orders. SaleSoft now has an opportunity to sell a part of the total CSAS solution as a stand-alone product. This "Trojan Horse" (TH) product offers an easy way for the firm to enter new customer accounts, gain quick sales, and generate much needed revenues. However, it could potentially distract the firm from its primary objective and cannibalize CSAS sales. SaleSoft needs to decide whether to continue selling CSAS or launch TH. And, the firm needs to develop a detailed marketing strategy to implement this decision.

Keywords: Business Startups; Decisions; Revenue; Marketing Strategy; Product Launch; Sales; Opportunities; Information Technology; Technology Industry;

Format: Print

22 pages

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Narayandas, Das. "SaleSoft, Inc. (A)." Harvard Business School Case 596-112, May 1996. (Revised March 1998.)

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SaleSoft, Inc. (A)

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