April–May 2005
Article
Journal of the European Economic Association

Markets for Partially-Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping Versus Bundling

By: James J Anton and Dennis A. Yao

Format:Print

Abstract

We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can be protected. The analysis shows that a sequential strategy in which the protected portion of the IP is sold prior to selling the unprotected IP is superior to selling both portions of the IP as a bundle.

Keywords

Knowledge; Markets; Rights; Valuation; Problems and Challenges; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Intellectual Property; Strategy

Citation

Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "Markets for Partially-Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping Versus Bundling." Journal of the European Economic Association 3, nos. 2-3 (April–May 2005): 745–754. (Harvard users click here for full text.)