Publications
Publications
- July 2007
- Journal of Economic Theory
A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission
By: Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. Stokey
Abstract
We consider a statistical decision problem faced by a two player organization whose members may not
agree on outcome evaluations and prior probabilities. One player is specialized in gathering information
and transmitting it to the other, who takes the decision. This process is modeled as a game. Qualitative
properties of the equilibria are analyzed. The impact of improving the quality of available information on
the equilibrium welfares of the two individuals is studied. Better information generally may not improve
welfare. We give conditions under which it will.
Keywords
Citation
Green, Jerry R., and Nancy L. Stokey. "A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission." Journal of Economic Theory 135, no. 1 (July 2007): 90–104.