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Chapter | Future Competition in Telecommunications | 1989

The Future Evolution of the Central Office Switching Industry

by Jerry A. Hausman and Elon Kohlberg

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Keywords: Innovation and Invention; Communication Technology; Forecasting and Prediction; Telecommunications Industry;

Format: Print

Citation:

Hausman, Jerry A., and Elon Kohlberg. "The Future Evolution of the Central Office Switching Industry." In Future Competition in Telecommunications, edited by Stephen P. Bradley and Jerry A. Hausman. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1989.

About the Author

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Elon Kohlberg
Baker Foundation Professor, Royal Little Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus
Strategy

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More from the Author

  • Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2017

    Cooperative Strategic Games

    Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman

    We examine a solution concept, called the “value," for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player's position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player's contribution to the total payoff but also the player's ability to inflict losses on other players. A salient feature is that the value takes account of the costs that “spoilers" impose on themselves. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of the value. For every subset, S, consider the zero-sum game played between S and its complement, where the players in each of these sets collaborate as a single player, and where the payoff is the difference between the sum of the payoffs to the players in S and the sum of payoffs to the players not in S. We say that S has an effective threat if the minmax value of this game is positive. The first axiom is that if no subset of players has an effective threat then all players are allocated the same amount. The second axiom is that if the overall payoff to the players in a game is the sum of their payoffs in two unrelated games, then the overall value is the sum of the values in these two games. The remaining axioms are the strategic-game analogs of the classical coalitional-games axioms for the Shapley value: efficiency, symmetry, and null player.

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "Cooperative Strategic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 17-075, February 2017.  View Details
    CiteView Details Read Now Related
  • Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2015

    The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games

    Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman

    Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU case. Our main result is an extension of the definition and the existence and uniqueness theorems to stochastic games—discounted or undiscounted.

    Keywords: game theory; economics; Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-071, March 2015.  View Details
    CiteView Details Read Now Related
  • Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2014

    The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games

    Elon Kohlberg and Abraham Neyman

    Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first step in this direction. We show that the Harsanyi-Shapley-Nash cooperative solution to one-shot strategic games can be extended to stochastic games. While this extension applies to general n-person stochastic games, it does not rely on Nash equilibrium analysis in such games. Rather, it only makes use of minmax analysis in two-person (zero-sum) stochastic games. This will become clear in the sequel.

    Keywords: Strategy; Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014.  View Details
    CiteView Details Read Now Related
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