

Northern Lights: Political Economy and the *Terroir* of the Norwegian Enlightenment*

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On May 27, 1776, the Scottish immigrant John Robertson Brand, sometimes known as John Brandt, was awarded a silver medal by the Royal Norwegian Scientific Society in the church of the fishing village of Hustad, south of the Trondheim Fjord in central Norway. Though below the Arctic Circle, Hustad lies slightly off the sixty-third parallel north, which runs through Canada's Nunavut and Yukon Territories, the Davis Strait, and the deep Russian tundra—a decidedly hyperborean region compared to the traditional latitudes of Enlightenment. And yet, stepping into the small wooden church's aisle on that spring day to deliver a speech marking the occasion, District Governor Even Hammer of Romsdal (1732–1800; fig. 1) summoned a language of reform, improvement, industriousness, civic virtue, public happiness, jealousy of trade, and political economy that would have resonated deeply and widely across the European world, a language indebted to international currents but resolutely inflected by local conditions in what he appropriately called “our cold North.”¹ Few cases better justify the great Turinese

* Rolv Petter Amdam first introduced me to Even Hammer, and I would like to express my gratitude to him; to Mads Langnes at Romsdalsmuseet in Molde, Norway, for going well beyond the call of duty in facilitating my work on this intriguing figure; and, particularly, to Marit Sjelmo for jovial research assistance and to John Brewer, Robert Fredona, Steven L. Kaplan, Erik S. Reinert, Hugo Reinert, John Robertson, John Shovlin, Andre Wakefield, Carl Wennerlind, and Sophie Wilkowske for suggestions. I am furthermore grateful to Ann Thomson and Richard Whatmore for the kind invitation to present on Hammer at the European University Institute in Florence, and to Alexandra Chadwick, Rory Cox, Franz Leander Fillafer, Konrad M. Lawson, and Koen Stapelbroek for comments there. Finally, I would like to thank the journal's three incisive reviewers for their feedback, and Isabelle Lewis for preparing the map. This article develops my earlier “Even Hammer: Politisk økonomi i den norske opplysningstiden,” in *Årbok 2017: Opplysningstida i Romsdal 1700–1814* (Molde, 2017), 9–39.

¹ Even Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .* (Copenhagen, 1776), 12. The pamphlet is exceedingly rare, but I have consulted the copy classified R.Ark.1264/H/L0003 in Romsdalsmuseet, Molde, Norway. For a review, see *Kritisk Tilskuer over Indenlandsk og Udenlandsk Literatur*, nos. 47–48 (1776), 369–71. On “the North Sea and Baltic region” as a “northern, colder and poorer reflection of Braudel's Mediterranean,” as well as illuminating caveats, see Hanno Brand and Leos Müller, “Introduction,” in *The Dynamics of Economic Culture in the North Sea and Baltic Region in*



FIG. 1.—Anonymous portrait of Even Hammer. Domkirkeodden Photoarchive, Hamar, Norway. Color version available as an online enhancement.

the Late Medieval and Early Modern Period, ed. Brand and Müller (Hilversum, 2007), 7–12, 7, as well as the volume’s essays. The reference is of course to Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols., trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley, 1996).

historian Franco Venturi's admonition, a few days before his death, to "the young and the less young" to remember "always that local roots and the great ideas that break the skies of Europe can never be separated."²

So how were the two—local roots and great ideas—related in the case of District Governor Hammer, and what might it tell us about the larger questions of the Enlightenment? What cursory scholarship about him that exists, including even the *Norwegian Biographical Dictionary*, argues doggedly but with little evidence that "French Physiocracy" was the "starting point" for his work and that he was essentially a boreal recipient of François Quesnay's doctrines expounding laissez-faire, large-scale capitalist landowning, and the exclusive power of agriculture to create wealth.³ Hammer may have been a figure of the Enlightenment, in short, but hardly more than a dim reflection at the utmost periphery of the movement. Only Rolv Petter Amdam has suggested that scholars may have exaggerated the influence of physiocracy in Norway in general and on Hammer in particular. This article builds on his observation to provide a more nuanced portrayal of Hammer's world and of his vision as a means of integrating Norway's experience into our understanding of the emergence and internationalization of political economy in the eighteenth century—what Steven L. Kaplan and I have called "the Economic Turn"—and, more broadly, into the European Enlightenment.⁴ For

² Franco Venturi, quoted in Leonardo Casalino, "Nota introduttiva e biografica," in Franco Venturi, *La lotta per la libertà: Scritti politici*, ed. Leonardo Casalino (Turin, 1996), liii–lxxv, lxxv. On Venturi see, among others, Adriano Viarengo, *Franco Venturi, politica e storia nel novecento* (Rome, 2014). On his vision of the Enlightenment, see John Robertson, "Franco Venturi's Enlightenment," *Past & Present* 137, no. 1 (1992): 183–206.

³ Arne Apelseth, "Even Hammer," February 13, 2009, https://nbl.snli.no/Even_Hammer; Asbjørn Øverås, "Opplysningstida i Romsdal: Amtmann Even Hammer," *Syn og Segn* 41 (1935): 274–84, and Øverås, *Romsdals Soga*, vol. 2, *Dansketida* (Trondheim, 1941), 283–301; Arne Odd Johnsen, "En amtmann fra opplysningstiden: Etatsråd Even Hammer; fremskrittssmannen og patrioten," *Heimen* 5, no. 4 (1939): 177–96, 178; Sven Erik Skarsbø and Jógvan Hammer, "Knut Ellingsgaard—tresfjordingen som vart plogkar på Færøyane," *Romsdal Sogelag Årsskrift* [Molde] 72 (2008): 274–96, 281–82. On the physiocratic experiment, see Steven L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics, and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV*, 2nd ed. (London, 2015), and, for the most recent literature, Kaplan, *The Stakes of Regulation: Reflections on Bread, Politics and Political Economy Forty Years Later* (London, 2015). On the international influence of physiocracy, see Bernard Delmas, Thierry Demals, and Philippe Steiner, eds., *La diffusion internationale de la physiocratie (XVIIIe–XIXe)* (Grenoble, 1995). On the numerous alternatives to physiocracy at the time, and indeed the prevalence of explicit "Antiphiysiocracy," see the essays in Gérard Klotz, Philippe Minard, and Arnaud Orain, eds., *Les voies de la richesse? La physiocratie en question (1760–1850)* (Rennes, 2017), and Steven L. Kaplan and Sophus A. Reinert, eds., *The Economic Turn: Recasting Political Economy in Enlightenment Europe* (London, 2019).

⁴ Rolv Petter Amdam, "Norske fysiokratar—fanst dei?," in *Det som svarte seg best: Studier i økonomisk historie og politikk*, ed. Edgar Hovland, Even Lange, and Sigurd

not only does a closer reading of Hammer's work reveal a far more complex economic vision than has hitherto been acknowledged, one indebted to cameralism rather than physiocracy; it can also serve as a beachhead from which we may better assess the Norwegian Enlightenment as such, which remains a woefully neglected yet fertile field for further studies, and ultimately—and perhaps more significantly—the nature of political economy when it was first codified in eighteenth-century Europe.⁵

Indeed, the case of Even Hammer's political economy and how it developed at the northern extreme of the European Enlightenment suggests that intellectual historians would benefit from considering the ideation, reception, appropriation, and development of ideas in relation to not merely shifting cultural, economic, and political contexts but also more fundamental environmental and geological conditions, that is, to their physical ecologies. Though an intellectual portrait of Hammer is interesting for what it teaches us about the varieties of political economy in the European Enlightenment, it more fundamentally—and broadly—challenges us to take the *terroir* of intellectual history more seriously: that is,

Rysstad (Oslo, 1990), 19–30, 20 and 26. On physiocracy's more complex reception in Sweden, see Lars Herlitz, *Fysiokratismen i svensk tappning 1767–1770* (Gothenburg [but Lund], 1974), and, more broadly, Carl Wennerlind, "Theatrum Oeconomicum: Anders Berch and the Dramatization of the Swedish Improvement Discourse," in *New Perspectives on the History of Political Economy*, ed. Robert Fredona and Sophus A. Reinert (Basingstoke, 2018), 103–30, and Lars Magnusson, "Physiocracy in Sweden: A Note on the Problem of Inventing Traditions," in Kaplan and Reinert, *The Economic Turn*, 585–605. On "the Enlightenment" as essentially a matter of "political economy," see also John Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680–1760* (Cambridge, 2005); Sophus A. Reinert, *Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy* (Cambridge, MA, 2011), and Reinert, *The Academy of Fisticuffs: Political Economy and Commercial Society in Enlightenment Italy* (Cambridge, MA, 2018).

⁵ Axiomatically, Norway was excluded even from Roy S. Porter and Mikuláš Teich, eds., *The Enlightenment in National Context* (Cambridge, 1981), long the Bible of those interested in the national varieties of Enlightenment. For a comparative sketch of the Scandinavian Enlightenment, see Jonathan Israel, "Northern Varieties: Contrasting the Dano-Norwegian and the Swedish-Finnish Enlightenments," in *Eighteenth-Century Periodicals as Agents of Change: Perspectives on Northern Enlightenment*, ed. Ellen Krefting, Aina Nøding, and Mona Ringvej (Leiden, 2015), 17–45, and, for a recent assessment of scholarship on the subject, Koen Stapelbroek and Antonella Alimento, "The Wealth and Freedom of the North: Scandinavian Political Cultures and Economic Ideas in the Eighteenth Century," *History of European Ideas* 40, no. 5 (2014): 662–740. On cameralism see, among others, Keith Tribe, "Cameralism and the Sciences of the State," in *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (Cambridge, 2006), 525–46, and Andre Wakefield, *The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice* (Chicago, 2009).

the particular complex of environmental conditions in a physical place evoked by wine critic Matt Kramer's notion of "somewhereness."⁶ For, as the case of Hammer elucidates so succinctly, it is not just that environmental concerns have enjoyed a long history, particularly in relation to resource use and humanity's management of the material world, but also that physical environments themselves inspire, inflect, and delimit intellectual life in ways that have often been neglected or denied altogether.⁷ Yet, by virtue of its very subject matter, the history of political economy must *perforce* operate in a nexus of theories, policies, and their shifting environments. As it happens, eighteenth-century Norway offers a unique lens on these greater dynamics.

NORÐRVEGR

"Oceans," it has recently been argued, "created Norway" (fig. 2).⁸ But before some fastidious reader hastens to note that Norway was merely part of "Denmark-Norway" during the long eighteenth century (as so many rush to proclaim that there was no "Italy" before the peninsula's belated national unification during the Risorgimento—pace a widespread tradition of cultural and geographical identity stretching back at least to Petrarch), it may be necessary to correct some popular misapprehensions regarding what sort of community the name

⁶ Matt Kramer, "The Notion of *Terroir*," in *Wine and Place: A "Terroir" Reader*, ed. Tim Patterson and John Buechsenstein (Berkeley, 2018), 8–13. For a striking recent fusion of intellectual and environmental history, see Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, *Enlightenment's Frontier: The Scottish Highlands and the Origins of Environmentalism* (New Haven, CT, 2013). J. G. A. Pocock once noted that he could be seen to write "an ecology rather than an etiology of the *Decline and Fall*" in his epic work on Edward Gibbon's masterpiece, but by "ecology" I mean something closer to the word's definition for the natural sciences; see Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion*, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1999–2016), 1:10. Similarly, the term *terroir* can take many meanings, but for a historiographical overview as well as developmental usages, see Thomas J. Bassett, Chantal Blanc-Pamard, and Jean Boutrais, "Constructing Locality: The *Terroir* Approach in West Africa," *Africa* 77, no. 1 (2007): 104–29, drawing on Tiphaine Barthélemy and Florence Weber, eds., *Les campagnes à libre ouvert: Regards sur la France rurale des années trente* (Paris, 1989). Though a *terroir* certainly can be a space of socionatural heritage and conflict, my emphasis here is quite literally on the physical soil in which ideas metaphorically can take root, grow, and cross-pollinate.

⁷ See, for a poignant perspective on the intersection of such ways of thinking about ideas and the environment, Katrina Forrester and Sophie Smith, "History, Theory and the Environment," in *Nature, Action, and the Future: Political Thought and the Environment*, ed. Forrester and Smith (Cambridge, 2018), 1–20, 3.

⁸ Per Anders Todal, *Havlandet: Historia om hava som skapte Noreg* (Bergen, 2018).



FIG. 2.—Isabelle Lewis, map of Scandinavia at the time of Even Hammer.

“Norway” represented at the time.⁹ The country’s name derived from *Norðrvegr*, known already in the eighteenth century as the Old Norse term for the “way to the North.”¹⁰ Historically, numerous kingdoms of varying degrees of political unity had emerged along the eastern coasts of the North Sea between Skagerrak and the Barents Sea during the first millennium CE, but the area emerged on the European scene only in the Viking Age, often bracketed by the first raid on the Northumbrian abbey of Lindisfarne in 793 and the 1066 Battle of Stamford Bridge. During this period, Scandinavian Vikings explored European and Atlantic waterways through trade, cultural encounters, and warfare, going as far as Greenland, Newfoundland, and Uzbekistan. Raids like that on Lindisfarne, during which hallowed grounds were desecrated and monks murdered or taken into slavery, long colored perceptions of Vikings, but a more nuanced view has recently emerged in scholarship appreciating their intensive commercial operations throughout western Eurasia and the North Atlantic.¹¹

The petty kingdoms of Norway were, however, united already following the 872 CE Battle of Hafsfjord, at which, as the Icelandic statesman and Saga-weaver Snorri Sturluson put it, Harald Fairhair “unified” Norway by force.¹² The country was, similarly, forcefully Christianized following the death of Olav the Holy at the Battle of Stiklestad in 1030, and its King Håkon V implemented lasting institutional changes such as abolishing an aristocracy and hamstringing regional warlords in 1308. A division of political powers was in place at an early date, and, like Iceland, the country never experienced “feudalism.”¹³ Norway was

⁹ Petrarch, *The Canzoniere or Rerum vulgarium fragmenta*, ed. Mark Musa (Bloomington, IN, 1999), poem CXLVI, 236–37, ll. 12–14. On the issue, see Gene A. Brucker, “From *Campanilismo* to Nationhood: Forging an Italian Identity,” in Brucker, *Living on the Edge in Leonardo’s Florence: Selected Essays* (Berkeley, 2005), 42–61, and Angelo Mazzocco, “Un’idea politica italiana in Petrarca?,” in *Petrarca politico* (Rome, 2006), 9–26.

¹⁰ See, for example, Andrew Swinton, *Travels into Norway, Denmark, and Russia, in the Years 1788, 1789, 1790, and 1791* (London, 1792), 39.

¹¹ Stefan Brink with Neil Price, eds., *The Viking World* (London, 2008); Anders Winroth, *The Age of the Vikings* (Princeton, NJ, 2014); Angelo Forte, Richard Oram, and Frederik Pedersen, *Viking Empires* (Cambridge, 2005).

¹² See still Snorri Sturluson, *Heimskringla: History of the Kings of Norway*, trans. Lee M. Hollander (Austin, TX, 1964), 73–76. On its early publication history, see Edel Porter, “Old Norse, New Norse: *Heimskringla* in Norway, 1599–1900,” in *True North: Literary Translation in the Nordic Countries*, ed. Brett Jocelyn Epstein (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014), 238–55.

¹³ For an account of these events, see the opening chapters of Rolf Danielsen et al., *Grunntrekk i Norsk Historie fra Vikingtid til Våre Dager* (Oslo, 1991). The question of feudalism is of course historiographically vexing; see particularly the early blast against the concept in Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,” *American Historical Review* 79 (October 1974): 1063–88, and Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted* (Oxford,

particularly hard struck by *Svartedauen*, or the Black Death, which decimated the population by 60 percent between 1348 and 1350 and caused a national trauma that still resonates in the popular imagination.¹⁴ The weakened polity subsequently entered the so-called Kalmar Union, which brought together the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in a so-called personal union, where the same monarchs ruled over distinct states, from 1397 to 1523.¹⁵ Once Sweden seceded from the union with the rise of Gustav Vasa, Norwegians sought to follow suit, but rebellions throughout the country failed and Norway remained in a personal union with Denmark until the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁶ The resulting unity, called the “Twin-Kingdoms,” was later referred to by the playwright Henrik Ibsen as the “400-Year Night.” Norwegian revolutionaries adopted their own entirely independent constitution on May 17, 1814, but, as the Norns would have it, liberty proved evanescent, with Swedish troops invading later the same year and inaugurating a new personal union, this time with Sweden, that would end only in 1905.¹⁷ Throughout the eighteenth century, then, Norway was an ostensibly independent kingdom in a personal union with the more powerful “Composite Monarchy” of Denmark and an uneasy part of the so-called Oldenburg Empire.¹⁸ And, as scholarship from the past few decades has come to emphasize,

1994). In a recent reassessment, Sverre Bagge, Michael H. Gelting, and Thomas Lindkvist argue that though “feudalism in practice differs considerably from Ganshof’s neat picture,” it nonetheless might be “premature to pronounce its death”; see their “Introduction” to *Feudalism: New Landscapes of Debate* (Turnhout, 2011), 1–15, 13.

¹⁴ Ole Jørgen Benedictow, *The Black Death, 1346–1353: The Complete History* (Woodbridge, 2004), 146–58. On its economic consequences, see further David Herlihy, *The Black Death and the Transformation of the West*, ed. Samuel K. Cohn Jr. (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 11, 45–52, but see, for caveats, Robert E. Lerner, “Fleas: Some Scratchy Issues Concerning the Black Death,” *Journal of the Historical Society* 8, no. 2 (2008): 205–28. For a particularly striking example of its cultural influence in Norway, see Theodor Kittelsen, *Svartedauen* (Kristiania, 1900).

¹⁵ Harald Gustafsson, “A State That Failed?,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 31, nos. 3–4 (2006): 205–20.

¹⁶ Sverre Bagge and Knut Mykland, *Norge i dansketiden* (Copenhagen, 1987); Henrik Ibsen, *Peer Gynt: Et dramatisk digt* (Copenhagen, 1867), 177.

¹⁷ See Bo Stråth, *Union och demokrati: De förenade rikena Sverige-Norge 1814–1905* (Nora, 2005). On the Norns, the Norse Fates, see Karen Bek-Pedersen, *The Norns in Old Norse Mythology* (Edinburgh, 2011).

¹⁸ On composite monarchies, see J. H. Elliot, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past & Present* 137, no. 1 (1992): 48–71, drawing on a venerable historiography dating back to the early modern period, for an overview of which see Istvan Hont, “The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: ‘Nation-State’ and ‘Nationalism’ in Historical Perspective,” in Hont, *Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 2005), 447–528, 458n14. On the long process through which the Oldenburg Empire became the nation-state of Denmark, see Uffe Østergård, “Nation-Building and Nationalism in the Oldenburg Empire,” in *Nationalizing Empires*, ed. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest, 2015), 461–510.

feelings of independent Norwegian identity were widespread and growing throughout the eighteenth century.¹⁹ Indeed, the relationship between Norway and Denmark was not entirely unlike that of Scotland and England following the Union of 1707 or, for that matter, of the Kingdom of Naples and the Spanish Empire—both cases understood, as John Robertson has demonstrated, to be of “Kingdoms governed as Provinces.”²⁰ As easy as it is to draw such political comparisons, though, Norway has largely resisted integration into the larger ambit of premodern European historiography precisely because of its remarkable difference, both real and perceived.

In fact, early modern historians may find much in Norway’s particular history that resonates with wider historiographical tropes in the European world, albeit taken—perhaps naturally given the country’s location and climate—to extremes. The Salem witch trials at the then westernmost end of the European world, for example, remain frightful for ending in the horrible killing of twenty people, mostly by hanging, between February 1692 and May 1693.²¹ Yet this paled in comparison to what occurred on the edge of the arctic Barents Sea in contemporary Vardø, Finnmark, Europe’s northernmost and easternmost town at the time (east even of St. Petersburg and Istanbul). Out of a population of 3,000 in all of Finnmark, 91 people—77 women and 14 men, the latter mostly Saami—were executed, often by burning, in Vardø in the early to mid-seventeenth century, including no less than 18 (along with 3 more who were tortured to death) during the harsh winter months of 1662–63. Some of the local fishing villages saw their entire female populations murdered during these periodic crazes. The causes were many, but scholars have focused on the region’s extreme isolation, its relentlessly cold eternal night for several months each year, its unforgiving climate, the unfamiliar rituals of the local Saami, and the need for reckoning in the face of so many deaths at sea. So engrained were these witch trials in Norwegian culture that the Doma mountain near Vardø still is known as “Hell’s Gateway” (fig. 3).²²

¹⁹ On early Norwegian patriotism, see Kåre Lunden, *Norsk grålysing: Norsk nasjonalisme 1770–1814 på allmenn bakgrunn* (Oslo, 1992), and the essays in Odd Arvid Storsveen, ed., *Norsk patriotisme før 1814* (Oslo, 1997). See, furthermore, *Danmark-Norge 1380–1814*, 4 vols. (Oslo, 1998), vol. 4: Ole Feldbæk, *Nærhed og adskillelse 1720–1814* and Rasmus Glenthøj, *Skilsmissen: Dansk og norsk identitet før og efter 1814* (Odense, 2012).

²⁰ Robertson, *The Case for the Enlightenment*.

²¹ The literature on the Salem witch trials is enormous, but see Mary Beth Norton, *In the Devil’s Snare: The Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692* (New York, 2002), and, for the actual cases, Bernard Rosenthal, ed., *Records of the Salem Witch-Hunt* (Cambridge, 2009).

²² Liv Helene Wilumsen, *Witches of the North: Scotland and Finnmark* (Leiden, 2013), 223–319, and the magisterial Rune Blix Hagen, *Ved porten til helvete: Trolldomsprosessene i Finnmark* (Oslo, 2015), and, for examples of entire female populations executed, Hagen, “Witchcraft Criminality and Witchcraft Research in the Nordic Countries,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe and Colonial America*, ed.

This was admittedly an unusual case, at the most extreme edge of an extreme land, but it serves to underscore the fact that, though Norway was very much part of Europe, it was also different. And it should not be surprising that travelers' depictions of the country were universally unforbearing in the early modern period, emphasizing the land's rawness and alterity with regard to continental Europe, to the point where Ludvig Holberg, the "Voltaire of the North," could report that people abroad thought Norwegians were "werewolves," a situation that explicitly angered Even Hammer and inspired his work on national improvement.²³ Curiously, many of these early accounts mirrored the negative views offered by Grand Tourists visiting southern Italy, a place also thought to be less "civilized" than the rest of Europe. But where Naples at least had the dubious honor of being known as a "Paradise inhabited by Devils," eighteenth-century Norway was at best a wilderness inhabited by primitives, not to mention lycanthropes.²⁴ The merchant and author Nathaniel William Wraxall, for one, who seemingly never visited the northern parts of the Oldenburg Empire in person, ridiculed the Danes: "they can boast, 'tis true, a vast extent of dominion; but of what importance are the barren and almost uninhabited mountains of Norway and Lapland, stretching to the pole; or the plains of Iceland, where the inhabitants

Brian P. Levack (Oxford, 2013), 375–92, 386. See, for an endlessly fascinating approach to the broader phenomenon, Carlo Ginzburg, *Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches' Sabbath*, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (Chicago, 2004), on which see Cora Presezzi, ed., *Streghe, sciamani, visionari: In margine a storia notturna di Carlo Ginzburg* (Rome, 2019). On witches blamed for misfortune generally, see Euan Cameron, *Enchanted Europe: Superstition, Reason, and Religion, 1250–1750* (Oxford, 2010), 29 and passim. On the Saami in the eighteenth century, see, among others, Florian Wagner, *Die Entdeckung Lapplands: Die Forschungsreisen Carl von Linnés und Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis' in den 1730er Jahren* (Norderstedt, 2004). On the grim landscape and climate, see still Jonas Carisius, "Christian IVs reisetur til Norge og Vardøhus i Finnmarken," in *Kongens reise til det ytterste nord: Dagbøker fra Christian IVs tokt til Finnmark og Kola i 1599*, ed. Rune Blix Hagen and Per Einar Sparboe (Tromsø, 2004), 32–59, 51–53.

²³ See Even Hammer discussing Holberg and negative stereotypes of Norway in *Philonorvagi: Velmente Tanker, til veltenkende medborgere* (Copenhagen, 1771), 21. On Holberg, see the essays in Knud Haakonssen and Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen, eds., *Ludvig Holberg (1684–1754): Learning and Literature in the Nordic Enlightenment* (London, 2017); Sebastian Olden-Jørgensen, *Ludvig Holberg som pragmatisk historiker: En historigrafisk-kritisk undersøgelse* (Copenhagen, 2015), 52 and passim; and, for his influence on Northern political economy, still Max Kjær Hansen, *Økonomen Ludvig Holberg* (Copenhagen, 1954).

²⁴ See, for a popular account of this, Arngeir Berg and Arne Johan Gjermundsen, *Da Norge ble oppdaget: Europeernes utrolige opplevelser og inntrykk i det mangslungne fjellandet Norge på 1700- og 1800-tallet* (Oslo, 1992). On the Neapolitan example see, among others, Melissa Calaresu, "Looking for Virgil's Tomb: The End of the Grand Tour and the Cosmopolitan Ideal in Europe," in *Voyages and Visions: Towards a Cultural History of Travel*, ed. Jas Elsner and Joan-Pau Rubiés (London, 1999), 138–61.




FIG. 3.—Hans H. Lilienskiold, *Dünnen-Felde*, or *Domen*, watercolor, ca. 1698. Universitetsbiblioteket i Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway.
© Lilienskiold/Domen from the Finnmark County Library Photoarchive. Color version available as an online enhancement.

are yet, and will probably ever remain, in the most profound barbarism?”²⁵ Norwegians themselves, Wraxall observed (though he himself fell for a pulchritudinous one in Copenhagen), were “*wrapt in all the horrors of a polar winter.*” Remaining therefore “unpolished in their manners, and still retaining the vestiges of Gothic ignorance, they present not many charms to tempt the traveler.”²⁶ Not everyone agreed, of course, but even later, more positive depictions were hardly less discriminatory. The Scottish minister and historian William Thompson began his accounts by stating that “the Norwegians are a fine race of men, of a free and generous spirit, and watch over their liberties with unremitting vigilance. Many ages have elapsed since they have settled quietly at home, and ceased to disturb the liberties of others.”²⁷ But he then went on to explain how “the Norwegians are exceedingly fond of dancing” and “continually trotting to the sound of a violin” in spite of the fact that “their music is without melody, and their playing without art.” Not only that, but, much like stereotypical southern Italians, they were of “a lively disposition” and “quick and violent in their passions, especially when intoxicated.”²⁸ Yet, as a territory, it was clear to Thompson that “Nature has done much for Norway” and that it represented “by far the most valuable part” of the Danish Empire.²⁹ That said, the absence of a feudal past profoundly influenced living conditions in the Norwegian countryside compared to its “Twin Kingdom” to the south.³⁰ As historian, priest, and frequent tutor to Grand Tourists William Coxe put it in the bestselling accounts of his travels to Norway, “as the peasants of that Kingdom are free, the forces are levied in a different manner from those of Denmark.”³¹

Travelers also noted what historical demographers have since fully established, namely, that Norway was very sparsely populated, with most people living in a few towns and cities. The most famous at the time was Hanseatic Bergen, with around 14,000 inhabitants; the mining metropolis of Kongsberg, with 8,000; and the cathedral city of Trondheim, with 7,000.³² There were, of course,

²⁵ Nathaniel William Wraxall, *A Tour through Some of the Northern Parts of Europe, Particularly Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Petersburg, in a Series of Letters*, 3 vols. (Dublin, [1776]), 1:16.

²⁶ Wraxall, *A Tour through Some of the Northern Parts of Europe*, 1:3, 11–16 (emphasis added).

²⁷ Andrew Swinton [William Thompson], *Travels into Norway, Denmark, and Russia, in the Years 1788, 1789, 1790, and 1791* (London, 1792), 46–47.

²⁸ [Thompson], *Travels into Norway*, 52–53.

²⁹ [Thompson], *Travels into Norway*, 37–38.

³⁰ See, for example, Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 22.

³¹ William Coxe, *Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark*, 2 vols. (London, 1784), 2:546.

³² Paul Bairoch, Jean Batou, and Pierre Chèvre, *La population des villes européennes de 800 à 1850* (Geneva, 1988), 52. See also on this theme Ståle Dyrvik, Knut Mykland, and Jan Oldervoll, *The Demographic Crises in Norway in the 17th and 18th Centuries* (Oslo, 1976).

good geological and ecological reasons for this. For though the length of Norway is heated by the Gulf Stream, rendering temperate what otherwise would have been an arctic climate by daily providing Europe with more energy than all the world's coal consumption generates in a decade, less than 3 percent of it consists in arable land.³³ The country's geography is serrated and mountainous (in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries increasingly designated "sublime"³⁴), with deep forests and plentiful rivers, its history shaped by a unique geological environment. So overpowering has "nature" been in the country's human history that anthropologists see it as "more important than culture" to this day.³⁵ Norway's historically small population resulted also from its largely infertile soil and bedrocks of granite and gneiss; more nutritious Cambro-Silurian pockets featuring marine clay deposits from retreating glaciers at the end of the last ice age—what William Cronon has called "Ice Age gifts"—correspond to the most populous areas around the current-day Oslo Fjord, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim. The same extensive but focused Permian volcanic activity that produced these soils elsewhere pushed large concentrations of mineral wealth to the surface, most importantly for the early modern period silver, gold, iron, and copper.³⁶ Indeed, the mines of Kongsberg (silver) and Røros (copper) both began operations in the early seventeenth century and quickly achieved Europe-wide

³³ Morten A. Strøksnes, *Havboka eller Kunsten å fange en kjempehai fra en gummibåt på et stort hav gjennom fire årstider* (Oslo, 2015), 167.

³⁴ See particularly Mary Wollstonecraft, *Letters Written during a Short Residence in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark*, ed. Ingrid Horrocks (Peterborough, 2013), and Derwent Conway [Henry David Inglis], *A Personal Narrative of a Journey through Norway, Part of Sweden, and the Islands and States of Denmark* (Edinburgh, 1829), 84–86, and generally Peter Fjægesund and Ruth A. Symes, *The Northern Utopia: British Perceptions of Norway in the Nineteenth Century* (Amsterdam, 2003), 284 and passim. On sublimity and mountaineering, see also Peter H. Hansen, *The Summit of Modern Man: Mountaineering after the Enlightenment* (Cambridge, MA, 2013).

³⁵ See, for example, Marianne Gullestad, "When Nature Is More Important than Culture," in Gullestad, *The Art of Social Relations: Essays on Culture, Social Action and Everyday Life in Modern Norway* (Oslo, 1992), 201–9. On the related Norwegian tradition of "deep ecology," often identified with the work of philosopher Arne Næss, see also the essays in Peter Reed and David Rothenberg, eds., *Wisdom in the Open Air: The Norwegian Roots of Deep Ecology* (Minneapolis, 1992).

³⁶ Reidar Müller, *Det som ble Norge: Om fjell, is og liv gjennom 2902 millioner år* (Oslo, 2014), 250–53; Tore O. Vorren, Jan Mangerud, Lars Blikra, Atle Nesje, and Harald Sveian, "The Emergence of Modern Norway: The Last 11,500 Years—the Holocene," in *The Making of a Land: Geology of Norway*, ed. Ivar B. Ramberg, Inge Bryhni, Arvid Nøttvedt, and Kristin Rangnes (Trondheim, 2008), 534–59. For more specialist minerals, see Brian A. Sturt, Håvard Gautneb, Tom Haldal, and Lars Petter Nilsson, "Industrial Minerals Associated with Ultramafic Rocks in Norway," in *Industrial Minerals and Extractive Industry Geology*, ed. Peter W. Scott and Colin M. Bristow (London, 2002), 43–58. For "Ice Age gifts," see William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York, 1991), 24.

fame.³⁷ And though Norwegians subsequently exported large amounts of cast metal, they were known across Europe to depend on foreign manufactures.³⁸ Generally, though, the country had an outsized export sector throughout the period, with 20–30 percent of output destined for foreign markets.³⁹ Norway's economic profile during this period, in other words, resulted from its unique geological and ecological niche, characterized not only by minerals but also by timber—which helped build the navies of Europe—and of course fish and marine mammals, staples on European markets since at least the twelfth century.⁴⁰

Indeed, in a work that later became famous for offering the world's first detailed description of the Kraken, or giant squid, and for “launching the sea serpent to stardom” (fig. 4), the Danish professor, political economist, and bishop of Bergen Erik Pontoppidan (1698–1764) proudly assembled a compendious laundry list of marine and mineral resources in his 1752–53 *Det første Forsøg paa Norges Naturlige Historie* (First attempt at Norway's natural history), which was quickly translated into both German and English.⁴¹ And, coincidentally, the coast near

³⁷ See, among others, Johann Kielland Bergwitz, *Kongsberg: Som bergkoloni, bergstad og kjøpstad 1624–1924*, 2 vols. (Kristiania, 1924), and Gunnar Brun Nissen, *Røros kobberverk 1644–1974* (Trondheim, 1976).

³⁸ Coxe, *Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark*, 2:548; Antonio Genovesi, *Storia del commercio della Gran Bretagna*, 3 vols. (Naples, 1757), 1:252, itself an edited translation of Butel-Dumont, *Essai sur l'état du commerce d'Angleterre*, 2 vols. (London [but Paris], 1755), in turn a rewriting of John Cary, *Essay on the State of England* (Bristol, 1695). On this process, see Reinert, *Translating Empire*.

³⁹ Ragnhild Hutchison, *In the Doorway to Development: An Enquiry into Market Oriented Structural Changes in Norway ca. 1750–1830* (Leiden, 2012), 220.

⁴⁰ On the origins of its timber trade, see, among others, Stein Tveite, *Engelsk-Norsk trelasthandel 1640–1710* (Bergen, 1961). For later chapters, see Ragnhild Hutchison, “The Norwegian and Baltic Timber Trade to Britain 1780–1835 and Its Interconnections,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 37, no. 5 (2012): 578–99. On the importance of Norwegian timber for European navies, and particularly the British, see still H. S. K. Kent, *War and Trade in Northern Seas: Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Relations in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1973). On fish, see, among others, Pål Christensen and Alf Ragnar Nielssen, “Norwegian Fisheries 1100–1970: Main Development,” in *The North Atlantic Fisheries, 1100–1976: National Perspectives on a Common Resource*, ed. Poul Holm, David J. Starkey, and Jón T. Thór (Esbjerg, 1996), 145–68. For a holistic account of the principal branch of this trade, see Mark Kurlansky, *Cod: A Biography of the Fish That Changed the World* (New York, 1998). On the northern extremes of the activity, see also Sverker Sörlin, “The Arctic Ocean,” in *Oceanic Histories*, ed. David Armitage, Alison Bashford, and Sujit Sivasundaram (Cambridge, 2018), 269–95, 285–86.

⁴¹ Erik Pontoppidan, *Det første Forsøg paa Norges naturlige Historie: Forestillende dette Kongeriges Luft, Grund, Fielde*, 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1752–53), trans. as *Versuch einer natürlichen Historie von Norwegen* (Copenhagen, 1753–59), and *The Natural History of Norway* (London, 1755). This extraordinary figure still awaits his biographer, but on how he launched the sea snake, see Daniel Loxton and Donald R. Prothero, *Abominable Science! The Origins of the Yeti, Nessie, and Other Famous Cryptids* (New York, 2013), 207–12, and, on the Kraken, 252. Though his astonishing poem “The Kraken”

Hustad and Romsdal, where Hammer worked, was where the majority of sightings of sea serpents occurred in the early modern and modern periods.⁴² His adoptive country, Pontoppidan noted, “surpassed most countries, and not only in dead elements, such as metals . . . but also with regard to animals, birds, and fish, and particularly the last, of which scarcely any part of the universe affords such a diversity and abundance.”⁴³ So abundant was Norway in resources that, in a passage whose prophetic nature would become apparent in the twentieth century, he foresaw the eventual utilization even of offshore petroleum resources: “In addition to its Saltiness, one of the North Sea’s curious characteristics is its Fatness [*Fedme*]. . . . It is probable that, in the Sea as on Land, springs or currents of Petroleum [*Petroleo*], Naphtha, Sulphur, Pitcoal fat, and other bituminous and oil-like juices may arise.”⁴⁴

There exists, of course, a long historiography engaging with what Lucien Febvre once called the relationship between “History and the Soil,” emphasizing the influence of environmental factors on intellectual history.⁴⁵ Similarly, the

(put to music in Benjamin Britten’s 1958 *Nocturne*), with its apocalyptic imagery, likely had many sources, Tennyson himself cited the entry for Pontoppidan in vol. 35 of the *Biographie universelle* (Paris, 1823); see Christopher Ricks, ed., *Tennyson: A Selected Edition* (London, 2007), 117–18. And Melville, who had read widely the lore of sea monsters, associated “the giant Kraken of Bishop Pontoppidan” with the squid: *Moby-Dick* (New York, 1992 [1851]), chap. 59, 302. Whether simply a giant squid (perhaps of the real-world genus *Architeuthis*), or something much more, the Kraken has loomed gigantically in fantastic literature and film, from H. P. Lovecraft’s “The Call of Cthulhu [1928],” in Lovecraft, *The Call of Cthulhu and Other Weird Stories*, ed. S. T. Joshi (London, 1999), 139–69, to John Wyndham’s *The Kraken Wakes* (London, 1953), and director Desmond Davis’s *Clash of the Titans*, Warner Brothers, 1981. On the Kraken as metaphor, see Robert Fredona and Sophus A. Reinert, “Leviathan and Kraken: States, Corporations, and Political Economy,” *History and Theory*, forthcoming 2020.

⁴² Mads Langnes, “Sjøormstradisjonar frå Romsdal,” *Romsdal Sogelag Årsskrift* [Molde] 66 (2002): 167–82.

⁴³ Pontoppidan, *Det første Forsøg paa Norges naturlige Historie*, unpaginated preface.

⁴⁴ Pontoppidan, *Det første Forsøg paa Norges naturlige Historie*, 1:116. For a different translation, see Pontoppidan, *Natural History of Norway*, 73. For caveats, see Jens Jähren and Knut Bjørlykke, “Myten om Erik Pontoppidan—Olje i Nordsjøen anno 1752,” *Magasinet Geo* 8, no. 2 (2005): 34–36.

⁴⁵ Lucien Febvre, *La terre et l’évolution humaine: Introduction géographique à l’histoire* (Paris, 1922), 97, on the historiography of which, see Geoffrey Symcox, “Braudel and the Mediterranean City,” in *Braudel Revisited: The Mediterranean World 1600–1800*, ed. Gabriel Piterberg, Teofilo F. Ruiz, and Geoffrey Symcox (Toronto, 2010), 35–52, 36–39. On these issues, see also Marshall D. Sahlins, “Culture and Environment: The Study of Cultural Ecology,” in *Horizons of Anthropology*, ed. Sol Tax (Chicago, 1964), 132–47; John Marino, “On the Shores of Bohemia: Recovering Geography,” in *Early Modern History and the Social Sciences: Testing the Limits of Braudel’s Mediterranean*, ed. Marino (Kirksville, MO, 2002), 3–32. Folklorists have long argued similarly; see, among others, Hans Henrik Holm, *Om Norsk Folkesjel* (Oslo, 1941), 11–17. Among the rare instances

accounts of travelers and Pontoppidan's description alike suggest how Norway's landscape and the nature of its resources may have influenced the reception and appropriation of the emerging European discipline of political economy at the time. Though an exquisitely rural and peripheral region of Europe in the early modern period, Norway was still, as the case of Even Hammer will make abundantly clear, very far from François Quesnay's notion of the "Agricultural Kingdom" of France, which enjoyed more than ten times the ratio of arable land of its northern counterpart.⁴⁶

EVEN HAMMER

Hammer himself was born to a parish priest near Ringsaker, south of Lillehammer, in 1732. He began studies in Christiania, now Oslo, in 1752, where he subsequently taught during the period 1756–68, having earned his degree in Copenhagen in 1758. Leaving his teaching career behind, he embarked on a Grand Tour at his own expense, traveling for periods of study in Oxford, Cambridge, Leiden, Göttingen, and Paris. Upon his return to Norway, he took advantage of the period of press freedom inaugurated by Johann Friedrich Struensee, the German physician who became de facto regent of Denmark-Norway in 1771–72 because of the madness of King Christian VII, to publish a polemical treatise entitled *Philonorvagi: Velmente Tanker; til veltaenkende medborgere* (Pro Norway: Well-intentioned thoughts for well-thinking fellow citizens).⁴⁷ Struensee himself took notice, helping Hammer embark on a career in Norwegian governmental administration, including the role of secretary to his newly established and short-lived Norwegian Rentekammer, or Treasury. Struensee's radical reforms alienated large parts of the Danish political elite, however, and particularly the powerful historian, secretary to the royal court, and future prime minister Ove Høegh-Guldberg,

of such perspectives influencing the history of political economy, see Giuseppe Pecchio, *Storia della economia pubblica in Italia* (Lugano, 1829), 281 on the failures of physiocracy, and Paul Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French Monarchy* (Cambridge, MA, 2010), 73–74, discussing the relevance of Edward W. Fox, *History in a Geographical Perspective: The Other France* (New York, 1971).

⁴⁶ See, among others, Philippe Steiner, "Wealth and Power: Quesnay and the Political Economy of the 'Agricultural Kingdom,'" *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 24, no. 1 (2002): 91–110. On northern landscapes in general, and their wide-ranging influences, see the essays in Michael Jones and Kennet R. Olwig, eds., *Nordic Landscapes: Region and Belonging on the Northern Edge of Europe* (Minneapolis, 2008). On the arable land of France, now more than 35 percent, see the data provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.ZS>.

⁴⁷ On Struensee, see Jens Glebe-Møller, *Struensees vej til skafottet: Fornuft og åbenbaring i oplysningstiden* (Copenhagen, 2007).




FIG. 4.—“The Great Sea Serpent, According to Different Descriptions.” Anonymous copperplate engraving, in Erik Pontoppidan, *The Natural History of Norway* (London, 1755). Houghton Library, Harvard University, QDC7 P7795 Eg755b (A). Color version available as an online enhancement.

who would lead a conspiracy leading to Struensee's execution in 1772. Hammer became directly involved in the Struensee affair when Høegh-Guldberg "smelled separatist tendencies" in the *Philonorvagi*, which was almost patently an attack on Høegh-Guldberg himself (who went frequently by the pseudonym "Philodanus").⁴⁸ Hammer outlived the Norwegian exchequer and survived the political fallout of the coup, however, eventually becoming district governor of Romsdal after the fall of Struensee in 1773. For the remainder of his career, Hammer would be broadly engaged in contemporary efforts for the social and economic improvement of Norway, becoming a member of learned and practical societies as well as initiating such measures as spearheading the Norwegian enclosure movement, establishing a fund supporting the families of people lost at sea, and sending a farmer from Tresfjord, in Romsdal, to teach the inhabitants of the Faroe Islands, historically part of the Kingdom of Norway, how to plow.⁴⁹ And, though seldom mentioned for more than a few words, Hammer has been considered one of the great pre-Independence Norwegian patriots since the early nineteenth century.⁵⁰

Strikingly though, in light of this deep-seated patriotism, Hammer's intellectual horizons were remarkably international, not merely geographically but also

⁴⁸ Andrea Gaarder, "Ivar Aasen og Opplysningsvirksomheten på Ekset," in *Ivar Aasen—Vandrerer og veiviseren*, ed. John Ole Askedal and Ann-Berit Aarnes Breder (Oslo, 2002), 41–54, 43, suggests that Guldberg replied to Hammer directly, but there may be reason to think Guldberg's replies actually were directed at the political and economic pamphlets of the Norwegian Jacob Christian Bie, written under the pseudonym Philopatreaia, or "Lover of the Fatherland." The debate also saw the contributions of Christian Martfelt's persona Philocosmus, or "Lover of the Cosmos." See Henrik Horstbøll, "The Politics of Publishing: Freedom of the Press in Denmark, 1770–1773," in *Scandinavia in the Age of Revolution: Nordic Political Cultures, 1740–1820*, ed. Pasi Ihalainen, Michael Bregnsbo, Karin Sennefelt, and Patrik Winton (Farnham, 2011), 145–56, 148–49. Hammer himself criticizes "the unknown author" behind Philodanus in his *Philonorvagi*, 33, 101.

⁴⁹ On Hammer's work with enclosures, see Mads Langnes, "Utskiftingsrett og gardsskipnad: Innmarksutskiftingar, tur og teigblanding i tre ulike landslutar" (PhD diss., University of Bergen, 2014), 126–29. See, for the ploughman's extraordinary story, Skarsbø and Hammer, "Knut Ellingsgaard." The historically Norwegian domains of Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands became part of the Kingdom of Denmark following the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, on which see Rasmus Glenthøj and Morten Nordhagen Ottesen, *Experiences of War and Nationality in Denmark-Norway, 1807–1815* (Basingstoke, 2014), 267.

⁵⁰ Hammer's *Philonorvagi* has long been a mainstay of scholarship on the origins of Norwegian nationalism, though it seldom has received much more than a mention. See Henrik Wergeland, "Norges Konstitutions Historie [1841–43]," in Wergeland, *Samlede Skrifter: Trykt og Utrykt*, ed. Herman Jæger, Didrik Arup Seip, Halvdan Koht, and Einar Høigård (Christiania/Oslo, 1918–40), 4:4, 172–398, 195; Edvard Holm, *Nogle Hovedtræk af trykkefrihedstidens Historie 1770–1773* (Copenhagen, 1885), 149n; Lunden, *Norsk grålysning*, 117, 123.

temporally.⁵¹ Seamlessly, he invoked places and examples from across the European world in his writings, from Boston and Philadelphia in the West to Riga and St. Petersburg in the East, from Coimbra, Portugal to Jelgava, Lithuania. Though an admittedly crude measure, counting the place names mentioned in Hammer's *Philonorvagi* reveals a vivid mental map. For a booklet that often turns to concrete local conditions and reforms, it is interesting that the body of his text contains as many mentions of Lisbon (2) and Oxford (2) as of Toten (2) and Hedmarken (2) near the central Norwegian lake of Mjøsa; perhaps more peculiarly, there are only slightly more references to Denmark (13) than to Holland (11), and both receive fewer references than England (14). Concerning the places of publication that appear in his bibliography, Copenhagen (2) is eclipsed by Paris (4), London (9), and, above all, the book capital of the Germanic world, Leipzig (22). Yet, though Hammer engaged with the entirety of the European world, including Spain and Italy, his emphasis, not entirely surprisingly given his context, lay squarely on the experiences of its septentrional parts, from North America through Great Britain and northern Europe to Russia.

Similarly, though the Copenhagen-based Genevan historian Paul Henri Mallet had already published his well-received *Northern Antiquities*, including early translations of the prose *Edda*, and though the accounts of Snorri Sturluson—"the Herodotus of the north"—circulated widely throughout Europe, Hammer's historical imagination did not highlight some proud Viking heritage.⁵² The real re-discovery (or invention) of a Viking past would of course only truly gain speed with the advent of National Romanticism and a series of major archaeological excavations in the second half of the nineteenth century, the most important of which were the Borre graves in the 1850s, the Tune ship in the 1860s, and the

⁵¹ For an illuminating analysis of eighteenth-century patriotism through a French lens, see John Shovlin, *The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, NY, 2006).

⁵² Paul Henri Mallet, *Northern Antiquities*, trans. Thomas Percy, 2 vols. (London, 1770), based on Mallet, *Introduction à l'histoire de Dannemarc* (Copenhagen, 1755). See also Mallet, *Monuments de la mythologie et de la poésie des Celtes et particulièrement des anciens Scandinaves* (Copenhagen, 1756), and the longer *Histoire du Danemarch*, 3 vols. in 4 (Copenhagen, 1758–77). On Mallet, see Henrik Horstbøll, "Northern Identities and National History: Paul-Henri Mallet, Peter Frederik Suhm, and Tyge Rothe," in *Northern Antiquities and National Identities: Perceptions of Denmark and the North in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Knud Haakonssen and Henrik Horstbøll (Copenhagen, 2008), 207–26, and Frederikke Jensen, "Paul-Henri Mallet, den danske historie og legitimeringen af enevælden" (MA thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2014). See, for an example of Mallet's continuing influence, Martin Arnold, *Thor: Myth to Marvel* (London, 2011), 88–93. See also, for a popular example of the venerable tradition of declaring Snorri "the Herodotus of the North," William Coxe, *Travels into Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark*, 3 vols. (Dublin, 1784), 3:383.

better-preserved Gokstad and Oseberg ships in the 1880s and early 1900s, respectively.⁵³ Still, it is worth emphasizing that the specific historical and mythical references beyond the early modern period in Hammer's *Philonorvagi* were resolutely classical or biblical in nature (though, given his context, it would be tempting to read cryptopagan intentions in his otherwise neutral references to God as "the All-Wise," a traditional attribute of divinity in the Judeo-Christian tradition but also the archetypal term for the principal Norse deity Odin).⁵⁴ His readers were therefore offered examples not merely of Dutch and British policy, or of the German mining handbooks that Andre Wakefield has shown to be so central to the cameralist discourse, but also of the Platonic republic and the civic lessons of the Roman Empire.⁵⁵ In more general terms, however, Hammer frequently appealed, without specificity, to the existence of immemorial Norwegian traditions, to the country's venerable internal "allegiance" and "freedom," and to the common memory of a halcyon age.⁵⁶

PHILONORVAGI

Undaunted, Hammer made the most of Struensee's reforms, the title page of his *Philonorvagi* proudly proclaiming the date of publication to be *Trykke-Frihedens første Aar* (the first year of press freedom). And he opened head on with a discussion of the meaning of "true Patriotism," addressing his "worthy fellow citizens" and drawing on the pugnacious work on the subject by the Frankfurt jurist and publicist Friedrich Karl von Moser. "Patriotism," Hammer maintained, ultimately meant an active "love of fatherland" for the purposes of the "improvement of the state."⁵⁷ Praising Struensee's reforms explicitly, he thanked the king for

⁵³ See, for example, Margaret Clunies Ross, *The Norse Muse in Britain, 1750–1820* (Triest, 1998), and Andrew Wawn, *The Vikings and the Victorians: Inventing the Old North in Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Cambridge, 2000). On the origins of Viking archaeology in Norway, see Hans-Emil Lidén, *Nicolay Nicolaysen: Et blad av norsk kulturminneverns historie* (Oslo, 2005). On the seminal Borre graves, near Horten, see Bjørn Myhre, *Før Viken ble Norge: Borregravfeltet som religiøs og politisk arena* (Tønsberg, 2015). For an overview of the main ship excavations, see Thorleif Sjøvold, *The Viking Ships in Oslo* (Oslo, 1985). On the influence of Norse myths more widely, from Wagner to Marvel Comics, see Heather O'Donogue, *From Asgard to Valhalla: The Remarkable History of the Norse Myths* (London, 2007).

⁵⁴ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 104.

⁵⁵ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 104–5, 109. On mining and cameralism, see particularly Wakefield, *Disordered Police State*, as well as his "The Hardrock Mines of Early Modern Germany," *Earth Sciences History* 32, no. 2 (2012): 326–31.

⁵⁶ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 102 and passim; and Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 25 and passim.

⁵⁷ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 3, 6–7, engaging with Karl Friedrich von Moser, *Beherrigung* (Frankfurt, 1761). Moser is called "the most vociferous German patriot of his

following “the example of other Enlightened Nations” by allowing the citizenry to “dare to think and write freely without any slavish Fear,” overcoming its “slavish way of thinking” to embrace a “Freedom, within the bounds of reason.”⁵⁸ This had been a “happy Era for these Kingdoms, and particularly so for Norway, because a tired People has been given free and unhindered Access to the Throne” after “for a long while having been a Step-Child,” its proud people suffering.⁵⁹ Norway, after all, “supplied by God and by Nature with so many Sources of Wealth and Blessings,” would have been rich and flourishing, had (Hammer summoned a contemporary European trope) its “jealous sister” Denmark not “wanted everything” and brought it “to its knees.”⁶⁰ As he concluded his book, Norway desperately had to find a way to “maintain some sort of balance with other Kingdoms, and to not simply become a victim of their advantages.”⁶¹

Principally, Hammer argued, Norwegians had to invest more in their young and encourage them to leave to study abroad, “to England, Holland, France, and other places, to learn the languages of these countries and to learn about trade and its relevant sciences [*handelen og de dertil hørende Videnskaber*].”⁶² Thus exposed to the world, very much as he himself had been, they could return to Norway, “which by Nature has been richly endowed with Forests, Cliffs, Mountains, and Dales, Seas and Lakes.” Given the wealth of its natural resources, Hammer maintained, Norway could become “the happiest Country in the World,” but only if “its Inhabitants are taught effectively to ennoble raw materials, and draw from them all possible utility and advantage.”⁶³ Indeed, “Norway should more than any other Kingdom be the true planting-place for the sciences of nature, mountains, and trade, for mathematics, mechanics, botany, and oeconomy,” assisted not merely by its natural riches but also (here flaunting a patriotism that crossed into chauvinism) by “our Nation’s [*Nations*] inborn mechanical genius.”⁶⁴ This, in turn, necessitated the establishment of trade schools,

time” by Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford, 1995), 112. On Moser, see also Notker Hammerstein, “Das politische Denken Friedrich Carl von Mosers,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 212, no. 2 (1971): 316–38. The literature on early modern “improvement” is vast, but see, among others, Richard Drayton, *Nature’s Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the “Improvement” of the World* (New Haven, CT, 2000), and Paul Slack, *The Invention of Improvement: Information and Material Progress in Seventeenth-Century England* (Oxford, 2015).

⁵⁸ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 7.

⁵⁹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 8–9.

⁶⁰ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 9–10, 93. On the language of “jealousy” at the time, see Istvan Hont, “Jealousy of Trade: An Introduction,” in Hont, *Jealousy of Trade*, 1–156.

⁶¹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 101.

⁶² Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 10.

⁶³ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 11.

⁶⁴ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 12, and again 83.

institutions of learning, public libraries, a program of traveling public lectures, “and even a university” to educate the citizenry.⁶⁵

“Do not the Scots have far less of a distance to travel to Oxford and Cambridge than we have to Copenhagen?” Hammer asked rhetorically. “And yet they have 4 universities. . . . But where do we find such a public State here?” In these “enlightened Times” all monopolies were “insults to the State,” so why not that held by the University of Copenhagen over all science in Denmark-Norway?⁶⁶ With Struensee’s reforms, the time was finally nigh to set things right. “Should, by Natural Law, one Child injure another, particularly when both have the right to the love of the same father? Yet this happens to this day. One has seen it, endured it and kept quiet, because nobody has dared speak up [*tage Bladet fra Munden*].”⁶⁷ Large parts of Hammer’s *Philonorvagi* were subsequently devoted to the importance of establishing new educational institutions in Norway, fostering what he called *de Nordiske Muser* (the Nordic muses), and finally overcoming the negative stereotypes of Norway flourishing in Europe.⁶⁸ He also advocated improving Norway’s *Landhuusholdnings-maade* (that is, its approach to the economy of the country) by encouraging its “industriousness” and, building on his previous theme, by establishing a *Oeconomie-Collegium* (economic council) to encourage and facilitate the material improvement of the country.⁶⁹ It seemed obvious to Hammer that such a council should be constituted by “reasonable patriots” of Norway, since “nothing is more natural, than that natives must have both better Knowledge about the nature of a Fatherland, and greater Love and Care for its Welfare than strangers.”⁷⁰ Political economy was thus a complicated field, and Hammer echoed a widespread idea when he argued that “the rules and basic things that must pave the way for good economic laws in a country must by necessity be grounded in its climate and nature, and additionally, as far as possible, in alignment with its inhabitants’ homes and ways of thinking. Therefore, what suits Denmark does not always suit Norway. . . . And much like what heals one human can be poison to another, so a law that is good for one country can hurt another.”⁷¹ “Economic plans” and “the sciences relating to the economy” alike had to be tailored to local conditions, and much was at stake

⁶⁵ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 13.

⁶⁶ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 14.

⁶⁷ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 15.

⁶⁸ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 21–22.

⁶⁹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 22–24. On early modern industriousness, see Jan de Vries, *The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present* (Cambridge, 2008).

⁷⁰ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 25.

⁷¹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 25–26.

in “directing the economy of an important country like Norway.” Particularly, Norwegians should be allowed to decide on their own economic fortunes, and, as Christian V had given Denmark and Norway different law books, why could they not have different economic systems?⁷² Returning to his earlier Scottish comparison, he could not but emphasize the happier condition of his brethren across the North Sea, for “Scotland is in relation to London roughly the same, as Norway is to Copenhagen, but I nowhere learn that they fetch their economic laws from there.”⁷³ Only a truly national policy grounded in local knowledge and experience could allow “Norway to rise again from its fallen condition.”⁷⁴

But his was far from a call for simple nativism: he maintained, on the basis of his own experiences on the Grand Tour, that national welfare could only be secured through the emulation of successful foreign “examples,” and particularly from looking at the “English enthusiasm” for “improvement.”⁷⁵ Not only that, but he suggested the establishment of scholarships for students to travel abroad, as he had, to learn “the sciences relating to the economy and to forestry,” one of the most important disciplines for the country’s development.⁷⁶ Informed by foreign ideas but knowledgeable enough about local conditions to implement them, a Norwegian economic council could thus establish “prizes” for improvements and encourage “a skilled agriculturalist, a diligent farmer, a laborious manufacturer, and industrious carpenter, or someone who may have invented a new branch of commerce or made useful proposals for the development of our fisheries” to ensure that “our neighbors don’t take the hats off us.”⁷⁷

Public education, in short, lay at the very core of Hammer’s political economy, and he wrote at length about the need for “public libraries” to familiarize his countrymen with “what has been written about the sciences relating to the economy and trade.”⁷⁸ He even went as far as offering a long bibliography of economic works meriting inclusion in such public libraries based on his readings abroad. It is a remarkable list, particularly for a supposed physiocrat like Hammer; it included no less than sixty distinct works or series originating in Austria, Denmark, England, France, the Germanies, Ireland, Italy, Scotland, Sweden, and Switzerland, the vast majority of them historiographically unknown

⁷² Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 26.

⁷³ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 27. On the contemporary trope of “giving laws,” see Reinert, *Translating Empire*, 26–29.

⁷⁴ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 28.

⁷⁵ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 35, 49–50, and passim. On emulation in early modern political economy, see again Reinert, *Translating Empire*, 29–33 and passim.

⁷⁶ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 68; on forestry, see also 60–66.

⁷⁷ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 30–31.

⁷⁸ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 35.

treatises on forestry, husbandry, mining, and political economy ranging from Johann Jacob Moser's cameralist *Bibliothec* to James Wheeler's 1747 *Modern Druid*.⁷⁹ In the final category entitled "Writings Relating to trade," which contained what today might fall under the rubrics of "history of economic analysis" or "history of political economy," Hammer opened with the German translation of papal banker Girolamo Belloni's bestselling *Del commercio* (On commerce), followed by Johan Joachim Becher's quintessentially cameralist *Politischer Discours* as well as the dictionaries of Jacques Savary and Malachy Postlethwayt, Jean-François Melon's *Essai politique sur le Commerce* (Political essay on commerce), and the German translation of François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais's *Elémens du commerce* (Elements of commerce), all decidedly on the pragmatic side of the contemporary spectrum of economic thought.⁸⁰

Throughout, Hammer demonstrated a keen awareness of the importance of translations in the field of political economy and the need to differentiate between various editions, here and there even suggesting to his readers one rather than others.⁸¹ But with the exception of a fleeting reference to the *Memoirs* of the Economic Society of Bern, to which Quesnay's disciple the Marquis de Mirabeau contributed an article, it is striking that none of the works in Hammer's suggested bibliography for the improvement of Norway demonstrated the vaguest physiocratic impetus.⁸² Instead, Hammer's reading list of political economy

⁷⁹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 36–45; Johann Jacob Moser, *Bibliothec von Oeconomischen-, Cameral-, Policey-, Handlungs-, Manufactur-, Mechanischen und Bergwerks Gesetzen, Schriften und kleinen Abhandlungen* (Ulm, 1758); James Wheeler, *The Modern Druid* (London, 1747). On the remarkably cosmopolitan habits of contemporary Norwegian book collectors, see Gina Dahl, *Libraries and Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Norway and the Outer World* (Aarhus, 2014).

⁸⁰ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 43–46, references Girolamo Belloni, *Del commercio* (Rome, 1750), in the German translation by Gottlieb Schumann published by the Gleditschen Buchhandlung in Leipzig in 1752; Johann Joachim Becher, *Politischer Discours: Von den eigentlichen Ursachen deß Auf- und Ablebens der Städt, Länder und Republicken* (Frankfurt, 1688) (though Hammer references the 1720 and 1754 editions), on which see Pamela H. Smith, *The Business of Alchemy: Science and Culture in the Holy Roman Empire* (Princeton, NJ, 1997); Jacques Savary, *Le parfait Négociant* (Paris, 1676) (in a 1751 folio edition), and Malachy Postlethwayt's rewriting of it as the *Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce* (London, 1757); Jean-François Melon, *Essai politique sur le commerce*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1742); François Véron Duverger de Forbonnais, *Elémens du commerce*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1755) (in a Hamburg translation of 1755), on which see Michael Sonenscher, *Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, 2007), 179–89.

⁸¹ For example, Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 44.

⁸² Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 37–38, referencing the *Recueil de Mémoires concernant l'oeconomie rurale par un Société établie a Berne* (Zurich, 1780–61). On this Bernese society, see Bela Kapossy, "Neo-Roman Republicanism and Commercial Society: The Example of Eighteenth-Century Berne," in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, 2 vols., ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 2002), 2:227–47, and

reflected works that were successful from a book-historical perspective at the time (influential in terms of editions, translations, and readerships) rather than those deemed canonical by later economists, ranging from universal bestsellers like Belloni and Postlethwayt to those coming out of the circle of political economists gathered around the French intendant of commerce Jacques Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay in the mid-1750s and the plethora of cameralist works published in the German-speaking world.⁸³ Together, in the zodiac of eighteenth-century political economy, these works point everywhere but to the constellation of physiocracy, suggesting instead the need for pragmatic administration in every economic sphere if not, more pointedly, for politics to succeed in ruthless and “jealous” international economic competition through forceful interventions to industrialize and “give laws” to foreigners.⁸⁴

But this is not to say Hammer necessarily was entirely unfamiliar with physiocratic arguments. Following his bibliography, the *Philonorvagi* set out to explain the importance of improving Norway’s agriculture, forestry, and mining as well as its “manufactures and factories,” in a passage touching upon questions that may have reflected familiarity with Quesnay’s project. He noted, for example, that

our now fashionable [*nymodens*] Patriots are not very much in favor of factories. Free trade, it is said, will be the rise of Denmark. There may have been a time, when it had been advantageous, if factories had never been established, at least in Copenhagen. Yes! Perhaps nowhere in Denmark; as that Nation which, a certain writer argues, allows raw materials to enter the Kingdom from outside, in order to bring them to perfection domestically and does not ennoble its own products, has not yet learned its economic ABCs. But now that we have them, we should not throw millions after millions, but rather, with the bee, suck honey even from the tiniest flowers.⁸⁵

Was this somehow a physiocratically inspired argument? Perhaps, though the only work Hammer quotes in the entire section is the now entirely unknown and anonymously published 1757 pamphlet *Ringe Tanker om Landvæsenet, Tarvelighed, og nyttige Fabriker, samt deres virkninger på staten* (Small thoughts regarding

Regula Wyss and Martin Stuber, “Paternalism and Agricultural Reform: The Economic Society of Bern in the Eighteenth Century,” in *The Rise of Economic Societies in the Eighteenth Century: Patriotic Reform in Europe and North America*, ed. Koen Stapelbroek and Jani Marjanen (Basingstoke, 2012), 157–81. On its physiocratic elements, see Michael Sonenscher, “French Economists and Bernese Agrarians: The Marquis de Mirabeau and the Economic Society of Berne,” *History of European Ideas* 33, no. 4 (2007): 411–26.

⁸³ On Gournay’s circle, see, among others, the essays in Loïc Charles, Frédéric LeFebvre, and Christine Théré, eds., *Le cercle de Vincent de Gournay: Savoirs économiques et pratiques administratives en France au milieu du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 2011).

⁸⁴ See, on this broad tradition, Reinert, *Translating Empire*, 281–85.

⁸⁵ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 74.

agriculture, tawdriness, and useful factories, as well as their effects on the state) by the practically inclined Norwegian professor of “economics” at the University of Copenhagen Ole Stockfleth Pihl, a longtime protégé of Pontoppidan.⁸⁶ Predating Quesnay’s writings, Pihl had written in favor of agricultural improvements and against the importation of foreign luxuries but, crucially, also at length about the necessity of working domestic raw materials, particularly in Norway. “If [a merchant] brings out the country’s money or goods, and brings back useless things, one can rightly compare him to a doctor who gives his patients poison instead of a cure; this because he enriches himself and foreigners, but makes his own countrymen excessive, lazy, and poor, while he instead should live off foreigners and be a means for enriching his fellow citizens and making them industrious.”⁸⁷ Pihl could foresee a time for luxuries once a country’s population was large and wealthy and its agriculture, mines, fisheries, and manufactures fully developed, but, he concluded, “odds are this will never happen to a country before the world ends [*Verdens Undergang*].” His argument was not that manufactures were not useful to a country, but that “useful” factories should work domestic products where they existed rather than relying on imports.⁸⁸

In any case, Hammer continued, “it is a different matter with Norway, which itself has raw materials,” as opposed to Denmark which largely lacked them, and if the former had no “factories” it was “not Nature’s fault” but a question of Danish policies. Indeed, Hammer had no doubts that “manufactures would be advantageous” in Norway, not merely economically but also in terms of morality and justice.⁸⁹ Given that “the majority and most important of Norway’s raw products are bred in the intestines of the Earth” in the form of mineral riches and through the “sweat” of “thousands” are “born in underground factories [i.e., mines],” it was only right that the resultant wealth should be enjoyed by Norwegians rather than “shared with neighbors and strangers.”⁹⁰ In any case it was “underground fire” that ensured Norway’s “sources of welfare and blessings,” and Hammer spent far longer discussing the various mineral resources and what might be done with them than he did agriculture or even forestry, from gold and

⁸⁶ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 87–89, quoting Ole Stockfleth Pihl, *Ringe Tanker om Landvæsenet, Tarvelighed, og nyttige Fabriker, samt deres virkninger på staten* (Copenhagen, 1757), 37–40. Pihl’s work was translated into German by Christian Gottlob Mengel as *Unmaassgebliche Gedanken von Landwesen der Sparsamkeit und nützlichen Fabriquen wie auch ihren Wirkungen in den Staat* (Copenhagen, 1758). See *Dansk og Norsk Litteraturlæxicon*, 2 vols. (Copenhagen, 1819), 2:461. On Pihl, see also Erik Oxenbøll, *Dansk økonomisk tænkning 1700–1770* (Copenhagen, 1977), 48, 67.

⁸⁷ Pihl, *Ringe Tanker*, 15, 17–18.

⁸⁸ Pihl, *Ringe Tanker*, 19.

⁸⁹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 75–76.

⁹⁰ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 76.

silver through copper and iron to marble and lead, and he consistently argued that the country should refine these raw materials for export as finished goods rather than as commodities benefiting Danish, Dutch, and Swedish manufactures.⁹¹ And why, he added, could Norwegian marble not compete with that of Italy on European markets?⁹² A similar approach informed Hammer's concluding section on Norway's vast fisheries, in which he bewailed his country's having allowed its maritime resources to become "the source of Holland's trade and wealth," even its "gold mine."⁹³

Norway had depended on foreigners for too long, and particularly on "Danish Manufactures," allowing others to benefit from its natural wealth at its own expense. A state without trade, he assured his readers, was like a "body without a soul; trade gives a State life, sets all its parts in motion and secures the Kingdom strength and respect."⁹⁴ It was, in short, time for Norway to step out of Denmark's shadow by means of political economy, and Hammer concluded by returning to his book's beginning, with a lengthy meditation on the nature of patriotism and, with explicit references to Roman republican paragons of "virtue," to the importance of an informed and empowered citizenry dedicated to the improvement of its fatherland.⁹⁵ Just as Italian authors at the time found succor in the virtue of emulation and the ability of latecomers to evaluate the policies of more advanced countries, so Pihl had argued that "though Denmark and Norway are among the last of Europe's peoples in many economic matters . . . they can expect to get things right more easily and more quickly than others, because of their form of government, their products, and that advantage they have in the form of knowledge regarding the happy and failed attempts of other nations."⁹⁶ Hammer's project built on the very same foundations; his *Philonorvagi* drew on contemporary European currents of political economy—though distinctly *not* on physiocracy—and adapted them to Norway's unique conditions in order to suggest the means by which it might "improve" on the various aspects of its economy and claim its rightful place not merely as an equal kingdom in the union with Denmark but in the international system as such. And his vision of economic regeneration and eventual greatness depended squarely on galvanizing the civic virtue and national pride of the Norwegian "folk," which he broadly

⁹¹ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 76–89.

⁹² Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 85.

⁹³ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 92.

⁹⁴ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 93, 100.

⁹⁵ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 102–12.

⁹⁶ Pihl, *Ringe Tanker*, 28–29. See similarly Genovesi, *Storia del commercio della Gran Bretagna*, 1:22–23. For a classic work on such leapfrogging, see Thorstein B. Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1915).

differentiated in relation to historical and cultural practices informed by climatic and environmental conditions without, as in Montesquieu's more famous work on the relationship between climates, laws, and mores, postulating actual physiological causes and consequences.⁹⁷

ENLIGHTENMENT

These were, not surprisingly, the same themes to which Hammer returned in his speech on the church floor at Hustad with which we began—although, and in spite of the end of press freedom, with greater emphasis. For John Brandt was precisely the sort of enlightened patriot Hammer had longed for, embodying the “civic virtue [*borgerlige Dyd*]” that alone could raise Norway from its knees.⁹⁸ He drew on the same historical exemplars as the *Philonorvagi*, from England and Holland to Caesar and Frederick V (the latter had dedicated himself to the “rise of science, the arts, trade, manufactures, agriculture, fisheries, and forestry” to ensure Norway's “welfare”) and of course to Norway's “old” traditions.⁹⁹ Yet, and though censorship was back in force, Hammer went even further than he had before, now emphasizing the

native right, through which we and others, who are under the Danish Scepter, have become a people of our own [*et Folk for sig selv*], and who as children of a common father have been ensured all possible child-rights. This immortal memorial to a wise, mild and merciful government, by which his Majesty has shown to open himself the shortest and safest pathway to the people's hearts; this so long longed for means of encouraging our hidden talents, this trusting letter of insurance for current and coming generations, should unceasingly remind us of what advantages we enjoy compared to other peoples who still must share bread and happiness with people of no rights.¹⁰⁰

Institutions like the Royal Norwegian Scientific Society of Trondheim had finally “contributed to the encouragement of industriousness and science” throughout the land, as well as to “a more enlightened way of thinking [*oplyst Tankemaade*], even in the Kingdom's most distant regions.” For aside from “God's blessing, as well as Kingly and Princely rewards . . . there are probably no stronger measures

⁹⁷ Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, ed. Anne M. Cohler et al. (Cambridge, 1989), 231 and passim (particularly Bk. XIV). On this question, see broadly Colin Kidd, “Northern Antiquity: The Ethnology of Liberty in Eighteenth-Century Europe,” in *Northern Antiquities and National Identities*, ed. Knud Haakonssen and Henrik Horstbøll (Copenhagen, 2008), 19–40, particularly 30.

⁹⁸ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 8.

⁹⁹ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 10.

¹⁰⁰ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 10–11.

for recasting peoples and countries, than such societies and well-deployed prizes” like the one he was bestowing on Brandt.¹⁰¹

Reiterating an argument from his *Philonorvagi*, Hammer noted that nature had done its part for Norway, but “the countryman becomes useless, unless he lays an industrious hand on the plough,” and the same was true of the miner, drawing on the earth’s “hidden treasures,” not to mention the fisherman, who had to “dare to sail at war with the roaring element, to catch the whale and the sturgeon, the cod and the ling, the halibut and the porpoise” and “other species of fish” to plumb the “bottomless source of wealth” represented by the ocean.¹⁰² “Workmanship and enterprise” were, indeed, at the very core of Hammer’s social, economic, and political vision for Norway. They were “the holiest, most necessary and beneficial duty in civic life,” for “from the King, who wields the scepter, to the Peasant, who wields the plough-whip, they are all bound by work, each according to his calling, in his order, and in his own way; some with their heads, others with their hands; these for the State, others for the necessities of life; each and every one for common happiness.”¹⁰³ Not only was “enterprise the mother of welfare”; it lay at the polity’s very core.¹⁰⁴ If anything, the republican themes that were merely hinted at in *Philonorvagi* became explicit in his speech, when, addressing his “honorable fellow citizens,” Hammer emphasized “the most honorable Sacrifice we then can offer our Fatherland, the country, in which we live and enjoy the State’s protection, as citizens, and not like unfree and serf-born slaves, is an honest soul and an active life in fulfilling our duties.”¹⁰⁵ The key was for individuals to be truly patriotic and therefore “useful to the public without being forced to,” which would have been a condition good only for “slaves,” and John Brandt was nothing less than a symbol of Hammer’s political economy.¹⁰⁶ Throughout his writings, this new discipline remained the key to understanding

¹⁰¹ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 11–12. See also Even Hammer to Lorenz Wittrup, April 16, 1773, Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskap, Trondheim, Norway, VS III j.nr. 1773-01-16.

¹⁰² Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 13.

¹⁰³ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 13. For context, see Jan de Vries, *The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present* (Cambridge, 2008), and, for a useful meditation on the phenomenon, see Thorstein Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts* (New York, 1914).

¹⁰⁴ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 14.

¹⁰⁵ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 14. The literature on European republicanism is of course immense, but see, for a manifesto, Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge, 1997), and, for its diverse European manifestations, Van Gelderen and Skinner, *Republicanism*.

¹⁰⁶ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 14.

the relationship between environment and human economy, the interplay of what Cronon has called “first and second nature.”¹⁰⁷

Turning to address Brandt in the church, Hammer continued: “you have transformed the rotting and collapsing houses of Brevig into neat and orderly, yes even stylish buildings, and singlehandedly transformed its rocky lands and its many and wide marshes into fertile fields and meadows, and even enclosed them with handsome and durable fences.”¹⁰⁸ Not only that: Brandt had also been “the first, to have planted and bred a notable quantity of Potatoes in these parts, given them out to your neighbors, and taught them to know and use this nourishing host,” taking Hammer’s cameralist ideal of “planting” more literally than most.¹⁰⁹ Brandt embodied “improvement” and the pursuit of “economic applications,” leading by “example” rather than “jealousy” to promote “useful arts and sciences,” “the improvement of households and of the earth,” and, of course, “love of fatherland”; through him, in short, the “old Norwegian allegiance and courage was again brought to life.”¹¹⁰ For, as Hammer passionately argued in the rhetorical crescendo by which he ended his speech: “Love of Fatherland leads to love of humanity! Love of humanity to honesty; honesty to happiness in trade and commerce [*handel og vandel*]! To renew the ancient allegiance and courage, and ensure that we and our furthest descendants always must think and act, live and die like upright patriots, and true Norwegians!!!”¹¹¹

We do not know what became of Brandt, but Hammer continued his work as district governor until his death in 1800, during the Napoleonic Wars that ultimately would lead to his beloved Norway’s independence from Denmark. Like many reformers of his age, he invested the majority of his time and energy in practical work rather than theoretical pursuits, and he was an exemplary participant in Venturi’s Enlightenment.¹¹² Indeed, practicing what he preached, Hammer left behind a library of 570 volumes, and in his will he bequeathed the considerable sum of 30 Riksdaler to the Royal Norwegian Scientific Society in Trondheim, of which he long had been a member, and to Romsdal’s Society for Practical Land-Economy (Praktiske Landhuusholdningsselskab), which he had helped found, for the purchase of “useful books.”¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ Cronon, *Nature’s Metropolis*, 62, 72, 93.

¹⁰⁸ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 15.

¹⁰⁹ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 15. On potatoes, see still Redcliffe N. Salaman, *The History and Social Influence of the Potato*, ed. J. G. Hawkes (Cambridge, 1985).

¹¹⁰ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 15–20.

¹¹¹ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 25.

¹¹² Franco Venturi, *Settecento riformatore*, 5 vols. in 7 (Turin, 1969–90). See also, for a similar point, Reinert, *Academy of Fisticuffs*, 91.

¹¹³ See Hammer’s will in *Molde byfogd, skifteprotokoll 1786–1800*, fol. 286v and following, Statsarkivet i Trondheim, Trondheim, Norway.

Undoubtedly, the system to which he contributed set the stage for Norway's subsequent economic development in the nineteenth century. Already in the opening decades of that century, most travelers agreed that Norwegians were better off than other Scandinavians, and particularly so "the lower orders," who, as the British naturalist and mineralogist Edward Daniel Clarke noted in his accounts from a visit to rural Trøndelag, near where Hammer had been based, appeared "to live as well as in *England*."¹¹⁴ As Ragnhild Hutchison has demonstrated, Norway embarked on gradual economic transformations and a yeoman "pluri-active way to the market economy" that, though slower than those taken by some other countries, proved to be a "'softer way' to acclimatise to the new structures of the domestic, European and world economy" in the late eighteenth century.¹¹⁵ The mountainous terrain that so long had hindered its development in the agricultural periods of humanity's economic development rapidly became extraordinarily valuable with the technology of the Industrial Revolution, when Norway's cheap access to energy in the form of uniquely abundant hydropower facilitated rapid industrialization based on its copious natural resources.¹¹⁶ With time, even Pontoppidan's "springs or currents of Petroleum" in the North Sea would be harnessed, helping the country to become, as Hammer had hoped, the world's "happiest."¹¹⁷

Given the intensity and the passionate fervor of his patriotism, it might be more appropriate to consider Hammer a veritable nationalist of the sort that would characterize Europe in subsequent centuries—though a remarkably early

¹¹⁴ Edward Daniel Clarke, *Travels in Various Countries of Scandinavia*, 2 vols. (London, 1838), 2:71, also discussed in Hildor Arnold Barton, *Northern Arcadia: Foreign Travelers in Scandinavia, 1765–1815* (Carbondale, IL, 1998), 83–85.

¹¹⁵ Hutchison, *In the Doorway to Development*, 221.

¹¹⁶ Kristine Bruland, *British Technology and European Industrialization: The Norwegian Textile Industry in the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1989). The Angus Maddison Project suggests that there indeed was significant comparative growth in Norway around the middle of the nineteenth century, though the country only diverged dramatically from the rest of Europe with oil revenues coming online around 1980. See historical projections of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the Maddison-Project, <http://www.ggd.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>, 2013 version, on which see Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, "The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts," *Economic History Review* 67 (2014): 627–51, as well as Angus Maddison, *Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030 AD* (Oxford, 2007), 379.

¹¹⁷ Pontoppidan, *Det første Forsøg paa Norges naturlige Historie*, 1:116. On Norway's oil wealth, see Asle Skredderberget, *Usannsynlig rik: Historien om Norge og oljefondet* (Oslo, 2015). The number of such happiness rankings is now endless, and Norway fluctuates near the top of all of them, frequently even topping them, but for insightful meditations, see Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Storeulvsyndromet: Jakten på lykken i overflods-samfunnet* (Oslo, 2008), and the essays in Karma Ura and Karma Galay, eds., *Gross National Happiness and Development* (Thimphu, 2004).

one in the history of Norway.¹¹⁸ Indeed, the *Philonorvagi* may very well be one of the first robust statements of modern Norwegian nationalism. And though he precociously justified his endeavor by recourse to the cosmopolitan ideal—soon more famously expounded by the likes of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, the Count of Saint-Simon, Giuseppe Mazzini, and Jules Michelet—that “Love of Fatherland leads to love of humanity!,” so that nationalism was a mere stepping stone to cosmopolis, Hammer seemed to care rather more about the former than the latter.¹¹⁹ The word “nation,” after all, derives from the Latin *natio*, or birth. And his beloved “fatherland” is the equivalent of the Latinate *patria*, which again is shorthand for the longer phrase *terra patria*, translated as “paternal land,” from which the term for patriotism derives. Furthermore, *patria* was often connected to the *res publica*, the “land of the fathers” with “the public thing,” which we have to come to think of as politics. Cicero, for one, whom Hammer mentioned explicitly, linked *patria* to the liberty and laws of a specific political community. Seemingly, a true ancestral polity was one in which inhabitants were invested, one that became their civic world, a basic idea resurrected repeatedly in the Renaissance and early modern periods. Hammer’s form of nationalism was, in effect, rather thick, ranging across the realms of the cultural (what Jean-Jacques Rousseau referred to as “national character” in a draft of his 1765 *Plan for a Constitution for Corsica*), the political, the demographic, and even the landscape itself.¹²⁰ Hammer’s insistence on the natural “genius” of the Norwegian “folk,” on its timeless traditions, active political independence, and unique climate, not to mention his obsession with the mountains, dales, and coasts that made up his “nation,” was paramount in his work, a love of fatherland that he wished to promulgate and

¹¹⁸ For a lengthy attempt to disentangle “patriotism” and “nationalism,” see Viroli, *For Love of Country*. On the problems of beginning accounts of “nationalism” only in the nineteenth century, see Hont, “Jealousy of Trade,” 137, and, on the intrinsic historical relationship between patriotism and nationalism, Hont, “Permanent Crisis,” 510–11.

¹¹⁹ Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 25. On such arguments, see Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990), 25–31; Keith Tribe, “Die Vernunft des List: National Economy and the Critique of Cosmopolitical Economy,” in Tribe, *Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750–1950* (Cambridge, 1995), 32–65; Viroli, *For Love of Country*, 138 and passim. Other examples include Johann Gottlieb Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, ed. Isaac Nakhimovsky, Bela Kapossy, and Keith Tribe (Indianapolis, 2013), 134 and passim; Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati, eds., *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ, 2009), 94–95, 125, and Jules Michelet, *Le peuple* (Brussels, 1846), 118. See also, for a sketch of something similar, Ghița Ionescu, *The Political Thought of Saint-Simon* (Oxford, 1976).

¹²⁰ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Plan for Perpetual Peace, on the Government of Poland, and Other Writings on History and Politics*, ed. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, 2005), 252n10.

galvanize through widespread popular educational reforms not unlike those identified by Benedict Anderson as being at the core of later and more famous nation-building processes.¹²¹ If one accepts the contemporary equation of virtue with patriotism rendered famous by the likes of Voltaire and Robespierre in the eighteenth century, Hammer was part and parcel of the moment.¹²²

Yet, compared to the growing nationalism of contemporary Britain, which, as Linda Colley has emphasized, channeled popular patriotic fervor into a decidedly imperialist form, Hammer's form of independence through improvement was explicitly introspective; looting and pillaging, however broadly conceived, were not his cup of tea.¹²³ Where, for example, the core of British political economy at the time had revolved around importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods, Hammer was adamant that "Norway" should work "its own raw materials," parenthetically and tellingly adding that "with those of others it should not engage."¹²⁴ It is difficult to see what, precisely, was ever "physiocratic" about Hammer's nationalist political economy, if by calling him "physiocratic" one does not merely mean that he "cared about economic matters during the eighteenth century, including agriculture." After all, he mentioned no physiocratic works at all in the lengthy bibliography he included in his *Philonorvagi*, and he never invoked any distinctly physiocratic themes, whether regarding the need for large-scale agriculture, legal despotism, a single tax, or the sterility of manufactures. His passionate plea, in its introduction, to "ennoble" Norway's "raw Materials, and gain from that every possible Utility and Advantage," not to mention his praise of its traditional yeoman farmers, should, if anything, immediately suggest a radically different theoretical and practical framework—one that would superbly come to fruition in the subsequent century.¹²⁵

THE ECOLOGY OF IDEAS

But this is hardly the only time physiocracy has been projected where it does not belong, equated somehow, in the academic imagination, with Enlightenment economic thought *tout court*.¹²⁶ Hammer's case, in short, offers yet another example of how radically we need to rethink the rich origins and history of political economy in Enlightenment Europe, and the ever-narrower role physiocracy can

¹²¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins of and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (London, 2006).

¹²² Hont, "Permanent Crisis," 502.

¹²³ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, CT), 1992.

¹²⁴ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 75.

¹²⁵ Hammer, *Philonorvagi*, 11.

¹²⁶ See, for similar arguments, John Shovlin, *Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, NY, 2006), 3–4; Cheney, *Revolutionary Commerce*, 6; Kaplan and Reinert, *The Economic Turn*.

be seen to have played in it. More importantly, Hammer's political economy suggests the need for intellectual historians to show a greater awareness not merely of the context of ideas but also of their broader ecology and, indeed, their *terroir*. For, without inviting environmental determinism, the fact remains that there were eminently "natural" reasons why latifundian physiocracy failed to gain traction in places like Norway or, for that matter, Genoa, which not only politically and economically but also geologically, geographically, and climatologically were simply not suited for it.¹²⁷ This was obvious also to contemporary observers. Already in the 1730s, the Danish cameralist and bibliophile Otto Thott envisioned Denmark-Norway as an integrated economy in which flat and fertile Denmark would be the breadbasket, while Norway, where "Climate and Nature themselves struggle against agriculture," would focus on the ocean, timber, and minerals.¹²⁸ And, needless to say, such ecological mindfulness is crucial for what has come to be known as international intellectual history, which, by necessity, deals with processes of transmission, reception, and appropriation across what often turn out to be dramatically changing climates and physical landscapes.¹²⁹

This is, again, not to suggest that historians have not previously turned their attention to the relationship between mind and matter, or for that matter nature and nurture. In the United States, in particular, this has been an enduring focus of scholarship from the nineteenth-century musings of John Muir regarding the "environmental restrictions" on civilization to Frederick Turner's "frontier thesis" and, more recently, in one of the founding works in the blooming field of modern environmental history, Roderick Frazier Nash's *Wilderness and the American Mind*, as well as, of course, Cronon's magisterial *Nature's Metropolis*.¹³⁰ Yet, with few exceptions, the historiography of political economy, or "economic analysis," in Joseph A. Schumpeter's terms, has—paradoxically, given its ostensible

¹²⁷ See, again, Pecchio, *Storia della economia pubblica*, 281.

¹²⁸ Otto Thott, "Allerunderdanigste uforgribelige tanker om commerciens tilstand og opkomst [1735]," in *Studier i dansk merkantilisme: Omkring tekster af Otto Thott*, ed. Kristof Glamann and Erik Oxenbøll (Copenhagen, 1977), 169–216, 184. For a similar observation in the context of the early nineteenth-century Scottish highlands, see Jonsson, *Enlightenment's Frontier*, 253.

¹²⁹ See, for example, Reinert, *Translating Empire*, 9, and, on this movement more broadly, David Armitage, "The International Turn in Intellectual History," in *Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History*, ed. Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn (Oxford, 2014), 232–352.

¹³⁰ For a discussion about John Muir in these terms, see Aaron Sachs, *The Humboldt Current: A European Explorer and His American Disciples* (Oxford, 2007), 324. For Turner's thesis, see his "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1893), 119–227. On the main theme of his book being an "intellectual revolution," see Roderick Frazier Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, 5th ed. (New Haven, CT, 2014), 317 and passim; Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis*.

grounding in the management of resources—often occupied a featureless space just as economics itself has.¹³¹

This is particularly inappropriate for a doctrine like physiocracy, which, in spite of its explicit claims to universal validity, was after all a complex model derived from a number of assumptions about the way the world worked—assumptions that may or may not have been realistic in an “agricultural kingdom” like France, but that certainly were not so on the eighteenth-century Norwegian tundra any more than they were in the Enlightenment outback or the early modern Amazon.¹³² In effect, this was the core message of the most powerful contemporary critique of physiocracy, and one of the undisputed publishing phenomena of Enlightenment political economy: the Neapolitan statesman Ferdinando Galiani’s *Dialogues sur le commerce des bleds* (Dialogues on the grain trade), informed by experiences at the opposite end of the European continent from Hammer’s “cold North.” Beyond the fact that he disagreed with the theoretical postulates and policy conclusions of physiocracy even in France, Galiani challenged the arrogance of proclaiming a set of maxims for the entire world. “The only error of men,” he wrote, “is to regulate themselves on reasons and examples that are not adapted to their circumstances,” among which he counted “climate, soil, canals, rivers, agriculture, commerce, money, navigation, extension, possessions, production, administration,” and so on. “In matters of political economy,” he concluded, “a single change makes an immense difference.”¹³³ Meaningful economic theorizing, in short, demanded careful situating in a richer and more specific *terroir* than Quesnay and his followers allowed for, understood as the complete natural environment in which ideas and practices emerged, related, and took effect.

¹³¹ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, ed. Elizabeth B. Schumpeter (Oxford, 1954). Exceptions of course exist, such as, from different perspectives, Drayton, *Nature’s Government*, and John Robertson, “Political Economy and the ‘Feudal System’ in Enlightenment Naples: Outline of a Problem,” in *Peripheries of Enlightenment*, ed. Richard Butterwick and Simon Davies (Oxford, 2008), 65–86.

¹³² See, for example, the description of how physiocracy “would make the happiness of men anywhere they were followed no matter that the Constitution might be,” in Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, *Autobiography*, ed. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese (Wilmington, DE, 1984), 238, 244, and Ann Robert Jacques Turgot’s letter to David Hume of July 23, 1766, in which he maintains that “it would, therefore, be very desirable that . . . all those who lead nations, should think like Quesnay on all points,” in David Hume, *Writings on Economics*, ed. Eugene Rotwein (London, 1955), 205. On the universal aspirations of physiocracy, see the discussion in Reinert, *Translating Empire*, 178 and passim.

¹³³ See, for a critical edition, Ferdinando Galiani, *Dialogues entre M. Marquis de Roquemaure, et M.s le Chevalier Zanobi*, ed. Philip Koch (Frankfurt, 1968), 57–59. On Galiani and his work, see, among others, Steven L. Kaplan, “Galiani: Grain and Governance,” and Sophus A. Reinert, “A Sublimely Stupid Idea: Physiocracy in Italy from the Enlightenment to Fascism,” both in Kaplan and Reinert, *The Economic Turn*, 221–303 and 699–733, respectively.

The importance of “somewhereness” in Enlightenment political economy may have found its most powerful pictorial representation in the Giessen cameralist August Friedrich Wilhelm Crome’s 1782 *Neue Carte von Europa welche die merkwürdigsten Producte und vornehmsten Handelsplätze nebst dem Flächen-Inhalt aller Europäischer Länder in deutschen Quadrat-Meilen enthält* (New map of Europe containing the strangest and most prestigious products of trading places together with the surface content of all European countries in German square miles; figs. 5 and 6). It is often considered one of the earliest thematic maps in the history of cartography, explicitly seeking to visualize the current productions of countries for the purpose of facilitating international trade and identifying “the different branches of commerce already open or that may further be opened.” Not only was the map itself populated with signs, icons, and abbreviations signifying different resources and economic activities, but the disparate countries of Europe all had their own entries as well listing the most pertinent output along the sides of the chart, with minor deposits marked in parentheses. For Norway, stretching over 7,000 miles from the “North Sea” to the “Sea of Ice,” Crome noted the presence of “husbandry, forestry, game [furs], reindeer, (gold), (silver), copper, iron, marble, alabaster, fisheries, (pearls),” a list that largely aligned with the main economic activities identified by Hammer in his work. At the other end of Europe, the smaller island of Sicily was instead characterized by “cereals, exotic fruits, wine, sugar-cane, olive oil, honey, manna trees, silk, hemp, natron, salt, fisheries, corals,” thus highlighting the very different “oeconomic states,” to use Crome’s terminology, of the two countries. Not only did different environments allow for different economic activities, but trade itself depended on these very differences to flourish. As such, cameralism perforce demanded an awareness of place, of the shifting *terroir* of political economy, from the sun-baked shores of the Mediterranean to the desolate edge of the northern ice floes.¹³⁴

Such insights reappear sporadically in the history of economics and are repeatedly forgotten, always to great detriment.¹³⁵ Indeed, a similar sentiment regarding difference informed much early development economics, as is evident even from the title of Nobel Laureate Gunnar Myrdal’s 1957 *Economic Theory*

¹³⁴ Wilhelm Crome, *Neue Carte von Europa welche die merkwürdigsten Producte und vornehmsten Handelsplätze nebst dem Flächen-Inhalt aller Europäischer Länder in deutschen Quadrat-Meilen enthält* (Dessau, 1782). For Crome’s justification, see what he wrote in relation to a planned American version of the map to Benjamin Franklin, March 4, 1783, in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Leonard W. Labaree et al., 42 vols. to date (New Haven, CT, 1959–2017), 39:247–49. On the map, see Arthur H. Robinson, *Early Thematic Mapping in the History of Cartography* (Chicago, 1982), 55.

¹³⁵ Sophus A. Reinert, “Historical Political Economy,” in *Palgrave Handbook of Political Economy*, ed. Ivano Cardinale and Roberto Scazzieri (Basingstoke, 2018), 133–69.



Fig. 5.—Wilhelm Crome, *Neue Carte von Europa welche die merkwürdigsten Producte und vornehmsten Handelsplätze nebst dem Flächen-Inhalt aller Europäischer Länder in deutschen Quadrat-Meilen enthält* (Dessau, 1782). Cornell University—PJ Mode Collection of Persuasive Cartography. Color version available as an online enhancement.



FIG. 6.—Wilhelm Crome, *Neue Carte von Europa* (Dessau, 1782), detail. Cornell University—PJ Mode Collection of Persuasive Cartography. Color version available as an online enhancement.

and Under-Developed Regions; economic theories produced in the so-called first world could not simply be translated to regions with extremely divergent developmental paths.¹³⁶ He expounded upon this in his essay “An Economist’s Vision of a Sane World”: “In regard to the development problems of underdeveloped countries, I feel that we have been living, and are still living, in a fool’s paradise.

¹³⁶ Gunnar Myrdal, *Economic Theory and Under-Developed Countries* (London, 1957). For context, see also Örjan Appelqvist, *The Political Economy of Gunnar Myrdal: Transcending Dilemmas Post-2008* (London, 2014), 72.

We have formed opinions which are heavily biased in an optimistic direction. The careless application of Western economic theories and models that are not adequate to reality in underdeveloped countries has contributed to this by making it possible to disregard levels and modes of living, and attitudes and institutions—that is, the social facts which raise obstacles and inhibitions to development.”¹³⁷

It was precisely this sort of guarded, approximate, and, to an increasing number of economists, theoretically questionable approach to political economy that, as Paul Krugman has explained, increasingly fell out of favor in the later twentieth century.¹³⁸ This came, however, at a cost, for if Milton Friedman famously defended his approach to “positive economics” by way of John Neville Keynes’s dictum that it dealt with “‘what is,’ not with ‘what ought to be,’” the problem was that many common assumptions of economics derived from reality as it was perceived to be somewhere entirely different from where it often was deployed, whether in terms of physical ecology or developmental trajectory. In short, what “is” in matters of political economy—as in most fields of intellectual inquiry—varies greatly across time and space, and scholars are today again beginning to emphasize the degree to which academic scholarship and even business practices tends to reflect the realities of so-called WEIRD countries—that is, countries that are “Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic.”¹³⁹ But, as the example of the Norwegian Enlightenment suggests, the history of ideas and of their elaboration, reception, and application cannot durably be divorced from the actual physical ecologies in which they are forged and which they traverse and inhabit. The Norwegian Enlightenment was, in short, part of a larger project that united most parts of the European world, but its environment, and not merely its relative “development,” modulated aspects of it in profound and enduring ways.

Brian Dolan has recently argued that British travelers to Norway during the eighteenth century observed what he calls an “alternative Enlightenment” in which “the state” played an important role. So Norway is once again, in Dolan’s

¹³⁷ Gunnar Myrdal, “An Economist’s Vision of a Sane World,” in Myrdal, *Essays and Lectures*, ed. Mutsumi Okada (Kyoto, 1973), 87–103, 99.

¹³⁸ Paul Krugman, “The Fall and Rise of Development Economics,” in *Rethinking the Development Experience: Essays Provided by the World of Albert O. Hirschman*, ed. Lloyd Rodwin and Donald A. Schön (Washington, DC, 1994), 39–58.

¹³⁹ Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago, 1953), 3–43, 4, drawing on John Neville Keynes, *The Scope and Method of Political Economy* (London, 1891), plausibly 4, 49, but also passim, recalling the famous distinction lionized by David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature* (London, 1739), 335. See, for the case of business administration, Krishna Palepu and Tarun Khanna, *Winning in Emerging Markets: A Road Map for Strategy and Execution* (Boston, 2010). The acronym “WEIRD” was popularized by Jared Diamond, *The World Until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?* (New York, 2012), 8–9 and passim.

take, different and far from Europe's interior. But, in light of recent scholarship, this observation seems to align the region with, rather than differentiating it from, the reigning rhythms of European thought and practice. In other words, the observers were surely right about the role of the state, but variations of this, and not physiocracy, lay at the very core of Enlightenment political economy.¹⁴⁰ If one really has to apply a label to Hammer's project, that of "cameralism" (or even, perhaps, the neologism "coastal cameralism," given its eclectic emphasis on mining but also on maritime resources, networks, and itineraries) would be far more appropriate given his administrative vocation, his dual interest in the high realms of theory on the one hand and the practical world of worldly melioration in small states on the other, and, of course, his openness both to explicitly cameralist primers on natural resource management and to Italian, French, and English works on the significance of international trade in high-value-added goods. As such, Hammer's work testifies to the influence of cameralism "beyond the Germanic World," as Ernst Lluich once put it, as well as to its ability to make itself relevant for different intellectual but also economic and indeed environmental contexts.¹⁴¹ Ultimately, however, Hammer's world offers new and fruitful perspectives on the history of political economy, the richness of the European Enlightenment, and the way in which common themes—regarding improvement, public happiness, jealousy of trade, civic virtue, political unions, and interstate relations, even burgeoning nationalism—were emulated and inflected by local conditions, even, as he himself proudly put it, in "our cold North."¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Brian Dolan, *Exploring European Frontiers: British Travellers in the Age of Enlightenment* (Basingstoke, 2000), 68–70. The literature underpinning this historiographical shift is immense, but for the key case of Britain, see, among others, John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783* (Cambridge, MA, 1988); Steven Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, CT, 2009); and, for comparative perspectives, Reinert, *Translating Empire*, and Reinert and Kaplan, *The Economic Turn*.

¹⁴¹ For Lluich's phrase, see his "Cameralism beyond the Germanic World: A Note on Tribe," *History of Economic Ideas* 5, no. 2 (1997): 85–99. This has now become mainstream; see, for example, Reinert, *Translating Empire*; Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, "Scottish Tobacco and Rhubarb: The Natural Order of Civil Cameralism in the Scottish Enlightenment," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 49, no. 2 (2016): 129–47, 132; and Marten Seppel, "Introduction: Cameralism in Practice," in *Cameralism in Practice: State Administration and Economy in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Marten Seppel and Keith Tribe (Woodbridge, 2017), 1–16, 3. For Tribe's most recent argument about the disconnection between cameralist theory and economic reality, see his "Baltic Cameralism?," in Seppel and Tribe, *Cameralism in Practice*, 39–64, particularly 63–64.

¹⁴² Hammer, *Vinskibeligheds høye Fornødenhed og ærefulde Løn . . .*, 12.