Winner Takes All? Tech Clusters, Population Centers, and the Spatial Transformation of U.S. Invention

Brad Chattergoon William R. Kerr

Working Paper 22-027



Winner Takes All? Tech Clusters, Population Centers, and the Spatial Transformation of U.S. Invention

Brad Chattergoon Harvard University

William R. Kerr Harvard Business School

Working Paper 22-027

Copyright © 2021 by Brad Chattergoon and William R. Kerr.

Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author.

Funding for this research was provided in part by from Harvard Business School.

Winner Takes All? Tech Clusters, Population Centers, and the Spatial Transformation of U.S. Invention

Authors: Brad Chattergoon¹, William R. Kerr^{1,2*}.

Affiliations:

¹Harvard University, Boston MA.

²National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.

*Correspondence to: wkerr@hbs.edu.

Abstract: U.S. invention has become increasingly concentrated around major tech centers since the 1970s, with implications for how much cities across the country share in concomitant local benefits. Is invention becoming a winner-takes-all race? We explore the rising spatial concentration of patents and identify an underlying stability in their distribution. Software patents have exploded to account for about half of patents today, and these patents are highly concentrated in tech centers. Tech centers also account for a growing share of non-software patents, but the reallocation, by contrast, is entirely from the five largest population centers in 1980. Non-software patenting is stable for most cities, with anchor tenants like universities playing important roles, suggesting the growing concentration of invention may be nearing its end. Immigrant inventors and new businesses aided in the spatial transformation.

One Sentence Summary: The growing concentration of patenting in tech centers masks an important stability in non-software patenting for most U.S. cities.

JEL Codes: O30, O31, O32, O33, O34, R11, R12, L86.

Keywords: invention, patents, innovation, software, artificial intelligence, clusters, agglomeration.

Acknowledgments: We thank Bob Hunt, Adam Jaffe, Josh Lerner, Megan MacGarvie, Mike Webb, seminar participants, and anonymous referees for helpful comments on this project. This research was supported by Harvard Business School. Authors declare no competing interests. Data and code are available with online supplement: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GTVSIY.

Introduction

The spatial distribution of invention is important for science, business, and policy. Invention builds upon itself, and knowledge spillovers are more localized than other forms of economic interaction.¹ Consequently, tight clusters of innovation form and shape the access of individuals and institutions to important resources necessary for this work.² The depths of these local technology pools influence the likelihood of achieving breakthrough inventions that draw frontier industries to a region and the capacity of regions to recombine prior work into novel contributions.³ The distributional implications of the spatial location of invention are significant and long-lasting, with one study showing children raised in areas lacking invention are less likely to become future inventors (Bell et al., 2019).

U.S. patenting has become much more spatially concentrated around tech clusters like San Francisco and Boston compared to the 1970s, making these places more productive for researchers in terms of their patenting propensity, important for business organization, and central to high-tech startups.⁴ Astoundingly, five of the six most valuable public companies *in the world* in 2020 were tech companies headquartered in San Francisco or Seattle. In response, local policy initiatives to boost innovation abound (Chatterji et al., 2014), and 238 U.S. cities bid for Amazon's HQ2. Is invention becoming a winner-takes-all race?

While the growing prominence of tech clusters is important, we show in this note that it is mostly due to two forces: 1) the rise of software patents, which are very concentrated in tech centers, and 2) the reallocation of non-software patents to tech centers from a few big population centers. These trends mask an important stability in the spatial distribution of non-software patents. We trace part of this stability to dispersed anchor tenants like universities.

Our work is closely linked to Bettencourt et al. (2007) and Balland et al. (2020). Bettencourt et al. (2007) show that patenting activity became increasingly concentrated in U.S. urban areas in the latter decades of the 20th century and that patenting scales at a super-linear rate to city population; Verspagen and Schoenmakers (2004) show similar spatial concentration in multinational patenting in Europe. More recently, Balland et al. (2020) quantify that patenting and related forms of innovation have become increasingly concentrated in larger cities.⁵ This increase is linked to the capacity of big cities to conduct more complex processes; the spatial concentration of invention has been growing since the 1850s.

We contribute to this literature in several ways. Most studies focus on quantifying the macro relationship of patenting to city size, using data spanning small cities like Casper, WY, and Enid, OK to the giants of New York and Los Angeles. Case studies also contemplate competition among tech clusters, such as Saxenian's (1996) account of the migration of semiconductors from Boston to San Francisco. Our contribution is to quantify how much of the rise of tech centers like Boston, Seattle, and San Francisco since the 1970s is due to a shift of patenting from the biggest population centers in 1980 like NYC and LA. The magnitudes are large: the 13.6% reduction from the 1970s to 2015-2019 in the patent share accounted for by the five largest population

¹ Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Ganguli et al., 2020; Jaffe et al., 1993; Rosenthal and Strange, 2020.

² Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Buzard et al., 2017, 2020; Kerr and Kominers, 2015; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003.

³ Bloom et al., 2021; Duranton, 2007; Duranton and Puga, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Jacobs, 1970; Kerr, 2010; Lin, 2011; Youn et al., 2015.

⁴ Alcacer and Delgado, 2016; Guzman, 2020; Guzman and Stern, 2020; Moretti, 2019; Verspagen and Schoenmakers, 2004.

⁵ In a model of the form $y \approx \text{population} \land \beta$, the authors estimate β equals 1.54 for published papers, 1.26 for patents, 1.11 for GDP, and 1.04 for employment. Related, they also note a scaling of 1.57 for patents in 'computer hardware and software'.

centers in 1980 is comparable to the combined patenting of the 238 MSAs with the least patenting in 2015-2019.

We also provide new evidence linking this increasing spatial concentration to software/digital inventions, including artificial intelligence. We draw upon algorithms by Bessen and Hunt (2007) and Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013), as well as our own extension of these using machine learning techniques. We measure an enormous increase in the share of patenting that is software related, to account for almost half of patenting today. This type of invention is conducive to spatial concentration and responsible for much of the overall rise in the concentration of inventions. In non-software domains, the distribution of patenting is more stable, although the shift of activity away from large population centers is still evident.⁶

These two trends—the reallocation of patents from a few large population centers to tech clusters and the explosion of software patents—are nuanced and masked in aggregate assessments. The purpose of this research note is to quantify them and raise their profile. We close by exploring their link to factors important for innovation (e.g., universities, immigration). These preliminary explorations are atheoretical and not conclusive, but they hopefully spark interest in follow-on assessments.

Patent Data

We study micro-records for all utility patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from January 1976 to December 2020 (Hall et al., 2001; Li et al., 2014). We consider patents with at least one inventor in the United States and locate the work to the modal U.S. city of inventors listed on the patent. We date patents by their application year and consider applications made during 1975 to 2019. Our Online Supplemental Materials describe data preparation in detail.

Defining a tech cluster requires consideration of complementary inputs to patenting like venture capital investment.⁷ We follow Kerr and Robert-Nicoud (2020) and Rosenthal and Strange (2020) by using two criteria that reflect the scale and density of local tech activity: 1) the city ranks among the top 15 cities for patents and venture capital investment (the scale of activity) and 2) the city holds shares for patents, venture capital, employment in R&D-intensive sectors, and employment in digital-connected occupations that exceed its population share (the density of activity).

Six metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs⁸) satisfy these scale and density criteria: San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, San Diego, Denver, and Austin. New York and Los Angeles are ambiguous, as the cities hold large scale but fall short on several density requirements. If we relax some requirements, three other candidates are Raleigh-Durham, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Washington DC, and our Online Supplement Materials discuss robustness of the patterns documented to tech cluster definitions.

⁶ As we describe further below, the line between software patents and other digitally connected inventions is blurry. The spatial transformation we depict in this note is robust under available definitions, including one for artificial intelligence, but we do not claim that the clustering pattern would be necessarily absent in neighboring domains.

⁷ Samila and Sorenson, 2011; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001.

⁸ Throughout, we use consolidated MSAs such that San Francisco includes San Jose, Oakland, and so on.

In 1980, the ten most populated MSAs were New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, San Francisco, Washington DC, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Houston, and Boston. San Francisco (#6) and Boston (#10) are two of the identified tech clusters, and the next largest is San Diego at #17 in terms of the 1980 population ranking. Our analysis focuses on the reallocation of patenting from the five largest MSAs in 1980 in terms of population that rank ahead of San Francisco to tech centers.

We identify software patents using algorithms based upon key words in the patent.⁹ We build our main results on the algorithm developed by Bessen and Hunt (2007), as it has been commonly used, and we later discuss alternatives.

Bessen and Hunt (2007) state: "Our concept of software patent involves a logic algorithm for processing data that is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is not 'hard-wired.' These instructions could reside on a disk or other storage medium or they could be stored in 'firmware,' that is, a read-only memory, as is typical of embedded software. But we want to exclude inventions that do not use software as part of the invention. For example, some patents reference off-the-shelf software used to determine key parameters of the invention; such uses do not make the patent a software patent."

The Bessen-Hunt algorithm requires that a utility patent description includes either the string "software" or the strings "computer" and "program", but it must not contain "antigen" or "antigenic" or "chromatography". The patent title must also not contain "chip" or "semiconductor" or "bus" or "circuit" or "circuitry". The patent titles and grant year of three examples: Apparatus for identifying the type of devices coupled to a data processing system controller (4025906, 1977); Remotely initiated telemetry calling system (5327488, 1992); and Intelligent power cycling of a wireless modem (7308611, 2007).

Software patents have exploded as a share of patenting. During 1975-1979, 2.5% of patents are software related, and this share is 49.9% since 2015. This tremendous growth is due to technological changes making software widespread and legal changes allowing more intellectual property protection.¹⁰

The Spatial Transformation of U.S. Patenting

Figure 1 shows annual rates of U.S. patenting for tech clusters and large population centers. Beyond these two groups, we aggregate the remaining 270 MSAs and prepare a fourth group for rural areas. The thatched portion of each series is software-related, and the solid portion is non-software-related. Patents are dated by their application years, and the final period of 2015-2019 is not shown due to incomplete series with respect to patent counts given future grants will occur. The share-based metrics that we focus on for most of this paper are less sensitive to this incomplete process.

The rise of the six tech centers is very stark, and Figure 2 presents these data in terms of shares. The six tech centers account for 11.3% of patents from 1975-1979, but surge to 34.2% for 2015-2019. San Francisco's growth is from 4.6% to 18.4%. While other groups decline in share, the magnitudes and economic importance are different. The five largest population centers show the

⁹ Bessen and Hunt, 2007; Graham and Vishnubhakat, 2013; Hall and MacGarvie, 2010; Layne-Farrar, 2005; Webb, 2019; Webb et al., 2018.

¹⁰ Graham and Vishnubhakat, 2013; Hunt, 2010; Lerner and Seru, 2017.

largest drop, from 32.2% to 18.6%. By contrast, the aggregate decline for the other 270 cities, from 45.5% to 41.0%, is much less. Non-urban areas also decline from 11.0% to 6.1%.

This reallocation is remarkable and has not been documented in prior work. Indeed, because the reallocation is among big cities, this movement of well more than 10% of patents is almost completely orthogonal to the standard elasticity measured across the full city size distribution. In a model of the form patents \approx population^ β , we estimate β =1.313 (0.037) for 1975-1979 and β =1.397 (0.047) for 2015-2019, like prior work. Yet, if we take the patenting that occurs in tech centers and the large population centers for 2015-2019 and re-apportion according to the relative patent shares that were present in 1975-1979, our estimate remains almost identical at β =1.397 (0.042). In other words, the β coefficient is a big vs small city comparison and less sensitive to shifts among bigger cities.¹¹

By contrast, an Ellison-Glaeser (EG) metric (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997) calculates the sum of squared deviations between the patenting shares of MSAs compared to their population shares (with a normalization factor). The index is defined as:

$$EG = \frac{\sum_i (s_i - p_i)^2}{1 - \sum_i p_i^2}$$

where s_i is the share of patenting in city *i* and p_i is the population share. The EG index is well suited for capturing reallocation of activity at the top end of the city size distribution. The EG index has a value of zero if innovation is spread out the same as population; positive values indicate concentration that differs from what one would expect based upon population.

An EG index shows a much stronger response. From a starting value of 0.003 in 1975-1979, the EG increases ten-fold to 0.033 in 2015-2019. This increase is substantial, and if we instead rere-apportion recent patenting within tech clusters and large population centers according to their relative rates in 1975-1979, our EG index only grows to 0.011. Thus, more than 70% of the rise in the EG index is due to movements among these larger cities.

Software vs Non-Software Patenting

Figures 1 and 2 suggest that software patenting is important for our understanding of spatial clustering and tech clusters. Software patents are a significant share of invention in all cities, but they account for well more than half of patents in tech clusters. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that the tech centers account for 45.4% of software patents after 2015, more than double their starting share of 20.2%. San Francisco again features prominently with 25.8% of software patents filed after 2015. This reallocation pulled from all regions.

Panel B of Figure 2 shows that tech clusters are also important for non-software patents (solid lines), growing from 11.0% to 23.1% across the period. San Francisco is 11.1%. However, the share for the 270 MSAs grows slightly from 45.5% to 48.1%. The shift is instead from the five largest cities in 1980, which fall from 32.3% to 20.0%. These cities have remained mostly prosperous and often hold leading positions in important sectors (e.g., media in Los Angeles, finance in New York). But, while patents continue to increase in a super-linear relationship to city population, invention has become less coupled to the largest cities.¹²

¹¹ We exclude rural areas from this exercise and the upcoming Ellison-Glaeser calculations.

¹² Carlino et al., 2007; Fritsch and Wyrwich, 2020; Lerner et al., 2020; Moretti, 2012.

We next separate industrial and university assignees to study agglomeration behavior. Industrial firms have discretion over locations, such as the choice by IBM of how much of its R&D work to conduct in its Yorktown Heights and Albany, NY, labs versus those in Cambridge, MA and San Jose, CA. The creative destruction process also pits new entrants in tech centers against spatially distant incumbents. By contrast, universities are local anchor tenants across the country and mostly constrained from agglomerating.¹³ Research universities also rarely go out of business.

Panel A of Figure 3 displays the EG metric for software and non-software patenting by industrial assignees. Software patenting is more concentrated than non-software patenting, and it has become extremely agglomerated among industrial assignees. As industrial firms account for most patents (85.7% after 2015¹⁴), their concentration principally shapes the overall concentration of US patenting.

Panel B of Figure 3 provides a stark contrast with university patenting. While software represents 31.5% of university patents after 2015, their spatial concentration has declined. Concentration levels among non-software patents have also declined.

This recent role of universities in promoting the geographic stability of invention stands in contrast to how universities contributed disproportionately in the 1970s and 1980s for the emergence of software patents in tech centers, especially Boston and San Francisco. After this concentrated start, however, university contributions have been more widespread. The compound annual growth rate of university patenting from 1975 to 2015 is highest in the Other 270 Cities.

The Spread of Software Patents

In 2011, prominent venture investor Marc Andreessen famously proclaimed "software is eating the world" (Andreessen, 2011). Indeed, Figure 4 shows that software patenting has expanded beyond its traditional NBER technology categories of computers/communications and electrical/electronics. For example, software patents are 15.8% of patents in chemicals and drugs/medicines. In total for 2012, software patents represent more than a quarter of patents in 24.6% of the 410 United States Patent Classes (USPCs) that are continually present from 1975 to 2012, and more than two-thirds of classes have a greater than 5% software share by 2012.

We can decompose software's growth using the USPC patent class system (which ends in 2012) using the identity:

$$\Delta SW_t = \sum c_{i,t-1} \Delta SW_{i,t} + \sum (SW_{i,t-1} - SW_{t-1}) \Delta c_{i,t} + \sum \Delta c_{i,t} \Delta SW_{i,t}$$

where ΔSW_t is the change in the share of software patents between 2012 (*t*) and 1976 (*t*-1) and $c_{i,t}$ is USPC class *i*'s share of patents in year *t*. The first term captures the within-class effect (i.e., software becoming more prevalent as technology classes looked in 1976), the second captures a between-class effect (i.e., classes that were software intensive in 1976 growing more quickly), and the third term represents a cross component (i.e., classes that are becoming more software intensive also growing more quickly).

¹³ Agrawal and Cockburn, 2003; Agrawal et al., 2014; Berkes and Nencka, 2019; Feldman, 2003; Hausman, 2012; Kantor and Whalley, 2014.

¹⁴ During 1975-1979, approximately 70.2% of patents were made by industrial assignees, 1.1% by universities, 2.8% by government, and 26.0% unassigned. For 2015-2019, these shares were 85.7%, 4.2%, 0.7%, and 9.5%, respectively. Shares can total to more than 100% due to joint assignment of patents across institutions.

We calculate that 38.3% of the software patenting growth is from an increased software share holding the 1976 distribution of patent classes constant (the within term), 36.9% from an increase in the class shares holding constant the 1976 software intensity (the between term), and 24.7% from faster growth of classes also correlating with faster software penetration (the cross term). These elements are visible in Figure 4 as well.

Extensions

We discuss here supporting evidence contained in the Online Supplemental Materials.

We defined tech clusters with attention to non-patenting factors (e.g., venture investment). An alternative approach isolates absolute changes in realized patenting growth, which proves informative.¹⁵ The four MSAs that attracted the biggest absolute change in patent counts from 1975 to 2020 are four of our tech clusters (in order): San Francisco, Seattle, Boston, and San Diego. The next three cities in terms of the biggest absolute change in patent counts over the period are Los Angeles, New York City, and Detroit, three of our five large 1980 population centers. Thus, these cities still attracted more patents, as hinted at in Figure 1, but they lost substantial relative grounds. Indeed, we can replicate our findings with just a focus on the four tech clusters identified with this approach.

Additionally, there is a substantial stagnation and decline in the economic might of the Rust Belt during this period. While the major Rust Belt cities (such as Buffalo, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh) also lose a substantial share of patenting since the 1970s, this process is distinct. Among our large 1980 population centers, Detroit and, to a lesser extent, Chicago, feature among the Rust Belt, but they play a relatively small role in the trends we focus on.

Turning to software definition, a first question focuses on the quality of software patents. Perhaps the explosion in patents in tech centers has been associated with deteriorations in their quality. Using techniques like forward citations¹⁶, we do not observe any declines in patent quality (software and non-software) for tech centers compared to other locations.

The Bessen and Hunt (BH) technique uses keywords, and a prominent technique by Graham and Vishnubhakat (GV) defines software via patent classes. To evaluate the performance of these approaches, we randomly sampled 1600 patents from NBER Category 2 stratified across eight periods from 1976-79 to 2010-14. Within each period, we sampled 100 BH, 50 GV, and 50 other patents. One patent was sampled twice, and several could not be reliably assigned, resulting in a final sample of 1559 patents. We manually defined 788 (50.5%) of these as software patents.

Both techniques performed reasonably well and had understandable challenges. BH identified 91% of the patents that we classified as software (recall), but only 79% of BH identified patents were ones we identified as software (precision). The parsimonious set of keywords in the BH algorithm performs well in identifying likely software patents, and the algorithm's weakness are the false positives that evade the few negatively selected terms.

The GV algorithm identified 98% of the patents that we classified as software (recall), but only 68% of GV patents identified as software were manually classified as software (precision). The

¹⁵ We thank a referee for this suggestion. In the Online Supplemental Materials, we also discuss the small scope for expanding out the tech cluster definition to include more cities like Raleigh-Durham and Minneapolis-St. Paul.

¹⁶ Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005.

patent class approach achieves a lot by identifying the classes with the most software patents, although 98% will overstate performance if extending sample beyond NBER Category 2. GV's straightforward challenge is that these classes are not exclusive to software patents.

The Online Supplemental Materials show that performance of BH and GV algorithms is best after 1995, increasing on both precision and recall from the 1970s until that point.

Using these 1559 hand-coded patents, we developed a third approach by training a machine learning algorithm. Conceptually, this is an extension of both techniques, giving up the transparency of BH's keywords for a computational approach that particularly bolsters negative selection. The training on many patents in GV classes also benefits from the technology perspectives developed during the examination process. The algorithm is stingier in assignment (88% recall) but has fewer false positives (85% precision).

Figure 5 shows our key findings with the three techniques. We further incorporate a definition of AI-related patents developed by Giczy et al. (2021). The spatial reallocation of patents that this paper emphasizes are robust across these definitions. There is important scope for further honing patent technology divisions with computation techniques, with this robustness check perhaps being a seed.

Future Research

This note has documented a remarkable spatial transformation of patenting due to 1) the rise of software patents, which are very concentrated in tech centers, and 2) the reallocation of non-software patents to tech centers from a few big population centers.

Future research should explore why software patenting rose so much in its spatial concentration. Its higher initial concentration than patenting in traditional technologies (e.g., chemicals, agriculture) is not too surprising, but the subsequent growth in agglomeration deserves attention. Candidate ideas include growing technology complexity (Sorenson et al., 2006; Balland et al., 2020), greater need to participate in tacit knowledge about technology and market trends to be competitive, greater role of venture investment in new software startups, and greater desire for top talent in these fields to be in certain cities.

How this concentration happened is also interesting. In the Online Supplemental Materials, we provide preliminary evidence that software patenting growth in tech centers is facilitated through new businesses coming to the forefront, such as Apple and Microsoft, and less due to shifts in locations of incumbents, such as IBM. We also quantify how the increased US reliance on immigrant inventors¹⁷ aided the speed of the spatial transition. These two early cuts suggest that the dynamism of the U.S. innovation system, in terms of new firm formation and access to global talent, shaped the spatial transformation.

Hidden behind these trends is an important stability in the spatial distribution of non-software patents. Indeed, to some degree, the spatial transformation of patenting may be ending, except for a mechanical effect, should software grow as a share of patenting. Figure 1's trends taper off over the last two decades, and the underlying patenting shares of cities are becoming calcified.¹⁸

¹⁷ Bernstein et al., 2019; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Kerr and Lincoln, 2010; Peri et al., 2015; Stephan and Levin, 2001. ¹⁸ To illustrate, a vector of non-software patenting shares for cities in 2015-2019 displays a 0.970 correlation to a similar vector for 1995-1999, whereas the correlation between the vectors for 1995-1999 and 1975-1979 is lower at 0.877.

Despite software's growth across technologies, non-traditional sectors have yet to experience a substantial agglomeration around tech clusters like what transpired in computers/communications and electrical/electronics.

The pandemic raises many ongoing debates about future spatial concentration and tech clusters. Yet, even without the pandemic's emergence, this paper shows that the underlying stability of non-software patenting is likely to continue and ensure a broader spatial distribution of innovation. Regional advantages for being a premier location for invention will likely remain the subject of intense local competition¹⁹, but these spatial dynamics suggest the remarkable recent increases in the concentration of local invention are unlikely to segue into a winner-takes-all race.

References:

Agrawal, A. & I. Cockburn. (2003). The anchor tenant hypothesis: exploring the role of large, local, R&D-intensive firms in regional innovation systems. *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 21(9), 1217-1253.

Agrawal, A., I. Cockburn, A. Galasso & A. Oettl. (2014). Why are some regions more innovative than others? the role of small firms in the presence of large labs. *Journal of Urban Economics* 81(1), 149-165.

Alcacer, J. & M. Delgado. (2016). Spatial organization of firms and location choices through the value chain. *Management Science* 62(11), 3213-3234.

Andreessen, M. (2011). Why software is eating the world. *Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460

Audretsch, D.B. & M.P. Feldman. (1996). R&D spillovers and the geography of innovation and production. *American Economic Review* 86(3), 630-640.

Balland, P.A., C. Jara-Figueroa, S.G. Petralia, M.P.A. Steijn, D.L. Rigby & C.A. Hidalgo. (2020). Complex economic activities concentrate in large cities. *Nature Human Behavior* 4, 248-254 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0803-3.

Bell, A., R. Chetty, X. Jaravel, N. Petkova & J. Van Reenen. (2019). Who becomes an inventor in America? The importance of exposure to innovation. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134(2), 647-713.

Berkes, E. & P. Nencka. (2019). 'Novel' ideas: the effects of Carnegie libraries on innovative activities. Working Paper.

Bernstein, S., R. Diamond, T. McQuade & B. Pousada. (2019). The contribution of high-skilled immigrants to innovation in the United States. Working Paper.

Bessen, J. & R.M. Hunt. (2007). An empirical look at software patents. *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 16(1), 157-189.

¹⁹ Chatterji et al., 2014; Gruber and Johnson, 2019; Moretti, 2012; Saxenian, 1996.

Bettencourt, L., J. Lobo & D. Strumsky. (2007). Invention in the city: increasing returns to patenting as a scaling function of metropolitan size. *Research Policy* 36, 107-120. 10.1016/j.respol.2006.09.026.

Bloom, N., T.A. Hassan, A. Kalyani, J. Lerner, and A. Tahoun. (2021). The diffusion of disruptive technologies. NBER Working Paper 28999.

Breschi, S. & F. Lissoni. (2001). Knowledge spillovers and local innovation systems: a critical survey. *Industrial and Corporate Change* 10(4), 975-1005.

Buzard, K., G. Carlino, R.M. Hunt, J. Carr & T. Smith. (2017). The agglomeration of American R&D labs. *Journal of Urban Economics* 101, 14-26.

Buzard, K., G. Carlino, R.M. Hunt, J. Carr & T. Smith. (2020). Localized knowledge spillovers: evidence from the spatial clustering of R&D labs and patent citations. *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 81, 103490.

Carlino, G.A., S. Chatterjee & R.M. Hunt. (2007). Urban density and the rate of invention. *Journal* of Urban Economics 61(3), 389-419.

Chatterji, A., E. Glaeser & W. Kerr. (2014). Clusters of entrepreneurship and innovation. *Innovation Policy and the Economy* 14, 129-166.

Duranton, G. 2007. Urban evolutions: the fast, the slow, and the still. *American Economic Review* 97(1), 197-221.

Duranton, G. & D. Puga. (2001). Nursery cities: urban diversity, process innovation, and the life cycle of products. *American Economic Review* 91(5), 1454-1477.

Ellison, G. & E. Glaeser. (1997). Geographic concentration in U.S. manufacturing industries: a dartboard approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 105(5), 889-927.

Feldman, M. (2003). The locational dynamics of the US biotech industry: knowledge externalities and the anchor hypothesis. *Industry and Innovation* 10(3), 311-329.

Fleming, L. & O. Sorenson. (2001). Technology as a complex adaptive system: evidence from patent data. *Research Policy* 30(7), 1019-1039.

Fritsch, M. & M. Wyrwich. (2020). Is innovation (increasingly) concentrated in large cities? an international comparison. Working paper.

Ganguli, I., J. Lin & N. Reynolds. (2020). The paper trail of knowledge spillovers: evidence from patent interferences. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 12(2), 278-302.

Giczy, A., N. Pairolero & A. Toole. (2021). Identifying artificial intelligence (AI) invention: A novel AI patent dataset. USPTO Economic Working Paper No. 2021-2.

Graham, S. & S. Vishnubhakat. (2013). Of smart phone wars and software patents. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27(1), 67-86.

Gruber, J. & S. Johnson. (2019). *Jump-Starting America: How Breakthrough Science Can Revive Economic Growth and the American Dream*. New York: Public Affairs.

Guzman, J. (2020). Go west young firm: the value of entrepreneurial migration for startups and their founders. Working Paper.

Guzman, J. & S. Stern. (2020). The state of American entrepreneurship: new estimates of the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship for 32 US states, 1988–2014. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, forthcoming.

Hall, B., A. Jaffe & M. Trajtenberg. (2001). The NBER patent citation data file: lessons, insights and methodological tools. NBER Working Paper 8498.

Hall, B.H., A. Jaffe & M. Trajtenberg. (2005). Market value and patent citations. *RAND Journal of Economics* 36(1), 16-38.

Hall, B. & M. MacGarvie. (2010). The private value of software patents. *Research Policy* 39(7), 994-1009.

Harhoff, D., F. Narin, F.M. Scherer & K. Vopel. (1999). Citation frequency and the value of patented inventions. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 81(3), 511-515.

Hausman, N. (2012). University innovation, local economic growth, and entrepreneurship. Center for Economic Studies Paper 12-10.

Hunt, J. & M. Gauthier-Loiselle. (2010). How much does immigration boost innovation? *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 2(2), 31-56.

Hunt, R. (2010). Business method patents and U.S. financial services. *Contemporary Economic Policy* 28, 322-352.

Jacobs, J. 1970. The Economy of Cities. New York: Vintage Books

Jaffe, A.B., M. Trajtenberg & R. Henderson. (1993). Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(3), 577-598.

Kantor, S. & A. Whalley. (2014). Knowledge spillovers from research universities: evidence from endowment value shocks. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 96(1), 171-188.

Kerr, W.R. (2010). Breakthrough inventions and migrating clusters of innovation. *Journal of Urban Economics* 67(1), 46-60.

Kerr, W.R. & S.D. Kominers. (2015). Agglomerative forces and cluster shapes. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 97(4), 877–899.

Kerr, W.R. & W. Lincoln. (2010). The supply side of innovation: H-1B visa reforms and U.S. ethnic invention. *Journal of Labor Economics* 28(3), 473-508.

Kerr. W.R. & F. Robert-Nicoud. (2020). Tech clusters. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 34(3), 50-76.

Layne-Farrar, A. (2005). Defining software patents: a research field guide. SSRN Electronic Journal. DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1818025.

Lerner, J. & A. Seru. (2017). The use and misuse of patent data: issues for corporate finance and beyond. NBER Working Paper 24053.

Lerner, J., A. Seru, N. Short & Y. Sun. (2020). Financial innovation in the 21st century: evidence from U.S. patenting. Working Paper.

Li, G.C., R. Lai, A. D'Amour, D.M. Doolin, Y. Sun, V.I. Torvik, Z.Y. Amy, and L. Fleming. (2014). Disambiguation and co-authorship networks of the US patent inventor database (1975–2010). *Research Policy* 43(6), 941-955.

Lin, J. (2011). Technological adaptation, cities, and new work. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93(2), 554-574.

Moretti, E. (2012). The New Geography of Jobs. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Moretti, E. (2019). The effect of high-tech clusters on the productivity of top inventors. NBER Working Paper 26270.

Peri, G., K. Shih & C. Sparber. (2015). STEM workers, H-1B visas and productivity in U.S. cities. *Journal of Labor Economics* 33(S1), S225-S255.

Rosenthal, S. & W. Strange. (2020). How close is close? the spatial reach of agglomeration economies. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 34(3), 27-49.

Samila, S. & O. Sorenson. (2011). Venture capital, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93(1), 338-349.

Saxenian, A.L. (1996). *Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route* 128. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sorenson, O., J.W. Rivkin, & L. Fleming. (2006). Complexity, networks and knowledge flow. *Research Policy* 35(7), 994-1017.

Sorenson, O. & T.E. Stuart. (2001). Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of venture capital investments. *American Journal of Sociology* 106(6), 1546-1588.

Stephan, P. & S. Levin. (2001). Exceptional contributions to US science by the foreign-born and foreign-educated. *Population Research and Policy Review* 20(1), 59-79.

Stuart, T. & O. Sorenson. (2003). The geography of opportunity: spatial heterogeneity in founding rates and the performance of biotechnology firms. *Research Policy* 32(2), 229-253.

Verspagen, B. & W. Schoenmakers. (2004). The spatial dimension of patenting by multinational firms in Europe. *Journal of Economic Geography* 4, 23-42.

Webb, M. (2019). The impact of artificial intelligence on the labor market. Working Paper.

Webb, M., N. Short, N. Bloom & J. Lerner. (2018). Some facts of high-tech patenting. NBER Working Paper 24793.

Youn, H., D. Strumsky, L.M.A Bettencourt & J. Lobo. (2015). Invention as a combinatorial process: evidence from US patents. *Journal of the Royal Society Interface* 12(106), 20150272.





Fig. 1: US patents by location and software-related

Notes: Figure presents the spatial distribution of granted U.S. patents. The 6 tech centers are San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, San Diego, Denver, and Austin. The 5 largest cities in 1980 are New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. A third group aggregates the remaining 270 metropolitan areas. The thatched portion of each series is software-related, and the solid portion is non-software-related. Patents are dated by their application years, and the final period of 2015-2019 is not shown due to incomplete series with respect to patent counts given future grants will occur.





	All patents				Software patents				Non-Software patents			
	1975- 1989	1990- 2004	2005- 2019		1975- 1989	1990- 2004	2005- 2019		1975- 1989	1990- 2004	2005- 2019	
6 tech clusters	12.5	22.3	33.0		20.6	35.4	45.0		12.1	18.9	23.1	
5 largest cities in 1980	29.9	22.5	19.1		27.6	19.0	17.2		30.0	23.3	20.6	
Other 270 cities	46.7	46.5	41.7		45.1	41.0	34.4		46.8	48.1	47.6	
Rural areas	10.9	8.7	6.3		6.7	4.6	3.4		11.2	9.7	8.6	

Notes: See Figure 1. Figure presents the spatial distribution of granted U.S. patents. The 6 tech centers are San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, San Diego, Denver, and Austin. The 5 largest cities in 1980 are New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit. A third group aggregates the remaining 270 metropolitan areas. Panel B splits by software vs. non-software patents. Values given in table are averages of the corresponding five-year values in each period.




Fig. 3: Spatial concentration of U.S. patents compared to population

	EG: All patents			EG: I	ndustry pa	tents	EG: University patents			
	1975-	1990-	2005-	1975-	1990-	2005-	1975-	1990-	2005-	
	1989	2004	2019	1989	2004	2019	1989	2004	2019	
All	0.003	0.013	0.030	0.005	0.017	0.036	0.024	0.016	0.012	
Software	0.008	0.034	0.060	0.009	0.039	0.066	0.038	0.019	0.012	
Non-Software	0.003	0.009	0.014	0.005	0.012	0.018	0.024	0.016	0.012	

Notes: Figure presents the Ellison-Glaeser index of spatial concentration for granted US patents relative to the population distribution of cities.




Fig. 4: U.S. patents by technology category and software-related

Notes: Figure presents the technology composition of granted U.S. patents by the six major NBER categories and whether software-related. The thatched portion of each series is software-related, the solid portion is non-software-related. Shares in table do not precisely sum to 100% due to rounding to two-decimal places.




Fig. 5: Key outcomes with software and AI definitions

	Share	e in 6 tech clu	usters	EG: Software/AI patents				
	1975-1989	1990-2004	2005-2019	1975-1989	1990-2004	2005-2019		
SW: Bessen-Hunt	20.6	35.4	45.0	0.008	0.034	0.060		
SW: Graham-Vishnubhakat	20.4	34.2	43.7	0.010	0.037	0.060		
SW: Machine Learning	19.5	34.7	44.8	0.010	0.029	0.056		
AI: Giczy et al.	21.9	39.9	49.3	0.010	0.045	0.078		

Notes: Panel A presents the shares of software and AI related patents in the six tech clusters, as well as the non-software and non-AI shares according to each definition. Panel B presents the Ellison-Glaeser index of spatial concentration for granted US patents relative to the population distribution of cities. BH=Bessen and Hunt (2007) Software; GV: Graham-Vishnubhakat (2013) Software; ML: Machine Learning (authors) Software; and AI: Giczy, Pairolero, and Toole (2021) AI. Values given in table are averages of the corresponding five-year values in each period. GV values in final columns are for 2005-2014.

Materials and Methods

1. Additional Information on Data

We utilize the patent records created and held by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our data source is the PatentsView.org web API. Established in 2012 by the Obama administration, PatentsView provides a standardized database of patent records that "longitudinally links inventors, their organizations, locations, and overall patenting activity." (source: https://www.patentsview.org/web/).

PatentsView contains all patent records starting with patents granted in 1976, and our download from spring 2021 contains records through December 31, 2020. This paper considers patent records with application dates from the start of 1975 through the end of 2019. The use of application dates for patents is better suited for the timing of innovation, as the USPTO's review procedure can take multiple years and varies across fields.

We downloaded the following fields (not all of which have employed in our study):

- Patent Data: Patent Number; Patent Date (Grant Date); Patent Abstract; Patent Kind (Patent Kind code, e.g. B1, B2, S, P1); Patent Type (Functional category of Patent, e.g. Utility, Design, Plant); Patent Title; Number of Claims in Patent; Application Date of Patent; List of Patent Numbers for Cited Patents; List of Patent Numbers for Citing Patents
 - United States Patent Classification Codes (USPC): USPC Mainclass ID; USPC Subclass ID; Sequence (Order Priority of USPC code)
 - NBER Category Codes: NBER Category ID; NBER Subcategory ID
 - Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) Codes: CPC Section ID; CPC Subsection ID; CPC
 Group ID; CPC Subgroup ID; Sequence (Order Priority of CPC code)
- Inventor Data: Inventor ID (assigned by PatentsView); First Name; Last Name; City; State; State FIPs; County FIPs; Country; Sequence (Order Priority of Inventor on Patent)
- Assignee Data: Assignee ID (assigned by PatentsView); Organization Name; First Name; Last Name; City; State; State FIPs; County FIPs; Country; Assignee Type (discussed below); Sequence (Order Priority of Assignee)

Notes about requested fields and their preparation:

- The USPC system was retired at the beginning of 2015 in favor of the CPC system, jointly developed by the USPTO and the European Patent Office to code Utility patents. The USPC system remains in place for other patent types, e.g. Design and Plant. For statistics in the paper, we use the older USPC system (e.g., level of software penetration into non-traditional patent classes) since it covered the full duration of our sample period excepting the last few years.
- We also use the NBER Category system that aggregates the USPC patent classes, as initially started by Hall et al. (2001). To extend the NBER system to the end of our data, we developed a probabilistic mapping of CPC codes to NBER categories and subcategories based upon the transition period during which the USPTO assigned both CPC and USPC codes to granted patents.
- The Assignee Type refers to the organizational character of the assignee.

- PatentsView provides the following classifications for Assignee Type: US Company or Corporation; Foreign Company or Corporation; US Individual; Foreign Individual; US Government; Foreign Government; Country Government; and State Government (US). We group these categories into "Industrial", "Government", and "Individual".
 - Note that an Individual assignee indicates a person has a claim to the property rights of the patent. This is separate from the inventor designations below. Every patent has listed inventors, but the assignment of patents to individuals is rare. Most inventors working for a university, corporation, or government have agreed to assign the rights of an invention over to their employer.
- We also construct a "University" classification to represent academic and research institutions using automated and manual procedures:
 - If an assignee's name includes the strings "university", "college", "institute of technology", "research foundation", "research institute", or "polytechnic institute", we classify it as a "University" patent. We verified the accuracy on the classification for the top 2000 patent assignees by number of patents.
 - During this manual review, we also identified several academic organizations that are best classified as a University but did not have the above the naming conventions (e.g. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Inc.; Georgia Tech Research Corporation).
 - We remove the PatentsView-based designation (e.g. Industrial) when classifying an assignee as a university. As such, the assignee types are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, but patents can have multiple assignees with different assignee types.
- PatentsView provides geographic data identifying country and city, in addition to state and county codes for US-based inventors and assignees. For most records, we map the provided county FIPs codes into Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). The county code is missing in a small share of US cases, and, where possible, we use the city and state to repair the missing code.
 - We require patents to have at least one inventor located in the United States, and we do not further consider foreign inventors in our analysis.
 - Patents can contain multiple inventors in different locations. If there is a unique most common MSA, we use that as the spatial location of the patent. We use the highest rank inventor's location when a tie exists.
- To identify software patents, our main algorithm follows Bessen and Hunt (2007). Section 3 of this Supplement discuss additional procedures for identifying software patents in detail. The Bessen and Hunt (2007) approach that underlies most of our results:
 - Patent must be a Utility Patent but not a Reissued Patent. We screen via limiting patents to Patent Kinds "A", "B1", and "B2".
 - The patent description must include either the string "software" or the strings "computer" and "program", but must not contain "antigen" or "antigenic" or "chromatography".
 - The patent title must not contain "chip" or "semiconductor" or "bus" or "circuit" or "circuitry".

- To identify inventor ethnicity, we follow a procedure that utilizes the names of inventors and ethnic name algorithms: e.g., mapping the surnames "Patel" and "Gupta" to the Indian ethnicity and those with "Rodriguez" and "Hernandez" to the Hispanic ethnicity. The algorithms combine common name conventions with ethnic name databases first developed for marketing purposes.
 - Ethnicity is assigned at the inventor level and then aggregated to the patent level by averaging over inventors, thus giving equal weight to each patent in aggregate statistics.
 - The procedure is laid out in detail in these papers:
 - Kerr, W. & W. Lincoln. (2010). The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention. *Journal of Labor Economics* 28(3), 473–508.
 - Kerr, W. (2007). The Ethnic Composition of U.S. Inventors. Harvard Business School Working Paper 08-006.

Table S1 documents several measures for cities using data from around 2015-2018 that we employ to define a tech cluster. (Table S1 and the next three paragraphs are taken from Kerr and Robert-Nicoud (2020) with small modification.) The table contains the top 15 MSAs in terms of venture investment. This table speaks best to the scale of tech activity across cities and, through a comparison to the population share in Column 7, the implied density of tech efforts. The top 15 MSAs as ranked by venture capital investment hold 94% of venture capital activity in Column 1 and 57% of patenting in Column 2, compared to just 31% of population. If we instead rank on patents, Detroit, Portland, Dallas-Ft. Worth, and Houston feature in the 15 largest centers, with Washington, Miami, Atlanta, and Raleigh-Durham dropping out. Either way, patenting and especially venture capital investment are under-represented outside of leading tech centers.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table S1 next provide two measures of local employment in leading industries for R&D investment as measured by National Science Foundation (2017). We first show a restrictive definition, where we identify college-educated workers earning more than \$50,000 (short-hand labelled as "high-skilled") and working in a top 10 R&D-intensive sector—11.7% of such individuals work in the San Francisco area, compared to 5.9% of them being outside metropolitan areas. The second measure broadens to any full-time employee (no education or salary restriction) among the 20 most R&D-intensive sectors. Column 5 similarly looks at high-skilled workers in occupations in computer- and digital-connected work, and Column 6 expands to all full-time workers in a broader class of STEM-connected occupations.

This table shows the potential and challenges of defining tech clusters using the scale and density of local tech activity. Six cities appear to qualify under any aggregation scheme: San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, San Diego, Denver, and Austin all rank among top 15 locations for venture capital and for patents (scale) and hold shares for venture capital, patents, employment in R&D-intensive sectors, and employment in digital-connected occupations that exceed their population shares (density). These six cities are our core group for analysis. Washington, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and Raleigh-Durham would join the list if relaxing the expectation that that share of venture investment exceed population share (which is hard due to the very high concentration in San Francisco). These three borderline cases grow from 3.8% to 5.2% of US patents during our sample period, and thus their inclusion would be consistent with our results but also not greatly influence them.

New York and Los Angeles are more ambiguous: they hold large venture capital markets, but their patents and employment shares in key industries and fields are somewhat less than their population shares. They account for 7% of the patent share decline. At the other end of the city size distribution, it is hard to be a robust-yet-small tech cluster on both venture investment and patent metrics due to the concentration of innovation. If one only requires that a tech cluster achieve a venture capital and patent share that is 1.5x the local population share, the one new city would be Provo, UT, with Denver dropping out.

The reallocation that we emphasize in this paper is separate from the declines in industrial activity for the "Rust Belt" of America. As a representative calculation, the collective share of patenting in Buffalo NY, Cincinnati OH, Cleveland OH, Columbus OH, Indianapolis IN, Milwaukee WI, Pittsburgh PA, and St. Louis MO declined from 9.3% in 1975-1984 to 4.4% after 2015. Detroit is among the five major population centers in 1980 but does not play a significant role its decline as its patenting share grows slightly during the period. The dynamic is also not connected to a broad mean reversion phenomenon from 1980 stature: exactly half of the 20 largest cities in 1980 grow their patenting share and half experience declines.

2. Supporting Data Analysis and Statistical Methods

Table S2 tabulates the data used in Figure 2 of the main text.

We use two common measures to capture the agglomeration of innovative activity as documented in our patent dataset: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Ellison-Glaeser (EG) Index. We apply these two metrics at the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level.

Let *s_i* represent the share of patents in MSA *i*:

$$s_i = \frac{Number of Patents in MSA_i}{Total Number of Patents}$$

The HHI is defined as the sum of the squared shares of patenting held by MSAs:

$$HHI = \sum_{i} s_i^2$$

The EG (Ellison and Glaeser 1997) index incorporates more information than the HHI by including the underlying population share of the geographic unit as a benchmark against which to compare innovation shares. Define the MSA population share as p_i .

$$p_i = \frac{Population \ of \ MSA_i}{Total \ Population}$$

Then we define the EG index as follows:

$$EGI = \frac{\sum_i (s_i - p_i)^2}{1 - \sum_i p_i^2}$$

The EG metric takes a value of zero if innovation is spread out the same as population. Positive values indicate concentration that differs from what one would expect based upon population. This metric captures better than an HHI metric the reallocation of patenting among large cities.

Table S3 documents the patent counts, software share, and HHI and EG concentration levels for all patents and broken out into three major groups based upon the NBER categories: Computers and Communications together with Electrical and Electronics, Chemical together with Drugs and Medical, and Mechanical together with Miscellaneous/Others. This table shows the growth in software patenting in multiple technology areas and the rising EG values for software. It is noticeable that concentration levels are not rising substantially outside of software categories.

Figure S1 is a companion figure to Figure 4 in the main text. It shows the absolute patent counts used to generate the patent shares made up by each combination of NBER category and software relevance. This figure does not include the final period of 2015-2019 applications as the full level of patenting is not well established for that period yet due to the grants still in progress; Figure 4's composition is better assessed.

Figure S2 displays a correlation plot that models the stability of the spatial distribution of patenting across MSAs for software and non-software patents. High correlations, indicated by dark shading, measure that there has been very little change from one period to the other in patenting shares. This figure highlights the significant shift through the 1990s from an earlier spatial stability to the current one. This aligns with the significant shift in patent from the 1980 population centers into the tech clusters, with less subsequent movement once most of the transition occurred. The spatial distribution of software shows a stronger shift than non-software patenting.

Table S4 repeats Table S3 with breakouts by types of patent assignee: Industrial, University, Government, or Unassigned. Industrial patents are the majority and grow to be 85.7% of patents during 2015-2019. University patents are also a growing share, while government and unassigned patents are declining in absolute count and share. The EG values by assignee type from this table are used in Figure 3.

Tables S5a-S5b compare metrics of patent quality for tech clusters versus elsewhere for software and non-software patents, respectively. The first three metrics are directly from the patent data: number of claims, number of backward citations, and number of forward citations. The fourth metric recalculates forward citations excluding citations from the same assignee, and have also confirmed similar results when excluding citations from the same MSA as any inventor on the focal patent. (Forward looking measures have natural attrition in later periods as a shorter time horizon is used in their calculations.)

We also compute two metrics based upon Hall et al. (2001): Patent Originality and Patent Generality. Originality measures how novel an innovation is through the technological diversity of the patents cited. Let s_{ij} be the percentage of citations by patent *i* to patents in technology *j*; the originality metric is:

$$Originality_i = 1 - \sum_{j}^{n_j} s_{ij}^2$$

Generality measures how broad future use of a patent is based on the technological diversity of the future patents citing it. Let s_{ij} be the percentage of forward citations for patent *i* from patents in technology *j*. Then we define the Generality of patent *i* as follows.

$$Generality_i = 1 - \sum_{j}^{n_j} s_{ij}^2$$

In examining Tables S5a-S5b, there is no systematic evidence of patent quality being lower in tech clusters as they have come to represent more of US patenting.

Figure S3 shows the distribution of patents by assignee cohort in our four groups. We identify the first year that an assignee applies for a patent and keep that cohort assignment throughout the sample period. Technology clusters show a weaker reliance on older incumbent assignees than other cities. In addition, the assignees that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s show a large share of patenting in these locations compared to other locations.

Immigration to the United States increased substantially since 1975 for science and engineering, and these workers display greater spatial mobility for opportunities (see references in main text). Using ethnic namematching algorithms, we group inventors into those of Anglo-Saxon and European ethnicities vs ethnic inventors showing Chinese, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Vietnamese names. We restrict the next analyses to those inventors present in US cities, excluding rural areas.

Figure S4 displays the change in patent share among ethnic inventors over time. Anglo-Saxon and European ethnicity inventors decline from 90.6% of invention in 1975 to 66.0% for 2019. The growth of ethnic invention to one-third of U.S. patenting is due in large part to Chinese and Indian invention surging from collectively 3.4% of 1975 patenting to 22.3% for 2019. **Tables S6a-S6c** further catalogue the ethnic composition of inventors by period and for software vs. non-software. Ethnic inventors are more prevalent in fields Computers & Communications and Electrical & Electronic. Indian inventors are especially prominent for software patenting.

Figure S5 documents that this shift in inventor composition aided the rapid spatial reallocation of invention. Ethnic invention has been particularly important for the reallocation of patenting from the largest cities to tech clusters.

The section closes with two analyses that do not utilize the tech cluster definition. **Table S7** presents trends based dividing cities by the four with the biggest absolute change in patent counts from 1975 to 2020 (San Francisco, Seattle, Boston, and San Diego) compared to the next three (Los Angeles, New York City, and Detroit). Our trends carry through with this approach. Measures like Ellison and Glaeser concentration indices are not affected as they are calculated across the full city distribution.

Table S8 returns to the super-linear model patents \approx population^ β described in the main text. We estimate β =1.313 (0.037) for 1975-1979 and β =1.397 (0.047) for 2015-2019, like prior work. The first column of Table S7 repeats for interim years. The second and third columns show break outs for software and non-software. The final column shows the values when we reallocate patenting that occurs in tech

centers and the large population centers for a period according to the relative patent shares that were present in 1975-1979.

3. Variations for Defining Software Patents

Our paper models the substantial rise in the geographic concentration of patenting activity for the United States, and one of its core themes is that this is due to the increasing geographic concentration of software patents combined with the increasingly large share of software patents as a share of patents overall.

This section reviews in greater detail approaches for defining software patents to show the robustness of our spatial transformation under alternative algorithms.

Our main classification of "software patent" comes from Bessen and Hunt (2007, BH). As noted earlier, the BH algorithm requires the utility patent description include either the string "software" or the strings "computer" and "program", but must not contain "antigen" or "antigenic" or "chromatography". In addition, the patent title must not contain "chip" or "semiconductor" or "bus" or "circuit" or "circuitry". In short, BH is a string-matching algorithm that looks for key words to select and negatively select patents.

BH describe their motivation and process as follows: "Griliches (1990) reviews the two main techniques that researchers have used to assign patents to an industry or technology field: (1) using the patent classification system developed by the patent office; and (2) reading and classifying individual patents. In this paper, we use a modification of the second technique. We began by reading a random sample of patents, classifying them according to our definition of software, and identifying some common features of these patents. We used these to construct a search algorithm to identify patents that met our criteria."

In their design of their algorithm, BH state: "Our concept of software patent involves a logic algorithm for processing data that is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is not 'hard-wired.' These instructions could reside on a disk or other storage medium or they could be stored in 'firmware,' that is, a read-only memory, as is typical of embedded software. But we want to exclude inventions that do not use software as part of the invention. For example, some patents reference off-the-shelf software used to determine key parameters of the invention; such uses do not make the patent a software patent."

The BH approach has several strengths. Notably, it is straightforward to understand and can be applied to all patents. A potential weakness, which we examine below, is the propensity to include non-software patents that evade the negative selection terms.

BH evaluate their algorithm on a sample of 400 randomly selected patents in the period 1996-98. BH find that 78% of patents which were identified as software by manual examination were captured by the algorithm, while 84% of patents identified by the algorithm were actually software patents.

Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013, GV) take the other route noted by Griliches (1990) by defining software patents through a selected set of USPC classes. GV work builds upon a similar approach taken by Graham

and Mowery (2003, GM).¹ The GV approach again benefits from being straightforward to understand and implement, and it captures insights from patent examiners during the classification process. A potential weakness is that the chosen patent classes are not exclusive to software, allowing false positives, and that some patents will show up in other classes too.²

Layne-Farrar (2005) explores how well BH and the earlier GM approaches identified software patents. Layne-Farrar attempts to recreate the patent datasets generated by BH and GM for investigation. She then samples 500 BH and 320 GM patents, asking software experts to answer the question, "Is the patent clearly for a non-software innovation?" She reports that 6.3% of GM and 52.4% of BH patents were rejected by experts. Layne-Farrar suggests the high rejection rate for BH is due to the algorithm picking up instances that "mentioned software only in passing." The most common types of these patents related to "sensors/monitors, machinery, and transportation", and these patents "typically did not qualify as software because the software control portion of the sensor/machine generally used standard algorithms and methods ("off-the-shelf" software in Bessen and Hunt's parlance), with the novel part of the invention entirely captured in the mechanical portion." For some purposes, this expert scrutiny might be too strict.

We also investigate the performance of the BH and GV algorithms with our own sample of 1600 patents from NBER Category 2: Computers & Communications. We focus on this category to center the exercise (including the upcoming machine learning algorithm) in the NBER category where both techniques place

¹ Graham S. & D. Mowery. (2003). Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software Industry. In Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy (W. Cohen & S. Merrill, eds.).

² The class-subclass pairs are as follows. Class 29: Subclasses 026000-065000, 560000-566400, 650000- 650000; Class 73: Subclasses 455000-487000, 570000-669000; Class 84: Subclasses 600000-746000; Class 235; Class 236; Class 244: Subclasses 003100-003300, 014000; Class 250; Class 257; Class 307; Class 315; Class 318: Subclasses 700000-832000; Class 320; Class 323; Class 324; Class 326; Class 327; Class 330; Class 331; Class 340: Subclasses 850000-870440; Class 340: Subclasses 002100-010600, 825000-825980; Class 340: Subclasses 286010-693900, 901000-999000; Class 340: Subclasses 815400-815730, 815740- 815920; Class 341: Subclasses 020000-035000, 173000-192000; Class 341: Subclasses 001000-017000, 050000-172000, 200000-899000; Class 342: Subclasses 001000-465000; Class 343; Class 345: Subclasses 001100-215000, 418000-428000, 440000-472300, 473000-475000, 501000-517000, 518000-689000, 690000-698000, 699000; Class 348; Class 353; Class 355; Class 356: Subclasses 002000-003000, 004090- 004100, 006000-027000, 030000-139000, 140000, 142000-151000, 153000-900000; Class 358: Subclasses 001100-003320, 260000-517000, 518000-540000; Class 359: Subclasses 326000-332000; Class 361: Subclasses 001000-270000, 437000; Class 363; Class 365; Class 367: Subclasses 001000-008000, 009000, 010000-013000, 014000-080000, 081000-085000, 086000, 087000-092000, 093000-094000, 095000- 191000, 197000-199000, 900000-910000, 911000-912000; Class 368; Class 369: Subclasses 001000-032000, 043000-054000, 058000-062000, 064000, 069000-070000, 083000-095000, 097000, 100000-126000, 128000-152000, 174000-175000, 275100-276000, 300000; Class 370; Class 374; Class 375; Class 378: Subclasses 004000-020000, 210000-901000; Class 379: Subclasses 067100-088280, 188000-337000; Class 380; Class 381; Class 382; Class 385; Class 386; Class 396: Subclasses 028000, 048000-304000, 310000- 321000, 373000-386000, 406000-410000, 421000, 449000-501000, 505000-510000, 529000-533000, 563000; Class 398; Class 438: Subclasses 009000, 689000-698000, 704000-757000; Class 455; Class 463: Subclasses 001000-047000, 048000-069000; Class 473: Subclasses 065000, 070000, 136000, 140000- 141000, 151000-156000, 407000; Class 482: Subclasses 001000-009000, 051000-053000, 057000-065000, 069000-070000, 112000-113000; Class 600: Subclasses 001000-015000, 019000-041000, 300000-406000, 407000-480000, 481000-507000, 529000-595000, 920000-921000; Class 606: Subclasses 001000-052000, 163000-164000; Class 623: Subclasses 024000-026000; Class 700; Class 701; Class 702; Class 703: Subclasses 001000-010000, 011000-012000, 013000-999000; Class 704; Class 705; Class 706; Class 707; Class 708; Class 709; Class 710; Class 711; Class 712; Class 713; Class 714: Subclasses 001000-100000, 699000-824000; Class 715; Class 716; Class 717; Class 718; Class 719; Class 725; Class 726; Class 901; Class 902.

their most patents. We generate a stratified sample of patents evenly split over eight time periods: 1976-79, 1980-84, ..., 2010-14. This stratification ensures equal representation of technologies from different periods and avoided oversampling later patent technologies due to increasing numbers of patents over time. Within each strata, we randomly selected 100 BH patents, 50 GV patents, and 50 patents that neither algorithm had selected as software related. We sampled more BH patents given that it was the primary software definition used in the paper.

We manually evaluated the patent title, abstract, and description of these 1600 patents to classify whether we deemed them software related. We followed the BH conceptual model of seeking to identify software patents as separate from hard-wired instructions and to not simply capture "off-the-shelf" software use. One patent was sampled twice, and some patents could not be confidently classified as software or non-software. These patents were omitted from the sample, resulting in a final sample size of 1559 unique patents. During manual review and classification, 788 patents were classified as software and 771 patents were classified as non-software.

Table S9 shows diagnostics on software definitions. The BH algorithm identifies 91% of the patents which were manually classified as software (recall), but only 79% of patents identified as software by the algorithm were manually classified as software (precision). Our sample selection favored patents that are more likely to be classified as software by BH algorithm, so this performance level may be an upper bound.

Compared to their stated goal and the parsimonious keyword structure, we conclude BH does a reasonably good job. The algorithm is liable to over-select software patents, which is what we see in our manual review. Patent 5252970: Ergonomic multi-axis controller is an example of a BH software patent that we deemed in error. The abstract reads:

"A manually operated ergonomic multi-axis controller such as those used for controlling cursor position along x and y axes and for entering x, y and/or z coordinate information into a computer or the like. The housing includes a distal end portion angled with respect to the upper surface and the base of the housing to conform to the natural curvature of the human hand. The primary actuator, such as a trackball or joystick is positioned at the distal end portion. Secondary actuators are located along the sides of the housing."

This patent relates to a hardware invention that may have software elements for communicating with the computer system to which it serves as an input device, but this software is not the focus of the invention. The BH algorithm responds to the statement "types of controllers described below, are often used in conjunction with computer graphics software" in the patent specification to classify it as software.

In our manual review, we adjust BH conceptual model to also focus more generally on patents where the invention relies on using some type of computation or logical instructions to be run by a central processing unit (CPU). Consider for instance Patent 4238746: Adaptive line enhancer. The abstract reads:

"An input signal X(j) is fed directly to the positive port of a summing function and is simultaneously fed through a parallel channel in which it is delayed, and passed through an adaptive linear transversal filter, the output being then subtracted from the instantaneous input signal X(j). The difference, X(j)-Y(j), between these two signals is the error signal .epsilon.(j). .epsilon.(j) is multiplied by a gain .mu. and fed

back to the adaptive filter to readjust the weights of the filter. The weights of the filter are readjusted until .epsilon.(j) is minimized according to the recursive algorithm: ##EQU1## where the arrow above a term indicates that the term is a signal vector. Thus, when the means square error is minimized, W.sub.(j+1) =W.sub.(j), and the filter is stabilized."

The BH algorithm does not classify this as a software patent, but we do based upon the need to implement the invention into software code to complete the computations outlined.

Table S9 also reports diagnostics on the GV algorithm. GV's recall rate is 98% and its precision is 68%. As with BH, we emphasize these results are specifically for NBER Category 2 patents and thus the recall rate is likely to be lower when applied across the full patent database.

Patent 4238746: Adaptive line enhancer discussed above is an example of a patent that we deem software but is not classified as software by the GV algorithm because its USPC classification, 333/166 Time Domain Filters, is not used as a software class by the algorithm. Patent 6827508: Optical fiber fusion system is, however, classified as a software patent via its USPC class 385/96 Fusion Splicing. Its abstract reads:

"An automated fusion system includes a draw assembly for holding optical fibers and for applying a tension to the fibers. The fibers are held substantially parallel to each other in the draw assembly. The system also includes a removal station that etches or strips buffer material from the fibers after the fibers have been placed in the draw assembly, and a heater or torch assembly for heating the fibers as the draw assembly applies a tension to the fibers in a manner that causes the fibers to fuse together to form a coupler region. In addition, a packaging station is used to secure a substrate to the coupler region of the fibers to form the optical coupler." This patent is about a production process for optical fibers, rather than anything to do with software invention.

Table S9 shows that performance of BH and GV algorithms is best after 1995, increasing on both precision and recall from the 1970s until that point. The BH and GV algorithms show a 0.515 correlation.

Table S10a shows our concentration levels using the GV technique. The GV approach is based upon USPC classes and cannot be reliably extended to the last period after the USPC system ends. The GV approach shows a higher level of initial software patenting in **Table S10a**, with very similar trend growth. The key findings for our four city groupings and the EG concentration metric are almost identical in **Table S11a**. This consistency to the outcomes with the BH algorithm is very reassuring.

Using these 1559 hand-coded patents, we also developed a third approach by training a machine learning (ML) algorithm. Conceptually, this is an extension of both techniques, giving up the transparency of BH's keywords for a computational approach that particularly bolsters negative selection. The training on many patents in GV classes also benefits from perspectives developed during the examination process. We used 80% of the sample to train the algorithm and the remaining 20% for out-of-sample testing. The ML algorithm is stingier in assignment (88% recall) but has fewer false positives (85% precision) on the out-of-sample test. ML patents show a 0.584 and 0.444 correlation to the BH and GV definitions, respectively.³

³ Our procedure uses Natural Language Processing methods. We use a transformer model named Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT, https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.04805) provided by the Hugging

Table S10b shows our concentration levels using the ML technique. The key findings for our four city groupings and the EG concentration metric are again very similar in **Table S11b**.

Following common practice, we assigned a patent to be software related in the ML procedure if the probability was greater than 50%. 57.2% of the sample had a probability of 10% or less, 17.5% of the sample had a probability between 10% and 80%, and 25.3% of the sample had a probability of more than 80%. We observe even higher clustering (a 2015-2019 EG value of 0.071) when using the latter group only.

Finally, we incorporated the recently released work of Giczy et al. (2021) for designating AI-related patents. In their Table A1, they report Precision, Recall, and F1 as 0.405, 0.375, and 0.390, respectively. Their technique assigns AI-related to 12.7% of patents in 1975-2019 sample; by comparison, BH estimate 29.4% are software related across the same period. Most of their AI-related patents are also selected by the software definitions: 84.1%, 92.7%, and 94.8% are also BH, GV, and ML patents, respectively. **Table 10c** and **Table S11b** show concentration levels are even higher among AI-related patents.


We close by emphasizing that the purpose of these comparisons and our machine learning exercise was to demonstrate robustness to the core work developed in this paper using the BH algorithms. We hope in future work to continue using these techniques more broadly over patent technologies.

Face (https://huggingface.co) community organization. The BERT model is made up of a complex deep neural network architecture, and Hugging Face provides pre-trained BERT models that can be fine-tuned through transfer learning (i.e., the process of training models on one corpus of documents and tuning it to a similar but different corpus of documents). For our use case, we make use of the SciBERT (https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.10676) model which is a BERT model trained to a corpus of scientific documents.

Step 1: Adapt the SciBERT Language model to the patent corpus. We want to train the SciBERT model to the patent corpus used for classification. We extract patents used to generate our sample, i.e. patents in NBER Category 2 and with grant years 1976-2014. We then randomly sample 1% of patents from this group for unsupervised training of the language model. This group is split into an 80-20 train-validation split for training the language model. We use a masked language model for training, where the train set is used by the model for unsupervised learning of the model weights and the validation set is used to evaluate how well the model is learning the weights through a prediction task for next token prediction with a 15% probability of token masking across the sequence.


Step 2: Train a classification layer added to the end of the adapted SciBERT model. With the masked language model training completed, we use the Hugging Face AutoModelForSequenceClassification class to load the trained model and append a classification head on top of it for use in our classification task. We split our manually generated supervised dataset of 1559 patents in an 80-20 train-test split for the classification task. We make use of active learning in the training process. Specifically, we split our train dataset into 50% subtrain and 50% validation, then we iteratively add the most impactful patents from the validation dataset back to the subtrain dataset with each training cycle. We determine the "most impactful patents" by evaluating the patents for which the model got the prediction wrong and where it was most erroneously confident in the prediction. For instance, an impactful patent would be one which has a ground truth of software, but the model predicted non-software with a probability of non-software more than 75%. The expanded subtrain dataset is then used for training in the next cycle of training. Each cycle of training consists of 3 epochs, and we use 3 cycles of active learning, moving at most 125 patents each cycle, for a total of 4 training cycles. In all cycles and epochs, we use the held-out test set to evaluate performance.

Fig. S1: US patents by technology category and software-related




Notes: Figure presents the average annualized U.S.-based patent grants by the six major NBER categories and whether software-related. The thatched portion of each series is software-related, the solid portion is non-software-related. The final period of 2015-2019 is not shown due to incomplete series.

Fig. S2: Correlation plot of MSA patent shares across periods




Persistence of MSA Software Patent Shares

Persistence of MSA non-Software Patent Shares




Notes: Figure presents the correlation of the distribution of patenting activity from period to period in the sample and decomposes this patenting activity by software patents and non-software patents.

Fig. S3: Distribution of patents by assignee cohort



Notes: Figure groups applications by the application date of their first patent regardless of location.


Fig. S4: Ethnic composition of US invention




Notes: Figure presents the ethnic composition of US domestic inventors. Anglo-Saxon and European contributions (not shown) collectively decline from 90.6% in 1975 to 66.0% in 2019.

Fig. S5: Ethnic patenting and spatial adjustments

A: Distribution of ethnic patenting



B: Distribution of Anglo-Saxon and European patenting



Notes: See Figure S4. Figure presents the spatial distribution of patenting by the ethnicity of inventors for 1975-1979 compared to 2015-2019. Ethnicity is assigned through inventor names. Ethnic patenting includes those with Chinese, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and Vietnamese names.

Consolidated metro area	Venture capital investment	Granted patents	Employment in top 10 R&D industries, high-skilled	Employment in top 20 R&D industries, all workers	Employment in computer- and digital- connected occupations, high-skilled	Employment in STEM- connected occupations, all workers	Population
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
San Francisco	48.1%	18.4%	11.7%	4.9%	8.6%	5.5%	2.5%
New York	15.3%	6.0%	6.3%	5.1%	8.0%	6.0%	6.4%
Boston	10.5%	4.5%	5.5%	2.4%	3.4%	2.7%	1.6%
Los Angeles	6.5%	5.3%	5.6%	5.7%	3.9%	3.9%	5.8%
Seattle	2.1%	4.0%	4.2%	2.4%	3.5%	2.5%	1.2%
San Diego	1.9%	3.6%	3.2%	1.6%	1.5%	1.5%	1.0%
Chicago	1.7%	2.5%	3.2%	3.2%	3.9%	3.2%	2.9%
Washington DC	1.5%	1.7%	4.4%	1.8%	6.6%	4.6%	1.8%
Miami	1.5%	0.7%	0.9%	1.1%	1.0%	1.2%	1.4%
Denver	1.1%	1.5%	1.5%	0.9%	1.7%	1.5%	1.0%
Austin	1.0%	2.1%	1.8%	1.0%	1.5%	1.2%	0.6%
Philadelphia	0.8%	1.8%	3.3%	2.1%	2.4%	2.2%	2.0%
Atlanta	0.7%	1.5%	1.4%	1.6%	2.8%	2.3%	1.7%
Minneapolis-St. Paul	0.7%	2.0%	1.3%	1.7%	2.0%	1.9%	1.0%
Raleigh-Durham	0.5%	1.4%	1.7%	0.8%	1.2%	1.0%	0.5%
Share in top 15 VC MSAs	93.8%	57.0%	55.9%	36.0%	52.1%	41.2%	31.3%
Share in other MSAs	5.9%	37.3%	38.3%	49.3%	41.8%	47.9%	48.0%
Share in non-metro areas	0.3%	5.7%	5.9%	14.8%	6.1%	10.9%	20.7%

Notes: Table lists the top 15 (consolidated) MSAs in terms of venture capital investment in descending rank. Venture capital investments are for 2015-2018 based upon location of new investments in ventures and are taken from Thomson One. Patents are for 2015-2018 based upon the most frequent location of inventors and application date of utility patents and are taken from patents granted by the USPTO through end of 2019. Employment columns are for 2014-2018 using the combined American Community Survey 1% files. ACS sample includes those aged 18-65 who are working and with positive wage earnings, not in group quarters, with usual hours worked greater than 30 per week, and with usual weeks worked per year greater than 40. High-skilled workers are those with college-degrees or higher in education and earning \$50,000 or more. The 10 industries with the highest R&D per worker as listed by NSF (2017) are Software publishers; Pharmaceuticals and medicines; Other computer and electronic products; Data processing, hosting, and related services; Communications equipment; Semiconductor and other electronic components; Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments; Pesticide, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemicals; Aerospace products and parts; Scientific research and development services. These industries in some cases map into more than one NAICS industry in the ACS for employment data. Population data are 2015-2018 based upon counties that comprise MSAs and are taken from the Census Bureau. There are 281 MSAs identified in the venture capital, patent, and population data and 261 identified in the ACS data. Population distributions in the ACS are very similar, with the one noticeable difference of LA being a 4.2% share. Table taken from Kerr and Robert-Nicoud (2020).

	Tech clusters (6 cities)	Five largest cities in 1980	Other 270 cities	non-Urban areas
		A. All p	oatents	
1975-1979	0.113	0.322	0.455	0.110
1980-1984	0.124	0.298	0.468	0.110
1985-1989	0.139	0.276	0.478	0.107
1990-1994	0.163	0.252	0.485	0.100
1995-1999	0.233	0.221	0.463	0.084
2000-2004	0.274	0.202	0.448	0.076
2005-2009	0.310	0.198	0.427	0.066
2010-2014	0.337	0.189	0.413	0.062
2015-2019	0.342	0.186	0.410	0.061
		B. Softwar	re patents	
1975-1979	0.202	0.300	0.432	0.067
1980-1984	0.200	0.272	0.465	0.063
1985-1989	0.217	0.257	0.457	0.070
1990-1994	0.274	0.217	0.452	0.057
1995-1999	0.374	0.188	0.396	0.042
2000-2004	0.413	0.166	0.381	0.039
2005-2009	0.436	0.175	0.355	0.033
2010-2014	0.461	0.169	0.337	0.033
2015-2019	0.454	0.172	0.339	0.035
		C. non-Softw	vare patents	
1975-1979	0.110	0.323	0.455	0.112
1980-1984	0.120	0.299	0.468	0.113
1985-1989	0.133	0.277	0.480	0.110
1990-1994	0.150	0.256	0.488	0.105
1995-1999	0.198	0.228	0.480	0.094
2000-2004	0.219	0.216	0.474	0.091
2005-2009	0.229	0.212	0.472	0.086
2010-2014	0.233	0.205	0.476	0.086
2015-2019	0.231	0.200	0.481	0.087

Table S2: Concentration levels

Notes: See Figure 2.

	Paten	t count	Software	Herfi	ndahl-Hirschma	an Index	E	Ellison-Glaeser I	on-Glaeser Index	
	Total	Software	share	Total	Software	non-Software	Total	Software	non-Software	
					A. All Patents	3				
1975-1979	197,897	4,968	2.5%	0.041	0.046	0.041	0.003	0.009	0.003	
1980-1984	181,212	8,635	4.8%	0.037	0.039	0.037	0.003	0.007	0.003	
1985-1989	214,539	15,172	7.1%	0.034	0.038	0.034	0.003	0.008	0.003	
1990-1994	293,573	31,174	10.6%	0.032	0.044	0.031	0.005	0.017	0.004	
1995-1999	443,669	87,172	19.6%	0.039	0.067	0.035	0.013	0.039	0.009	
2000-2004	526,751	148,325	28.2%	0.045	0.071	0.038	0.020	0.046	0.013	
2005-2009	515,688	201,201	39.0%	0.050	0.076	0.038	0.025	0.050	0.014	
2009-2014	630,822	285,806	45.3%	0.057	0.092	0.038	0.032	0.065	0.014	
2015-2019	494,057	246,593	49.9%	0.058	0.093	0.036	0.033	0.065	0.013	
			В.	Computers/Cor	mmunication +	Electrical/Electroni	ic			
1975-1979	46,367	3,458	7.5%	0.046	0.049	0.045	0.007	0.012	0.007	
1980-1984	46,652	6,063	13.0%	0.042	0.043	0.042	0.008	0.010	0.007	
1985-1989	57,965	10,540	18.2%	0.040	0.041	0.040	0.010	0.011	0.010	
1990-1994	87,764	22,327	25.4%	0.044	0.052	0.042	0.017	0.025	0.015	
1995-1999	177,186	69,591	39.3%	0.064	0.077	0.058	0.038	0.049	0.032	
2000-2004	251,806	121,025	48.1%	0.071	0.082	0.065	0.046	0.057	0.040	
2005-2009	280,364	167,932	59.9%	0.075	0.087	0.062	0.049	0.060	0.037	
2009-2014	340,067	233,063	68.5%	0.093	0.108	0.068	0.067	0.081	0.044	
2015-2019	275,123	198,549	72.2%	0.093	0.108	0.062	0.066	0.080	0.038	
				C. Cher	micals + Drugs/	Medicine				
1975-1979	53,724	334	0.6%	0.056	0.062	0.056	0.012	0.014	0.012	
1980-1984	53,021	730	1.4%	0.051	0.045	0.051	0.011	0.009	0.011	
1985-1989	61,737	1,523	2.5%	0.046	0.037	0.046	0.009	0.007	0.010	
1990-1994	87,414	3,623	4.1%	0.040	0.042	0.040	0.008	0.012	0.009	
1995-1999	124,661	8,255	6.6%	0.041	0.053	0.040	0.012	0.026	0.011	
2000-2004	127,046	12,512	9.8%	0.044	0.055	0.043	0.016	0.030	0.015	
2005-2009	113,673	15,255	13.4%	0.043	0.056	0.042	0.016	0.029	0.015	
2009-2014	147,643	25,869	17.5%	0.043	0.052	0.042	0.016	0.026	0.015	
2015-2019	102,251	21,216	20.7%	0.045	0.057	0.043	0.018	0.030	0.016	
				D. Mee	chanical + Misc	ellaneous				
1975-1979	97,806	1,176	1.2%	0.035	0.040	0.035	0.003	0.006	0.003	
1980-1984	81,539	1,842	2.3%	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.002	0.004	0.002	
1985-1989	94,837	3,109	3.3%	0.029	0.035	0.029	0.002	0.004	0.002	
1990-1994	118,395	5,224	4.4%	0.027	0.031	0.027	0.003	0.006	0.003	
1995-1999	141,822	9,326	6.6%	0.027	0.033	0.026	0.003	0.006	0.003	
2000-2004	147,899	14,788	10.0%	0.027	0.034	0.027	0.005	0.010	0.005	
2005-2009	121,651	18,014	14.8%	0.028	0.037	0.027	0.006	0.012	0.007	
2009-2014	143,112	26,874	18.8%	0.028	0.042	0.027	0.008	0.018	0.007	
2015-2019	116,683	26,828	23.0%	0.029	0.044	0.026	0.009	0.022	0.007	

Table S3: Concentration ratios within technology divisions

Notes: Metrics consider agglomeration of US domestic invention across 281 MSAs, with invention in rural areas excluded. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measure the sum of squared shares of activity for cities. Ellison and Glaeser metrics consider agglomeration of invention relative to MSA populations. Patents are grouped in Panels B-D into the six major NBER technology categories; a small number of patents are not included in the break-outs due to lack of NBER tech code.

	Paten	t count	Software	Herfi	ndahl-Hirschma	Index	E	llison-Glaeser I	ndex
	Total	Software	share	Total	Software	non-Software	Total	Software	non-Software
				A.	Industrial assig	nees			
1975-1979	138,940	3,983	2.87%	0.042	0.046	0.043	0.005	0.010	0.005
1980-1984	131,947	7,124	5.40%	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.005	0.008	0.005
1985-1989	152,800	12,268	8.03%	0.035	0.039	0.035	0.005	0.009	0.005
1990-1994	211,220	25,650	12.14%	0.034	0.046	0.033	0.007	0.020	0.006
1995-1999	343,117	76,899	22.41%	0.043	0.072	0.038	0.018	0.045	0.013
2000-2004	431,907	134,474	31.13%	0.050	0.076	0.043	0.026	0.052	0.018
2005-2009	438,643	185,587	42.31%	0.055	0.081	0.042	0.030	0.055	0.019
2009-2014	542,523	264,333	48.72%	0.064	0.098	0.042	0.039	0.071	0.018
2015-2019	425,980	228,270	53.59%	0.066	0.099	0.040	0.040	0.071	0.017
				В.	University assig	gnees			
1975-1979	2,099	108	5.15%	0.054	0.078	0.053	0.032	0.052	0.032
1980-1984	3,185	220	6.91%	0.043	0.057	0.043	0.020	0.034	0.020
1985-1989	5,723	571	9.98%	0.046	0.055	0.045	0.021	0.029	0.020
1990-1994	11,362	1,352	11.90%	0.040	0.049	0.040	0.018	0.025	0.018
1995-1999	19,145	2,657	13.88%	0.041	0.043	0.041	0.016	0.018	0.016
2000-2004	21,340	3,938	18.45%	0.036	0.034	0.037	0.013	0.013	0.013
2005-2009	22,651	5,430	23.97%	0.034	0.035	0.034	0.011	0.009	0.012
2009-2014	29,585	8,318	28.12%	0.035	0.037	0.035	0.012	0.012	0.012
2015-2019	20,892	6,571	31.45%	0.034	0.036	0.034	0.013	0.014	0.013
				C. C	Government assi	gnees			
1975-1979	5,461	179	3.28%	0.060	0.098	0.060	0.039	0.089	0.038
1980-1984	4,302	236	5.49%	0.076	0.072	0.077	0.054	0.055	0.054
1985-1989	3,108	249	8.01%	0.082	0.068	0.085	0.061	0.052	0.063
1990-1994	5,125	513	10.01%	0.110	0.082	0.114	0.091	0.065	0.095
1995-1999	4,740	661	13.95%	0.120	0.078	0.129	0.108	0.067	0.116
2000-2004	4,793	867	18.09%	0.121	0.113	0.124	0.108	0.099	0.111
2005-2009	4,235	931	21.98%	0.120	0.114	0.123	0.106	0.100	0.108
2009-2014	4,731	1,271	26.87%	0.123	0.099	0.135	0.109	0.089	0.121
2015-2019	3,386	996	29.42%	0.129	0.120	0.135	0.117	0.109	0.122
					D. Unassigned	1			
1975-1979	51,426	699	1.36%	0.044	0.071	0.044	0.005	0.019	0.005
1980-1984	41,838	1,055	2.52%	0.039	0.057	0.039	0.003	0.011	0.003
1985-1989	53,191	2,101	3.95%	0.036	0.046	0.036	0.003	0.007	0.003
1990-1994	66,880	3,755	5.61%	0.034	0.045	0.033	0.002	0.009	0.002
1995-1999	78,873	7,181	9.10%	0.034	0.046	0.034	0.003	0.011	0.002
2000-2004	70,980	9,371	13.20%	0.035	0.047	0.034	0.004	0.014	0.003
2005-2009	53,097	9,846	18.54%	0.035	0.051	0.033	0.004	0.018	0.003
2009-2014	58,164	12,932	22.23%	0.035	0.056	0.032	0.005	0.023	0.003
2015-2019	46,973	11,631	24.76%	0.035	0.056	0.031	0.005	0.021	0.003

 Table S4: Concentration ratios by type of assignee

Notes: See Table S3. Patents are grouped in Panels A-D by type of assignee. Patents can be assigned to two or more types of assignees.

	Patent Count	Number of Claims	Backward Citations	Forward Citations	Forward Citations External	Patent Originality	Patent Generality
			A.	Technology Clu	sters		
1975-1979	1,002	15.2	6.8	39.6	37.9	0.466	0.677
1980-1984	1,728	16.0	8.1	49.3	47.9	0.555	0.679
1985-1989	3,293	17.5	9.9	69.2	66.9	0.588	0.687
1990-1994	8,536	20.1	11.8	83.9	80.9	0.604	0.697
1995-1999	32,562	24.2	17.9	80.6	75.5	0.631	0.681
2000-2004	61,299	26.4	25.9	33.7	30.4	0.649	0.574
2005-2009	87,700	21.8	29.3	13.6	11.3	0.631	0.418
2009-2014	131,884	20.9	27.0	6.1	4.5	0.594	0.281
2015-2019	111,913	20.0	25.1	1.2	0.7	0.569	0.085
				B. All Other			
1975-1979	3,966	15.6	6.4	34.6	33.2	0.493	0.673
1980-1984	6,907	15.4	8.4	43.1	41.2	0.563	0.675
1985-1989	11,879	17.3	10.1	54.9	52.4	0.592	0.681
1990-1994	22,638	18.6	12.3	64.0	60.8	0.605	0.679
1995-1999	54,610	22.2	19.1	66.0	62.3	0.628	0.665
2000-2004	87,026	24.6	24.9	31.5	28.1	0.639	0.565
2005-2009	113,501	20.2	27.8	12.6	10.4	0.620	0.413
2009-2014	153,922	19.1	29.8	5.8	4.2	0.600	0.282
2015-2019	134,680	18.5	32.1	1.4	0.7	0.579	0.071

 Table S5a: Patent quality comparison for software patents

Notes: Table compares the patent traits for technology clusters compared to other regions. Number of claims, backward citations, and forward citations are derived from the USPTO directly. Forward citations external excludes forward citations in the originating assignee. Originality and Generality indices follow Hall et al. (2001).

	Patent Count	Number of Claims	Backward Citations	Forward Citations	Forward Citations External	Patent Originality	Patent Generality
			A.	Technology Clu	sters		
1975-1979	21,300	11.1	5.6	19.7	18.8	0.428	0.588
1980-1984	20,745	12.0	6.9	24.2	23.0	0.492	0.603
1985-1989	26,573	14.2	8.5	33.5	31.9	0.536	0.614
1990-1994	39,461	15.8	10.5	42.3	40.0	0.557	0.617
1995-1999	70,646	19.0	14.7	41.8	38.8	0.580	0.603
2000-2004	82,923	21.3	23.7	26.7	23.6	0.598	0.526
2005-2009	72,063	18.7	36.4	12.7	10.0	0.604	0.400
2009-2014	80,455	17.9	36.8	5.8	3.8	0.594	0.278
2015-2019	57,152	17.9	35.3	1.2	0.6	0.576	0.054
				B. All Other			
1975-1979	171,629	10.5	5.7	16.5	15.7	0.415	0.578
980-1984	151,832	11.5	7.4	20.2	19.0	0.470	0.582
1985-1989	172,794	13.1	8.9	24.7	23.2	0.511	0.588
1990-1994	222,938	14.2	10.9	29.4	27.4	0.540	0.588
1995-1999	285,851	16.8	14.4	28.4	26.0	0.564	0.571
2000-2004	295,503	19.6	20.6	19.1	16.7	0.583	0.502
2005-2009	242,424	17.1	26.8	10.8	8.8	0.584	0.378
2009-2014	264,561	16.7	30.9	5.2	3.8	0.573	0.236
2015-2019	190,312	16.4	32.6	1.1	0.5	0.553	0.050

Lubie Sebt Lutent quantif comparison for non Solenare parents	Table S5b:	Patent of	quality (comparison	for non-soft	ware patents
---	------------	-----------	-----------	------------	--------------	--------------

Notes: See Table S5a.

				Ethr	nicity of Inve	ntor			
	Anglo-Saxon	Chinese	European	Hispanic	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Russian	Vietnam.
1975-1979	74.6	2.0	15.5	3.0	1.9	0.5	0.3	2.0	0.1
1980-1984	73.2	2.8	15.1	3.0	2.5	0.7	0.5	2.1	0.1
1985-1989	72.1	3.3	14.7	3.3	2.8	0.8	0.5	2.2	0.2
1990-1994	70.1	4.4	14.1	3.5	3.5	0.9	0.6	2.4	0.3
1995-1999	66.3	6.5	13.6	3.6	5.1	1.0	0.7	2.7	0.5
2000-2004	62.4	8.7	13.0	3.9	6.3	1.1	0.9	3.1	0.6
2005-2009	59.1	10.3	12.3	4.1	7.9	1.2	1.2	3.3	0.6
2010-2014	57.1	11.2	11.7	4.6	9.1	1.0	1.3	3.4	0.6
2015-2019	55.4	11.6	11.5	5.1	10.0	1.0	1.4	3.4	0.6
Chemicals	63.6	8.3	13.9	3.7	5.5	1.0	0.9	2.9	0.4
Computers	55.2	11.2	11.7	4.2	11.4	1.1	1.1	3.4	0.6
Pharmaceuticals	61.5	8.6	14.0	4.6	5.7	1.0	1.0	3.1	0.5
Electrical	59.2	11.0	12.6	3.8	6.7	1.2	1.4	3.4	0.6
Mechanical	71.6	3.9	13.8	3.6	3.0	0.8	0.5	2.5	0.3
Miscellaneous	73.1	3.2	13.4	4.2	2.5	0.6	0.5	2.2	0.3

 Table S6a:
 Ethnic composition of inventors residing in United States

Notes: Table presents descriptive statistics for inventors residing in the US at the time of patent application. Inventor ethnicities are estimated through inventors' names using techniques described in the text. Patents are grouped by application years and major technology fields.

				Ethr	nicity of Inver	ntor			
	Anglo-Saxon	Chinese	European	Hispanic	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Russian	Vietnam.
1975-1979	76.5	2.1	14.1	2.7	1.7	0.4	0.2	2.2	0.1
1980-1984	74.5	2.3	14.6	3.0	2.4	0.7	0.3	2.2	0.1
1985-1989	73.5	2.9	13.9	3.0	3.0	0.7	0.4	2.2	0.2
1990-1994	69.9	4.9	14.1	3.1	3.9	0.9	0.5	2.4	0.4
1995-1999	64.7	7.0	13.4	3.2	6.7	1.1	0.5	2.8	0.6
2000-2004	60.5	8.7	12.7	3.8	8.7	1.1	0.7	3.3	0.6
2005-2009	56.2	10.6	11.9	4.1	10.8	1.2	1.1	3.5	0.6
2010-2014	53.4	12.0	11.3	4.5	12.3	0.9	1.3	3.6	0.5
2015-2019	51.4	12.5	11.0	5.0	13.3	0.9	1.6	3.7	0.6
Chemicals	61.2	9.4	12.6	3.9	6.4	1.2	1.2	3.5	0.5
Computers	54.3	11.1	11.4	4.3	12.8	1.0	1.1	3.4	0.6
Pharmaceuticals	59.9	8.9	13.7	4.6	6.5	0.8	1.4	3.7	0.5
Electrical	56.9	12.1	12.4	4.0	7.8	1.2	1.4	3.7	0.6
Mechanical	66.2	7.0	12.9	3.8	5.1	0.9	0.8	2.9	0.3
Miscellaneous	70.1	4.3	13.2	4.2	3.6	0.8	0.6	2.7	0.5

Table S6b: Ethnic composition of inventors residing in United States for software patents

Notes: See Table S6a.

				Ethr	nicity of Inver	ntor			
	Anglo-Saxon	Chinese	European	Hispanic	Indian	Japanese	Korean	Russian	Vietnam.
1975-1979	74.6	2.0	15.5	3.0	1.9	0.5	0.3	2.0	0.1
1980-1984	73.1	2.8	15.2	3.0	2.5	0.7	0.5	2.1	0.1
1985-1989	72.0	3.4	14.7	3.3	2.8	0.8	0.5	2.2	0.2
1990-1994	70.2	4.4	14.2	3.5	3.5	0.9	0.6	2.4	0.3
1995-1999	66.7	6.4	13.7	3.7	4.7	1.0	0.7	2.7	0.5
2000-2004	63.1	8.7	13.2	4.0	5.4	1.1	1.0	3.0	0.6
2005-2009	61.0	10.1	12.5	4.1	6.1	1.2	1.2	3.2	0.6
2010-2014	60.1	10.5	12.1	4.7	6.4	1.1	1.2	3.2	0.6
2015-2019	59.4	10.7	11.9	5.2	6.7	1.1	1.3	3.2	0.6
Chemicals	63.7	8.2	14.0	3.6	5.4	0.9	0.9	2.8	0.4
Computers	57.9	11.5	12.4	3.7	7.8	1.5	1.3	3.1	0.8
Pharmaceuticals	61.8	8.5	14.0	4.6	5.5	1.1	1.0	3.0	0.5
Electrical	59.9	10.7	12.7	3.8	6.4	1.3	1.3	3.3	0.6
Mechanical	72.3	3.5	13.9	3.6	2.7	0.8	0.5	2.4	0.2
Miscellaneous	73.4	3.1	13.4	4.2	2.4	0.6	0.5	2.1	0.3

Table S6c: Ethnic composition of inventors residing in United States for non-software patents

Notes: See Table S6a.

Tab	le S7: Table S2	based upon lai	rgest patenting	g changes
	Top 4: SF, SEA, BOS, SD	Next 3: LA, NYC, DET	Other 274 cities	non-Urban areas
		A. All	natents	
1975-1979	0.100	0.214	0.575	0.110
1980-1984	0.108	0.199	0.582	0.110
1985-1989	0.122	0.188	0.583	0.107
1990-1994	0.140	0.172	0.588	0.100
1995-1999	0.199	0.156	0.561	0.084
2000-2004	0.241	0.149	0.534	0.076
2005-2009	0.273	0.147	0.515	0.066
2010-2014	0.304	0.141	0.494	0.062
2015-2019	0.307	0.143	0.489	0.061
		B. Softwa	re patents	
1975-1979	0.178	0.225	0.530	0.067
1980-1984	0.170	0.196	0.571	0.063
1985-1989	0.184	0.188	0.559	0.070
1990-1994	0.229	0.158	0.555	0.057
1995-1999	0.312	0.139	0.507	0.042
2000-2004	0.355	0.125	0.481	0.039
2005-2009	0.380	0.135	0.451	0.033
2010-2014	0.418	0.130	0.419	0.033
2015-2019	0.408	0.137	0.420	0.035
		C. non-Softw	ware patents	
1975-1979	0.098	0.214	0.577	0.112
1980-1984	0.105	0.199	0.583	0.113
1985-1989	0.117	0.188	0.585	0.110
1990-1994	0.129	0.174	0.592	0.105
1995-1999	0.172	0.160	0.574	0.094
2000-2004	0.196	0.158	0.555	0.091
2005-2009	0.204	0.154	0.555	0.086
2010-2014	0.209	0.150	0.555	0.086
2015-2019	0.206	0.150	0.557	0.087

 Table S7: Table S2 based upon largest patenting changes

Notes: See Table S2.

	Total	Software	non-Software	Counterfactual
1975-1979	1.313	1.144	1.309	1.313
1980-1984	1.327	1.293	1.322	1.325
1985-1989	1.312	1.389	1.304	1.305
1990-1994	1.309	1.484	1.294	1.300
1995-1999	1.361	1.604	1.333	1.356
2000-2004	1.380	1.623	1.333	1.378
2005-2009	1.434	1.679	1.354	1.431
2010-2014	1.435	1.670	1.343	1.434
2015-2019	1.397	1.605	1.309	1.397

 Table S8:
 Super-linear patenting to population rates

Notes: Table reports estimations of β coefficient from a model of patents \approx population β . The last column shows the values when we reallocate patenting that occurs in tech centers and the large population centers for a period according to the relative patent shares that were present among these cities in 1975-1979. This highlights the degree to which the reallocation between tech centers and large population centers is largely orthogonal to the super-linear parameter calculated across the full city size distribution.

	Bes	Bessen and Hunt (2007)			and Vishnubhak	at (2013)	Machine Learning Approach		
-	F1	Precision	Recall	F1	Precision	Recall	F1	Precision	Recall
Test Sample							0.861	0.846	0.877
Full Sample	0.843	0.788	0.906	0.801	0.679	0.976	0.894	0.874	0.915
1975-1979	0.682	0.600	0.789	0.667	0.514	0.948	0.832	0.798	0.870
1980-1984	0.753	0.638	0.918	0.661	0.497	0.986	0.824	0.722	0.959
1985-1989	0.806	0.750	0.871	0.784	0.655	0.978	0.881	0.929	0.839
1990-1994	0.842	0.802	0.885	0.786	0.667	0.958	0.885	0.885	0.885
1995-1999	0.935	0.953	0.918	0.851	0.763	0.964	0.872	0.911	0.836
2000-2004	0.902	0.855	0.955	0.862	0.768	0.982	0.931	0.893	0.973
2005-2009	0.846	0.792	0.908	0.856	0.759	0.982	0.930	0.891	0.972
2010-2014	0.912	0.870	0.958	0.898	0.815	1.000	0.950	0.935	0.966

Table S9: Diagnostics on software definitions

Notes: Table reports precision and recall estimates from an application of algorithms to a random sample of patents classified by authors as software related. We randomly sampled 1600 patents from NBER Category 2 stratified across eight periods from 1976-79 to 2010-14. Within each period, we sampled 100 BH, 50 GV, and 50 other patents. One patent was sampled twice, and several could not be reliably assigned, resulting in a final sample of 1559 patents. A machine learning algorithm was trained on 80% of data and then tested out-of-sample on the remaining 20%. F1=2*(precision*recall)/(precision+recall).

	Tech clusters	Five largest	Other 270	non-Urban			
	(6 cities)	cities in 1980	cities	areas			
		A. All p	patents				
1975-1979	0.113	0.322	0.455	0.110			
1980-1984	0.124	0.298	0.468	0.110			
1985-1989	0.139	0.276	0.478	0.107			
1990-1994	0.163	0.252	0.485	0.100			
1995-1999	0.233	0.220	0.463	0.084			
2000-2004	0.274	0.202	0.448	0.077			
2005-2009	0.307	0.198	0.428	0.067			
2010-2014	0.323	0.195	0.415	0.067			
		B. Softwar	re patents				
1975-1979	0.183	0.324	0.422	0.071			
1980-1984	0.200	0.291	0.442	0.066			
1985-1989	0.228	0.256	0.445	0.070			
1990-1994	0.270	0.223	0.450	0.056			
1995-1999	0.360	0.187	0.409	0.044			
2000-2004	0.396	0.172	0.393	0.039			
2005-2009	0.424	0.175	0.367	0.033			
2010-2014	0.449	0.174	0.346	0.031			
	C. non-Software patents						
1975-1979	0.097	0.322	0.462	0.119			
1980-1984	0.104	0.300	0.474	0.122			
1985-1989	0.113	0.281	0.488	0.118			
1990-1994	0.125	0.262	0.497	0.116			
1995-1999	0.157			0.107			
2000-2004	0.172	0.227	0.496 0.494	0.108			
2005-2009	0.183 0.222		0.493	0.102			
2010-2014	0.193	0.217	0.486	0.105			

 Table S10a:
 Concentration levels using GV definition

Notes: See Table S2. Software defined using Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013).

	Tech clusters (6 cities)	Five largest cities in 1980	Other 270 cities	non-Urban areas
		A. All p	patents	
1975-1979	0.113	0.322	0.455	0.110
1980-1984	0.124	0.298	0.468	0.110
1985-1989	0.139	0.276	0.478	0.107
1990-1994	0.163	0.252	0.485	0.100
1995-1999	0.233	0.221	0.463	0.084
2000-2004	0.274	0.202	0.448	0.076
2005-2009	0.310	0.198	0.427	0.066
2010-2014	0.337	0.189	0.413	0.062
2015-2019	0.342	0.186	0.410	0.061
		B. Softwar	re patents	
1975-1979	0.160	0.348	0.424	0.068
1980-1984	0.195	0.315	0.432	0.057
1985-1989	0.231	0.293	0.413	0.063
1990-1994	0.278	0.260	0.411	0.052
1995-1999	0.364	0.217	0.378	0.041
2000-2004	0.400	0.195	0.368	0.037
2005-2009	0.425	0.190	0.349	0.036
2010-2014	0.459	0.179	0.327	0.035
2015-2019	0.461	0.176	0.328	0.036
		C. non-Softv	vare patents	
1975-1979	0.109	0.320	0.457	0.114
1980-1984	0.117	0.296	0.471	0.116
1985-1989	0.128	0.274	0.486	0.112
1990-1994	0.141	0.250	0.499	0.110
1995-1999	0.182	0.222	0.496	0.100
2000-2004	0.209	0.205	0.489	0.097
2005-2009	0.227	0.203	0.482	0.087
2010-2014	0.238	0.197	0.482	0.083
2015-2019	0.242	0.195	0.480	0.083

 Table S10b:
 Concentration levels using machine learning approach

Notes: See Table S2. Software defined using machine learning algorithm.

Table S10c: Concentration levels using AI definition								
	Tech clusters (6 cities)	6) non-Urban areas				
		A. All p	patents					
1975-1979	0.113	0.322	0.455	0.110				
1980-1984	0.124	0.298	0.468	0.110				
1985-1989	0.139	0.276	0.478	0.107				
1990-1994	0.163	0.252	0.485	0.100				
1995-1999	0.233	0.221	0.463	0.084				
2000-2004	0.274	0.202	0.448	0.076				
2005-2009	0.310	0.198	0.427	0.066				
2010-2014	0.337	0.189	0.413	0.062				
2015-2019	0.342	0.186	0.410	0.061				
		B. AI-relate	ed patents					
1975-1979	0.183	0.317	0.425	0.076				
1980-1984	0.211	0.288	0.442	0.058				
1985-1989	0.263	0.254	0.420	0.063				
1990-1994	0.319	0.217	0.411	0.053				
1995-1999	0.426	0.192	0.349	0.033				
2000-2004	0.452	0.174	0.344	0.031				
2005-2009	0.471	0.178	0.326	0.025				
2010-2014	0.505	0.173	0.297	0.024				
2015-2019	0.502	0.172	0.301	0.026				
	C. non-AI patents							
1975-1979	0.112	0.322	0.455	0.111				
1980-1984	0.123	0.298	0.468	0.111				
1985-1989	0.136	0.276	0.480	0.108				
1990-1994	0.156	0.254	0.488	0.102				
1995-1999	0.213	0.223	0.475	0.089				
2000-2004	0.247	0.206	0.464	0.083				
2005-2009	0.275	0.202	0.448	0.074				
2010-2014	0.296	0.193	0.440	0.071				
2015-2019	0.302	0.190	0.438	0.070				

 Table S10c:
 Concentration levels using AI definition

Notes: See Table S2. AI-related patents defined using Giczy et al. (2021).

	Patent count		Software	oftware Herfindahl-Hirschman Index		Ellison-Glaeser Index			
	Total	Software	share	Total	Software	non-Software	Total	Software	non-Software
			A. C	Core results usin	ng Bessen and H	Hunt (2007) approa	ch		
1975-1979	197,897	4,968	2.51%	0.041	0.046	0.041	0.003	0.009	0.003
1980-1984	181,212	8,635	4.77%	0.037	0.039	0.037	0.003	0.007	0.003
1985-1989	214,539	15,172	7.07%	0.034	0.038	0.034	0.003	0.008	0.003
1990-1994	293,573	31,174	10.62%	0.032	0.044	0.031	0.005	0.017	0.004
1995-1999	443,669	87,172	19.65%	0.039	0.067	0.035	0.013	0.039	0.009
2000-2004	526,751	148,325	28.16%	0.045	0.071	0.038	0.020	0.046	0.013
2005-2009	515,688	201,201	39.02%	0.050	0.076	0.038	0.025	0.050	0.014
2009-2014	630,822	285,806	45.31%	0.057	0.092	0.038	0.032	0.065	0.014
2015-2019	494,057	246,593	49.91%	0.058	0.093	0.036	0.033	0.065	0.013
			B. Alterr	native definitio	n from Graham	and Vishnubhakat	(2013)		
1975-1979	197,891	36,200	18.3%	0.041	0.050	0.039	0.003	0.009	0.003
1980-1984	181,181	37,687	20.8%	0.037	0.045	0.036	0.003	0.009	0.003
1985-1989	214,429	48,666	22.7%	0.034	0.044	0.033	0.003	0.011	0.003
1990-1994	293,466	77,971	26.6%	0.032	0.048	0.030	0.005	0.019	0.003
1995-1999	443,307	165,500	37.3%	0.039	0.071	0.030	0.013	0.042	0.005
2000-2004	525,416	238,531	45.4%	0.045	0.076	0.031	0.020	0.050	0.007
2005-2009	493,712	254,707	51.6%	0.049	0.079	0.031	0.024	0.052	0.008
2009-2014	303,394	154,871	51.0%	0.056	0.095	0.032	0.030	0.067	0.009

Table S11a: Comparison of software and AI definitions

Notes: See Tables S3 and S10a.

	Patent count		Software Herfindahl-Hirschman Index			Ellison-Glaeser Index			
	Total	Software	share	Total	Software	non-Software	Total	Software	non-Software
			A. Us	ing machine le	earning algorith	m for software pate	ents		
1975-1979	197,897	13,549	6.85%	0.041	0.052	0.040	0.003	0.009	0.003
1980-1984	181,212	16,072	8.87%	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.003	0.010	0.003
1985-1989	214,539	23,926	11.15%	0.034	0.047	0.033	0.003	0.011	0.003
1990-1994	293,573	48,792	16.62%	0.032	0.048	0.030	0.005	0.016	0.004
1995-1999	443,669	123,657	27.87%	0.039	0.062	0.033	0.013	0.032	0.008
2000-2004	526,751	178,614	33.91%	0.045	0.067	0.037	0.020	0.039	0.014
2005-2009	515,688	214,965	41.69%	0.050	0.072	0.039	0.025	0.044	0.016
2009-2014	630,822	280,922	44.53%	0.057	0.089	0.039	0.032	0.061	0.016
2015-2019	494,057	225,945	45.73%	0.058	0.092	0.039	0.033	0.063	0.016
			B. Usin	g AI-related pa	atent definition	from Giczy et al. (2	2021)		
1975-1979	197,893	1,778	0.90%	0.041	0.049	0.040	0.003	0.009	0.003
1980-1984	181,184	2,726	1.50%	0.037	0.044	0.037	0.003	0.008	0.003
1985-1989	214,436	5,342	2.49%	0.034	0.047	0.034	0.003	0.014	0.003
1990-1994	293,473	12,999	4.43%	0.032	0.058	0.032	0.005	0.027	0.004
1995-1999	443,348	40,893	9.22%	0.039	0.083	0.036	0.013	0.053	0.010
2000-2004	526,503	68,801	13.07%	0.045	0.083	0.041	0.020	0.056	0.017
2005-2009	515,238	90,882	17.64%	0.050	0.089	0.044	0.025	0.061	0.019
2009-2014	630,314	121,650	19.30%	0.057	0.113	0.048	0.032	0.083	0.023
2015-2019	494,056	99,931	20.23%	0.058	0.119	0.048	0.033	0.089	0.024

 Table S11b:
 Comparison of software and AI definitions

Notes: See Tables S10b and S10c. Values in Panel B are for AI and non-AI related paents.