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Control and Fairness: What Determines Elected Local Leaders' Support for Hosting Refugees in Their Community?

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Control and Fairness: What determines elected local leaders' support for hosting refugees in their community?*

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Abstract

When it comes to successful refugee reception the local level matters. Research overwhelmingly examines host communities' attitudes, but endorsement from local politicians is equally important to resolving conflicts and facilitating harmonious interaction. Yet, the preferences of local leaders and their willingness to support the resettlement process are understudied. We conduct the first-ever conjoint experiment on a representative sample of local elected leaders in Greece, a heavily impacted country with many active host sites. We elicit elite preferences regarding refugee resettlement and find that local leaders are more likely to support it if they are involved in the process and can control the frequency and intensity of local-refugee interactions. Overall, our results suggest that processes enabling elites to control exposure, when combined with fair-share allocations schemes, can facilitate future resettlement. Such processes, however, also have the potential to introduce new humanitarian concerns and debates about refugee mobility.

*The study was pre-registered at OSF. The pre-analysis plan (PAP) and the full survey instrument can be found following this [link](#). We would like to thank Mara Vidali for providing excellent research assistance throughout this project. We also thank Marco Tabellini, the editors, three anonymous referees, and various participants at seminars in Bocconi University, UCL, University of Pennsylvania, and the APSA 2021 annual meeting for useful comments and suggestions. Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop>). The empirical analysis has been successfully replicated by the JOP replication analyst. Authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose.

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Local communities’ attitudes and behavior are among the most important determinants of refugees’ successful socio-economic integration into host societies. As evidence suggests, refugees’ long-run outcomes (economic, educational, and otherwise) depend on them living in more accepting social environments (for a summary, see [OECD 2018](#)). Yet, local communities’ receptivity towards refugees –and thus the inclusiveness of the social environment refugees encounter– is also shaped by the rhetoric, actions and decisions of local political elites.

What, however, determines local political leaders’ attitudes and preferences towards refugee resettlement schemes? What types of processes are they willing to endorse? These questions matter. Local elites are responsible for many aspects of resettlement and integration policy. Without their support, policy implementation can become significantly more challenging ([Betts et al. 2020](#)). Local leaders also act as mediators (or instigators) of conflict. Their resistance –and sometimes outright hostility– to resettlement processes mandated by central governments can stoke popular backlash and violence. The Greek island of Lesbos, where locals opposed to settlement camps fight violently with refugees and the organizations that serve them and local officials denounce national policies, ([Editorial 2017](#)) is a case in point. Still, little is known about the preferences of local political leaders with respect to the issue of refugee resettlement. There are very few published studies ([Shaffer et al. 2020](#); [Doherty et al. 2019](#)) that focus on local politicians’ attitudes. Interestingly, this stands in sharp contrast to an abundance of high-quality research on citizens’ preferences and attitudes about refugees and migrants (e.g. [Bansak et al. 2016](#); [Hangartner et al. 2019](#); [Adida et al. 2018](#); [Getmansky et al. 2020](#)). Whereas these papers inform us about the “profiles” of refugees that locals (and in one case) local politicians are willing to host, refugees’ identity attributes are not negotiable or changeable. As such, these studies tell us little about actual policy choices or the political feasibility constraints that surround successful implementation of refugee resettlement. Furthermore, important emerging work ([Lahdelma 2021](#)) suggests that there are indeed mechanisms through which the arrival of asylum seekers can increase

support for refugee hosting schemes among citizens and politicians alike, especially in rural areas.

We address this gap in the literature by fielding a conjoint survey experiment on a representative sample of locally-elected municipal officials in Greece ($N = 586$; AAPOR response rate 44.3%). Greece has been at the forefront of the ongoing European refugee crisis since 2015 and its level of exposure has been intense.¹ Moreover, in Greece, where dozens of active refugee reception facilities and host sites of various types and sizes are scattered across the country, the migration debate often centers around the local issues that arise with the presence of such sites and the challenges they pose for the harmonious interaction between locals and refugees. These challenges extend well beyond the identity characteristics of refugees, and include such practical considerations as settlement location, administrative oversight, funding, and the issue of refugee mobility. Local politicians become heavily involved in these debates and career concerns may factor in significantly in shaping their preferences.

The conjoint experiment asked elected local officials to choose between two resettlement proposals (each containing five attributes) that were hypothetically submitted for approval at the municipal council. The proposals focus on the characteristics of the refugee host sites (size, type, geographical location, and administrative authority) and the provision of additional municipal funds to hosting municipalities. Our study design introduces several novelties. Not only are the characteristics of hosting sites both logically and anecdotally critical to the success of integration and harmony, but local politicians also have much more say over them than they do over the identity of the refugees arriving in their municipalities. This is especially the case in “transit states” like Greece, where many refugees and migrants “got stuck” seeking passage to other parts of Europe as borders closed in response to the 2015 crisis. Indeed, local government officials in Greece have been asked repeatedly by the central government about their preferences and suggestions on the size, type, and location

¹To put this in perspective, Greece received almost 50,000 new asylum requests in 2019 alone, whereas the USA with a population 30 times larger received only 30,000.

of refugee host sites and facilities (see, e.g. [Georgiopolou 2021](#)). Thus, by explicitly asking local politicians how they would cast their votes should specific resettlement schemes reach the floor of their municipal council, we directly elicit political behavior that is consequential for policy. This approach also allows us to focus on the *general equilibrium* effects of refugee resettlement schemes for small communities in a realistic way: hosting a refugee site is different from accepting a *single* hypothetical refugee based on their identity characteristics.

Our proposals draw directly on a ‘fair-share allocation’ approach endorsed by the Greek central government to ‘decongest’ the municipalities heavily impacted by the 2015 crisis (see Appendix [B](#)). This approach spreads hosting obligations across localities in Greece, such that the size of refugee settlements would not exceed 1% of the local population anywhere in the country. Studying this fair-share approach has relevance beyond the case of Greece, as NIMBY (not in my backyard) collective action problems have been shown reduce support for resettlement in one’s own locality ([Ferwerda et al. 2017](#)). Still, other European states have proposed similar formulas for redistributing refugees across and within nations –the proposal has again been brought to the table in response to the Afghan crisis– and some evidence suggests that European citizens are in favor of such proportional allocation schemes ([Bansak et al. 2017](#)). We lack evidence, however, on whether such directives framing refugee resettlement as fairness can influence local leaders’ preferences or calculus. Put simply, *how* the refugee resettlement process is carried out, who controls it, how it is incentivized, and whether it is framed as “fair” might all be important factors in determining the willingness of local politicians to offer their endorsement.

We report two main findings. First, local councilors support policies that allow for a more controlled and gradual exposure to refugees: sites that are small in size, geographically distant from the urban center and that restrict the mobility of refugees (e.g. partially closed and closed sites) gain their overwhelming support. Second, they are mostly willing to approve resettlement schemes that do not exceed centrally-mandated hosting obligations framed as “fair” and that give them authority over site administration. Taken together,

these findings suggest that in order to accept a refugee host site in their municipality, local politicians will compromise on resettlement mandates framed as fair, but still exhibit strong a preference for controlling the likelihood and frequency with which refugees interact with locals. This implies, in turn, elites’ preference for a more controlled process of exposure (and contact) between citizens and refugees. Second, we find only one notable –and surprising given our pre-registered priors– difference between elected officials serving in municipalities that already have refugee hosting sites versus those that do not: Councilors serving in the former are no more opposed to hosting larger sized camps (greater than 1%).

Our work makes several contributions. First, our experimental design is the first that explores multiple dimensions of the resettlement process, especially elected-officials’ role in controlling the nature and intensity of contact between locals and refugees (e.g. host site’s location, refugees’ freedom of movement etc.). Second, the work builds on previous studies ([Hangartner et al. 2019](#)), which point to the difficulties local communities face in effectively managing intense migratory flows as the main reasons behind the observed backlash against refugees. Given the extreme overcrowding and atrocious conditions in many hosting sites, resettlement is not just a policy question, but thus also a humanitarian one. Third, our work points to the fact that much of the opposition to hosting refugees can be addressed, despite lack of control over refugees’ identity characteristics, if local communities and their leaders regain some say over the design and implementation of the process. This is a wholly new insight that suggests a possible refocusing of public policies from trying to alter locals’ attitudes –which is costly and must be long-run- to engaging elected stakeholders in the design and implementation of the resettlement process. Finally, and complementary to work by [Lahdelma \(2021\)](#), our findings cast doubt on a widely-held assumption that refugee arrivals always lead to heightened anti-refugee sentiment. They further suggest, building on important new work by [Schwartz et al. \(2021\)](#), that views about control are a key mechanism for understanding how attitudes towards refugees evolve in tandem with changing political contexts.

Design and Theoretical Mechanisms

We designed our experiment to test a series of mechanisms that can shed light on the determinants of local elites' support for refugee hosting and integration. Our first set of mechanisms relate to control. The growing frictions between international and non-governmental actors (e.g. IOM, UNHCR) and local communities may have made local leaders less willing to support hosting refugees, especially if they fear that they will have little say over a process that they find quite 'arbitrary' and ad hoc in terms of planning or if they feel they have not been properly consulted. In some areas, locals express more anger at IOs and NGOs than towards refugees, arguing that such organizations lack proper oversight and create pull factors that attract more migrants. As a local official in a municipality designated to receive a new site exclaimed: "Think about it! I got a phone call past midnight with someone telling me they were possibly going to set-up a camp in my village. A camp larger than our actual village! Greece is a democracy. Is that democratic?" (Author interview, 03/11/2019) Councilors may also want to control the precise location where camps are set-up and the freedom of movement of those in them, so that intense and rapid exposure between locals and refugees does not induce backlash, as in the summer 2015 crisis (Hangartner et al. 2019). In the words of another interviewee: "It is one thing to host a refugee camp. It is another thing to turn our whole town center into a giant refugee camp." (Author interview, 03/10/2019). More drastically, a local representative of the ruling party remarked on social media: "Maybe the following is a good way to understand the issues surrounding the construction of closed camps: Immigration flows are the disease, like the Corona Virus. A new virus is something that scares because the unknown causes terror. Gradually we learned the virus and how to confront it. A closed camp is the vaccine that shields us. [...] When the virus is out of control you would rather be vaccinated (closed, controlled camp) so you will avoid the ICU (Kipos Souda.)"² *Kipos Souda* refers to a public park on the Greek Island of Chios where

²See: <https://www.news247.gr/koinonia/chios-ratsistiko-paralirima-stelechoys-tis-nd-pa-romoiazei-toys-metanastes-me-ton-koronoio.9494059.html>

refugees sought shelter as a result of camp over-crowding.

Our second set of mechanisms relates to how centralized mandates framed as procedural fairness regarding the allocation of refugees conditions the response of local elected leaders to refugee resettlement proposals. Evidence at the citizen level shows that opposition to hosting refugees might stem from the perceived ‘unfairness’ of a process that resulted in some localities shouldering disproportionately more than their fair-share (Hangartner et al. 2019). Preliminary qualitative work for this study revealed similar narratives at the elite level. One local official from a heavily impacted municipality with an active site told us: “[T]his time we cannot handle it. The question of where to host all these people created huge divisions. People are asking: Why us? Didn’t we already do enough? Shouldn’t others do more?” (Author interview, 03/08/2019). In other words, local leaders might be willing to host refugees, but only if they expect to host a number that is framed as fair and *proportional* to the local population.³ Considerations of fairness also relate to the increased demands put on public resources in heavily impacted communities. Another councilor from a municipality with 8,000 locals and over 3,500 refugees told us: “My constituents had a shock and we were not prepared. Immediately people were asking me. Where will we find room in the hospitals? How will we run our schools? I had no answers.” (Author interview, 03/06/2019) Thus, the two sets of our (pre-registered) hypotheses follow:

H.1 (Control): Support for hosting sites increases when the process of resettlement is managed by local authorities compared to IOs, government agencies and other NGOs.

H.1a (Control): Local leaders are more likely to support refugee resettlement if the process guarantees a lower frequency/intensity type of contact.

H.2 (Fairness): Opposition to (support for) hosting sites increases as the proportion of refugees relative to the local population moves above (below) the mandated fair-share threshold.

³In Appendix B we further discuss the relationship between size and fairness considerations as they relate to spatial distribution


H.2b (Fairness): Opposition (support) to hosting sites decreases (increases) when public goods to the municipality are increased to meet additional demand.

Data and Methods

We conducted our survey in October 2020 via an email campaign and recruited 586 councilors. Our study was pre-registered with OSF. We presented each councilor with three pairs of alternative resettlement proposals with randomly assigned attribute values and randomized the attribute order (between subjects). The proposals varied on five attributes: (1) type of public good provision used for municipal compensation, (2) host site size, (3) who is in charge of daily site administration, (4) site proximity to the urban center and (5) the type of site. The reasoning behind attribute selection and values is presented in Appendix B. After being shown a pair, councilors were asked to rate each proposal (Likert scale) and choose the one package they would vote for in the council (forced choice). To identify the causal effects of the different attributes of the council proposals on preferred proposal, we leverage the difference in attributes between distinct proposals to estimate the following OLS regression (AMCEs and MMs) in Equation 1:

$$Y_{ijk} = a_0 + \gamma_k + \delta \mathbf{T}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

where T_{ij} is a treatment vector (containing five randomly assigned values) that indicates whether (or not) a resettlement proposal has a particular attribute value and Y_{ijk} is the outcome variable (Likert scale and binary). Respondents were asked to choose between $j = 2$ alternative resettlement proposals in each of their $k = 3$ choice tasks. We cluster the standard errors by respondent i . In some specifications we also use municipal FE and entropy balancing weights (see SI appendix Table C.2 and Fig. B.4). In the SI appendix (sections A and B), we also present more details on data collection and methods, including various covariate balance tests.



Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These values can be interpreted as the average probability that a councilor will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. SE's are clustered by respondent (N= 586); N= 3,516.

Figure 1: Aggregate marginal means (MMs)


Results

Fig. 1 displays marginal means for each attribute value. These values can be interpreted as the average probability that a councilor will support each resettlement proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. Given the wording of our question, forced choice and marginal means can be directly interpreted as the *expected support* that a proposal containing this particular attribute value would receive if it were to come to a vote in the municipal council *ceteris paribus*. In the Appendix, we present alternative specifications and various robustness checks, including AMCEs (see Table C.2) and the Likert-scale outcome (see Fig B.3). Results are substantively identical with the ones presented below.

Overall, the aggregate preference of local elected leaders that we identify is one of ‘conditional support’ towards hosting refugees and desire for control. Councilors want sites that limit refugee mobility. Mostly clearly, they are likely to support the creation of a site in their

municipality if control of site management remains in national hands. Councilors strongly object to any host site being set up in the urban center of their municipality (but additional distance from urban centers does not matter), and they clearly prefer small-sized camps and object to hosting more than the proportionally ‘fair’ 1% –coefficient point estimates are statistically different from each other ($p < .01$). That is, the ‘fair-share’ allocation rule appears to be a reasonable compromise gaining just about sufficient support, but exceeding it draws strong objections. Local elites are also more likely to support the creation of a site when it involves considerable public goods investment in their municipality. Interestingly, and consistent with an emphasis on fairness, the type of municipal investments that elites’ prefer are ones that increase management efficacy as opposed to simply extracting political rents through patronage (the latter being a common critique of Greek local elites). Taken together, these results suggest that local politicians are not adamantly opposed to setting up host sites in their municipalities; but they do want compliance with the “fair” process and one that guarantees limited and mediated interaction between refugees and locals, most importantly, one being controlled and managed by national (central or local) government. Despite this aggregate pattern, there is also significant preference heterogeneity depending on councilors’ ideology. Subgroup analysis presented in the Appendix Section [D](#) reveals that two of the attributes related to control—the type of host site and who manages it—show significant divergence from aggregate preferences, while there is no such divergence between councilors on the left vs. right when it comes to fairness (camp size and public goods).

Finally, the impact of all these factors could be further exacerbated by councilors’ past experience of hosting refugees within their municipal boundaries. Since such past experiences usually entailed very intense and badly managed exposure –with little opportunity for meaningful contact—it is possible that the presence of an active refugee camp within municipal boundaries would make local leaders more hostile to hosting additional refugees. In [Fig. 2](#), we examine whether the presence of an active host site in a councilors’ municipality alters their attitudes towards resettlement. We fail to find evidence of this. That is, opposition to



Note: Plot shows marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analysis by the presence of an active refugee host site in councilors' municipality. SE's are clustered by respondent.

Figure 2: MMs based on presence of active host sites

hosting larger camps (more the 1% of the population) is *not* stronger in municipalities that already host a refugee camp. In other words, when refugee-hosting obligations are framed within 'fair-share allocation' bounds, even elites in municipalities that have experience hosting refugees are no more likely to oppose hosting larger-sized camps.⁴

In sum, our results suggest that the way forward resembles a *saddle path*: a scaled-down process, controlled by national or local elites, which restricts contact between locals and refugees, will likely get sufficient endorsement from local leaders. As municipalities begin to accept host sites, the sustained yet proportional presence of refugees can possibly facilitate, and at the very least will not exacerbate (see Fig. 2), reactions to the continuation of the resettlement process. The ultimate normative aim of resettlement programs is to provide better conditions for asylum seekers and to minimize the hosting "burden" in heavily impacted localities by distributing it more equally. Our work thus directly touches upon a critically important dimension of the refugee issue: the humanitarian one. Most of the problems underlying the severe humanitarian crisis in Greece until now (e.g. overcrowding, poor sanitation and living conditions, lack of security) can be attributed to policy decisions and failures. Yet the voice of politicians—and especially local politicians—is conspicuously absent from academic inquiry. We find that for local politicians, there is a very strong preference that control over site administration remains in national hands (either central or local government). Our findings also suggest that in solving for one set of humanitarian

⁴We provide a test of this in Appendix Section C.3.

issues, new humanitarian concerns about refugees’ freedom of movement are likely to take center stage and polarize national debates (See Figure D.8). This work therefore has clear implications regarding the trade-offs involved in addressing the pressing humanitarian issues in overcrowded sites in Greece (e.g. Lesvos), elsewhere in Europe (e.g. Mineo, Sicily) and beyond.

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A SURVEY PROCEDURE AND SAMPLING PROCESS

A.1 Fieldwork

Prior to launching the survey, we conducted six months of fieldwork including meetings with government officials (local and national), workers in health and education, and citizens. Furthermore, we visited refugee reception and host sites throughout Greece and interviewed members of the administrative staff as well as citizens residing nearby to help perfect our survey materials. We also spoke to numerous municipal officials in heavily impacted, moderately impacted and non-impacted localities. Before being fielded, the research was approved by through a formal IRB. We note that we use the term refugees for all persons being hosted in refugee reception and host sites during their asylum application process. Refugee reception facilities are meant to host refugees temporarily until their application has been reviewed.

A.2 Recruitment, Survey distribution and Response rates

Interaction with research participants was through a Qualtrics survey distributed by electronic invitation. Invitations were sent with the help of the research organization Public Opinion Research Unit at the University of Macedonia (PORU UoM), which has performed a large number of prior surveys in Greece on similar topics. Working from publicly available contact information for all of Greece’s 332 municipalities, we contacted 4,463 council members with invitations. Participants were able to access the survey from a link, and if they expressed interest in the research by clicking the link, a written copy of the consent form was made available to the prospective participant. If consent was given, the survey proceeded. The anticipated completion time for this survey was 30-35 minutes. Also, we should note that the survey did not involve the use of deception or false information.

In the first round, 41.71% of invitations were opened and 10.22% clicked to proceed to the research. There were then two reminder rounds, which were accompanied by reminder phone calls to all municipalities (49.47% opened and 8.12% clicked and 25% opened and 5.76% clicked in these two subsequent rounds). To put this in perspective, according to PORU UoM, the average campaign statistics on the category of “Education Training” are 23.43% opens and 2.90% clicks, while in the “Government” category are 28.77% opens and 3.99% clicks.

Our response rate is 44.8%, which is very good compared to other comparative political

elite surveys, (see for example) with reported response rates varying between 13% (France) and 43% (Netherlands) with an average response rate of 25%.⁵ At the end of the campaign, 624 municipal council members completed the survey with 586 of them completing at least one task of the conjoint experiment.

A.3 Sample representativeness

The localities represented by municipal council members in our sample cover a large portion of Greece. Specifically, we have respondents from 194 municipalities (60% of Greek municipalities), covering 100% of the 52 Greek prefectures and 100% of the 13 Greek regional units. We used quota sampling based on three characteristics: gender, regional unit and party affiliation. Gender-wise, we perfectly matched the actual distribution of elected councilors following the last election in 2019 (81% men to 19% women) with a ratio of 8:2. In terms of administrative/geographical distribution, we received responses from councilors from all the 13 regional units of Greece. Our sample of councilors is proportional to the numbers of elected council members across each of the 13 regional units.⁶ Regarding party affiliation, 55% of our respondents did not share their party affiliation. From those who indicated their affiliation, we had respondents from all eight parties represented in municipal councils across Greece and in proportions that closely match the actual distribution of seats in the municipals council across parties –the distribution of seats is not proportional to the actual distribution of vote-shares as Greece applies a party list formula that is distorting.

During our fieldwork, we collected data on refugee reception centers and host sites from each municipality. To measure the effect of the presence of an active camp on preferences regarding resettlement schemes, we created a binary variable where 1 indicates that there is a refugee reception and host site in the relevant municipality with a capacity of *at least 100* people, and 0 otherwise (there are 38 such sites in Greece distributed across 36 municipalities; the number of councilors in our sample, representing 27 out of these 36 municipalities, is 97 (or 16.6% of total respondents)).

⁵We calculate the Response Rate based on the following formula: $\text{Response Rate} = I / ((I+P)+(R+NC+O)+(UH+UO))$ where I=Complete Interviews, P=Partial Interviews, R=Refusal and break off, NC=Non-Contact, O=Other, UH=Unknown Household and UO=Unknown other. To calculate the outcome rates based on AAPOR’s Standard Definitions, Version 9 (2016) and e , which is the estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible. This estimate is based on the proportion of eligible units among all units in the sample for which a definitive determination of status was obtained (a conservative estimate). For more, see AAPOR’s 2009 Eligibility Estimates. We use the AAPOR Outcome Rate Calculator for Internet/ specifically named persons, Version 4.1 (web), March 2018.


⁶There are two regional units (Thessaly and Peloponnese) where the number of councilors we managed to recruit was slightly below the proportional threshold but the differences were marginal.

Because of IRB restrictions, we were unable to collect any identifiable data at the individual level on the respondents. Thus, we cannot check for representativeness using an individual level regression. We can, however, do the next best thing, which is checking for representativeness more systematically at the municipal level.

To do this, we create a municipal level “participation ratio” variable, which measures the percentage of councilors that responded to us in each municipality. We present a histogram of this variable in Figure A.1, which shows the distribution of participation across municipalities. On average, 15% of councilors participated from a given municipality.

Next, we accessed the names of the entire universe of 9,857 councilors from the Greek Ministry of the Interior. We then manually coded the gender of the entire universe of 9,857 councilors based on their first and last names. We also collected data on and coded the party affiliation for those councilors that publicly declared it from the Greek Ministry of the Interior. Finally, we create a dummy variable to measure whether or not each councilor serves in a municipality with an active host site.

To check for municipal level representativeness, we then run a regression where we regress “participation ratio” on ratios of the characteristics of councilors in each municipality (gender and party affiliation) as well as dummy variable to capture the existence of a camp in each municipality. The regression results in Table A.1 show that there are no imbalances at the municipal level in councilor participation in our study based on gender, party affiliation or camp presence in the councilor’s municipality.



Note: Red line depicts the average participation rate.

Figure A.1: Councilor survey participation

Table A.1: Sample representativeness

	DV: Participation ratio
(Intercept)	0.15*** (0.01)
Golden Dawn	0.01 (0.02)
New Democracy	0.00 (0.00)
Kinal	−0.00 (0.00)
Syriza	0.00 (0.01)
KKE	−0.00 (0.00)
Antarsya	0.01 (0.05)
Female councilor	−0.08 (0.06)
Existing camp	−0.00 (0.02)
R ²	0.14
Adj. R ²	0.13
Num. obs.	645
RMSE	0.07
N Clusters	202

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

B THE CONJOINT EXPERIMENT

B.1 The survey instrument

We present here some key elements of our survey questionnaire. The full questionnaire instrument is included in the PAP and is available online.

Before taking the conjoint, respondents were prompted with the following text:

“Now we would like you to assess below some aspects of hypothetical scenarios where your municipality is in a position of deciding on the characteristics of the asylum-seeker host site (camp) and the areas that possible additional funds can be used. We present below two hypothetical proposals (A and B) which have been submitted for approval to the city council. Each of the proposals consists of 5 characteristics. Please consider each proposal (A and B) in its entirety. You will now be invited to choose between the two proposals. We will present you three such pairs.”

Each task consisted of a comparison between two randomly generated profiles (resettlement proposals). Each profile/proposal was populated with a *randomly assigned* value (drawn from the list below) for each one of its five attributes. The five attributes and the possible values that they could take were as follows:

1. Type of public goods provision

- More infrastructure to the municipality
- Hire more teachers and doctors
- Hire more municipal employees

We chose these three types of public goods based on extensive qualitative work with municipal officials and citizens. Our objective was to strike a balance between contextual relevance in the Greek case and generalizability. We also sought to engage with ongoing theoretical debates in our selection of the type of municipal compensation. Our logic was as follows:

More infrastructure: We note that in the survey as deployed in Greek the term we used for “additional infrastructure” was “Περισσότερες υποδομές” which relates to

a broad set of infrastructural public goods that fall under municipal purview. In the Greek case this includes roads, water, energy, trash collection, sports centers, parks, playgrounds, and cultural centers.

Teachers and doctors: Doctors and teachers were selected for two reasons. First these were exactly the shortages and bottlenecks found repeatedly in our qualitative work with citizens and municipal officials, especially in municipalities with large hosting obligations. Second, this type of public goods provision (at least in the Greek case) requires inputs from the central government. To elaborate, teachers and doctors in Greece do not originate from the municipalities in which they serve. After finishing their credentials they apply for positions through the central government, which then distributes them to municipalities across the country based on a needs assessment of municipalities and local negotiations with mayors and councils. In other words, this is a type of public good that is appointed and funded by the central government and then distributed to the municipalities. There are huge backlogs (επετηριδα) of teachers and doctors waiting for jobs, and the central government must create and fund the positions and then allocate them to a respective municipality. As we see it, this form of public good both allays concerns regarding resource competition in key institutions at the municipal level and is akin to recognition from the central government that a given municipality has an increased or heightened need (important given our interest in the role of fairness).

Municipal employees: Municipal employees were selected because of contextual significance—namely an association with patronage/corruption—and thus their relevance to broader debates about rent-seeking in the context of refugee crises (). Municipal employment is the institutional public good most associated with patronage politics, clientelism and corruption in Greece. Scholars have shown that local officials—sometimes in collusion with their national-level counterparts—use the three types of municipal employment (permanent, temporary/contract and day-labor) to increase their own popularity and chances for reelection, even if the positions hired are unnecessary or redundant (). Notably, the municipal employee is distinct from other public professions (doctors, teachers, police) in that they are hired by the municipality itself, and not subjected to the same needs assessments, credential verification, and budgetary scrutiny that accompany national-level public employment allocation schemes. By including municipal employees, we therefore sought to tap ongoing theoretical discussions in the literature about elite capture of crisis related funding, namely public goods allocation

that is biased towards local elite interests.

2. Size of the host site for asylum-seekers

- Less than 1% of local population
- 1% of local population
- More than 1% of local population

In the wake of the European refugee crisis, during which over a million asylum seekers entered Europe mostly through Greece and Italy, political elites have increasingly sought to address issues of refugee and asylum-seeker settlement through “fair-share” directives based on quota systems.⁷ A similar logic also has been applied domestically in Greece to deal with the unequal impact of the 2015 refugee crisis. In Greece, as a consequence of migration routes and early government policies in response to the crisis, thousands of refugees wound-up trapped in deplorable conditions. Many of these refugees were stuck on a handful of Aegean islands close to Turkey, while others managed to pass to the mainland and then became trapped there. Nonetheless, many other regions closer to and within mainland Greece still host no refugees at all. Asylum seekers trapped on the islands and elsewhere have demanded reallocation and faster processing times, and tensions with local host communities have led to violence on numerous occasions.

More recently, to address the protracted crisis, the Greek government has turned to directives based on proportional quotas for domestically resettling asylum seekers throughout Greece in an effort to “decongest” the island hot spots and other heavily impacted areas. In November 2019, the Greek government announced that domestic re-locations would be arranged such that the number of asylum seekers in all regional units of Greece should not exceed 1 percent of the regional unit, as shown by the 2011 census.⁸ Moreover, this particular 1% rule has been framed from the outset by central government officials as an effort to introduce a more strict but also fairer immigration policy (αυστηρή, αλλά δίκαιη μεταναστευτική πολιτική) nation wide⁹. Additionally upon the announcement of the directive, government spokesman Stelios Petsas, described the issue of refugee resettlement as a matter of national importance, emphasizing that

⁷See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO15_5038

⁸See for example: <https://www.capital.gr/epikairoτητα/3391190/metafora-1-000-aitounton-asulo-apo-ta-nisia-stin-endoxora-den-tha-xepernoun-to-1-tou-plithusmou-ana-nomo> and <https://m.naftemporiki.gr/story/1529990>

⁹See: <https://government.gov.gr/enimerosi-ton-politikon-sintakton-ke-ton-antapokriton-xenou-tipou-apo-ton-ifipourgo-para-to-prothipourgo-ke-kivernitiko-ekprosopo-stelio-petsa-ke-ton-ipourgo-metanastefsis-ke-asilou-noti-mitaraki/>

“the fair distribution of people transported from the islands throughout the country is a clear order of the Prime Minister.”¹⁰ Thus, these new directives were explicitly framed in terms of fairness considerations. In this attribute, we therefore featured a 1% rule in a hypothetical scenario where the basis would be each municipality, instead of each regional unit, to make the question more relevant to the respondents. As in Europe more broadly, these domestic quota schemes have stirred controversy in Greece, in some cases provoking violent reactions as well as protests from citizens and local government.

We note here that although the Greek government has framed things in terms of 1% being fair, there is nothing intrinsic in the 1% threshold. It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine the precise numeric threshold that would be perceived as fair on average. Rather, we are interested in whether a policy that focuses on the spatial distribution of refugees in a way that is framed as fair (including in terms of size) can overcome NIMBY logic. Additionally, we have several reasons to believe that our respondents interpret the 1% attribute of the conjoint experiment, not merely as matter of size but also as something taps into fairness considerations about spacial distribution. The first piece of evidence comes from Question 5 in our survey, which asked: *Would you be willing to host asylum-seekers amounting to more than 1% of your population in exchange for monetary compensation in your municipality?* This question was asked before the conjoint and is explicitly framed in terms of distributional fairness (government setting a common 1% quota) and reciprocity (the option to exceeding the common quota in exchange for monetary compensation). Critically, 43% of our respondents would be willing to support more than 1% in their municipality. In this sense, we can see that 43% is the lower bound of the 1% quota policy, ie at least 43% would accept the 1% rule if it was fairly applied (ie with a common quota and reciprocity). If limiting size—in other words, minimizing the number of refugees hosted—was the only concern in people’s mind, we would expect that a much smaller percentage of respondents would be willing to support more than 1% in their municipality in response to Q5.

Second, we can also draw on evidence from an open-ended question in our survey to see if respondents use fairness rationales when asked:

“In this box, you can share your thoughts regarding the immigration policies presented to you in this survey. We are especially interested to know under which conditions

¹⁰See: <https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1529990/st-petsas-sto-1-tou-plithusmou-ana-perifereia-o-arithmos-ton-metakiniseon-stin-endoxora>

you would support the construction of a hosting facility for asylum seekers in your municipality.”

In line with the preliminary findings from our pre-survey fieldwork, we find that councilors do indeed voluntarily raise fairness concerns related to the spatial distribution of refugees throughout the country. As one would expect, the precise expressions differ, but they are clearly about fairness and not just size considerations. For example, councilors say:

- *“The distribution across municipalities must be equal”*
- *“Equal distribution according to the population.”*
- *“The population quota should apply to all of Greece. There are no hosting sites in southern Greece, in contrast to the north and the islands. There needs to be a fair distribution system for the entire country.”*
- *“I would agree, under the condition that the distribution of immigrants includes all the municipalities of the country. No exceptions for Kifissia [a rich municipality], such that the burden falls on Peristeri and Byronas [poorer municipalities]. That is, if all the municipalities accepted [a hosting site], with rules and reliable structures and proportionality of legal Immigrants and refugees.”*
- *“[I would accept] a closed and controlled structure that is in proportion with the population and [if structures are] distributed in all of the country’s municipalities proportionally.”*

Some councilors even explicitly framed the 1% policy rule around fairness considerations. For example, they say:

- *“Supporting the construction of a refugee hosting site in the current situation is a humanitarian and patriotic duty. The commitment to a percentage, for example of 1%, of the population and the fair distribution in the various areas are very important conditions. Compensation to the municipality and its economy should exist to avoid overburdening the services and the budget of the municipality and not as a necessary condition for the support of desperate people.”*
- *“[I would support] 1% of the population of our regional unit, distributed in all the municipalities of the prefecture according to their population.”*
- *“Athens, where I live, has greatly exceeded the hosting rate of 1%. In this sense, you should decongest [Athens] and not burden [it] with new structures. . . .”*

- *“It should be 1% and distributed proportionally in each village.”*
- *“[I support] hosting with a municipal dispersion of settlement facilities at the rate of 1% [of the local population] per settlement facility.”*
- *“I would support a hosting structure under the following absolute pre-requisites listed in descending order of importance a) the observance of the 1% quota in relation to the local population 2) creating closed camps 3) compensatory benefits.”*
- *“I would like an open not a closed [facility] Refugees should not exceed 1% [of the local population] There should be a widespread distribution to all of the municipalities.”*
- *“In the amount of 1% [of the population] and economic benefits to the region and the municipality.”*

It thus remains to be seen, whether local officials can be swayed towards compromise through directives based on a fair-share logic or framing.

3. Who is in charge of day-to-day administration of the camp

- National Government
- International Organizations (UNHCR, IOM)
- Local Government
- Army
- Church

We selected these organizations to examine preferences about current day-to-day administrators of reception facilities in Greece (**National Government**, **UNHCR/IOM**, **Army**) and two other possible types of day-to-day administrators (Local Government, Church).

Local government was selected given the nature of our respondent pool—local councilors. Put simply, we could see if local officials preferred to take over day-to-day administrative responsibilities themselves, and therefore maintain control over them instead of delegating control upwards (to the National Government, Army or Church) or outwards to international bodies (UNHCR/IOM). UNHCR/IOM are the most recognizable international bodies participating in the response in Greece.

Church was selected for reasons that are contextually relevant to the Greek case and it is also linked to broader debates about how religion shapes the issues of refugee reception and resettlement. Like elsewhere in Europe, Muslim refugees face discrimination

and persecution in Greece. This is exacerbated further in the Greek case because of the country’s contentious history with its Muslim-majority neighbor Turkey as well as its state-building legacy. Nominal allegiance to the Greek Orthodox Church—that is, being Greek Orthodox—has been viewed as the sine-qua-non of “Greekness” for centuries. This belief still persists today, even among many Greeks who consider themselves secular. Greek assimilation and immigration policies have consistently categorized Greek Orthodox groups as deserving members of the community. Even groups that do not necessarily speak the Greek language, but are Greek Orthodox, have been privileged. A historical case in point is Albanians: Christian Orthodox Albanians that thus have “Greek names” have been given preference over Muslim Albanians (). By including Church, we could therefore see if cultural concerns were translated into a preference for having one of the primary torch-bearers of Greek cultural heritage take on an administrative role.

4. Proximity of the camp to the urban center

- In the centre
- 30-minute walk or less from the center
- More than a 30-minute walk from the center

5. Type of site

- Fully open (site residents have unrestricted mobility)
- Partially open (site residents must check in and out before leaving)
- Closed (exit allowed by permission of authorities only for a specified amount of time)


B.2 Further details to the conjoint design

In total, we had (2 profiles \times 3 tasks \times 586 respondents) 3,516 profiles shown. Given the number of attributes (five) and the possible levels/values for each one, we had a total of 405 unique profile combinations. This implies that each of these 405 *unique* profiles were shown (on average) about 8-9 times. The frequencies of the randomly displayed attribute levels, for each of the five attributes, are as follows (percentages in parentheses):

- *Proximity of the camp to the urban center:* (i) in the center: 1156 (32.9%) (ii) 30-min walk or less from center: 1162 (33%) (iii) more than 30-min walk from center: 1198 (34.1%)

- *Type of public goods provision:* (i) hire more municipal employees: 1192 (34%) (ii) hire more teachers and doctors: 1140 (32.3%) (iii) more infrastructure to municipality: 1184 (33.7%)
- *Size of the host site:* (i) less than 1% of local population: 1193 (33.9%) (ii) 1% of local population: 1122 (31.9%) (iii) more than 1% of local population: 1201 (34.2%)
- *Type of site:* (i) fully open: 1168 (33.3%) (ii) partially open: 1147 (32.6%) (iii) closed: 1201 (34.1%)
- *Who is in charge of day-to-day administration:* (i) army: 716 (20.4%) (ii) church: 643 (18.3%) (iii) national government: 719 (20.4%) (iv) international organizations (UNHCR, IOM): 728 (20.7%) (v) local government: 710 (20.2%)

We also examined whether there is any preference for the left-hand or right-hand profile in our pair design. We did not observe any overall trends or any significant imbalances in the ordering of preferences after performing this diagnostic test. In Fig. [B.2](#) we show those results.



Note: The plot illustrates the marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These values can be interpreted as the average probability that a councilor will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. SE's are clustered by respondent. N= 3,516; unique N = 586.

Figure B.2: Aggregate marginal means showing profile placement diagnostics

B.3 Randomization and outcome variables

Each respondent received three pairs of proposals with randomly assigned attribute values. We also randomized the attribute order (between respondents). Two questions were asked for each pair. The first question asked respondents to rate on a Likert scale how likely it would be for them to vote for each of the two hypothetical proposals.


Specifically, the question was:

“On a scale from 0 to 7 , where 0 indicates that you definitely will not vote for that proposal and 7 indicates that you will definitely vote for that proposal, how likely is it for you to vote for it?”.

The second question (binary choice) asked them to choose between the two hypothetical proposals:

“Now, imagine if you had to choose between these two proposals, which one of two would you vote for if it reached the municipal council?”.

We report forced choice results in the main text because we would like to know councillors’ vote (Yes or No), should a similar proposal reach the floor of a municipal council (for a detailed presentation of the conjoint experiment methodology, see). Nevertheless, we get substantively identical results when using the Likert scale-based variable. Fig. B.3 displays those results (with outcome being rescaled to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation).



Note: The plot illustrates the marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These values can be interpreted as the average probability that a councilor will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. Likert scale outcome is rescaled to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation. SE's are clustered by respondent. N= 3,516; unique N = 586.

Figure B.3: Aggregate marginal means with Likert scale outcome


B.4 Methodology

We estimated average marginal component effects (for a discussion of AMCEs, see) and marginal means (see,) to analyze the data recorded in the three choice tasks.¹¹ We display marginal means (MMs) in the main text (also see Tables C.3 and C.4). We report estimated average marginal component effects in Table C.2. In our forced choice conjoint design with two resettlement proposals per choice task, MMs represent the the average probability that a councilor will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. The AMCE coefficients represent the average effect of a change from the omitted attribute level on the probability of a proposal being chosen. We report MMs and differences in MMs in the main text so as to be able to show inferences on the absolute preference. We also employ this approach to demonstrate respondents' preferences in subgroups (for a detailed presentation of the methods, see). We report AMCEs in section C.

B.5 Robustness to the analysis

In additional specifications, we used (i) municipality fixed effects (see Table C.2 column 3) and (ii) (manually targeted) entropy balancing weights (see Table C.2 column 2 and Fig. B.4) to further ensure that our estimates are representative of the councilor population (for a detailed presentation of the methods, see). Specifically, on the left panel of Figure B.4, we used entropy balancing to re-weight our survey sample to known characteristics of the Greek councillor population using gender and geographical distribution of councilors. On the right panel, in addition to gender and geography, we include the existence of a camp in the entropy weight. Our results remain robust in both specifications.

¹¹ make a critique of common practices employed in conjoint experiments using AMCEs to interpret majority vote shares. differentiate the interpretation of effects of attributes on vote shares from the fraction of voters who prefer a specific attribute. recommend focusing on marginal means because it conveys the absolute level of favorability of respondents toward all levels of each proposal attribute.



Note: The plot illustrates the marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). These values can be interpreted as the average probability that a councilor will support each proposal with a given attribute level, marginalized over all other attribute values. SE's are clustered by respondent. geog=geography. N= 3,516; unique N = 586.

Figure B.4: Aggregate marginal means with entropy balancing weights

C AGGREGATE RESULTS

Tables C.2 and C.3 report aggregate average marginal component effects (AMCEs) and aggregate marginal means (MMs), respectively. In AMCEs, the omitted categories on each attribute are the following: (1) in the center, (2) hire more municipal employees, (3) 1% of local population, (4) closed and (5) army.

C.1 Aggregate average marginal component effects (AMCEs)

Table C.2: Aggregate average marginal component effects (AMCEs)

	Main model	Weighted model	Municipality FE model
(Intercept)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.03)	
More than 30-min walk	0.17*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)
Less than 30-min walk	0.16*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)
More infrastructure to municipality	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
More than 1% of local population	−0.05* (0.02)	−0.05* (0.02)	−0.06* (0.02)
Less than 1% of local population	0.05* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Partially open	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)
Fully open	−0.12*** (0.02)	−0.12*** (0.03)	−0.12*** (0.02)
Church	−0.07* (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)	−0.07* (0.03)
Government	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
IOs	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Local government	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)
R ²	0.06	0.06	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.05	0.05	0.00
Num. obs.	3496	3496	3496
RMSE	0.49	0.49	0.50
N Clusters	586	586	586

Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire municipal employees, (3) 1% of local pop, (4) closed, (5) army. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

C.2 Aggregate marginal means (MMs)

Table C.3: Aggregate marginal means (MMs)

level	estimate	std.error	z
In ctr	0.39	0.01	30.36
< 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.01	46.58
> 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.01	47.27
Hire more municipal employees	0.44	0.01	38.34
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.53	0.01	42.14
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.53	0.01	42.38
< 1% of local population	0.55	0.01	46.59
1% of local population	0.50	0.01	39.61
> 1% of local population	0.45	0.01	36.53
Fully open	0.43	0.01	33.87
Partially open	0.54	0.01	43.02
Closed	0.54	0.01	42.44
Army	0.49	0.02	29.11
Church	0.43	0.02	23.83
Government	0.54	0.02	33.57
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.48	0.02	27.26
Local Government	0.56	0.02	32.06

Note: SE's in parentheses are clustered by respondent. N= 3,516; unique N = 586.

C.3 Test of Past Exposure

In this section we test for differences in subgroup preferences on camp size, by presence of an active host site.¹² Tables C.4 and C.6 show marginal means and average marginal component effects for subgroups based on camp size, respectively. Table C.5 shows that there is no statistically significant difference in marginal means between subgroups towards camp size, suggesting that there is no evidence that there are substantial differences in preferences for camp size between those places with and without an active host site.

Table C.4: Active host site marginal means (MMs)

level	estimate	std.error	z	Camp
< 1% of local population	0.52	0.03	19.93	Yes
1% of local population	0.50	0.03	16.10	Yes
> 1% of local population	0.47	0.03	15.92	Yes
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.01	42.25	No
1% of local population	0.50	0.01	36.25	No
> 1% of local population	0.44	0.01	32.91	No

Note: SE's are clustered by respondent. N= 3,516; unique N = 586.

Table C.5: Subgroup analysis, differences in marginal means

BY	statistic	level	estimate	std.error	z
No - Yes	mm_difference	< 1% of local population	0.04	0.03	1.34
No - Yes	mm_difference	1% of local population	-0.01	0.03	-0.16
No - Yes	mm_difference	> 1% of local population	-0.03	0.03	-0.99

Note: Table reports differences in MM between municipalities who do not host a camp (No) and those who do (Yes)

Based on our qualitative work, we expect that the presence of an active camp makes people less likely to support the construction of a relatively large host site (more than 1%) in their municipality. In other words, our testing hypothesis here is:

- *H.0: Opposition to hosting large camps (more the 1% of the population) is not stronger in municipalities that already host a refugee camp.*
- *H.A: Opposition to hosting large camps (more the 1% of the population) is stronger in municipalities that already host a refugee camp.*

We get a Z-score -0.99 .¹³ Under $\alpha = 0.05$, the critical value is 1.64 (p -value = 0.84) and hence, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. We therefore conclude that there is no

¹²For a discussion of testing for differences in marginal means see .

¹³We test against the alternative hypothesis that the difference in marginal means for a large camp (more than 1% of local population) between municipalities without and with active host sites is positive.

evidence in favor of the hypothesis that opposition to hosting large camps (more the 1% of the population) is stronger in municipalities that already host a refugee camp.

Table C.6: Active host site AMCEs

	Active host site	No active host site
(Intercept)	0.41*** (0.07)	0.36*** (0.03)
More than 30mins walk	0.17*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.02)
Less than 30mins walk	0.12** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.02)
More infrastructure	0.09 (0.05)	0.09*** (0.02)
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.08 (0.04)	0.08*** (0.02)
More than 1% of local population	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.06* (0.02)
Less than 1% of local population	0.01 (0.05)	0.06** (0.02)
Partially open	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.00 (0.02)
Fully open	−0.14** (0.05)	−0.11*** (0.02)
Church	−0.11 (0.06)	−0.06* (0.03)
Government	0.04 (0.06)	0.04 (0.03)
IOs	−0.07 (0.06)	−0.01 (0.03)
Local government	0.08 (0.07)	0.05 (0.03)
R ²	0.06	0.06
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.05
Num. obs.	706	2790
RMSE	0.49	0.49
N Clusters	119	467

Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire municipal employees, (3) 1% of local pop, (4) closed, (5) army. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

D SUBGROUP RESULTS

D.1 Variables

Table D.7: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Sociocultural threat PCA	3,516	1.951	2.069	0	0	3.2	10
Economic threat PCA	3,516	3.778	2.911	0	1.3	6.2	10
Ethnocentric PCA	3,516	6.400	2.274	0	4.995	8.011	10
Ideology	3,294	5.020	2.493	0	4.000	7.000	10

In addition to the aggregate results, we also conducted subgroup analysis. We present descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis in Table D.7. In order to construct the first three variables, we created three indices using polychoric principle component analysis (PCA): (1) perceived socio-cultural threat, (2) perceived economic threat and (3) ethnocentric values. We normalized these variables to vary between 0 and 10. Prior to computing our centered and standardized PCAs, we replaced few missing data with mean values of the respective variables. We present a screeplot of eigenvalues and principal components loadings in Figure D.5 and Table D.11.

Perceived socio-cultural threat PCA

To form an index of perceived socio-cultural threat, we used variables measuring respondents' perceptions on how refugees' presence threatens the community because

- They are not Christians
- They do not follow the customs and traditions
- They are not white
- They do not speak the language ¹⁴

All four variables included a 5-scale outcome ranging from completely agree to completely disagree. We present below the correlation table of these variables (Table D.8). This centered and standardized PCA explains 65.58% of the variation.

¹⁴Number of missing values for each variable at the councilor level were the following, respectively: 11, 11, 5, 6.

Table D.8: Perceived socio-cultural threat correlation matrix

	Christians	Customs	White	Language
Christians	1.0000			
Customs	0.8297	1.0000		
White	0.5685	0.6023	1.0000	
Language	0.5947	0.7139	0.7715	1.0000

Perceived economic threat PCA

To create an index of perceived economic threat, we used variables measuring respondents' perceptions on how refugees' presence causes economic threat because

- Asylum seekers threaten our municipality by taking jobs from Greeks
- Asylum seekers are a burden on the municipal budget and take up resources that are intended for locals ¹⁵

Both variables included a 5-scale outcome ranging from completely agree to completely disagree. We present below the correlation table of these variables (Table D.9). This centered and standardized PCA explains 80.84% of the variation.

Table D.9: Perceived economic threat correlation matrix

	Budget	Jobs
Budget	1.0000	
Jobs	0.6849	1.0000

Ethnocentric values PCA

We created an index of ethnocentric values based on how important councilors thought one (or all) of the following elements are for someone to be considered a “truly Greek”: (question adapted from):

- Being able to speak the Greek language
- Sharing Greek customs and traditions

¹⁵Number of missing values for each variable at the councilor level were the following, respectively: 11, 29.

- Having been born in Greece
- Being an Orthodox Christian ¹⁶

All four variables included a 5-scale outcome ranging from completely agree to completely disagree. We present below the correlation table of these variables (Table D.10). This centered and standardized PCA explains 57.24% of the variation.

Table D.10: Ethnocentric values correlation matrix

	Language	Customs	Born	Christian
Language	1.0000			
Customs	0.6225	1.0000		
Born	0.3748	0.3771	1.0000	
Christian	0.4589	0.6423	0.5483	1.0000

¹⁶Number of missing values for each variable at the councilor level were the following, respectively: 6, 6, 8, 9.

Figure D.5: Screeplot of eigenvalues




Table D.11: Principal Components loadings

Perceived socio-cultural threat PCA		Perceived economic threat PCA		Ethnnocentric values PCA	
Christians	0.49	Budget	0.71	Language	0.49
Customs	0.52	Jobs	0.71	Customs	0.53
White	0.48			Born	0.44
Language	0.51			Christian	0.53

Ideology

We also performed subgroup analysis by political ideology. To measure ideology, we asked "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?" and provided a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). For the purposes of the analysis, we divided respondents by the mid-value (5). We present a histogram of this variable in Figure D.6.




Figure D.6: Histogram of self-reported ideology

D.2 Subgroup AMCEs and MMs

Table D.12 reports average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for subgroups of respondent based on their perceived sociocultural threat, perceived economic threat, ethnocentric values and political orientation (ideology). Table D.13 (p. 32-35) and Figures D.7 and D.8 show marginal means for the same subgroups, respectively. For the purposes of the analysis, we divided PCA indices by median values and assigned them to the categories of 'low' and 'high' for each index. We divide ideology variable by its median value and assigned the categories of 'left' and 'right'.

Table D.12: Subgroup AMCEs

	Sociocult. PCA-low	Sociocult. PCA-high	Econ. PCA-low	Econ. PCA-high	Ethnocent. PCA-low	Ethnocent. PCA-high	Ideology Left	Ideology Right
(Intercept)	0.31*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.30*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.04)
< 30mins from ctr	0.20*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.03)
> 30mins from ctr	0.18*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.06* (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.07** (0.03)
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.09** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.09* (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)
< 1% of local population	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)
> 1% of local population	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.03)
Partially open	0.08** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.03)
Closed	0.01 (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)
Church	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.13** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.08* (0.03)
Government	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.07* (0.04)
Local Government	0.14*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.12** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
R ²	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.07
Adj. R ²	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.07
Num. obs.	1768	1728	1694	1802	1732	1764	1170	2124
RMSE	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.48
N Clusters	295	291	283	303	292	294	195	354

We divide PCA variables by their median values. Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire municipal employees, (3) 1% of local pop, (4) closed, (5) army. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table D.13: Subgroup marginal means (MMs)


level	estimate	std.error	z	Sociocultural threat
In ctr	0.40	0.02	22.62	High
< 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.02	31.53	High
> 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.02	36.08	High
Hire more municipal employees	0.43	0.02	27.12	High
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.54	0.02	27.92	High
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.53	0.02	30.04	High
< 1% of local population	0.54	0.02	32.58	High
1% of local population	0.53	0.02	31.84	High
> 1% of local population	0.43	0.02	24.67	High
Fully open	0.38	0.02	21.91	High
Partially open	0.52	0.02	29.28	High
Closed	0.59	0.02	35.32	High
Army	0.53	0.03	21.34	High
Church	0.48	0.02	20.07	High
Government	0.57	0.02	22.76	High
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.43	0.02	18.91	High
Local Government	0.50	0.03	19.95	High
In ctr	0.37	0.02	20.46	Low
< 30mins from ctr	0.57	0.02	34.15	Low
> 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.02	31.14	Low
Hire more municipal employees	0.45	0.02	27.15	Low
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.52	0.02	32.02	Low
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.53	0.02	29.86	Low
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.02	33.34	Low
1% of local population	0.47	0.02	24.57	Low
> 1% of local population	0.46	0.02	26.96	Low
Fully open	0.47	0.02	26.62	Low
Partially open	0.55	0.02	31.77	Low
Closed	0.48	0.02	25.90	Low
Army	0.46	0.02	20.25	Low
Church	0.37	0.03	14.13	Low
Government	0.52	0.02	24.87	Low
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.53	0.03	20.05	Low
Local Government	0.60	0.02	25.73	Low

level	estimate	std.error	z	Economic threat
In ctr	0.39	0.02	22.42	High
< 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.02	33.11	High
> 30mins from ctr	0.57	0.02	35.88	High
Hire more municipal employees	0.44	0.01	30.08	High
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.53	0.02	29.67	High
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.54	0.02	32.16	High
< 1% of local population	0.57	0.02	35.69	High
1% of local population	0.50	0.02	28.82	High
> 1% of local population	0.43	0.02	25.67	High
Fully open	0.38	0.02	21.42	High
Partially open	0.53	0.02	31.78	High
Closed	0.58	0.02	34.43	High
Army	0.52	0.02	21.91	High
Church	0.44	0.03	17.65	High
Government	0.54	0.02	22.69	High
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.46	0.02	19.73	High
Local Government	0.53	0.02	21.24	High
In ctr	0.38	0.02	20.46	Low
< 30mins from ctr	0.57	0.02	32.77	Low
> 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.02	31.08	Low
Hire more municipal employees	0.45	0.02	24.61	Low
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.52	0.02	29.91	Low
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.52	0.02	27.92	Low
< 1% of local population	0.53	0.02	30.39	Low
1% of local population	0.50	0.02	27.11	Low
> 1% of local population	0.47	0.02	26.12	Low
Fully open	0.47	0.02	27.32	Low
Partially open	0.54	0.02	29.04	Low
Closed	0.49	0.02	26.40	Low
Army	0.46	0.02	19.37	Low
Church	0.41	0.03	16.01	Low
Government	0.54	0.02	24.82	Low
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.50	0.03	18.85	Low
Local Government	0.59	0.02	24.47	Low

level	estimate	std.error	z	Ethnocentric values
In ctr	0.38	0.02	21.58	High
< 30mins from ctr	0.54	0.02	32.98	High
> 30mins from ctr	0.58	0.02	37.42	High
Hire more municipal employees	0.45	0.02	26.35	High
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.55	0.02	29.21	High
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.51	0.02	29.77	High
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.02	34.55	High
1% of local population	0.52	0.02	28.16	High
> 1% of local population	0.42	0.02	23.78	High
Fully open	0.38	0.02	21.55	High
Partially open	0.54	0.02	30.00	High
Closed	0.59	0.02	33.94	High
Army	0.49	0.03	19.61	High
Church	0.48	0.02	19.75	High
Government	0.51	0.02	21.43	High
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.48	0.02	20.67	High
Local Government	0.53	0.02	21.84	High
In ctr	0.40	0.02	21.31	Low
< 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.02	32.91	Low
> 30mins from ctr	0.53	0.02	30.22	Low
Hire more municipal employees	0.44	0.02	28.03	Low
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.51	0.02	30.69	Low
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.55	0.02	30.33	Low
< 1% of local population	0.55	0.02	31.21	Low
1% of local population	0.48	0.02	27.87	Low
> 1% of local population	0.48	0.02	28.02	Low
Fully open	0.48	0.02	27.25	Low
Partially open	0.54	0.02	30.83	Low
Closed	0.49	0.02	27.01	Low
Army	0.50	0.02	21.51	Low
Church	0.36	0.03	14.35	Low
Government	0.56	0.02	26.32	Low
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.47	0.03	17.87	Low
Local Government	0.58	0.02	23.51	Low


level	estimate	std.error	z	Reported Ideology
In ctr	0.39	0.02	24.03	Right
< 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.01	36.67	Right
> 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.01	38.58	Right
Hire more municipal employees	0.45	0.01	30.26	Right
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.53	0.02	32.78	Right
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.53	0.02	32.60	Right
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.01	38.50	Right
1% of local population	0.52	0.02	31.46	Right
> 1% of local population	0.43	0.02	27.39	Right
Fully open	0.39	0.02	24.35	Right
Partially open	0.53	0.02	33.25	Right
Closed	0.58	0.02	36.83	Right
Army	0.52	0.02	23.03	Right
Church	0.45	0.02	19.72	Right
Government	0.54	0.02	27.02	Right
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.47	0.02	21.32	Right
Local Government	0.53	0.02	22.89	Right
In ctr	0.39	0.02	16.39	Left
< 30mins from ctr	0.56	0.02	26.77	Left
> 30mins from ctr	0.55	0.02	24.65	Left
Hire more municipal employees	0.44	0.02	21.09	Left
Hire more teachers and doctors	0.53	0.02	24.28	Left
More infrastructure to the municipality	0.53	0.02	23.74	Left
< 1% of local population	0.56	0.02	24.36	Left
1% of local population	0.48	0.02	21.97	Left
> 1% of local population	0.47	0.02	22.41	Left
Fully open	0.49	0.02	23.53	Left
Partially open	0.55	0.02	25.18	Left
Closed	0.46	0.02	21.00	Left
Army	0.44	0.03	16.14	Left
Church	0.40	0.03	12.82	Left
Government	0.53	0.03	18.25	Left
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.49	0.03	16.31	Left
Local Government	0.63	0.03	23.12	Left

Note: N= 3,516; unique N = 586.



Note: Plots show marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analyses by a) perceived socio-cultural threat, b) perceived economic threat and c) ethnocentric values and. We constructed these metrics using multiple variables as factors in PCA analysis. SE's are clustered by respondent.

Figure D.7: Subgroup marginal means - PCAs (MMs)



Note: Plots show marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). We present subgroup analyses by ideology. SE's are clustered by respondent.


Figure D.8: Subgroup marginal means - Ideology (MMs)

D.3 Further robustness checks

In Figure D.9, we conduct sensitivity analysis where we show results with different cutoff criteria for Ideology (0-10). The panel on top-left shows the results when the cutoff point is the median point (5). The panel on the top-right displays results when we restrict ‘Left’ to 0-4 and ‘Right’ to 6-10. The panel on the bottom-left demonstrates results when the cutoff is the mean ideological point (5.02). Finally, the panel on the bottom-right divides ideology into three categories: 0-4 being ‘Left’, 4-7 being ‘Center’ and 7-10 being ‘Right’. In Figures D.10, D.11 and D.12, we conduct similar sensitivity checks for PCA variables. In each figure, in the top panel, we divide the indices by their median values and assign them to the categories of ‘low’ and ‘high’ (similarly to the main subgroup analysis). In each middle panel we divide the indices by their mean values instead and assign them accordingly to the categories of ‘low’ and ‘high’. In each bottom panel we divide the variable into tertiles and assign them accordingly to the categories of ‘low’, ‘median’ and ‘high’. We do not detect major differences in results when different cut-offs were applied.

In Figure D.13 we show the distribution of reported ideology by councilors’ reported party affiliation (a response to the question, Which party do you think most closely represents your political beliefs now?). The plot shows distribution of reported ideology by reported party affiliation, where the X-axis displays count of councilors by party and the y-axis shows their reported ideology from 0 to 10, 0 being far left and 10 being far right. KKE (the Communist Party of Greece), Mera25, Pleusi Eleutherias and Syriza are parties associated with the left. Kinal is a center/left party and New Democracy is a center-right/right-wing party.

Finally, we conduct a balance test where rather than comparing outcomes across feature levels, we compared covariates across feature levels. We did not detect any imbalances for any of the covariates we use in the analysis. Table D.14 reports those regression results.



Note: Plots show marginal means for each attribute value (point estimates and 95% CIs). SE's are clustered by respondent.

Figure D.9: Ideology sensitivity checks (MMs)




Figure D.10: Sociocultural threat PCA sensitivity checks




Figure D.11: Economic threat PCA sensitivity checks





Figure D.12: Ethnocentric values PCA sensitivity checks



Note: Plot shows the distribution of reported ideology by reported party affiliation. The y-axis displays the count of councilors by party and the x-axis shows their reported ideology from 0 to 10, with 0 being far left and 10 being far right. We are unable to produce graphs for two extreme far-right parties Golden Dawn and the Greek Solution as we only had two respondents (12 observations) from these parties and neither of these two respondents answered our question about ideology.

Figure D.13: Reported party affiliation vs. reported ideology of councilors

Table D.14: Balance test (Covariates as dependent variables)

	Sociocultural threat	Economic threat	Ideology	Ethnocentric values	Active camp
(Intercept)	1.86*** (0.15)	3.63*** (0.21)	4.91*** (0.19)	6.62*** (0.15)	0.18*** (0.03)
< 30mins from ctr	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.01 (0.02)
> 30mins from ctr	0.01 (0.08)	0.10 (0.12)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.02)
Hire more teachers and doctors	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.09)	0.01 (0.02)
More infrastructure to the municipality	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.02)
< 1% of local population	0.00 (0.09)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.02)
> 1% of local population	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.10)	-0.01 (0.02)
Partially open	0.15 (0.09)	0.17 (0.13)	0.17 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.02)
Closed	0.09 (0.09)	0.15 (0.12)	0.13 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.02)
Church	0.28* (0.11)	0.24 (0.16)	0.18 (0.15)	0.29* (0.12)	0.02 (0.02)
Government	0.06 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.15)	0.13 (0.13)	0.10 (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)
IOs (UNHCR,IOM)	0.22* (0.10)	0.25 (0.14)	0.20 (0.13)	0.21 (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)
Local Government	0.13 (0.10)	0.11 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00
Num. obs.	3516	3516	3294	3516	3516
RMSE	2.07	2.91	2.49	2.27	0.40
N Clusters	586	586	549	586	586

Omitted: (1) in the ctr, (2) hire municipal employees, (3) 1% of local pop, (4) closed, (5) army. *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$