Climate Rising

McKinsey on Climate Adaptation: The Global Resilience Gap

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Climate adaptation is emerging as one of the most critical—and least understood—challenges in the climate transition. Mekala Krishnan, Partner at the McKinsey Global Institute, joins Climate Rising to discuss McKinsey’s new research assessing adaptation needs, costs, and gaps around the world.

The conversation explores why the world is already underinvesting in resilience, and how climate risks are distributed unevenly across geographies and income levels. Mekala explains the concept of the “resiliency gap,” highlighting that billions of people remain under-protected despite the existence of cost-effective solutions.

The episode also examines how climate risks will evolve in the coming decades, why adaptation spending needs could rise to over $1 trillion annually, and what barriers—beyond finance—are preventing action. The discussion concludes with insights into how businesses, governments, and financial institutions are beginning to respond, and what it will take to scale adaptation globally.

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Transcript

Editor's Note: The following was prepared by a machine algorithm, and may not perfectly reflect the audio file of the interview.

Mike Toffel:

Mekala, thank you so much for joining us here on Climate Rising.

Mekala Krishnan:

It's great to be here with you, Mike.

Mike Toffel:

So, we met at New York Climate Week a year ago over dinner, which was super fun. And at the time, you were talking about this report that was coming out on adaptation. And here we are talking about that report that's now come out. So, I'm really excited to have that conversation. But maybe before we get started, if you could just give us a sense of what your job is at McKinsey and a little bit about how you got there?

Mekala Krishnan:

That was really fun. Yeah, so it's great to be here and great to be having this conversation, Mike. Just a little bit about myself. I'm a partner at the McKinsey Global Institute, which I may in this conversation refer to as MGI, which is the think tank that sits inside of McKinsey. I got here by way of quite a detour. So, after I graduated from undergrad, I had an offer to join McKinsey, turned it down, went and did a PhD in mechanical engineering, but at the end of that, I decided to come back to McKinsey. I was doing generalist consulting work, found my way to the McKinsey Global Institute, where a lot of my work focuses on issues that I would say are at the intersection of the physical world and how we've built our economies and societies. And that's maybe where my engineering background comes into play. I'm really fascinated by questions that have to do with limits and opportunities and how we use effectively the physical resources that exist around us, and then how we use that to support economies and societies around the world.

Mike Toffel:

Great, so let's dig into this adaptation work. So first, who's the target audience for this and for the work that you set out to do?

Mekala Krishnan:

I think, as with all MGI research, it's really geared towards policymakers and decision makers at companies. That's really the primary audience. But I would say in this space on adaptation.

The world's understanding of this topic is so much more nascent than the world's understanding of anything to do with decarbonization. As you mentioned, the marginal abatement cost curves are 20-something years old now. And so, part of it for me was also how do we actually, as a community, as a world, start to understand this topic, whether that's academics and researchers, whether that's nonprofit organizations, whether that's other think tanks, or whether that's us as individuals, really try and understand and unpack what that term of adaptation means, not just today, but also going forward in time. I kind of joke that what we’ve put together with this research is a bit like a 16th-century map of the world, those maps that people put out back in the day, which were, maybe it's not quite 16th century, maybe it's 17th century. It's largely correct, but there are still gaps.

There are still things we need to do to enhance our understanding. But a lot of it for us, beyond reaching our core audiences, was really improving how the world approaches decision-making around adaptation and understanding of adaptation.

Mike Toffel:

And with adaptation, there's such a wide array of topics to think about Various stressors, what I call stressors or perils, which all start with heat and moisture and go from there to hurricane risk, droughts, flooding, and sea level rise. There are different sectors and how they're going to be impacted. This is geographically diverse, in some ways quite different from the carbon issue of atmospheric carbon, which mixes pretty well. So how did you get your hands around scoping this effort? Because I imagine it could be a thousand pages, or it could be a hundred pages, and part of that's going to have to do with scope.

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, we were very ambitious when we started the work; we had this insane scope, which I'll talk about in a moment. We'll just be done with it in a year. And then here I am, two and a half years later, I think, talking about the work. So, it was quite the undertaking. So, we knew we wanted to do something adaptation.

For a few reasons. One is that we’re certainly starting to see more companies interested in this question. Companies can decarbonize to reduce their own emissions, but they also live in a world where they're experiencing risks today, and the expectation is that those risks will rise. So, they've understood more that this is not an either-or, this is an end conversation between decarbonization and adaptation.

We're seeing more and more countries start to ask questions about adaptation. I think we assessed how many countries have submitted National adaptation plans are, their charter as it were on adaptation. And the number has gone up from about somewhere in the 80s, about five years ago, to 141 countries today that have national adaptation plans.

When we look at the academic literature on this, it tends to be very barbell-like. So, you have very micro-based work. So, it's a mangrove project in Bangladesh. Or there are some very quote-unquote -macro-based work that is trying to build a view of how to develop a good adaptation strategy. In some cases, trying to also cost adaptation, but done in quite a piecemeal way, meaning not a holistic view of hazards, not a holistic view of measures, not even oftentimes a consistent view of time horizons, meaning you're mixing and matching 2030 costs for something, and 2050 costs for something else.

So, our scope was geospatial and global today and going forward. We ended up narrowing the number of hazards we looked at to eight. So, we looked at three different kinds of heat, three different kinds of flooding, wildfire, and drought.

And then really taking this economy's lens, so really understanding each place and what each place experiences in terms of hazard and then thinking about adaptation responses.

Mike Toffel:

Well, that sounds like an ambitious scope. My gray hair has increased as a result of having done that. And how A big team was assembled to work on this?

Mekala Krishnan:

So, it varied over time. We had almost two phases of work that we did. So, the first phase was really the climate and exposure modeling.

By that I mean, once we defined these sets of hazards, really understanding what the climate, an ensemble of climate models, or a set of climate models tells us. For example, with heat, how many days are you going to experience in different parts of the world of heat above a certain temperature level or a certain threshold? And then overlaying that with where people and economic activity are. So that was kind of one phase of work where we worked with climate scientists. who-

We then asked questions about adaptation, right? So, if we know how many people around the world are experiencing events of different kinds, how do you think about a suite of adaptation responses? How do you understand the penetration of those adaptation responses today? And then how do you send those responses? So, we combined the two, two and a half years or so of work. And that was somewhere between three-to-five-person teams.

Mike Toffel:

Okay, got it. Wow. So that's a substantial investment in this report. Multiple years, 10 people, maybe more.

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, and drawing on just amazing resources that exist out there. So, we are not climate scientists. So, we drew on models that are cited in the IPCC, just a lot of climate data, and just great thinking that exists in the world. And then really a lot of it was how do we structure these models, these analyses to give us tractable answers.

Mike Toffel:

So, let's turn to the findings. So, at a high level, and then we can dive in, how do you describe the findings of this report?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, so I think the thing that really at its core stands out at the heart of this for me. You start with the view that in many ways, human beings have been adapting to their environment for centuries, if not millennia, right? Like just for fun, we went back, and we looked at, now, the Mesopotamians dealing with drought risk, or the Netherlands, which used to be called the Low Countries, dealing with flood risk. So, in many ways, cost effective proven measures for adaptation already exist, and human beings have been deploying them for centuries and millennia. But if you then really start to look at the problem, there are two challenges that exist.

The first is that despite the existence of these proven cost-effective adaptation measures, today the world experiences a resiliency gap, meaning not every part of the world spends on these measures. And in fact, we can get into this in a little while, but in fact, large swaths of the world are substantially under protected. So, despite the fact that these proven measures exist, large resiliency gaps already exist around the world today. So that's one problem.

The second problem is that the climate is not static. And under the current trajectory of emissions, the world is expected to warm by 1.5 degrees relative to pre-industrial levels by 2030. This is not just one year of 1.5 degrees, but multi-decadal periods that exceed 1.5 degrees by 2030, and warm to 2 degrees by 2050.

And so, what that means is that not only are we underspending today, but spending needs are expected to rise going forward as you look ahead. And so, really, what the work then is able to say, where is the world underspending today? Which places, which types of hazards? Where are needs likely to rise going forward? And then really try to understand why the spending is not taking place?

And then what do people need to do to unlock that spending? Which, spoiler alert is not just about finance. It's also about a whole host of other things.

Mike Toffel:

You mentioned the phrase resiliency gap. So, can you unpack that for us a bit?

Mekala Krishnan:

There are many ways one could think about managing physical climate risks. So physical climate risks are things like heat, as I said, we looked at three different types of heat, flooding, wildfire, and drought. You can manage that with three different types of tools. The first is what I call adaptation and what we refer to as adaptation in this research, which is essentially measures that you put in place to either reduce your vulnerability to the hazard. So, think about this like you're elevating your home to eliminate flood damage, minimize flood damage, or reduce your exposure to the hazard, meaning you're not building the home in a flood zone in the first place. That's adaptation. That's what we call adaptation. You could also do things like insurance, so that's transferring the financial burden of the damage, should it occur. Or you could do things like disaster recovery, so you let the damage hit, and then you rebuild the event. And so, for our purposes, we focused on the first, which is adaptation. So, sets of measures that you can put in place to reduce your vulnerability or reduce your exposure to the hazard.

As you think about even that question, there are so many things that sit under the toolkit of adaptation. As I said, we've been doing this in many ways for centuries and millennia. We ended up narrowing our list down to what we refer to in the research as 20 commonly used adaptation measures. These are things that could span, for example, irrigation to manage drought. We looked at air conditioning as one example of a measure to manage heat. Also, things like passive building cooling, things like urban trees, then measures like undergrounding power lines to manage wildfire risk, things like sea dikes or levees to manage flood risk. So, we identified 20 measures. The lens for these 20 was really to say, let's look at measures that are not specific.

So, I work in mining, and in mining, we do sediment control. We didn't want to go that narrow. So, we look at measures that were widely applicable across sectors and fairly commonly used and also provide a high degree of protection. Okay, so with that definition of adaptation, what do I mean by the term resiliency gap? So, as I mentioned, the world already experiences climate hazards today. Any guesses on whether you think about the landmass of the earth, what percent of the landmass of the earth experiences relatively high degrees of heat, wildfire, flooding, or drought?

Mike Toffel:

Hmm. That's an interesting question. What percent of the landmass? I would think it would be relatively small, like 20%.

Mekala Krishnan:

Okay, so our number was actually 40 % double what you just said. And now, this is a bit of a trick question because it depends on how you define the different events. So that was another, by the way, the phase one exercise that I described, a big question mark that we grappled with of how do you actually define an event? There is no set of definitions in the community on how to define different forms of hazards. And eventually, what we settled on was to define hazards based on what has been typically known to trigger some adaptation response? So, if you talk to flood engineers, they might use the term one in a hundred-year flood, which is essentially a flood with a 1 % likelihood of occurring. And that's usually a design standard. Some places use more stringent ones; some places use less stringent ones. But that's a design parameter that exists for flooding. So, we tried as best as possible to identify common design parameters for these different hazards and these different measures. But based on those common design parameters, we find 40 percent of the Earth is exposed to climate hazards today. We then said, OK, if we take these 20 adaptation measures that I referred to and we look at 40 percent of the landmass that's exposed, by the way, that translates to about four billion people around the world that live in these places, what we found was that only about a billion of those people had substantial protection with those 20 measures.

And about 3 billion people had very limited protection. And so that is essentially what constitutes a resiliency gap. It's the fact that there are places in the world that are exposed to these hazards but have either no or very limited protection against them. We also translated that to dollars.

Essentially what we found is that to protect those 1 billion people, the world on average is spending about $190 billion a year. That includes both operating expenditures and amortized capital expenditures. I mean, a simple example of that is a sea dike built in the Netherlands.

To protect all 4 billion people with those 20 measures would cost $540 billion. So, there's a resiliency gap even in dollar terms of about $350 billion a year. So, this is what I meant when I said even though we have these cost-effective proven measures, we're not spending today.

Mike Toffel:

And that must embed a whole host of assumptions about how much of that additional spend should be dedicated to reducing vulnerability versus reducing exposure. Like how many people would have to move versus protecting them in place. Just as a simple example.

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, and so the simplifying, indeed. And this is why I described this a bit as a 17th century map, where the simplifying assumption we made was these 20 measures. We looked at the prevalence of those 20 measures. So, in our list of 20, the act of moving is not included, just because data on that is poor for this kind of first pass. But we would include things like, your buildings are flood-proofed?

Mekala Krishnan:

Do you have coastal protection of some kind? Do you have a levee system if you are in an area where a river runs through, et cetera?

Mike Toffel:

So, these are big numbers, hundreds of billions, but not trillions. How do we think about putting those numbers into perspective?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, that's a great question. And we should talk more about this in the go-forward sense as well. One way to think about it is as a share of GDP, right? And so, what we tend to find in general is that as a share of GDP, the spending today, the resiliency gap as it were, tends to be much smaller in cities compared to rural areas. That is because you can think about measures like sea dikes that protect many people; you get a bigger bang for the buck, as it were, in a city because you're protecting more people for the same cost than you would in a more sparsely populated rural area. Some of it was because it's just the GDP of cities is larger than it is in rural areas. So, one way to think about dimension Alize these numbers are as a percent of GDP, and in general, we find that as a percent of GDP, both the need as well as the gap tends to be lower in cities than it is in rural areas.

Mike Toffel:

I mean, that matches an intuitive sense of the cost of just maintaining existing infrastructure like roads on a per-mile basis. It's just more expensive on a per capita basis, which is a proxy for some of these expenses in a rural area than it is in a much harder to maintain roads in a rural area than an urban area.

Mekala Krishnan:

Exactly. And I think the corollary, by the way, also applies to income. So, part of how we did the work was we divided the world into income groups and density groups. So, we said every pixel on the planet, we tag it as a high, middle- or low-income pixel, and we tag it as a rural area, a peri-urban area, and an urban area. And in general, what we find is that not just a city is better protected compared to rural areas. Not surprisingly, high-income places are more protected, meaning even at a pixel level, high-income places tend to be better protected than low-income places.

Mike Toffel:

So, this is the current events piece of the report, a bit of a census, and a gap analysis is how I would think about it.

Mekala Krishnan:

That's exactly right. It's like a stop take of where we are today. I will say that some somewhat counterintuitive things, maybe even today, are that, so if I talked about the 1 billion and the 3 billion gaps, so.

It's true that most of the 3 billion gap people who are not protected or have limited protection are in low-income places, but about 700 million of those 3 billion are in high-income places. So even in high-income places, we don't have full degrees of protection.

We tend to find that in high-income places, the largest gaps this is going to surprise no one who has read any news in the United States, but the largest gaps in high-income places tend to be the wildfire. And to some extent, this was a little bit of wildfire. And related flooding may not surprise people living in New York. When it comes to low-income and middle-income areas, it's many different hazards. Low-income areas, large portion of their exposure, so low-income areas often tend to be in South Asia, for example, or Sub-Saharan Africa, a lot of their exposure is to heat, and that's where a lot of the gaps, both in terms of people protected as well as the spending needs, are to protect against heat.

Mike Toffel:

Got it. Okay, so then in the looking ahead portion, let's dive into that. So, what was the goal of that? As you mentioned, modeling before and the difference between today and the future is going to depend to some extent on the decarbonization efforts that actually occur. But it's widely assumed now that we are going to have lots of changes, physical climate changes, regardless of how much decarbonization we engage in, even if you turn the spigot off tomorrow of greenhouse gas emissions.

Mike Toffel:

Because of the slowness of the system, today's emissions or yesterday's emissions will still be impacting the environment for decades to come, and in some cases, longer than that. So different scenarios. You mentioned IPCC, the Consortium of scientists who are looking into this. They have different model projections. So that's the baseline. What did McKinsey add to that baseline?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, so what we did first in terms of the baseline, different people have different versions of what a baseline is.

Yeah, so you mentioned the term baseline. Different people have different views of what a baseline is. And so first and foremost, what we did was to try and say, we thought a lot about how one even conceives of a baseline in a world where the Paris Agreement, at least for most countries in the world, is still in force? How do we think about what we're planning for? And what we converged upon was to say, let's look at what scenarios are telling us about expectations on the current trajectory of emissions. Because just from a prudent risk management standpoint, a prudency of adaptation standpoint, that's the quote-unquote base case scenario that it's important to plan around at least.

And so, we identified about 25 different scenarios, some by the IPCC, some by an organization called the Network for Greening the Financial System. It's a consortium of central banks that have built scenarios for financial institutions, stress testing, and our own McKinsey scenarios around the current trajectory of emissions and where that gets us. And we put all of that together, and we found that across the 25.

There's a lot of consensuses that the world will get to about 1.5 degrees by 2030, 2 degrees by 2050. And so that was our starting point.

Mike Toffel:

So, What I meant to say was bass line trajectory, because I wanted to convey the idea that things are moving. We know things are moving. You had concluded that 2030 and the 2050 are sort of consensus targets. Like, we understand roughly where we are. So, we can take off, you can just keep going from there if you like.

Mekala Krishnan:

Great, so then if we think about 1.5 degrees by 2030 and 2 degrees by 2050. Firstly, why does that matter for adaptation? It matters for two reasons. Why does that matter for adaptation decisions being made today? The first is that a lot of things we're putting in place today for adaptation have long lifetimes. So, if you're thinking about putting in place a sea dike, for example, that's something that could last 30, 40, 50 years or longer. And so, it's important to understand the future climate as you're designing adaptation decisions even today.

The second is that adaptation can also come with long lead times. So, putting in place and implementing any of these projects. Even then, we looked at an example of a project in the Netherlands, which was a project around levee protection.

Even in the Netherlands, which you would argue is a country that is used to implementing flood protection measures, it took about 10 years to build the project from start to finish, from conception to completion. And so, both because of the lead time and the lifetime associated with adaptation, understanding the future, even for decisions today, is important.

So, what happens, basically as the world warms to 1.5 degrees and 2 degrees? If you recall the 40 % number that I mentioned on landmass.

You start to see more and more places around the world being exposed. So that 40 % that exist today becomes about 75 % of the landmass that's exposed by 2 degrees. So, more places around the world are starting to experience climate hazards. So, if a place experiences two types of hazards by our definition, today it might experience three or four.

So that's the first thing that happens. It starts to spread, and more places start to experience more hazards as a result. The second thing that happens is that places that experience hazards today also start to, in some cases, experience them more severely. So, an example of that is heat stress, which is one of the three heat hazards we looked at, which we define as periods, long periods, weeks or longer, of very high heat and or humidity conditions.

Such that human productivity is affected, workers get tired more easily, need to take more breaks, etc. Human health can also be affected in some cases. And so today, the places that experience heat stress around the world on average experience about 12 weeks of heat stress. At 2 degrees, the places that experience heat stress around the world experience about 16 weeks of heat stress. And so, you have this phenomenon where more places start to become exposed, and places that are exposed today start to experience events with greater frequency or greater intensity. And so, what all of that means is that costs for adaptation rise. And so that's really the analysis that we did, looking forward to 2 degrees.

Mike Toffel:

Got it. And you said you did this around the world.

Mekala Krishnan:

We did this around the world.

Mike Toffel:

And so far, we're talking about infrastructure projects, but that's just one of the resilience or adaptation measures of your 20, I imagine, like seawalls, for example. There are more operational approaches, like having scheduling differences, having people working not in the dead of the day, because it's just too hot.

Or have people working at night or other approaches like that, that won't show up in these enormous infrastructure projects. Is that part of your analysis as well, these shorter-term measures as well?

Mekala Krishnan:

As I mentioned, picked 20 different types of measures. A lot of them are infrastructure, especially when it comes to things like flooding. So, there would be things like building a sea dike or a levee. Some of them are more of what I would call projects but not infrastructure, so things like building an irrigation system are an example of that. Some of them are more individual consumer type measures. So, we looked at personal cooling equipment, which is something that you can provide to people to protect against heat waves. We also looked at things like early warning systems, which are alerts that you can provide to people to warn them of everything from heat to flood taking place, like other cooling measures like air conditioning. So, it's by no means a comprehensive list, but it's a wide list that spans quite a lot of different types of things. It’s also got a good, interesting spectrum of the benefits of the measures. So, for example, something like a sea dike, once you build the sea dike up to a certain height it will protect you from every flood up to that height, provided, of course, it's well built. Something like undergrounding a power line and managing cropping, managing forest foliage, and cover protect against wildfires don't fully eliminate the risk; it just reduces the likelihood of the risk. So, the nature of these adaptational measures also varies. Some come with high OPEC, some come with high CAPEX, so a huge spectrum of things in there. Things I would like to add over time are things like the reducing exposure idea, referred to as the reducing exposure idea before that was in someone of the 20s that we looked at. So, there are a few that I would like to treat as a living thing that we continue to expand over time, and those are examples of things I'd like to add.

Mike Toffel:

Yeah, and so one of the findings in the report talked about there are opportunities that actually have a high benefit-to-cost ratio, and that surprised me. I mean, there's always some low-hanging fruit in anything one looks at, but it seems to me in this area, the reluctance to invest is often because it's just so expensive, and if you invest a lot of money on a low probability event, and it doesn't occur, then people look at you like you just spent gazillions of dollars on this device and it's never been tested. And you could say, well, it might have happened. And it's a bit like buying insurance, where every year that you don't use your insurance, someone might say, " Well, that was a waste of money. But others would say, well, no, we felt well protected in case the hazard arose.

Tell us a little bit about the high benefit-to-cost ratio. What are the types of investment opportunities or expenditures that you saw that had that characteristic, and why do you think they exist out there?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, absolutely. So maybe just anchoring on the disorienting nature of the amount of spending that increase going forward first, and then I'll get to your question. So, remember I said today there's already a resiliency gap. The world is spending $190 billion today. To protect everybody with these 20 measures at a high standard of protection would cost $540 billion.

At 2 degrees, that number would go up to $1.2 trillion a year. So, we're spending 190 billion today. If we are to protect everybody to high standards, that would cost $540 billion. By the way, those standards that we measured go back to the one in 100-year flood that I alluded to, are standards that are adaptation standards largely in developed economies, also to some extent in developing economies. So, in the research, we keep using this phrase, developing economy standards. That's what we mean by that.

So, 190 billion, 540 billion rising to 1.2 trillion a year at 2 degrees, and that's because of what I mentioned about more places becoming exposed and places becoming exposed more intensely, more frequently, more severely.

So, the good news, though, is that the measures that we're talking about, as you said, have high benefit-to-cost ratios. And interestingly, today the average benefit-to-cost ratio of implementing adaptation is three to one, where for every dollar you invest in adaptation, you get $3 of benefit on average in terms of your avoided damage going forward at a 2-degree world, partly because we have bigger economies in the world, partly because we experience these events more frequently, more severely, more places experience them, that number becomes seven to one. So, if anything, the benefit-to-cost ratio actually goes up over time, not down over time.

Mike Toffel:

That’s interesting. And this is over what time period? Like, if you say the three to one, is that a dollar expended sometime in the next 20 years, compared to the $3 cumulative benefit or present value of that benefit over the next 20 years?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, so this is assuming over the lifetime of the asset, the spending and the lifetime of the asset, the potential benefit in terms of avoided damages, accounting for the frequency and probability of different events. Some of our events are acute events. So, we looked at a probability distribution curve associated with them. Some of them are more chronic events that happen every year, things like a heat stress event that occurs every year. So, we accounted for that a little bit across both types of events.

But as you said, despite that positive benefit-to-cost ratio, we're not spending already today, and there's no guarantee that we will spend going forward. And so, part of what we asked ourselves in this was really the aha moment for me on the research was, why is this spending not happening? And there are actually a few different types of reasons why it's not happening. As you look at the data, we aren't able to fully attribute every reason to place or location or decision, but if you look at the data, a few things stand out.

The first is that, I mentioned previously that low-income places are clearly less protected than high-income places. It's widely apparent in the data. About 85 % of people living in low-income places have limited protection compared to only 25 % in high-income places. And so clearly, there is a capacity to pay competing spending priorities question that is happening here and now.

Abundant in every measure we look at and across every geography, low-income places tend to be spent less than high-income places, so clearly a capacity to spend issue. The second is, and you mentioned this, it's the nature of the benefits, right? So, the nature of the benefits is that you avoid the damage and you avoid the damage especially for acute events, only if, only in the instance where the event occurs, which is not by any means indeed. And so, there is a cognitive bias, almost, a reluctance to spend that can happen because of that. And there's some very interesting academic work that is found, for example, when a wildfire event occurs, you start to see spending increase post the event. And that's because it's created this recency of the event. And then over time, again, spending starts to fall. So, this idea that the nature of the benefits is not just intangible in the form of avoided damage, but they only occur, they're only manifested if and when the event occurs, is a very real thing. And this to me is one of the main reasons why one of the largest gaps we see in high-income places is to wildfire risk.

The third is a risk awareness gap. And this, I think, is likely to be an increasing challenge going forward as the earth warms, because people's understanding of the risks that they're already exposed to and how those risks could increase going forward, I think, more work needs to be done to create that awareness. And then finally, there are real implementation challenges. Ramba talked about the Netherlands project that took eight to 10 years to execute. Especially the large infrastructure things, if there are those that involve coordination across communities, they can be really hard to implement. And so, you see that especially with some of the more infrastructure-oriented measures. And then finally, there is actual financing, which I'm distinguishing from the capacity to pay, a question of how you actually get capital to flow, especially in places where the person that is incurring the expense, like a taxpayer, is not the person that sees the benefit.

Questions about misaligned incentives that can create financing challenges as well.

Mike Toffel:

Yeah, it's interesting that you call it a financing challenge. I think of it as a political challenge because both politicians and the voters who elect or unselect them want benefits now. And of course, you can try to match the benefits with the cost by using debt as we do with schools and bridges, and so on. Say with this bridge, this school's going to last for 50 years.

We shouldn't all pay for all of it today. We should spread that cost across the 50 years so that the beneficiaries become taxpayers at that time and share that burden. But you still need to pull the trigger, and people must agree to incur a stream of debt payments. And for something that in a world of competing priorities, it seems to me this is going to be hard to get people to really celebrate these types of investments, especially one of the things that I face when teaching or grappling with adaptation is when you're talking about physical risk, it's not really good news, right? Like the avoidance of problems is a little harder to get people rallied around, versus other types of opportunities. Like, there's no, like a school, has bigger and better acoustics and a new shop and all sorts of benefits that you can then see when it's built.

Or solar power, you can get a sense of, you can see the solar array or wind, you get a sense of like, we're trying to solve the problem, and there's a physical manifestation every day at solving the problem because it's substituting for fossil fuel combustion. But these adaptation measures that I'm familiar with seem like they don't have that same cache, that same excitement. And are you seeing any examples where people can actually get excited about these types of things?

Mekala Krishnan:

I would like to think that over time, even the things we've been talking about, people would get excited about, partly because it allows you to continue to drive economic growth, continue to live resilient lives, right? And so, think part of what has started to change in this debate a bit is the use of the word resilience, I think, for maybe that reason. I think there is a class of measures that do come with what people in the community refer to as co-benefits. So, irrigation is a great example of that, right? So, it not only, if you put an irrigation system in, it not only protects you from drought, but oftentimes can enhance yields for farmers. And so, there are measures that come with these co-benefits that I think are being talked about now a lot for that reason. And there is now, increasingly, maybe a third category of measures that people are paying attention to, which is areas that are maybe frontiers of technological innovation. So partly again, can you get venture capitalists or private equity excited about new opportunities? So, this is in things like, can you get better climate data and better climate analytics to be more decision ready as you're making these investments? Or can we think about a new class of drought-resistant seeds? Or can you think about new materials to help with wildfire protection? So, there's also that more frontier.

Innovation is starting to happen in space, but I think there's also just how do we talk about adaptation today, so it doesn't feel like this ugly gray seawall boring project, and then also how do we talk more about co-benefits related to these measures.

Mike Toffel:

Right. Yeah, the co-benefits are an important one, as is the products or service economy that will arise out of the growing need for these products. Mean, it is very different. I often stress this in our classrooms here, thinking about physical climate risks and alternatively transition risks, which have more to do with whether we price carbon or if norms change so that people exert preferences for decarbonized products.

Those are very different worlds. And the one thing we know about the physical risks is that they are coming. We don't quite know how big they will be, and we know they'll vary over space. But that will certainly create demand for new products and services to help maintain or even increase productivity, as you're describing. Let me pivot now that we've heard a bit about the report itself and ask you about the reception of the report.

As mentioned earlier, this report can inform policymakers. It could inform corporations that you engage with. It could inform McKinsey's own practice. Take us through a couple of stories, if you would, about how people have been receiving the report and what you're hearing.

Mike Toffel:

How does this work affect McKinsey's consulting or MGI's next projects? You mentioned you'd like this to be a living project. Tell us a little bit about what you'd like to have living in it, and whether there are consulting opportunities here.

So, you'd mentioned there are opportunities, of course, for longer-term planning. How is this affecting the consulting side of McKinsey?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, so I think on the conversations we are having with our clients, we’re seeing a lot of interest on the part of financial institutions, asking questions of, you know, the research has identified in some sense the need. Where are those needs starting to translate into real value pools today? And where are there already commercial opportunities today? And where are there almost near commercial opportunities, which can be unlocked with innovative financing, better coordination across financial institutions, and the real economy? And where can financial institutions also lean in to create demand for this adaptation? Remember, I said already today we're spending; we're not spending enough. So, there is a real question of how to spur demand. And so, we're starting to see some interest on the part of financial institutions.

Not just to capture existing demand but also to question how they can spur additional demand going forward. I think the real economy corporates are also of various sorts, as I mentioned, and are also starting to get interested in this. It's interesting when we talk to companies, our client base tends to be large Fortune 500 companies. What we do find is that in many ways, Fortune 500 companies are already doing a lot of adaptation. They don't always call it that.

So, if I have a big physical asset base, like I'm an infrastructure operator, for example, or an infrastructure owner, oftentimes these assets are not built to the one in 100-year standard that I described, but to a one in 10,000-year standard. And so even if you think about climate change going forward, these facilities, these assets are quite well protected. But where they do have exposure tends to be exactly as you said, they supply chains in their distribution channels with their employees. And that's not always something that they've thought about because it isn't always directly in their remit. And so, we're seeing more really.

Mike Toffel:

So now that the report has been published, how's this changing the conversation within your consulting at McKinsey?

Mekala Krishnan:

We are seeing a lot of interest from different types of clients and across the world, not just in one region or the other. I would say by far the biggest interest in this topic seems to be from financial institutions. And I think that's because the questions they're asking us are the research that has identified adaptation needs around the world. Where are those needs starting to translate into real value creation, value pools that are being formed today? And where are there clear demand signals for that adaptation, for those adaptation responses around the world? Where are there commercial opportunities because of that? And where are there near commercial opportunities where innovative financing, better partnerships across the real economy and financial institutions can unlock financing? So those are very real-life conversations. And this is everything from banks in Asia, to banks in Europe, to private equity companies in the US, a huge host of financial institutions are interested in this.

The second is the real economy corporations. think this is obviously a large part of our core client base. I think what's been interesting as we've worked with a lot of companies on this topic, which our bias tends to be large Fortune 500 companies, of course. But what we find is that, at least in terms of their direct exposure, many of them are actually quite well protected. So, they're doing adaptation without calling it that. And that's just because of the design standards that they've set for themselves.

So, if I have a large physical facility, oftentimes they're designed not just for that one in 100-year flood that I described, but a one in 10,000-year flood, for example. So, even factoring in a changing climate, they're quite well protected. Where they tend to have gaps is often in their supply chains, in their distribution channels, when it comes to their labor and their employees. Thinking about heat management protocols, for example, I think heat in general is very under-recognized.

And so that's where they're now starting to say, how do I make a holistic assessment of my exposure to physical risks, not just today, but in the future? How do I then think about managing that? The other type of conversation we're starting to have with many real economy companies is what their role is in providing the products and services to support adaptation. And what role can they play in better products, better supply chains, better services, lower cost, improved affordability, things of that kind.

Mike Toffel:

So, as we bring ourselves to a close here, let me just have two more questions for you. At a high level, how would you summarize the key takeaway messages you'd like listeners to glean from the publication of your report?

Mekala Krishnan:

So, I would say; the world has many proven cost-effective adaptation measures, but that's not a guarantee that adaptation will happen. We're already seeing a resiliency gap today. Of the four billion people exposed around the world to hazards today, only one billion are well protected. And the need for adaptation will only rise with the changing climate. Our estimates would suggest that at 2 degrees, the world would need to spend $1.2 trillion a year.

The vast majority of that is going to heat and drought. And so, the real question is, how do we use this understanding of adaptation needs and costs to better unlock adaptation spending around the world? And the answer is not just finance. It's really, how do we spur demand for adaptation? How do we improve risk awareness? How do we educate on the benefits of adaptation? And then how do we get finance to flow?

Mike Toffel:

Great. And final question, for those interested in learning more, clearly, they should read this report, and we'll link it in the show notes of this episode. What other resources would you point folks to?

Mekala Krishnan:

Yeah, so few that I would highlight, and this is by no means comprehensive. There's another great podcast, exclusively on adaptation called America Adapts. So that would be interesting, especially for people based in the US. There is a great website called We Adapt, which has a whole repository of case studies on adaptation that I always find interesting to look at. There's also a great resource by an organization called Probable Futures that has created these great maps of climate hazards around the world, and that really allows users to just explore how their location, their particular part of the world, is going to be exposed to these hazards, and they're also starting to talk now more about adaptation responses. So those would be just three, but first and foremost, read our research.

Mike Toffel:

Very good. Yes, we had probable futures on the podcast before, so we've been linked to that episode as well. Great. Mekala, thank you so much for joining us here on Climate Rising and sharing your insights about adaptation and this relatively recent report from McKinsey.

Mekala Krishnan:

Okay. It was a pleasure to be on, Mike. Thank you so much for having me.