Jee-Eun Shin

34 HBS Mail Center
700 Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163 USA

Phone: 857.200.6900
Email: jeshin@hbs.edu

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Design of performance measurement, management control, and incentive systems; executive compensation, corporate governance

EDUCATION

Harvard Business School — Boston, Massachusetts USA
Doctoral Candidate — September 2013 – May 2018 (Expected)

Seoul National University — Seoul, South Korea
M.S., Accounting — March 2013

Yonsei University — Seoul, South Korea
B.A., Economics with Minor in Business Administration — March 2011

RESEARCH (Presentations marked with * were presented by me)

Job Market Paper

"Relational Disruptions as a Control Mechanism"

- Solo-authored
- Presentations: Harvard Business School*; 2018 AAA MAS Midyear Meeting* (Scheduled)

Working Papers (Draft Available Upon Request)

"An Evaluation of Compensation Benchmarking Peer Groups Based on Mutual Peer-Designating Behaviors"

- Solo-authored
- Presentations: 2017 AAA MAS Midyear Meeting*; 2016 AAA Annual Meeting*; 2016 Tilburg University Accounting Spring Camp*; 2016 Wharton CAI Research Symposium*; 2016 AAA FARS Midyear Meeting*; Harvard Business School*

"Relative Performance Benchmarks: Do Boards Follow the Informativeness Principle?"

- Coauthors: Paul Ma and Charles Wang
- Presentations: 2017 AAA Annual Meeting; 2017 Utah Winter Accounting Conference; 2017 AAA FARS Midyear Meeting*; 2017 UBC Winter Finance Conference; 2016 HKUST Accounting Symposium; 2016 SMU Accounting Symposium; Georgia State University; Harvard Business School; University of Florida

"Do Mandatory Compensation Disclosures Alter Firms' Compensation Benchmarking Practices? Evidence for CFOs from the 2006 SEC Compensation Disclosure Amendments"

- Solo-authored
- Presentations: 2016 Temple Conference on Convergence of Financial and Managerial Accounting*; Harvard Business School*

“Who Do Franchisees Work For: Themselves or the Network?”
- Coauthors: Jan Bouwens and Dennis Campbell
- Presentations: 2016 Global Management Accounting Research Symposium*; Ludwig Maximilian University; Tilburg University; 2015 AAA MAS Midyear Meeting*

“Employee-Organizational Congruence as a Control Mechanism during Organizational Change: Evidence from a Merger Announcement”
- Coauthors: Ohchan Kwon
- Presentations: Harvard Business School*

Research-in-progress

“An Examination of a Tournament-based Incentive System to Promote Innovation”
- Coauthors: Wei Cai and Susanna Gallani

“Promoting Innovation via Platforms: An Investigation of Management Control Systems at Science Parks”
- Coauthors: Wei Cai, Dennis Campbell, and Susanna Gallani

CASES

"Buffer.com"
- Published in *Harvard Business School Case* [917-019 (May 2017)]
- Coauthors: Tiffany Y. Chang, Susanna Gallani, and Brian J. Hall

"Buffer.com (B)"
- Published in *Harvard Business School Supplement* [917-020 (May 2017)]
- Coauthors: Tiffany Y. Chang, Susanna Gallani, and Brian J. Hall

INVITED CONFERENCES

Notre Dame Accounting Research Conference	2017
Wharton Spring Accounting Conference	2017
AAA Annual Meeting	2016, 2017
AAA Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Midyear Meeting	2016, 2017
Information, Markets, and Organizations (IMO), Harvard Business School	2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
AAA Management Accounting Section (MAS) Midyear Meeting	2013, 2015, 2016, 2017
Temple Conference on Convergence of Financial and Managerial Accounting	2016
Global Management Accounting Research Symposium	2016
Tilburg Accounting Spring Camp	2016
Wharton Customer Analytics Initiative Research Symposium	2016
Empirical Management Conference, Harvard Business School	2014

ACADEMIC SERVICE ACTIVITIES

Reviewer
- Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Research Grants Council (RGC) of Hong Kong
- AAA Annual Meeting [2016, 2017]

- AAA MAS Midyear Meeting [2015, 2016, 2017]

Discussant
- AAA Annual Meeting [2017]
- AAA MAS Midyear Meeting [2018; 2016]

Advisor of "Program For Research In Markets & Organizations" (PRIMO), Harvard Business School
- 10-week summer residential community of undergraduates participating in research affiliated with HBS faculty, drawn from the entire Harvard undergraduate population

Member of Doctoral Student Advisory Committee, Harvard Business School

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

"Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance" [Spring 2017]
- Mandatory Undergraduate Course, Harvard University Economics Department
- Main Instructor (Teaching Rating: 4.4/5): Designed syllabus for full-semester course; 1.5 hours in-front-class teaching twice a week; 2-hour weekly office hours; in charge of grading all assignments and determination of the final grade

"Financial Reporting and Control" [Fall 2016, Fall 2015]
- MBA Required Curriculum, Harvard Business School
- Teaching Assistant for Professor Gerardo Perez Cavazos, Professor Paula Price, and Professor Suraj Srinivasan

"Designing Competitive Organizations" [Fall 2015]
- MBA Elective Curriculum, Harvard Business School
- Teaching Assistant for Professor Tatiana Sandino, and Professor Robert Simons

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Center for Accounting Research, Seoul National University 2012 – 2013
Research Assistant for Prof. Jae Yong Shin

Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PWC), South Korea 2009
Intern

HONORS AND AWARDS

Doctoral fellowship, Harvard Business School 2013 – 2018
Research Grant, Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies (KFAS) 2013 – 2018
Award for Academic Excellence, Yonsei University 2008 – 2010
1st Place in Mathematics Competition of Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany 2003

OTHER

Computing Skills: STATA, SAS, R, ArcGIS, Matlab, Git, LaTex
Languages: (Native) German, Korean; (Fluent) English

REFERENCES

Professor Dennis Campbell (Chair)
Dwight P. Robinson, Jr. Professor of Business Administration
Unit Head, Accounting & Management
Harvard Business School
(617) 495-1797
dcampbell@hbs.edu

Professor Srikant M. Datar
Arthur Lowes Dickinson Professor of Business Administration
Accounting & Management
Harvard Business School
(617) 495-6543
sdatar@hbs.edu

Professor Brian J. Hall
Albert H. Gordon Professor of Business Administration
Unit Head, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets
Harvard Business School
(617) 495-5062
bhall@hbs.edu

Professor Paul M. Healy
James R. Williston Professor of Business Administration
Accounting & Management
Harvard Business School
(617) 495-1283
phealy@hbs.edu

Professor Charles C.Y. Wang
Glenn and Mary Jane Creamer Associate Professor of Business Administration
Accounting & Management
Harvard Business School
(617) 496-9633
cwang@hbs.edu

APPENDIX (Paper Abstracts):

Title: "Relational Disruptions as a Control Mechanism"
Abstract: This study examines the effect of changes in relationships (i.e. relational disruptions) on performance. On-going relationships facilitate the development of synergies in productivity such that relational disruptions could hamper subsequent performance. However, increasing familiarity in on-going relationships may inhibit monitoring incentives such that relational disruptions may improve subsequent performance due to fresh-look benefits. This study investigates this debate empirically using data from a roadside assistance company that outsources its towing services to a nationwide vendor network. My findings show that performance subsequent to relational disruptions is affected differently depending on the nature of the change in the relationship. Specifically, I proxy for disruptions in manager-vendor relationships using vendor network manager changes, and examine vendor performance subsequent to such relational disruptions. Employee-initiated manager changes decrease subsequent vendor performance which is suggestive of adjustment costs to manager changes that are not intended by the organization. Company-initiated manager changes reverse declined vendor performance suggesting that network manager changes are used as a control mechanism to sustain vendor performance. My findings highlight the importance of relationship dynamics in incentive contracting.

Title: "An Evaluation of Compensation Benchmarking Peer Groups Based on Mutual Peer-Designating Behaviors"
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that firms mutually recognizing each other as compensation benchmarking peers constitute viable competitors in the same CEO labor market, and that non-mutual peer relationships can serve as a tool to evaluate firms' executive compensation practices. In particular, I ask why some of the firm's chosen peers do not consider to select the base firm back despite listing other firms as compensation benchmarking peers. I hypothesize that such one-sided peer choices are driven either by rent extraction or motivational motives. My analyses show that firms with a larger proportion of such one-sided peer choices are associated with higher compensation via setting a higher benchmark level. Consistent with rent extraction motives, such firms are also associated with higher excess compensation and lower firm performance. In additional analyses, I show that the proportion of one-sided peers increases when firms adjust their benchmark level upward by adding higher compensated peers and/or dropping lower compensated peers. Collectively, the findings suggest that patterns in mutual compensation benchmarking peer-designating behaviors can serve as a tool to evaluate firms' executive compensation practices.

Title: "Relative Performance Benchmarks: Do Boards Follow the Informativeness Principle?"
Abstract: Relative TSR (rTSR) is increasingly used by market participants to judge and incentivize managerial performance. We evaluate the efficacy, reasons, and implications of firms' benchmarks in rTSR-based contracts. Although compensation consultants suggest that a primary objective of rTSR is to filter shocks unrelated to managerial performance, following the informativeness principle, we document that a significant subset of firms, who choose index-based benchmarks, do not adequately achieve this objective. Further, the index-benchmark selection is associated with governance-related frictions, and not driven by plausible alternative theories. Both structural calibration and reduced-form estimates reveal significant negative performance implications from sub-optimal peer-selection.

Title: "Do Mandatory Compensation Disclosures Alter Firms' Compensation Benchmarking Practices? Evidence for CFOs from the 2006 SEC Compensation Disclosure Amendments"
Abstract: This paper shows that mandatory compensation disclosures increase firms' compensation benchmarking practices due to more compensation information at other firms. I exploit the 2006 compensation disclosure amendment to distinguish between CFOs whose compensation disclosure became newly mandatory, and CEOs whose compensation disclosure was already mandatory even before the amendment. My empirical findings show that the mandated CFO compensation disclosures increased the size, and benchmark level (measured as the median compensation) of the industry peer group for which CFO compensation information was available. Overall, I document that

compensation benchmarking practices became more prevalent following the 2006 amendments, but that CFO compensation benchmarking became more prevalent in firms with a higher CFO industry benchmark level due to the additional disclosure.

Title: “Who Do Franchisees Work For: Themselves or the Network?”
Abstract: Using data from a franchise network of supermarkets, this paper shows that noncompliance with network-wide standards has negative economic contagion effects on the overall network. In the presence of such economic spillover effects, we show that social norms within organizations can entice individual franchisees to defy their own financial incentives to adhere to network-wide standards. Whereas on average franchisees benefit financially by complying with network-wide set quality standards, franchisees located in poorer areas are more profitable if they deviate. Notwithstanding this financial incentive from noncompliance, our results suggest that franchisees serving poorer areas that are surrounded by a large group of compliers are more subject to social pressure to comply with the network-wide targets.

Title: “Employee-Organizational Congruence as a Control Mechanism during Organizational Change: Evidence from a Merger Announcement”
Abstract: This study examines how employee-organizational congruence can be used as a control mechanism to induce more desirable employee behaviors in periods of organizational change. Using data from a company that made a company-wide merger announcement to its employees, we examine the performance effects of store locations that exhibit high versus low employee-organizational congruence. We consider two distinct employee performance measures: a sales-based performance measure, and customer satisfaction. Our empirical findings show that, subsequent to the merger announcement, employees at high congruence locations are associated with a greater improvement in customer satisfaction, but less improvement in the sales-based performance measure compared to employees at low congruence locations. In subsequent tests, we document that such effects are driven by employees at store locations where the merger-related career concerns are more predominant. Taken together, these findings suggest that employee-organizational congruence mitigates career concern-related myopic employee behaviors to fixate effort levels on relatively short term-oriented performance measures such as sales at the expense of decreasing effort levels towards more goal-congruent performance measures such as customer satisfaction.