Speaker(s):   Jackson Nickerson (WA University-St. Louis)

Title: Strategic Management of R&D Pipelines with Co-Specialized Investments and Technology Markets

Abstract
The theoretical literature on managing R&D pipeline is largely based on real option theory, which has been the workhorse for assessing R&D projects and making decisions about undertaking, continuing, or terminating projects. The theory typically assumes that each project or causally related set of projects is independent. Yet, casual observation suggests that this assumption is not valid in many circumstances. For instance, firms expend much effort on “managing” and “balancing” its R&D pipeline, where managing appears to be related to the choice of R&D selection thresholds and balancing is related to finding projects perhaps from different sources to fill the pipeline. Not only do these rule appear to differ across firms, they also appear that they can vary over time for the same firm. Such managing suggests there may be some type of interdependency among R&D projects and that the choice of R&D selection rules is a strategic decision. In this paper we develop a model using dynamic programming techniques that explains why firms vary in their R&D project selection rules. The novelty and value of our model derives from the central insight that some firms invest in downstream co-specialized activities that would incur substantial adjustment costs if R&D efforts are unsuccessful while other firms have no such investment. If transaction costs in technology markets are positive, which implies that accessing the market for projects is costly, these investments lead to state-contingent project selection rules that create a dynamic interdependency among R&D activities and product mix. The existence of a dynamic interdependency fundamentally implies that a firm's current project selection decision will affect future state conditions and future profit and that the project selection prescription for assessing each project independently is never correct. We describe how strategic management of the R&D pipeline optimally changes in response to a variety of state conditions. We conclude that our model can be extended to address several additional research questions associated with R&D portfolio management, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions.