Speaker(s): Pranab Majumder (Duke)
Title:
Author(s):
Pranab Majumder & Ashok Srinivasan
Abstract
This paper considers asset-specific supply chains which
are prevalent in many industries, notably the Japanese keiretsu, with price
dependent deterministic demand. We study the effect of contract leadership and
coordination. We demonstrate the importance of leader position in the chain--
this determines the extent of demand marginalization and cost curve
marginalization. We also show how to determine the optimal location of the
leader. Member profits are determined by system-wide rather than individual
costs. We consider Cournot competition between competing supply chains and show
the effect of changes in leadership and cost efficiency on the equilibrium. Our
work formalizes many intuitive insights and serves as a foundation for a number
of extensions.
Keywords
Stackelberg Game, Double Marginalization, Contracting,
Non-Cooperative Games, Supply Chains, Coordination, Cournot Competition,
Japanese keiretsu