

# The “Chemical Spillover” effect: Are polluters “intoxicating” clean organizations?

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## Motivation

Inefficient users of **toxic chemicals** are punished (King and Lenox, 2002)

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Better off using toxic chemicals that are **inefficiently** handled by others

Firms diversify into industries with same **chemicals** (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2010).

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Better off using toxic chemicals that are **broadly** used across activities

*Better off using toxic chemicals that are broadly and inefficiently handled by others....really?*

## “Chemical Spillover” Effect

- ⊕ Existence of a **chemical-level reputation** (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001)
- ⊕ **Information asymmetry** of the risks of that chemical and how safely firms handle it (Barnett and King, 2008)
- ⊕ Stakeholders’ ability to **administer common sanctions** to all users of the same toxic chemical (King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002)

*Hypothesis 1: Firms using a given toxic chemical are punished after somebody else’s accident with that chemical.*

## Chemical’s Illegitimacy

- Strength of the proposed mechanisms will be enhanced by chemical’s **illegitimacy**:
- ⊕ *Chemical reputation*: worse for illegitimate chemicals (Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001)
  - ⊕ *Stakeholders’ sanctions*: stronger for illegitimate chemicals (Eesley and Lenox, 2006)

*Hypothesis 2: The illegitimacy of the toxic chemical increases the strength of the “chemical spillover” effect*

## Chemical-level Association

- Strength of the proposed mechanisms will be reduced by the presence of **chemical-level associations** (Barnett and King, 2008)
- ⊕ CLAs reduce the existing *information asymmetry* (Slovik and Weber, 2002)
  - ⊕ CLAs reduce the likelihood and strength of *stakeholders’ sanctions* (Baron, 1995)



*Hypothesis 3: The presence of a chemical-level association reduces the strength of the “chemical spillover” effect*

## METHODS-RESULTS

### DATA & SAMPLE

- ⊕ **Environmental accidents** : Content analysis → 81 accidents with specific toxic chemicals between 1995 and 2005
- ⊕ **Firms’ emissions of specific toxic chemicals**: Environmental protection Agency’s (EPA) Toxic Release Inventory
- ⊕ **Stock price daily variations**: Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP)
- ⊕ **Final sample**: 181 “innocent” firms across 81 accidents → 15147 observations

CONSTRUCT	MEASURE
Dependent Variable	CARs days 0 to5
Firm’s Chemical Use	Toxic chemical releases (toxicity-weighted)
Chemical Illegitimacy	Chemical’s appearances in Greenpeace scientific reports
Chemical-level Association	Presence & Services provided



## CONTRIBUTION

- Environmental management**
  - ⊕ Potential costs of focusing on toxic chemicals that are **broadly** and **inefficiently** used by others
- Environmental Stakeholder literature**
  - ⊕ Impose common sanctions to users of same chemicals, yet these are not necessarily driven by **real toxicity**
- Self-regulation research**
  - ⊕ CLAs arise to solve a commons problem arising from a shared **chemical reputation**