Governing International Advocacy NGOs

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Summary. — International advocacy NGOs (IANGOs) are increasingly important actors in the international arena. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the cases of ten IANGOs that operate in diverse advocacy contexts, including development, environment, governance, human rights, and constituent support. It examines the patterns of governance, organizational architecture, and advocacy effectiveness across the cases and generates six propositions that link governance, architecture, accountability, legitimacy, and effectiveness for such organizations.

Key words — international civil society, international NGOs, international advocacy NGOs, NGO legitimacy, NGO accountability, advocacy effectiveness

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last quarter century, international nongovernmental advocacy organizations (IANGOs) have emerged as important actors in identifying transnational problems, articulating transnational norms and expectations, advocating for international policies, and implementing and monitoring compliance with international agreements (Florini, 2000; Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2001; Reinicke & Deng, 2000). Existing institutions have not coped well with many transnational problems (Nye & Donohue, 2000; Rischard, 2002). Understanding more about how IANGOs govern themselves and advocate effectively is important to enhancing global governance and problem-solving.

This paper draws on comparative case analysis to explore the governance arrangements of IANGOs. The next section discusses the literature on IANGOs and their governance to define guiding concepts and pose research questions to be explored. The following section describes the comparative case methodology and the sample of IANGOs. The third section reports results of the comparative analysis about patterns of governance, organizational architectures, and links among governance, architecture, and advocacy. We then frame propositions about IANGO governance and explore the tradeoffs faced by IANGO leaders. The final section explores some larger implications of this analysis.

2. BACKGROUND

Organizational governance refers to decisions about “big issues” (such as missions, strategies, or accountabilities) that shape how the organization defines its objectives and affects its stakeholders (Chait, Ryan, & Taylor, 2005; Nye & Donohue, 2000). Often governance is seen as the task of boards or organizational leaders. Governance questions involve power, benefit, and accountability: who controls organizational decisions, with what benefits to whom, and subject to what accountabilities? Governance in IANGOs involves decisions about missions, strategies, distributions of power and responsibility, and dealing with problems of legitimacy and accountability.

Governance decisions shape the architectures IANGOs construct to carry out their strategies and achieve their missions. Organizational architectures include informal culture and expectations, formal structures and systems, human resources, and their interactions to accomplish the tasks required to achieve organizational goals (Nadler et al., 1992).

There is considerable research on the links among governance, strategy, and architecture in the corporate world, public agencies, and social movements, but much less in the context of transnational civil society organizations. Many such agencies have created international boards for governance purposes and developed a range of architectures to carry out strategies and programs. International NGOs involved in humanitarian response and poverty alleviation, for example, have adopted architectures that range from centralized corporate structures to loosely-connected networks (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001). As in the business sector, a key challenge is to balance the advantages of centralized...
coordination for brand protection, quality control, economies of scale, and rapid response to emergencies, with the advantages of local information and resources, customization, and innovation offered by less centralized architectures (Grossman & Rangan 2001).

Some studies have investigated a wider range of transnational civil society organizations, including advocacy, training, research, conflict management, humanitarian, and development agencies (Young, Koenig, Najam, & Fisher, 1999). These studies identify multi-unit organizational architectures that enable increased local flexibility for autonomous units at the cost of centralized control (Anheier & Themudo, 2002; Powell, 1990). Some analysts have argued that such architectures are critical to effectiveness and sustainability in changing environments, accountability for advocacy, and coordination across the industrialized and developing worlds (Anheier & Themudo, 2002, 210–212).

Many researchers have described the dynamics of transnational civil society advocacy campaigns (Batliwala & Brown, 2006; Florini, 2000; Fox & Brown, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Khagram et al., 2001). There has been less attention to the governance and architecture challenges posed by those campaigns, though one study has argued that transnational advocacy requires federation architectures (Young, 1991).

IANGOs have adopted a wide range of advocacy strategies to influence transnational targets, from largely cooperative to largely adversarial (Huberts, 1989). Cooperative strategies include research and education to better inform policy makers or persuasion and incentives for particular policy alternatives. More adversarial strategies range from mobilizing public pressure (“naming and shaming”), litigation, and contestation (including both legal and extra-legal pressure). Different forms of advocacy strategy may be associated with different kinds of governance and architecture.

This paper explores NGO governance and architectural arrangements associated with transnational advocacy. More specifically it focuses on three research questions:

1. What patterns of governance characterize IANGOs?
2. What architectures are associated with different forms of governance?
3. How are governance and architecture arrangements related to effective advocacy?

The paper uses comparative analysis across IANGOs to generate propositions relevant to these questions. It also explores the trade-offs implied by these propositions for IANGO leadership and governance.

### 3. METHODS

This study has grown out of a series of annual meetings of leaders of NGOs involved in international advocacy. Discussions of governance and accountability challenges encouraged us to undertake this study. We sought to generate concepts and propositions about our research questions rather than to test hypotheses at this stage, so we sought a broad spectrum of organizations for inclusion in the sample.

We chose ten NGOs that met three criteria: (1) they are international umbrellas for multiple national affiliates, (2) they are centrally concerned with policy advocacy and influence, and (3) they work across a range of international issues and regional bases. Some but not all of these organizations were participants in the annual meetings. We developed descriptive case studies of ten international advocacy NGOs and networks. Table 1 lists the IANGOs, their issue areas, and brief statements of their missions related to those issue areas. The

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue area</th>
<th>IANGOs, issues and missions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Action Aid International (AAI) (S) Rights-based development with poor and marginalized groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Oxfam International (OI) (N) Enable lasting solutions to poverty by global advocacy, humanitarian relief and local self-help for rights-based development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace and civil governance</td>
<td>Greenpeace International (GPI) (N) Expose environmental problems and challenge key actors to solve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public and civil governance</td>
<td>CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (S) Strengthen citizen action and civil society worldwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Social Watch (SW) (N) Monitor international and government social development commitments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>Transparency International (TI) (N) Reduce corruption by fostering international and national reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constituent support</td>
<td>Amnesty International (AI) (N) Prevent and end human rights abuses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constituent support</td>
<td>Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) (N) Strengthen voices of advocates to advance women’s rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constituent support</td>
<td>Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI) (S) Enable members to share strategies for creating pro-poor cities and policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent support</td>
<td>Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) (S) Improve status of working poor, especially women in informal sector</td>
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IANGOs are marked by (S) or (N) to indicate the location of their headquarters in the global South or North.

We used a semi-structured interview protocol that was common to all ten of the cases but was sufficiently flexible to allow us to explore unanticipated innovations in governance. The interviews were supplemented with archival material, particularly internal strategy documents and, where available, internal histories of the organization. We wrote up summaries for each case, which were then discussed during a series of three half-day meetings in order to identify common patterns and insights across the cases. The initial cases were drafted in 2007 and were then shared with IANGO leaders in order to check for accuracy, clarify ambiguities, and elaborate on key issues. This work fed into a series of discussions at an annual workshop for the leaders of over 30 IANGOs during 2008–10, followed by some supplemental data collection in 2011. With a few exceptions, our data reflect IANGO experiences up to 2007. We also draw on practitioner experiences: two of the authors have served on the leadership or boards of three of the case organizations; all of us have worked as consultants or advisors to several IANGOs; and we have all engaged in previous research-related exchanges with many of these organizations.

We chose to use comparative case analysis because it can deal with complex issues and identify concepts and relationships relevant to other contexts (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1984). The case studies are based on data collected from interviews and archival materials from the IANGOs, their websites, and other public documents. We interviewed on average three or four leaders for each case, including CEOs in all cases and leaders of affiliates or campaigns in most. We asked respondents about IANGO governance and architectures and how those arrangements have evolved. We asked respondents to describe more and less successful advocacy campaigns and how those campaigns were affected by governance and architecture arrangements.

We constructed case studies and discussed drafts with IANGO leaders to ensure accuracy, clarify ambiguities, elaborate key issues, and discuss implications. We then compared cases to identify patterns related to our research questions.

4. RESULTS

This section examines the results that emerged from the comparative analysis. Each section reports patterns, frames propositions and explores their wider implications for governing IANGOs.

(a) Patterns of IANGO governance

The missions of these IANGOs vary across a wide spectrum of issues—protecting human rights, alleviating poverty, dealing with environmental degradation, improving governance, fighting corruption, and advocating for particular constituencies. While they all engage in transnational advocacy, they use many strategies and target different levels of policy-makers.

In some ways the governance arrangements of these IANGOs are quite similar. Figure 1 portrays a set of governance arrangements that are common across the sample. Most have some sort of general assembly of members or constituents. Most have international boards that oversee the work of international secretariats. The international secretariats coordinate the transnational work of national affiliates, some of which have their own national boards. The solid lines indicate governance links, though influence across these links is not always one way. The block arrows indicate services and impacts delivered to IANGO beneficiaries or constituents.

While the IANGOs have many governance arrangements in common, there are significant differences in how they define their primary accountability. They all face demands for accountability from multiple constituents—funders and donors, boards and staff, governmental agencies and regulators, other NGOs, community groups and citizens—and thus face the challenge of prioritizing among those accountabilities (Brown, 2008; Ebrahim, forthcoming). They all respond to factors like national expectations, founding cultures, and dominant patterns for their issues. But in these cases many patterns of governance were associated with accountability priorities.

Some IANGOs grant primary accountability to the constituents who benefit directly from their activities. Constituency-based accountability focuses the IANGO on the interests and
concerns of primary stakeholders, as represented by the dotted arrow from constituents and beneficiaries to the General Assembly in Figure 1. The board of Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI), for example, is dominated by representatives elected by national associations of slum and shack dwellers. WIEGO is governed by an Executive Council controlled by elected representatives of national associations of informal sector women workers. At biannual general assemblies WIEGO constituents review the performance of the secretariat to insure that it serves their interests.

Other IANGOs organize their governance to serve members committed to public goods rather than their own interests. **Movement-based accountability** emphasizes answering to members who serve the values of a movement beyond their own direct interests. This accountability is reflected in the dotted arrow from members/donors to the General Assembly of “other-serving” rather than “member-serving” agencies. The Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), for example, is a network of activists, largely from the Global South, committed to enhancing the rights of all women. The CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation is committed to strengthening civil society and its contributions around the world. Its members elect a Board that serves those values rather than its members’ direct interests; AWID members do much the same. Social Watch is a network of civil society actors (the “Watchers”) committed to eradicating poverty by monitoring government implementation of social programs.

A third pattern emphasizes IANGO organizational affiliates and their goals. **Mission-based accountability** responds to affiliate expectations rather than the interests of constituents or a broader movement. The dotted arrow from affiliates to international boards reflects less attention to general assemblies and elections as governance mechanisms. Some mission-based IANGOs, including Transparency International, Action Aid International and Amnesty International, supported the rise of affiliates to expand their national impacts. Others, such as Greenpeace International and Oxfam International, were created by loose families of national affiliates to expand their international influence. Mission-based IANGOs are often larger and more widely visible than those that are constituent-based or movement-based. Their international boards are often composed of representatives of national affiliates selected for professional expertise or for their commitment to IANGO goals rather than to speak for member values or constituent interests. In ActionAid International, for example, national affiliates are represented in the general assembly which elects members to the international board. International board members are expected to represent the broad interests of the organization rather than their national affiliates.

It is important to note that these three primary accountabilities—constituent-based; movement-based, and mission-based—are not mutually exclusive. IANGOs that prioritize accountability to their constituents, for instance, also feel accountable to missions and to broader movements. But how they frame their primary accountability helps shape their governance arrangements.

As might be expected governance concerns vary substantially across these three patterns. Constituency-based accountability requires attending to constituent needs, helping them to understand strategic priorities and organizing to work for their interests. Movement-based accountability calls for defining public goods important to the broader movement and crafting strategies to create those goods. Mission-based accountability presses the IANGO for consistency across its international mission and affiliate goals, to coordinate transnational activities to advance those goals, and to assess initiatives in terms meaningful at both global and local levels. The differences in primary stakes—constituent interests, movement values, and organizational missions—call for different emphases in decision-making, implementation, and performance measurement.

**Proposition 1.** Primary accountabilities shape IANGO governance arrangements:

- **Constituency-based accountability leads to governance arrangements that represent constituent interests.**
- **Movement-based accountability leads to governance arrangements that support member commitments to serving others in a broader movement.**
- **Mission-based accountability leads to governance arrangements that advance the goals of the organization.**

Primary accountabilities also have important implications for the legitimacy of advocacy organizations. Analysts have suggested several bases for the legitimacy of international NGOs, including legal legitimacy from compliance with relevant laws, normative legitimacy from widely-held values, technical or pragmatic legitimacy from expertise and performance, associational legitimacy from links to eminent individuals or institutions, cognitive legitimacy from fit with widely held expectations, or political legitimacy from representing important stakeholders (Brinkerhoff, 2005; Brown, 2008; Suchman, 1995). Many critics of IANGOs attack their legitimacy as “unelected” or “unrepresentative” organizations, implying that political legitimacy is the only basis for legitimate influence on policy-making. Constituency-based IANGOs can claim political legitimacy on the basis of democratic governance by their beneficiaries. WIEGO, for example, has built alliances with international labor unions to influence policies of the International Labor Organization, in part because of governance arrangements that unions saw as creating real accountability to grassroots constituents.

Movement-based and mission-based IANGOs, on the other hand, cannot easily claim legitimacy from representing constituents. Legitimacy for movement-based IANGOs is often grounded in a normative commitment to widely-held or universal values, and is further supported by demonstrated technical expertise, knowledge, and performance (Saward 2009). AWID, for example, gains legitimacy from working for women’s rights (normative legitimacy) and fidelity to high standards of research (technical legitimacy). Social Watch similarly supports widely valued anti-poverty programs and principles of good governance, supported by good research.

Mission-based IANGOs gain legitimacy from high quality work (technical or performance legitimacy), commitment to societal values (normative legitimacy) and association with widely respected actors (associational legitimacy). For example, Oxfam and Amnesty depend on reputations for good research and high quality programs that serve the poor and oppressed; Transparency International challenges corruption and has support from a board of ex-heads of state and corporate CEOs. The international context presents a range of legal, normative, and cognitive standards, so IANGOs may have to construct their own cases for legitimacy in the absence of shared and compelling international standards.

**Proposition 2.** Primary accountabilities enable different sources of IANGO legitimacy:

- **Constituency-based accountability enables political legitimacy.**
Movement-based accountability enables normative (and possibly technical) legitimacy.

Mission-based accountability enables technical (and possibly normative and associational) legitimacy.

For many IANGOs the links among primary accountabilities, governance arrangements, and wider legitimacy remains murky or unexamined. As credibility in the international arena becomes more contested, in part because of the growing success of IANGO campaigns, failure to clarify accountability and legitimacy claims will become increasingly costly. Amnesty International, for example, found that emphasizing accountability to members (who were donors rather than to victims of rights abuses) created tensions between boards and professional staff because of the changing nature of human rights abuses. Board members committed to nonviolence challenged staff advocacy for armed protection for Darfur refugees. Oxfam’s growing emphasis on international policy campaigns at times conflicted with its historic emphasis on local partners, who were often more interested in local problems. IANGOs must clarify how primary accountabilities, governance arrangements and legitimacy bases can be aligned in the face of challenges from internal and external stakeholders.

(b) Patterns of IANGO architecture

The IANGOs all seek to articulate transnational strategies and organize cohesive campaigns from diverse member goals, interests, perspectives, and capacities. Implementing campaigns requires organizing resources and activities across countries, levels, and issues. IANGO architectures include shared values, norms and expectations, formal structures and systems, and human resources required to carry out the tasks defined by their strategies. These elements interact to shape activities that generate results, and incongruent elements can seriously undermine organization and network performance (Nadler et al., 1992).

The combination of informal cultures, formal systems, and human resources may produce different multi-organization architectures. The IANGOs in this sample fell into four of the five configurations of relations among national members and international secretariats portrayed in Figure 2. The architecture at the upper left—the “unitary organization”—centralizes decision-making at the top by hierarchical structures, norms of subordination, and the placement of senior human resources. This architecture is common in many contexts, including some international service NGOs, such as PLAN International. But none of these IANGOs displayed this pattern. Instead they adopted the more decentralized architectures in the figure: federations in which secretariats influence but do not control their members, confederations of more autonomous affiliates with less central coordination, support organizations that provide technical services to larger movements, or networks of autonomous members linked by shared values and information flows.

IANGO federations have strong central units that set strategic contexts for affiliates and protect their shared brand. Examples include Transparency, Action Aid, Amnesty and Greenpeace. Often federation secretariats have explicit responsibility for articulating strategic priorities, supporting member development, and intervening to help members in difficulty. They often exert ultimate control over the brand name and its use. Although federations often have formal and legal structures that allocate authority to the secretariat, the cases suggest that they are more effective in coordinating cohesive action when their leaders have informal as well as formal
authority with affiliates. Several federated IANGOs (e.g., Amnesty, Greenpeace, Action Aid) reported that effective coordination grew from leadership consultation and consensus-building approaches, though formal power was useful in resolving disputes.

Confederations are characterized by less central coordination and more autonomy among members. The example among our cases is Oxfam International, which was created by affiliates to increase their transnational policy leverage and to protect their international brand. In federations, strategies and campaigns are negotiated between secretariats and affiliates, and secretariats have narrowly limited decision power. There is evidence that Oxfam affiliates are delegating more authority to the secretariat for coordinating international policy advocacy and humanitarian activities, so it may be evolving into a federation.

Networks bring together autonomous organizations that share values, information, and key goals, relying on relationships of mutual respect and trust to organize joint action at scale (Powell, 1996; Wei-Skillern & Marciano, 2008). The members of Social Watch, for example, coordinate their activities on the basis of their trust in the editor of the annual Social Watch Report. The organizational and individual members of CIVICUS work together when the secretariat or influential members identify shared issues and mobilize activities to advance member values and concerns. Sometimes networks evolve into more centrally-organized configurations: Oxfam International and Greenpeace International both evolved from loosely-connected networks of affiliates.

Support organizations provide technical assistance to a sector (Brown & Kalegao, 2002). Providing specialized support to movements or constituencies may be an increasingly important IANGO role. WIEGO, for example, offers research, advocacy, and capacity building support to national organizations of women in the informal sector that seek to influence global policies. AWID supports the women’s movement by convening key actors, doing useful research, disseminating information, and advocating for women’s rights. SDI fosters learning among its constituent organizations to better influence local and national policy-makers. Support organizations depend on the existence of organized constituencies to whom they can provide technical support.

These four types of architectures—federations, confederations, networks, and support organizations—are ideal types. We thus expect some organizations to be hybrids of these types. AWID, for example, is a support organization that might more accurately be described as being part of a “loosely-coupled” network of actors. On the other hand, SDI is a support organization to national-level associations of slum and shack dwellers around the world, but is also formally structured as a confederation governed by its constituents. It might be described as “tightly coupled” with the network of those associations.

What are the relationships, if any, between these four types of IANGO architectures and the primary accountabilities? IANGOs that prioritize constituency-based accountability, such as WIEGO and SDI, have a support organization architecture that enables them to serve those constituencies while being formally governed by them. Movement-based IANGOs seem to have decentralized architectures, such as networks or support organizations, in which the secretariat mobilizes members around shared values but has little direct authority. CIVICUS, Social Watch, and AWID all support member initiatives but do not exercise formal authority. Most mission-based IANGOs seem to have federation or confederation architectures that enable secretariat influence in coordinating affiliate activities, particularly when those activities pose risks to the IANGO brand. In other words, there appears to be a direct correlation between primary accountabilities and formal organizational architecture and authority.

Proposition 3. Primary accountabilities shape IANGO architectures:
- Constituent-based IANGOs use a support organization architecture, to enable technical support to constituent members.
- Movement-based IANGOs use a network or support architecture, to enable information-sharing among autonomous members.
- Mission-based IANGOs use a federation or confederation architecture, to enable coordination across affiliate members.

Different architectures have different strengths and weaknesses. Support organization architectures can enhance the capacities of organized constituencies, but they may also be narrowly focused. Networks allow members with common values to share information and identify common concerns and goals but they may not be able to act cohesively under time pressure. Federations enable close coordination across different countries and across local, national, and international levels but they remain slow to respond to crises and lack the adaptability of organizations exchanging informal understandings. Support organizations can be versatile and adaptable, but they may not be able to act cohesively under time pressure. IANGOs began as informal alliances coordinated by shared strategies and campaigns are negotiated between secretariats and affiliates and across local, national, and international levels but they remain slow to respond to crises and lack the adaptability of organizations exchanging informal understandings. Support organizations can be versatile and adaptable, but they may not be able to act cohesively under time pressure.

The distribution of power and authority between secretariats and affiliates is an ongoing issue for many IANGOs. In part, power distributions are shaped by IANGO origins, or path-dependence. Some IANGOs, such as Transparency International and Amnesty International, fostered the emergence of national affiliates to enhance national influence. This “top-down” origin locates considerable power in secretariats. Others, such as Oxfam International, WIEGO, SDI, and Greenpeace International, were created from the “bottom up” by national affiliates, who were careful about conceding authority to the secretariat. These initial distributions of power are subject to evolution in response to at least four factors.

Often creating a secretariat is a response to a crisis for an informally-linked “family” of affiliates. Several federations grew out of concern that the behavior of some affiliates might injure the brand of all. Transparency International, for example, created elaborate criteria for accrediting national branches after problems in a few countries threatened its global reputation. Many federated IANGOs reported developing formal rules and procedures when informal understandings failed to prevent risky behaviors by some members. So IANGOs may concede more authority to secretariats to cope with crises and brand risks that threaten the network as a whole.

In other cases, systems and more centralized authority evolved out of negotiations to improve coordination. Many IANGOs began as informal alliances coordinated by shared values, interpersonal relations, and informally agreed expectations and they have supplemented them with formal systems to enable coordination that enhances access to and efficient use of resources. WIEGO, for example, has developed governance arrangements that consist of its constituents have the final say on strategy decisions and so enhance its legitimacy with its influence targets. Oxfam International evolved from a loosely-knit “family” to a federation in order to expand its capacity for international policy influence and improve its capacities for unified humanitarian assistance. With growing experience, IANGOs often supplement informal coordination with more formal systems that enable cohesive and efficient joint action.
The distribution of influence within IANGOs is also affected by the nature of organizational tasks. Some tasks, such as managing human resources or building local alliances, depend on information and resources that are most easily available in national affiliates. Managing ActionAid’s staff in India, for example, may require understanding national cultures and legal systems. Other tasks require regional perspectives, such as organizing Oxfam’s humanitarian assistance to victims of the tsunami or managing Greenpeace’s campaign for conservation in the Amazon. Still other tasks involve global coordination, such as building IANGO-wide information systems or managing global finances. Many federated IANGOs are inventing combinations of national, regional, and global organization to deal with the economies of scale and the subsidiarity requirements of different tasks. Many international NGOs must deal with a tension between forces for autonomy—the need to localize and customize services—and forces for affiliation—to take advantage of a strong brand, economies of scale, and resources (Grossman & Rangan, 2001).

The distributions of power and resources in IANGOs are also shaped by shifting advocacy contexts and dynamics. Evolving advocacy campaigns may press IANGOs to reallocate distributions of power and authority. When Amnesty International campaigned for international prison reform, for example, the London research office was overwhelmed by the need to assess policies of 50 states in the US, so the secretariat reluctantly agreed to create a new US research office. For IANGOs that engage in adversarial campaigns, in contrast, the need for quick and cohesive response to attacks may require central coordination even when local affiliates treasure their autonomy. In short, the dynamics of advocacy campaigns may press for shifting secretariat power and authority.

Proposition 4. IANGO architectures allocate more or less power and authority to secretariats as:
- Network origins emphasize centralized leadership or constraints on secretariats,
- Crises and brand risks call for cohesive action across affiliates,
- Coordination enables access to and efficient use of resources,
- Organizational tasks benefit from economies of scale more than subsidiarity, and
- Campaigning demands cross-level and cross-national agility more than local sensitivity.

Decisions about the optimum distribution of power and resources among secretariats and national affiliates are constantly evolving for many IANGOs. Many that started as loose and informal coalitions, such as Oxfam International, have opted for increased secretariat coordination as leaders have recognized the importance of cohesive action across levels and countries. Many IANGOs launched by parent NGOs, such as Amnesty International or Transparency International, have fostered strong affiliates in order to strengthen national and regional campaigns. The control of resources and campaign decisions often evolves as circumstances change. So the distributions of power among affiliates and secretariats tend to shift, often in spite of the wishes of their leaders, as new actors, resources, and campaign targets emerge.

(c) Patterns of advocacy effectiveness

Respondents defined “advocacy effectiveness” in terms of variables such as policy influence, organizational capacity-building, enhanced coalitions, or wide public awareness. Given this definition, we asked them to compare how “very successful” and “not successful” campaigns were affected by their governance and architecture arrangements. Ideally we would have been able to complement their views of success with those of other stakeholders, but the resources of the study made that impossible in all but a few cases.

These IANGOs adopted a wide range of advocacy strategies, from collaborative initiatives such as education, research, and persuasion to adversarial approaches including public pressure, litigation, and contestation. They applied these strategies to influence local, national, and international targets. Table 3 lists the strategies and usual campaign targets for each IANGO.

It is clear from Table 2 that all the IANGOs employ some collaborative advocacy strategies, such as education, research, or persuasion. The use of adversarial strategies is less common. Oxfam International, Transparency International, Amnesty International and Greenpeace International all utilize public pressure approaches to influence their targets, but only Greenpeace makes systematic use of litigation or contestation in public protests and “stunts” to embarrass targets. These IANGOs in general use collaborative or combinations of collaborative and adversarial approaches.

Table 2 also suggests that some IANGOs focus on international targets, such as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Others focus on both international and national levels but emphasize governments as targets. Still others

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<th>IANGO</th>
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<th>Advocacy targets</th>
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<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Adversarial</td>
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<td>Research</td>
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combine a variety of advocacy strategies with a wide range of targets at many levels, including national and transnational corporations as well as governments. The IANGOs high in the table emphasize collaborative strategies to influence a few actors; those lower in the table use a wider variety of strategies to influence many actors at multiple levels.

Are there links between IANGO governance and architectures and their choices of advocacy strategy and target? The organizations in Table 2 are arranged by accountability base and architecture. The first two, SDI and WIEGO, are constituency-based support organizations that carry out research, education, and persuasion activities with a few international targets. The next three, AWID, CIVICUS, and Social Watch, are movement-based networks that use largely collaborative strategies to influence both international actors and national governments.

The mission-based confederation and federations—Oxfam, Action Aid, Transparency, Amnesty, and Greenpeace International—are more likely to use both collaborative and adversarial strategies, to apply them across local, national, and international levels, and to influence corporations as well as governments. The architectures of these IANGOs follow Young’s (1991) hypothesis that international advocacy organizations will use federation architectures.

But note that half of these IANGOs used less centralized architectures to carry out successful collaborative advocacy campaigns. WIEGO, for example, built governance arrangements to ensure accountability to its grassroots constituents but also includes as members researchers able to carry out policy research and officials of international agencies it seeks to influence. Federation architectures may be especially appropriate to managing the combinations of collaborative and adversarial advocacy that the mission-based IANGOs used to influence across levels and sectors.

**Proposition 5.** Advocacy effectiveness increases as organizational architectures match strategies and targets:
- Network and support architectures are effective for collaborative advocacy with single targets.
- Federation and confederation architectures are effective for combining collaborative and adversarial advocacy with multiple targets across levels, sectors, and countries.

The proposition suggests that flat and collegial architectures can use collaborative strategies to directly influence policymakers. Campaigns that require mixed strategies and influence across levels, countries, and sectors may require federated or confederated architectures that place more constraints on IANGO affiliates. The latter can expand the range of strategies available and support complex combinations to put pressure on resistant targets or respond to counterattacks. Oxfam International, for example, mounts international trade campaigns that engage local farmer cooperatives, national government regulators, World Trade Organization policymakers, and international corporations to enhance the livelihoods of local farmers. But such approaches also make complex demands on IANGO leaders to balance the interests of affiliates across countries and levels as well as to respond to changing contexts. These challenges vary across campaigns, so the architectures of different campaigns may vary even when undertaken by a single IANGO.

We distinguish between campaign architectures and organizational architectures. A single organization, such as Oxfam, may use different campaign architectures depending on its target, strategy, and time horizon. Figure 3 suggests alternative architectures that might be adopted for different combinations of strategy and time perspective across levels and countries. The figure contrasts the architectures that fit with collaborative and adversarial strategies (the vertical dimension) with short and long-term time horizons (the horizontal dimension). The third dimension (shaded) of the table reflects the need in some campaigns to coordinate across levels or countries.

For collaborative strategies, short-term coalitions may be adequate to mobilize affiliates and allies to shape policy outcomes. WIEGO began as an alliance among organizations of poor women workers and researchers concerned with understanding their situations. That coalition generated enough policy influence to justify creating an organization to pursue longer-term influence international policies about the informal sector.

Longer term cooperative advocacy requires more durable partnerships among key actors to support ongoing policy change and implementation. WIEGOs’ membership includes researchers and staffs of development agencies that have the capacity to shape policy options while its governance arrangements emphasize accountability to its informal sector constituents. Partnerships among SDI associations, local NGOs, and government agencies in some countries have enhanced understanding and services to slum populations.

Short-term adversarial campaigns designed to create public pressure may be organized as flexible, temporary systems that respond quickly to opportunities or threats. Such tribal war parties of opportunistic activists can create initiatives that embarrass large targets and generate wide public visibility, as when Greenpeace activists dance as chickens in McDonald’s parking lots or rain counterfeit dollars on World Bank meetings. While such stunts can raise public awareness and embarrass powerful actors, they are often not enough to alter entrenched policies and interests.

Longer term initiatives that support multi-year campaigns to change policies and monitor implementation require more integrated campaign organizations, such as Oxfam’s campaign to reshape the terms of international trade or Amnesty’s initiatives to counter human rights violations in prisons in many countries. Integrated campaign organizations need extensive planning, high-quality research, dedicated human resources, multi-year funding, and architectures that mobilize and coordinate resources to sustain a long-term effort. Such campaigns may also include strategically placed coalitions, partnerships, and war parties. When campaigns require advocacy at multiple levels across countries and sectors, the coordination demands for integrated campaigning are even greater.

**Proposition 6.** Advocacy effectiveness increases as campaign architectures are matched with strategies, time horizons, and target complexities:
- Tribal war parties and coalitions are suited to short time horizons.
- Integrated campaigns and sustained partnerships are suited to longer time horizons.

Many IANGOs undertake a range of campaigns and use organizational arrangements from different parts of Figure 3. Oxfam, Greenpeace, and Amnesty, for example, use both cooperative and adversarial strategies in different campaigns. But it is easy to apply familiar architectures to new situations even when the match is questionable. Several IANGOs reported that the war party architecture did not work well for extended campaigns that required coordination across organizational divisions. Success with short-term campaigns can mislead IANGOs about what long-term initiatives to influence
complex issues require. Oxfam’s initial trade campaign plan underestimated the time and organization required for influencing such deeply entrenched interests and policies.

Constructing new campaign architecture is difficult, particularly to work with new allies and different perspectives. IANGO leaders, already besieged by demands from diverse affiliates, may recoil from constructing alliances with other actors that have different strategies, values, and interests. But the rise of “perfect storms” of interlocking global problems—such as the combined crises around food, climate change, financial meltdowns, and escalating poverty—cannot be easily solved by agencies acting alone, however well-informed or resourced. Campaign architectures that enable IANGOs to work with other civil society organizations as well as government and business organizations are increasingly necessary to deal with emerging global problems. IANGOs may very well need to develop multi-layered organization and campaign architectures to address such complex challenges.

5. GOVERNING IANGOS IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

We have argued that IANGO governance is grounded in definitions of primary stakeholders and accountabilities. Governance arrangements, organization and network architectures, and advocacy campaigns vary considerably across IANGOs that define their primary accountabilities to the interests of constituents, the broader values of a movement, or the missions of affiliates. The effectiveness of IANGOs in influencing transnational institutions or policies depends in significant measure on their capacity to argue persuasively for their own accountability and legitimacy. Recent research suggests that IANGO efforts to manage accountability in advocacy contexts remain limited at best (Hammer, Rooney, & Warren, 2010).

Table 3 summarizes the propositions that have emerged from this comparative analysis. The propositions on governance suggest that different primary accountabilities generate different IANGO governance mechanisms and legitimacy bases. Many critiques of IANGO campaigns assume that their legitimacy is based on representing constituents, so “unelected” or “unrepresentative” organizations are not legitimate advocates. Only a minority of these IANGOs defined their primary accountability as being to constituent interests. IANGOs that emphasize accountability to broader public values or to affiliate missions are vulnerable if they are not clear about how those commitments affect their governance and legitimacy. IANGO leaders can expect increasing pressure to clarify their primary accountabilities, how those commitments shape governance arrangements, and what they mean for legitimacy in advocacy.

Primary accountabilities also shape IANGO architectures and relations between secretariats and affiliates. Movement-based IANGOs often have network architectures organized around shared conceptions of public goods; constituency-based IANGOs often create support organization architectures to provide technical support to the groups they serve; and mission-based IANGOs often have federation architectures designed to coordinate affiliates across levels and national boundaries to implement shared strategies. While many IANGOs initially emphasize informal coordination by shared values, information sharing, and mutual trust, those who seek to coordinate multiple interests across national boundaries and societal levels may be forced to supplement informal coordination with more formal structures and

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<th>Patterns of IANGO Governance:</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>P1:</strong> Primary accountabilities shape IANGO governance arrangements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Constituency-based accountability leads to governance arrangements that represent constituent interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Movement-based accountability leads to governance arrangements that support member commitments to serving others in a broader movement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Mission-based accountability leads to governance arrangements that advance the goals of the organization.</td>
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<th>Organization and Network Architectures:</th>
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<td><strong>P2:</strong> Primary accountabilities enable different sources of IANGO legitimacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Constituency-based accountability enables political legitimacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Movement-based accountability enables normative (and possibly technical) legitimacy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Mission-based accountability enables technical (and possibly normative and associational) legitimacy.</td>
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<th>Advocacy Effectiveness:</th>
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<td><strong>P5:</strong> Advocacy effectiveness increases as organizational architectures match strategies and targets:</td>
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<td>* Network and support architectures are effective for collaborative advocacy with single targets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Federation architectures are effective for combining collaborative with adversarial strategies to influence multi-level, multi-national targets.</td>
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| **P6:** Advocacy effectiveness increases as campaign architectures are match strategies, time horizons, and target complexities: |
| * Tribal war parties and coalitions are suited to short time horizons |
| * Integrated campaigns and partnerships are suited to longer time horizons that include wider alliances for multi-level, multi-national campaigns. |
expectations. As IANGOs take on complex campaigns they often shift power and resources to enable effective and sometimes simultaneous action at local, national, and international levels. They may also find that different functions require decisions at different levels; human resources decisions may be managed nationally, while finance and information technology may be better handled internationally. IANGO architectures are shaped in part by decisions about primary accountabilities—but they also evolve in response to pressures generated by organization demands and by campaign strategies and tasks.

IANGO architectures enable or constrain choices of advocacy strategies and targets. Network and support organization architectures were associated with collaborative advocacy strategies focused on targets at one level. IANGOs that combined collaborative and adversarial strategies to influence targets across levels and countries tended to adopt federation or confederation architectures that allowed more centralized planning and coordination. Organization-level architectures can be supplemented by a range of campaign-level architectures designed for combinations of strategies, time horizons, and targets. Effective advocacy is more likely when IANGOs match organizational and campaign architectures to campaign contexts. Note that transnational advocacy campaigns are subject to high levels of uncertainty, ambiguity, and rapid change. So IANGOs often redesign and reinvent campaign and organization architectures in response to changing contexts and circumstances. The recent history of the ten IANGOs in our study suggests that organizational structures and architectures can change quite rapidly when required.

Many of these IANGOs were grappling with how to include more diverse members (particularly Southern affiliates) and how to work across the issue-based “silos” (development, human rights, environment, and so on). It has become clear that many of these issues are interrelated, particularly as they affect poor and marginalized groups. Over the last decade a range of alliances and hybrid organizations have emerged to campaign on issues where poverty, environmental decline, and rights abuses exacerbate one another (Nelson & Dorsey, 2008). It has also become clear that existing international institutions are inadequate to solve many transnational problems and that IANGOs can play important roles in the processes of institutional innovation needed to respond more effectively (Maguire & Hardy, 2006; Rischard, 2002). As IANGO leaders learn to manage their own governance challenges and develop the architectures needed for effective multi-level advocacy, they may also become more effective in constructing and managing the kinds of multi-level, multi-country, multi-sector alliances needed to respond to the challenges that assail and often divide the global community—escalating food crises, expanding gaps between the rich and the poor, accelerating climate change, looming energy shortages—and growing questions about humanity’s capacity and will to manage its expanding global interdependence.

REFERENCES


