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The Global Agglomeration of Multinational Firms

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Working Paper

10-043

April 22, 2014

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The Global Agglomeration of Multinational Firms*

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April 2014

Abstract

The explosion of multinational activities in recent decades is rapidly transforming the global landscape of industrial production. But are the emerging clusters of multinational production the rule or the exception? What drives the offshore agglomeration of multinational firms in comparison to the agglomeration of domestic firms? Using a unique worldwide plant-level dataset that reports detailed location, ownership, and operation information for plants in over 100 countries, we construct a spatially continuous index of pairwise-industry agglomeration and investigate the patterns and determinants underlying the global economic geography of multinational firms. Our analysis presents new stylized facts that suggest the emerging offshore clusters of multinationals are not a simple reflection of domestic industrial clusters. Agglomeration economies including capital-good market externality and technology diffusion play a more important role in the offshore agglomeration of multinationals than the agglomeration of domestic firms. These findings remain robust when we address potential reverse causality by exploring the regional pattern and process of agglomeration.

JEL codes: F2, D2, R1

Key words: multinational firm, agglomeration, location fundamentals, agglomeration economies

^{*}We thank Jim Anderson, Bruce Blonigen, James Harrigan, Keith Head, Tarun Khanna, Jim Markusen, Keith Maskus, Mike Moore, Henry Overman, John Ries, Roberto Samaneigo, Stephen Yeaple, Tony Yezer, and seminar and conference participants at Harvard Business School, University of Virginia Darden School of Business, George Washington University, the AEA meeting, the ETSG meeting, the EIIT meeting, and the LACEA Trade, Integration and Growth Meeting for helpful suggestions, William Kerr for discussions on the agglomeration indices and kindly providing us the patent concordance data, Bill Simpson for advice on computing the indices, Francisco Pino and Hillary White for reserch assistance, Dennis Jacques for help with the D&B dataset, and HBS and GW for financial support.

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1 Introduction

An exponential increase in flows of goods, capital, and ideas is one of the most prominent economic trends in recent decades. A key driver of this phenomenon is cross-border production, investment, and innovation led by multinational corporations (MNCs). Multinational affiliate sales as a share of world GDP have more than doubled in the past two decades. This explosion of MNC activity is rapidly transforming the global landscape of industrial production, precipitating the emergence of new industrial clusters around the world. Firms that agglomerated in, for example, Silicon Valley and Detroit now have subsidiary plants clustering in Bangalore and Slovakia (termed, respectively, the Silicon Valley of India and the Detroit of the East).

Are the new MNC clusters the rule or the exception? What drives the current offshore agglomeration of MNCs? Are they a simple reflection of the domestic industrial clusters? Economic historians and regional and urban economists have long recognized the agglomeration of economic activity as one of the most salient features of economic development. An extensive body of research in regional economics and, more recently, in the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature examines the distribution of population and production across space and the economic characteristics and effects of spatial concentrations. However, relatively few studies have investigated the emerging spatial concentrations of multinational production (MP) around the world and their driving forces in comparison to their domestic counterparts.²

Our goal in this paper is to examine the patterns and causes of the global agglomeration of multinational production—both offshore and at headquarters—in comparison to the agglomeration of domestic firms. In contrast to domestic production, which emphasizes domestic geography and natural advantage, multinational production stresses foreign market access and international comparative advantage. Moreover, as highlighted in a growing literature led by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) and Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008), the economic attributes and organizations of multinationals are, by selection, distinctively different from those of domestic firms. The greater revenue and productivity, vertical integration, and higher capital- and knowledge-intensity all suggest that MNC offshore subsidiaries are likely to have agglomeration motives different from those of domestic firms.

We first quantify the global agglomeration of multinational and domestic firms to establish new stylized facts on how firms with different organizational forms might agglomerate differently. We construct an index of industry agglomeration following an empirical methodology introduced by Duranton and Overman (2005) (henceforth, DO). This index gives information on the extent of localization by industry and the spatial scales at which it takes space. It first assesses the distribution of distances between establishments in each industry pair (including both withinand between-industry pairs) and then compares the distribution with the counterfactual distri-

¹Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2009).

²See Ottaviano and Puga (1998), Head and Mayer (2004), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Duranton and Puga (2004), Puga (2010), and Redding (2010, 2011) for excellent reviews of these literatures. Section 2 discusses studies in regional and international economics that are closely related to this paper.

butions of hypothetical industries. Industry pairs that exhibit greater geographic densities than the counterfactuals are considered to exhibit significant agglomeration. In contrast to traditional indices, which tend to define agglomeration as the amount of activity taking place in a particular geographic unit, this spatially continuous index separates agglomeration from the general geographic concentration and is unbiased with respect to the scale of geographic units and the level of spatial aggregation.

We quantify the global agglomeration of both multinational and domestic firms using World-Base, a worldwide plant-level dataset that provides detailed location, ownership, and activity information for establishments in more than 100 countries. The dataset's detailed location and operation information for over 43 million plants, including multinational and domestic, offshore and headquarters establishments, makes it possible to compare the agglomeration of different types of establishment. We use the plant-level physical location information in our data to obtain latitude and longitude codes for each establishment and compute not only the distance but also the trade cost that accounts for other forms of trade barriers between each pair of establishments. We then construct the index of agglomeration based on the distance and the trade cost between establishments.

Our analysis presents a rich array of new stylized facts that shed light on the global agglomeration of multinational and domestic firms. We show that MNCs follow distinctively different agglomeration patterns offshore than their domestic counterparts:

- Across different types of plant, multinational headquarters are, on average, most agglomerative, followed by domestic plants and multinational foreign subsidiaries.
- The agglomeration of multinational foreign subsidiaries exhibits a low correlation with the agglomeration of domestic plants.
- Multinational foreign subsidiaries are more agglomerative than domestic plants in capital-, skilled-labor-, and R&D-intensive industries.

These observations indicate that the emerging offshore clusters of MNCs are not merely a projection of the domestic clusters and the driving agglomeration forces are likely to vary systematically from those of domestic plants and MNC headquarters.

In the second part of the paper, we further explore these findings and examine the relative importance of two distinct categories of economic factor in the agglomeration patterns of multinational versus domestic firms: (i) the location fundamentals (also referred to as "first nature") of multinational production and (ii) agglomeration economies (also known as "second nature"). The location fundamentals of MP, as stressed in the international trade literature, consist primarily of foreign market access (multinationals choose to produce in large foreign markets to avoid trade costs) and comparative advantage (multinationals produce in countries with desired factor

abundance and low factor prices).³ In contrast, agglomeration economies, the study of which dates from Marshall (1890), stress the benefits for firms of geographic proximity, including lower transport costs between input suppliers and final good producers, labor and capital-good market externalities, and technology diffusion. While existing studies have offered evidence of agglomeration economies in domestic economic geography, little is yet known about how they influence the global economic geography of multinationals differently from the economic geography of domestic firms, given the multinationals' organization structure and capital- and knowledge-intensity.

Identifying the effects of MP location fundamentals and agglomeration economies, however, is a key challenge in the empirical analysis of economic geography. Disentangling their effects is complicated by the difficulty of measuring them quantitatively. Moreover, their common propensity to lead MNCs to locate next to each other makes it difficult to separate their relative effects.

To overcome the above challenges, our empirical analysis proceeds in the following steps. First, while we take into account both within- and between-industry agglomeration in the descriptive analysis, we focus our econometric analysis on between-industry agglomeration, also called "coagglomeration." As noted by Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (2010) (henceforth, EGK), compared to firms in the same industries, firms from different industry pairs often exhibit greater variation in their relatedness in production, factor markets, and technology space, thereby displaying different agglomeration incentives. Exploring the between-industry agglomeration of MNCs and how it relates to pairwise industries' variation in agglomeration incentives thus makes it possible to separate the effects of location fundamentals and the various agglomeration economies.

Second, we construct an expected index of agglomeration to capture the effect of location fundamentals. This index reflects the geographic distribution of MNC plants predicted exclusively by country- and region-level location fundamentals of multinational production, including, for example, market size, trade costs, comparative advantage, infrastructure, corporate taxes.

Third, controlling for the agglomeration predicted by location fundamentals and all industry-specific factors, we examine the degree to which proxies of agglomeration forces—including between-industry input-output linkages, similarities in labor demand and capital-good demand, and technology linkages— explain the variations in the agglomeration index for multinational

³While comparative advantage is defined here in the context of neoclassical trade theory, other country factors such as institutional characteristics and physical locations can also play a role in firms' location decisions and are sometimes considered as part of comparative advantage (see, for example, Nunn, 2007; Limao and Venables, 2002). As described in Section 5.1, our empirical specification controls for all host-country-industry-specific factors and for regional characteristics such as education attainment, infrastructure, and tax rates when constructing the location fundamentals of multinational production.

⁴We use the term "agglomeration" broadly to refer to both within- and between-industry agglomeration (the latter sometimes referred to as "coagglomeration"). The broad usage of the term "agglomeration" is fairly common in the literature.

⁵While location fundamentals and all agglomeration economies tend to predict spatial concentration among firms in the same industry, their predictions of which industry pairs should agglomerate vary significantly. For example, firms in the automobile industry may agglomerate because of both location fundamentals and any of the agglomeration economies, but firms in the automobile and steel industries are likely to agglomerate mainly because of their production linkages.

firms and domestic firms. To mitigate concerns about reverse causality, we construct the proxies of agglomeration forces using lagged disaggregated U.S. industry account data, as it is not very likely that the production, factor, and technology linkages of U.S. industries are a result of worldwide MNC agglomeration patterns. We also include a vector of industry dummies to control for all industry-specific agglomeration motives.

Our empirical analysis shows that the location fundamentals of multinational production, although important, are not the only driving force in the patterns of MNC offshore agglomeration. Agglomeration economies—especially capital-good market externality and technology diffusion—are crucial determinants of MNCs' overseas location decisions. Further, as suggested by the stylized patterns we first document, the relative importance of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies varies significantly between MNC offshore subsidiaries and domestic plants and between MNC offshore subsidiaries and MNC headquarters.

- Capital-good market externality and technology diffusion exert a stronger effect on the agglomeration of MNCs' foreign subsidiaries than on domestic plants in the same industry pairs.
- Location fundamentals (including market size and comparative advantage) and labor market externality have a stronger effect on the agglomeration patterns of domestic plants.
- Location fundamentals and capital-good market externality exert a stronger effect on the
 offshore agglomeration of MNCs, while technology diffusion and labor market externality
 are the leading forces behind the agglomeration of MNC headquarters. Vertical production
 linkages, in contrast, matter for MNC offshore clustering only.

These findings are largely consistent with the characteristics of multinational firms. Relative to their domestic counterparts in the same industry, MNC offshore subsidiaries are, on average, more capital and knowledge intensive. As a result, they have stronger motives than domestic plants to agglomerate with each other when their industries exhibit potential for capital-good market externality and technology diffusion. Moreover, the increasing segmentation of activities within the boundary of multinational firms motivates MNC foreign subsidiaries and MNC headquarters to follow different agglomeration patterns. In particular, the market-seeking and input-sourcing focuses of offshore production motivates MNC foreign subsidiaries to place greater emphasis on location fundamentals, input-output linkages, and capital-good market externalities, while the emphasis of headquarters on knowledge-intensive activities such as R&D, management, and services leads MNC headquarters to agglomerate for technology diffusion and labor market externality.

To alleviate concerns of endogenous agglomeration economy measures, we also examine regional agglomeration patterns from which the United States is excluded and find the results to be robust. If U.S. domestic industry-pair relationships could be affected by the agglomeration of

MNCs in the U.S., then one would expect that the former would not be affected by the agglomeration of MNCs located in other regions like Europe. We also investigate not just the pattern, but also the process of agglomeration. Exploring the dynamics in MNCs' offshore agglomeration sheds light on the formation of MNC clusters and mitigates the possibility of reverse causation between our measures of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies and MNCs' agglomeration patterns.

Finally, we examine micro agglomeration patterns by constructing and exploring plant-level agglomeration indices. Specifically, we examine how a given plant's characteristics—such as size, age, foreign ownership, and the number of products—and its industry's characteristics—such as capital intensity, skilled-labor intensity, and R&D intensity—might jointly explain the extent of agglomeration centered around the plant. We find that the degree of agglomeration varies sharply across plants in the same industry. Multinational plants attract significantly more agglomeration than domestic plants in capital-, skilled-labor-, and R&D-intensive industries. The results are consistent with the industry-level agglomeration patterns we document and suggest that multinational firms enjoy greater benefits from agglomeration than their domestic counterparts do for capital- and knowledge-intensive activities.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the methodology and the data with which we quantify the agglomeration of multinational and domestic firms. Section 4 describes the agglomeration patterns observed worldwide and presents the emerging stylized facts. Section 5 describes the methodology we use to measure location fundamentals and agglomeration economies. Section 6 reports the econometric analysis on the determinants of MNC agglomeration in comparison with the agglomeration of non-MNC plants. Section 7 presents analyses of agglomeration patterns in Europe and the agglomeration process of MNCs to address endogeneity concerns as well as plant-level results. Section 8 concludes.

2 Related Literature

Our paper builds on the extensive theoretical and empirical literature in international trade that examines MNCs' decision to invest abroad. Two main motives of foreign investment have been stressed. First, firms produce overseas to avoid trade costs. This strategy, referred to as the market-access (or tariff jumping) motive, leads firms to deploy the same production processes across countries (see, for example, Markusen and Venables, 2000). Second, firms locate different stages of production in countries where the intensively-used factor is abundant. This strategy is referred to as the comparative-advantage motive (see, for example, Helpman, 1984). These two motives, leading to horizontal and vertical FDI respectively, have been synchronized in the knowledge-capital model developed by Markusen and Venables (1998) and Markusen (2002) and

examined in a number of empirical studies.⁶

In this paper, we investigate the extent to which the location fundamentals of multinational production explain the clustering of MNC offshore activities. However, we go beyond the emphasis on location fundamentals and introduce a separate category of factors—agglomeration economies. An overview of the vast regional and urban economics literature evaluating the importance of Marshallian agglomeration forces in domestic economic geography is beyond the scope of our paper. We focus below on the empirical studies most closely related to our analysis.⁷

As noted earlier, a central issue in agglomeration studies is the measurement of agglomeration. Ellison and Glaeser's (1997) influential paper introduces a "dartboard" approach to construct an index of spatial concentration. The authors note that even in an industry with no tendency for clustering, random locations may not generate regular location patterns due to the fact that number of plants is never arbitrarily large. Their index thus compares the observed distribution of economic activity in an industry to a null hypothesis of random location and controls for the effect of industrial concentration, an issue that has been noted to affect the accuracy of previous indices. Using Ellison and Glaeser's (1997) index to evaluate the importance of agglomeration forces in explaining the localization of U.S. industries, Rosenthal and Strange (2001) find that both labor-market pooling and input-output linkages have a positive impact on agglomeration. Overman and Puga (2009), also using Ellison and Glaeser's (1997) index, examine the role of labor-market pooling and input sharing in determining the spatial concentration of UK manufacturing establishments. They find that sectors whose establishments experience more idiosyncratic employment volatility and use localized intermediate inputs are more spatially concentrated.

The study by DO advances the literature by developing a spatially continuous concentration index that is independent of the level of geographic disaggregation (see Section 3.1 for a detailed description). Applying this index, EGK employ an innovative empirical approach that exploits the coagglomeration of U.S. industries to disentangle the effects of Marshallian agglomeration economies. Like Rosenthal and Strange (2001), they find a particularly important role for input-output relationships.

Exploring the role of agglomeration economies in MNCs' location patterns also relates our paper to a literature in international trade. Several studies (see, for example, Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1995; Head and Mayer, 2004a; Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Debaere, Lee and Paik, 2010) have examined the role of distance and production linkages in individual multinationals'

⁶The work by Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003a), and Alfaro and Charlton (2009), for example, offers empirical support for both types of motives.

⁷Another important strand of empirical literature concerns one of the key theoretical predictions of New Economic Geography models: factor prices should vary systematically across locations with respect to market access. See, for example, Redding and Venables (2004) and Hanson (2005) for related empirical evidence. Among the latest contributors to this literature are Ahlfeldt et al. (2012), who introduce a structural estimation approach incorporating both location fundamentals and agglomeration economies. The authors combine a quantitative model of city structure with the natural experiment of Berlin's division and reunification and find that the model accounts for the observed changes in factor prices and employment.

location decisions. The results of these studies, which suggest that MNCs with vertical linkages tend to agglomerate within a host country/region, shed light on the role of vertical production relationship in the economic geography of multinational production.

Our analysis, assessing the patterns and causes of global agglomeration with particular emphasis on MNCs, contributes to the literature in several ways. First, instead of examining domestic agglomeration patterns in an individual country, our analysis offers a perspective on the structure of industrial agglomeration at both the world and the region level.

Second, we investigate how the agglomeration of the most mobile and distinctive group of firms—the multinationals—compare to the agglomeration of domestic firms. We re-consider definitions of location fundamentals in the context of MNCs and develop a new quantitative measure to capture the role of location fundamentals in MNCs' spatial concentrations. We also construct agglomeration indices based on estimates of trade costs between each pair of establishments to account for trade barriers other than distance. Further, we evaluate how agglomeration economies, particularly the value of external scale economies in capital goods and knowledge, affect MNCs relative to domestic firms, given MNCs' vertically-integrated organizational form and large investment in capital goods and technologies.

Third, we address the potential endogeneity of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies by exploring regional and dynamic patterns of MNCs.

Fourth, we perform an analysis of plant-level agglomeration to examine the role of plant and industry characteristics in micro agglomeration patterns.

3 Quantifying Agglomeration: Methodology and Data

In this section, we describe the empirical methodology and data we use to quantify the global agglomeration of multinational and domestic firms. As noted in Head and Mayer (2004b), measurement of agglomeration is a central challenge in the economic geography literature. There has been a continuous effort to designing an index that accurately reflects the agglomeration of economic activities. One of the latest advances in this literature is Duranton and Overman (2005), DO, who construct an index to measure the significance of agglomeration in the U. K. DO's index has been adapted by other studies such as EGK's measurement of the agglomeration of U.S. pairwise industries. We extend this index to assess and compare the degree of agglomeration of multinational v.s. domestic firms worldwide. In contrast to the original index's focus on distance as the main form of trade cost, we construct the index based on both distance and a generalized measure of trade costs.

3.1 Econometric Methodology

The empirical procedure to construct the agglomeration index has three steps. In the first step, we estimate an actual geographic density function for each pair of industries (including within-industry pairs) based on the distance and the trade costs between establishments. In the second step, we obtain counterfactual density functions based on manufacturing plants as a whole to control for factors that affect all manufacturing plants and to compute the global confidence bands at each threshold distance and trade cost. In the last step, we construct the agglomeration index to measure the extent to which establishments in an industry pair agglomerate at a threshold relative to the counterfactuals and the statistical significance thereof. To compare global agglomeration patterns of MNC foreign subsidiaries, MNC headquarters, and domestic plants, we repeat the procedure for each type of establishment.

Step 1: Actual geographic density function We first estimate an actual geographic density function for each pair of industries (including within-industry pairs). Note that even when the locations of nearly all establishments are known with a high degree of precision (as is the case with the data we use, as described below), distance—and estimated trade cost—are only approximations of the true trade cost between establishments. One source of systematic error, for example, is that the travel time for any given distance might differ between low- and high-density areas. Given the potential noise in the measurement of trade costs, we follow DO in adopting kernel smoothing when estimating the distribution function.

Let τ_{ij} denote either the distance or the general trade cost between establishment i and j. For each industry pair k and \widetilde{k} , we obtain a kernel estimator at any point τ (i.e., $K_{k\widetilde{k}}(\tau)$):

$$f_{k\tilde{k}}(\tau) = \frac{1}{n_k n_{\tilde{k}} h} \sum_{i=1}^{n_k} \sum_{j=1}^{n_{\tilde{k}}} K\left(\frac{\tau - \tau_{ij}}{h}\right),\tag{1}$$

where n_k and $n_{\tilde{k}}$ are the number of plants in industries k and \tilde{k} , respectively; h is the bandwidth; and K is the kernel function. We use Gaussian kernels with the data reflected around zero and the bandwidth set to minimize the mean integrated squared error.⁸ This step generates a kernel estimator for each of the 7,938 (= $126 \times 126/2$) manufacturing industry pairs in our data.

In addition to estimating the geographic distribution based on establishment pairs, we can also treat each worker as the unit of observation and measure the level of agglomeration among workers. To proceed, we obtain a weighted kernel estimator by weighing each establishment by employment size, given by

$$f_{k\tilde{k}}^{w}(\tau) = \frac{1}{h\sum_{i=1}^{n_{k}}\sum_{j=1}^{n_{\tilde{k}}}(r_{i}r_{j})} \sum_{i=1}^{n_{k}}\sum_{j=1}^{n_{\tilde{k}}}r_{i}r_{j}K\left(\frac{\tau - \tau_{ij}}{h}\right)$$
(2)

where r_i and r_j represent the number of employees in establishments i and j, respectively. We do this for each of the 7,938 industry pairs.

⁸ Although we follow DO and EGK in obtaining kernel estimators, a less computationally intensive approach that yields similar properties would be to look at cumulative distances.

Step 2: Counterfactuals and global confidence bands To obtain counterfactual estimators, we estimate the geographic distribution of the manufacturing multinationals as a whole in order to control for factors that affect all manufacturing multinational plants. We proceed by drawing, for each of the 7,938 industry pairs, 1,000 random samples, each of which includes two counterfactual industries. In measuring the agglomeration patterns of MNCs, the random samples are drawn from the entire set of MNC establishment locations in manufacturing industries. Note that to control for the potential effect of industry concentration, it is important that the counterfactual industry in each sample has the same number of observations as the actual data. We then calculate the bilateral distance between each pair of establishments and obtain a kernel estimator, unweighted or weighted by employment, for each of the 7,938,000 samples. This gives 1,000 kernel estimators for each of the 7,938 industry pairs.

We compare the actual and counterfactual kernel estimators at various distance (and corresponding trade cost) thresholds, including 200, 400, 800, and 1,600 kilometers (thresholds previously considered by DO and EGK). We compute the 95% global confidence band for each threshold distance. Following DO, we choose identical local confidence intervals at all levels of distance such that the global confidence level is 5%. We use $\overline{f}_{k\widetilde{k}}(\tau)$ to denote the upper global confidence band of industry pair k and \widetilde{k} . When $f_{k\widetilde{k}}(\tau) > \overline{f}_{k\widetilde{k}}(\tau)$ for at least one $\tau \in [0,T]$, the industry pair is considered to agglomerate at T and to exhibit greater agglomeration than counterfactuals. Graphically, it is detected when the kernel estimates of the industry pair lie above its upper global confidence band.

Step 3: Agglomeration index We now construct the agglomeration index. Following EGK, for each industry pair k and \widetilde{k} , we obtain

$$agglomeration_{k\widetilde{k}}(T) \equiv \sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \max \left(f_{k\widetilde{k}}(\tau) - \overline{f}_{k\widetilde{k}}(\tau), 0 \right) \tag{3}$$

or employment-weighted

$$agglomeration_{k\widetilde{k}}^{w}(T) \equiv \sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \max \left(f_{k\widetilde{k}}^{w}(\tau) - \overline{f}_{k\widetilde{k}}^{w}(\tau), 0 \right). \tag{4}$$

The index measures the extent to which establishments in industries k and k agglomerate at threshold T and the statistical significance thereof. When the index is positive, the level of agglomeration between industries k and k is significantly greater than that of counterfactuals.

DO's index addresses three key issues that arise with traditional measures of agglomeration, most of which have tended to equalize agglomeration with activities located in the same

⁹An alternative approach would be to use all existing establishment locations, including domestic and MNC, as the counterfactuals. This would help to control for the effect of general location factors instead of those that affect primarily the location decisions of MNCs. In Section 6.2, we perform an analysis in that direction by using domestic establishments as the benchmark and comparing the agglomeration patterns of MNC and domestic plants.

¹⁰We also considered lower distance thresholds, such as 20, 50, and 100 km in Section 7.1.

administrative or geographic region (measured by number of firms or volume of production in the region). First, the traditional measures can be strongly driven by industrial concentration. Industries with a small number of establishments may appear agglomerative when they are not. Second, the measures often cannot separate the geographic concentration of manufacturing industry due to location attractiveness from agglomeration. Third, previous measures, by equating agglomeration with activities in the same region, can omit agglomerating activities separated by administrative or geographic borders, while overestimating the degree of agglomeration within the same administrative or geographic units. The accuracy of these measures is thus dependent on the scale of geographic units. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) develop an index that solves the first two problems. DO address the remaining issue of the dependence of existing measures on the level of geographic disaggregation by developing a "continuous-space concentration index."

DO's index thus exhibits five important properties essential to agglomeration measures. First, it is comparable across industries and captures cross-industry variation in the level of agglomeration. Second, it controls for industrial concentration within each industry. Third, its construction is based on a counterfactual approach and controls for the effect of location factors—such as market size, natural resources, and policies—that apply to all manufacturing plants. Fourth, by taking into account spatial continuity, the index is unbiased with respect to the scale and aggregation of geographic units. Fifth, the index offers an indication of the statistical significance of agglomeration.

However, the construction of this index poses two constraints. First, the index requires detailed physical location information for each establishment. As described next, the WorldBase dataset, supplemented by a geocoding software, satisfies this requirement. Second, the simulation approach adopted in the empirical procedure is extremely computationally intensive, especially for large datasets and analysis of pairwise-industry agglomeration. Constructing the index for different types of establishment further increases the computational burden.

3.2 Data: The WorldBase Database

Our empirical analysis uses a unique worldwide establishment dataset, WorldBase, that covers more than 43 million public and private establishments in more than 100 countries and territories. WorldBase is compiled by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), a leading source of commercial credit and marketing information since 1845. D&B—presently operating in over a dozen countries either directly or through affiliates, agents, and associated business partners—compiles data from a wide range of sources including public registries, partner firms, telephone directory records, and websites. All information collected by D&B is verified centrally via a variety of manual and automated checks.

¹¹For more information, see: http://www.dnb.com/us/about/db_database/dnbinfoquality.html. The dataset used in this paper was acquired from D&B with disclosure restrictions.

¹²Early uses of D&B data include, for example, Lipsey's (1978) comparisons of the D&B data with existing sources with regard to the reliability of U.S. data. More recently, Harrison, Love, and McMillian (2004) use D&B's cross-country foreign ownership information. Other research that has used D&B data includes Rosenthal and

Cross-Country Coverage and Geocode Information D&B's WorldBase is, in our view, an ideal data source for the research question proposed in this study. It offers several advantages over alternative data sources. First, its broad cross-country coverage enables us to examine agglomeration on a global and continuous scale. Examining the global patterns of agglomeration allows us to offer a systematic perspective that takes into account nations at various stages of development. Viewing agglomeration on a continuous scale is important in light of the increasing geographic agglomeration occurring across regional and country borders. Examples of cross-border clusters include the metalworking and electrical-engineering cluster involving Germany and German-speaking Switzerland; an electric-machinery cluster involving Switzerland and Italy; a biotech cluster spreading across Germany, Switzerland, and France; an automobile industry cluster that crosses the border of Germany and Slovakia; the Ontario-Canada-Michigan-US (Windsor-Detroit) auto cluster; and the Texas-Northeastern-Mexico cluster. Table A.1 shows that more than 20 percent of pairs of multinational plants that are within 200 km of each other are in different countries. The percentage rises to 40 percent at 400 km. This is not surprising given countries' growing participation in regional trading blocs and the rapid declines in cross-border trade costs.

Second, the database reports detailed information for multinational and non-multinational, offshore and headquarters establishments. This makes it possible to compare agglomeration patterns across different types of establishment and to investigate how the economic geography of production evolves with forms of firm organization.

Third, the WorldBase database reports the physical address and postal code of each plant, whereas most existing datasets report business registration addresses. The physical location information enables us to obtain precise latitude and longitude information for each plant in the data and compute the distance as well as trade cost between each establishment pair. Existing studies have tended to use distance between administrative units, such as state distances, as a proxy for distance of establishments. In doing so, establishments proximate in actual distance but separated by administrative boundaries (for example, San Diego and Phoenix) can be considered dispersed. Conversely, establishments far apart but still in the same administrative unit (for example, San Diego and San Francisco) can be counted as agglomeration.

We obtain latitude and longitude codes for each establishment using a geocoding software (GPS Visualizer). This software uses Yahoo's and Google's Geocoding API services, well known as the industry standard for transportation data. It provides more accurate geocode information than most alternative sources. The geocodes are obtained in batches and verified for precision. We apply the Haversine formula to the geocode data to compute the great-circle distance between each pair of establishments. To account for other forms of trade barriers, such as border, language, and tariffs, we further obtain in Section 6.4 an estimated measure of trade cost between

Strange's (2003) analysis of micro-level agglomeration in the United States; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton's (2009) cross-country study of concentration and vertical integration; and Alfaro and Charlton's (2009) analysis of vertical and horizontal activities of multinationals.

each pair of plants based on conventional gravity-equation estimations. The distance and the trade cost information are then both used to construct an index of agglomeration following the empirical methodology described in Section 3.1.

MNC and Domestic Establishment Data Our empirical analysis is based on MNC offshore subsidiaries, MNC headquarters, and domestic plants in 2005.¹³ WorldBase reports, for each establishment in the dataset, detailed information on location, ownership, and activities. Four categories of information are used in this paper: (i) industry information including the four-digit SIC code of the primary industry in which each establishment operates; (ii) ownership information including headquarters, domestic parent, global parent, status (for example, joint venture and partnership), and position in the hierarchy (for example, branch, division, and headquarters); (iii) detailed location information for both establishment and headquarters; and (iv) operational information including sales, employment, and year started.

An establishment is deemed an MNC foreign subsidiary if it satisfies two criteria: (i) it reports to a global parent firm, and (ii) the headquarters or the global parent firm is located in a different country. The parent is defined as an entity that has legal and financial responsibility for another establishment.¹⁴ We drop establishments with zero or missing employment values and industries with fewer than 10 observations.¹⁵

Our final sample includes 32,427 MNC offshore manufacturing plants. Top industries include Electronic Components and Accessories (367), Miscellaneous Plastics Products (308), Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment (371), General Industrial Machinery and Equipment (356), Laboratory Apparatus and Analytical, Optical, Measuring, and Controlling Instruments (382), Drugs (283), Metalworking Machinery and Equipment (354), Construction, Mining, and Materials Handling (353), and Special Industry Machinery except Metalworking (355). Top host countries include China, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Mexico.

To examine the coverage of our MNC establishment data, we compared U.S. owned subsidiaries in the WorldBase database with the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis' (BEA) Direct Investment Abroad Benchmark Survey, a legally mandated confidential survey conducted every five years that covers virtually the entire population of U.S. MNCs. The comparison revealed similar accounts of establishments and activities between the two databases. We also compared WorldBase with UNCTAD's Multinational Corporation Database. These two databases differ in

¹³In Section 6, when comparing the agglomeration patterns of MNC and non-MNC plants, we expand the analysis to include domestic firms.

¹⁴There are, of course, establishments that belong to the same multinational family. Although separately examining the interaction of these establishments is beyond the focus of this paper, we expect the Marshallian forces to have a similar effect here. For example, subsidiaries with an input-output linkage should have incentives to locate near one another independent of ownership. See Yeaple (2003b) for theoretical work in this area and Chen (2011) for supportive empirical evidence. One can use a similar methodology (estimating geographic distributions of establishments that belong to the same firm and comparing them with distributions of counterfactuals) to study intra-firm interaction (see Duranton and Overman, 2008).

¹⁵Requiring positive employment helps to exclude establishments registered exclusively for tax purposes.

that the former reports at the plant level and the latter at the firm level. For the U.S. and other major FDI source countries, the two databases report similar numbers of firms, but WorldBase contains more plants. See Alfaro and Charlton (2009) for detailed discussion of the WorldBase data and comparisons with other data sources.

Measuring the agglomeration of all domestic manufacturing plants worldwide is infeasible given the size of the WorldBase dataset and the computational intensity of the procedure. Consequently, we adopt a random sampling strategy to keep the analysis feasible. For each SIC 3-digit industry with more than 1,000 observations, we obtain a random sample of 1,000 plants. For industries with fewer than 1,000 observations, we include all domestic plants. This yields a final sample of 127,897 domestically owned plants.

4 The Global Agglomeration of MNCs and Domestic Plants: Stylized Facts

In this section, we examine various properties of the agglomeration indices for MNCs and domestic plants—including all within- and between-industry pairs—and present a number of stylized facts that emerge from the agglomeration patterns.

First, in Table 1 which shows descriptive statistics of the agglomeration indices for MNC foreign subsidiaries, domestic plants, MNC subsidiary workers, and MNC headquarters, we note that multinational headquarters exhibit, on average, the highest agglomeration index. At 200 km, the average value of the agglomeration index, reflecting the average degree of pairwise-industry agglomeration (relative to the global confidence band), is 0.140 percent for MNC headquarters, 0.102 percent for domestic plants, and 0.099 percent for MNC foreign subsidiaries.¹⁶

[Table 1 about here]

In contrast, MNC subsidiaries, measured in terms of either individual subsidiaries or workers, have the lowest agglomeration index among the different types of plant; the average value at the 200 km level is close to 0.1 percent, with the maximum value reaching 3.06 percent. At the more aggregate 400 km level, the average value increases to 0.22 percent, with the maximum reaching 6.63 percent. Industry pairs that exhibit some of the highest offshore agglomeration index values, reported in Table A.3, include Footwear except Rubber (314) and Boot and Shoe Cut Stock and Findings (313); Knitting Mills (225) and Footwear except Rubber (314); Dolls, Toys,

¹⁶The average values all rise substantially—to 0.48 percent for MNC headquarters, 0.35 percent for domestic plants, and 0.33 percent for MNC foreign subsidiaries—when we censor the data on only those industry pairs with significant positive agglomeration indices. Note, further, that as noted by DO, the absolute scale of the agglomeration index is driven by the geographic scope of the dataset and the empirical methodology and has relatively little meaning. Because we take into account the distance of all establishment pairs worldwide (the maximum distance being around 20,000 km), kernel estimates at each distance level will be low. Adoption of the Monte Carlo approach also means that the indices are constructed based on differences from the 95% global confidence bands and a positive value represents statistically significant evidence of agglomeration.

Games (394) and Sporting and Athletic and Footwear except Rubber (314); Miscellaneous Publishing (274) and Paperboard Mills (263); and Miscellaneous Publishing (274) and Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment (379).

The differences in agglomeration intensity across different types of plant, summarized as our first stylized fact, are consistent with the knowledge capital theory of multinational firms (see Markusen, 2002), which predicts that MNC headquarters should concentrate in skilled-laborabundant countries and subsidiaries should be dispersedly distributed across host regions based on markets and comparative advantages. Our finding also lends empirical support to theoretical predictions in urban economics which suggest greater clustering of headquarters relative to that of manufacturing plants (see, for example, Duranton and Puga, 2005).

Stylized Fact 1: Across different types of plant, multinational headquarters are, on average, most agglomerative, followed by domestic plants and multinational foreign subsidiaries.

In Table A.2, we present descriptive statistics for within- and between-industry agglomeration indices, respectively. We find that (i) stylized fact 1 holds for both within- and between-industry pairs; and (ii) firms in the same industry are more agglomerative than firms from different industries. The latter observation is consistent with the expectation noted in both EGK and our paper that location fundamentals and various agglomeration economies all motivate firms in the same industry to agglomerate with each other whereas firms from different industry pairs exhibit greater variation in their relatedness in production, factor markets, and technology space, thereby displaying weaker average agglomeration incentives.

Next, we examine in Table 2 the correlations of agglomeration indices across different types of plant. Comparing the index of MNC agglomeration with that of domestic plants, we find that the correlation of the MNC-foreign-subsidiary and the domestic-plant agglomeration indices is 0.2 at 200 km, suggesting that multinational and non-multinational plants exhibit sharply different spatial patterns. Specifically, the index is higher for domestic plants in about half of industry pairs at 200 km. The agglomeration patterns of MNC headquarters and foreign subsidiaries are correlated with a higher coefficient of 0.41 at 200 km, implying that while, for some industry pairs, the clusters of MNC subsidiaries resemble those of headquarters, for other industry pairs, the two types of establishment exhibit distinctly different agglomeration patterns. These observations, summarized in stylized fact 2, indicate that the emerging offshore clusters of MNCs are not merely a projection of the domestic clusters. The driving forces of MNCs' offshore agglomeration are likely to vary from those of domestic plants and MNC headquarters, as we explore in Section 6.¹⁷

[Table 2 about here]

¹⁷Similarly, the correlations do not change significantly when we drop within-industry agglomeration indices (which consist of 126 observations).

Stylized Fact 2: The agglomeration of multinational foreign subsidiaries exhibits a low correlation with the agglomeration of domestic plants.

Now we explore whether differences in multinational and domestic plants' agglomeration patterns exhibits any relationship with industry characteristics such as capital intensity, skilled-labor intensity and R&D intensity. 18

In Figure 1, we plot the distributions of pairwise-industry agglomeration densities for multinational foreign subsidiaries and domestic plants, respectively. We find that for industries with greater than median levels of capital intensity, the distribution shifts rightward for multinational foreign subsidiaries compared to domestic plants. This pattern is similarly observed for industries with greater than median levels of skilled-labor intensity and R&D intensity: in skilled-labor and R&D intensive industries, the distribution of multinational foreign subsidiaries' agglomeration densities dominates the distribution of domestic plants.¹⁹

We also plot the distribution of agglomeration densities at the plant level, for multinational foreign subsidiaries and domestic plants, respectively. We compute a agglomeration density for each plant—following the methodology in Section 3.1—to measure the degree to which a plant is proximate to other plants (from both the same and other industries). The plant-level densities are then demeaned by industry averages to ensure within-industry comparisons. Similar to industry-level patterns, we show in Figure 2 that multinational foreign subsidiaries exhibit greater agglomeration than their domestic peers in capital-, skilled-labor-, and R&D-intensive industries.

These findings, summarized as our stylized fact 3, suggest that in industries with high capital, skilled-labor, and R&D requirements, MNCs—which tend to be more productive and more capital- and knowledge-intensive than domestic firms in the same industry—are more likely to provide as well as derive benefits of capital market externality and technology diffusion—than their domestic peers—and thus are more likely to cluster with each other offshore.

Stylized Fact 3: Multinational foreign subsidiaries are more agglomerative than domestic plants in capital-, skilled-labor-, and R&D-intensive industries.

5 Measuring MP Location Fundamentals and Agglomeration Economies

After presenting stylized facts of the agglomeration indices, we now turn to economic factors that could systematically account for the observed agglomeration patterns of MNCs. Incorporating

¹⁸We use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database to construct each industry's capital and skilledlabor intensities, which are defined as, respectively, the ratio of investment and of non-production workers' payroll to value added. Each industry's R&D intensity is measured using the median firm's ratio of R&D expenditure relative to value added based on the COMPUTSTAT database.

¹⁹The pattern, again, does not change when within-industry agglomeration indices are excluded.




Figure 1: The agglomeration density distributions of multinational foreign subsidiaries and domestic plants: Pairwise industries




Figure 2: The agglomeration density distributions of multinational foreign subsidiaries and domestic plants: Plant level

multinational firm theories with the literature of economic geography, the location decisions of multinational firms can be viewed as a function of two categories of factors. One consists of location fundamentals of MP—such as market access and comparative advantage—that motivate MNCs to invest in a given country; the other consists of agglomeration forces including (i) vertical production linkages, (ii) externality in labor markets, (iii) externality in capital-good markets, and (iv) technology diffusion. We describe below how each of these factors is measured in the empirical analysis.

5.1 MP Location Fundamentals

We construct a measure of MP location fundamentals by incorporating an empirical approach from the multinational firm literature with the agglomeration index methodology and invoking a two-step procedure.

Step 1: Estimating MNC activity predicted by location fundamentals In the first step, we seek to obtain estimates of multinational activity predicted by location fundamentals including market size, trade cost, comparative advantage, natural advantage and etc. To obtain such estimates, we consider two alternative specifications.

In the first specification, we estimate a conventional empirical equation following Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Yeaple (2003a), and Alfaro and Charlton (2009). Using a conventional empirical specification enables us to assess how MP location fundamentals commonly stressed by previous studies affect MNCs' agglomeration patterns. Specifically, we consider the following specification:

$$y_{c\widetilde{c}k} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 marketsize_size_{c\widetilde{c}} + \gamma_2 distance_{c\widetilde{c}} + \gamma_3 skill_diff_{c\widetilde{c}} + \gamma_4 skill_diff_{c\widetilde{c}} \times skillintensity_k + \gamma_5 tariff_{c\widetilde{c}k} + \gamma_6 tariff_{\widetilde{c}ck} + +\mu_{ck} + \mu'_{\widetilde{c}k} + \varepsilon_{c\widetilde{c}k}$$
 (5)

where $y_{c\widetilde{c}k}$ denotes either the number or the total employment of subsidiaries in country \widetilde{c} and industry k owned by MNCs in country c, $marketsize_ave_{c\widetilde{c}}$ is the average market size proxied by the average GDP of the home and host countries, 20 distance_{$c\widetilde{c}$} is the distance, $skill_diff_{c\widetilde{c}}$ represents the difference in skill endowment, measured by average years of schooling, between the home and the host countries (i.e., $skill_{\widetilde{c}} - skill_c$), $skillintensity_k$ is the skilled-labor intensity proxied by share of non-production workers in total payroll for each industry, $tariff_{c\widetilde{c}k}$ and $tariff_{\widetilde{c}ck}$ are the levels of tariff set by the host country \widetilde{c} on the home country c and vice versa in industry c, and c, are the residuals. In addition to the above variables, host-country characteristics such as institutional and physical infrastructure could also affect multinationals' location decisions. We therefore include vectors of country-industry dummies, μ_{ck} and $\mu'_{\widetilde{c}k}$, to condecisions.

²⁰In addition to GDP, we consider market potential which is the sum of domestic and distance-weighted export market sizes of the home and host countries.

²¹As noted by Helpman (2006), firms' sorting patterns and organization choices are dependent on the charac-

trol for all country-industry specific factors such as institutional quality, physical infrastructure, domestic industry size, and economic policies.²²

We obtain GDP data from the World Bank's WDI database, distance from the CEPII Gravity dataset, education information from Barro and Lee (2000), and tariff data from the TRAINS database. All host-country characteristics are lagged by 5 years to mitigate reverse causality. We estimate Equation (5) using Poisson quasi-MLE (QMLE).²³ If market access is a significant motive in MNCs' investment decisions, we expect the effects of host-country market size and trade cost (measured by distance and tariff) to be positive; that is, $\gamma_1 > 0$, $\gamma_2 > 0$, and $\gamma_5 > 0$. If comparative advantage is a significant motive, we expect the effect of trade cost to be negative and the effect of difference in skilled labor endowment to be negative for unskilled-labor intensive industries; that is, $\gamma_2 < 0$, $\gamma_4 > 0$, $\gamma_5 < 0$, and $\gamma_6 < 0$. Our estimates are largely in line with the literature (see, for example, Yeaple, 2003a; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). Consistent with the market access motive, MNCs are found to be more likely to invest in countries with a larger market size ($\gamma_1 > 0$). Consistent with the comparative advantage motive, we found that (i) MNCs are more likely to invest in unskilled-labor abundant countries ($\gamma_3 < 0$), especially in unskilled-labor intensive industries ($\gamma_4 > 0$), and (ii) trade cost exerts a negative effect on MNCs' investment decisions ($\gamma_2 < 0$ and $\gamma_5 < 0$).²⁴

Based on the estimates of Equation (5), we obtain and sum, for each host country \tilde{c} and industry k, the values of $y_{c\tilde{c}k}$ predicted by market access and comparative advantage factors. To construct predicted MNC activities at a more disaggregated location level, we use the actual share of multinationals in each city to capture cross-city variations in attractiveness (for example, port access and favorable industrial policies). Multiplying the actual share by $\hat{y}_{\tilde{c}k}$ gives \hat{y}_{sk} for each city s and industry k.

In an alternative specification, we directly estimate MNC activity at a disaggregated region level. To proceed, we re-consider Equation (5) to examine MNC activity at the region, rather than the country, level and include a series of regional characteristics, such as market size, natural and comparative advantages, and infrastructure, as additional regressors to capture the effect of regional location fundamentals. The main advantage of this specification is that we can examine the role of regional characteristics in MNCs' location decisions, instead of relying on the role of

teristics of the firms and on the contractual environment (see, for example, Antras, 2003; Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Empirical evidence also suggests that institutional development (such as the rule of law and intellectual property rights) exerts a positive effect on the receipt of foreign investment (see Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet, and Mayer, 2007; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2008, among others).

²²Note that the effect of agglomeration forces such as the size of upstream and downstream industries is controlled for in equation (5) by country-industry dummies.

²³Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out that Poisson QMLE can be more attractive than least-square estimators when the variance of the error term is a function of the covariates, in which case the conditional expectation of the logged error term in the log-form estimation equation will not be zero. Head and Ries (2008) further show that estimates produced with this method are smaller than the least-square estimates and remarkably robust to the treatment of zeros and missing values. Following Helpman et al. (2008), we also considered a two-step Heckman selection procedure in which we estimated, respectively, the decision to trade and volume of trade; the results were similar.

²⁴Results are suppressed because of space considerations but are available upon request.

country characteristics alone and then using a region's share of MNCs as a proxy for regional attractiveness.

The disadvantage of this specification, however, is the difficulty to obtain disaggregated regional data for a wide sample of countries. We searched extensively for regional economic data across countries and, in the end, compiled a detailed database of regional characteristics from a number of national sources. For most countries, we were constrained to obtaining information at primarily the state or province level. Specifically, for countries including, for example, the U.S., Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, and South Korea, we used state/province data. For Europe, the data was compiled from the Eurostat Regional Database at the NUTS 2 level of disaggregation, both to compare with other countries and for availability reasons. Because of data availability constraints, the regional characteristics systematically available across countries and included in our final sample are income, schooling (percentage of labor with tertiary education), infrastructure (roadways, ports, and airports), and taxes, all measured in 2004 or the closest year available (to mitigate causality concerns).²⁵

Based on this database, we estimate the following equation:

$$y_{c\tilde{c}sk} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 marketsize_size_{c\tilde{c}} + \gamma_2 distance_{c\tilde{c}} + \gamma_3 skill_diff_{c\tilde{c}s}$$

$$+ \gamma_4 skill_diff_{c\tilde{c}s} \times skillintensity_k + \gamma_5 tariff_{c\tilde{c}k} + \gamma_6 tariff_{\tilde{c}ck}$$

$$+ \gamma_7 tax_{\tilde{c}s} + \gamma_8 roadway_{\tilde{c}s} + \gamma_9 port_{\tilde{c}s} + \gamma_{10} airport_{\tilde{c}s} + \mu_{ck} + \mu'_{\tilde{c}k} + \varepsilon_{c\tilde{c}k}.$$

$$(6)$$

where $y_{c\tilde{c}sk}$ now denotes either the number or the total employment of subsidiaries in country \hat{c} 's region s and industry k owned by MNCs in country c, $skill_diff_{c\tilde{c}s}$ represents the difference in skill endowment—measured by percentage of labor with tertiary education—between the home country and the host region (i.e., $skill_{\tilde{c}s} - skill_c$), $tax_{\tilde{c}s}$ is the region's corporate tax level, $roadway_{\tilde{c}s}$ is the length of roadway in each region s, and $port_{\tilde{c}s}$ and $airport_{\tilde{c}s}$ are, respectively, binary indicators of ports and airports in the region. Again, we estimate the equation using Poisson quasi-MLE (QMLE) and find estimated parameters to be largely similar to the results from the first specification. In addition, we find regional skill level and infrastructure characteristics to matter significantly in multinationals' location decisions. Based on the estimates, we then obtain and sum, for each host country c, region s, and industry k, values of $\hat{y}_{c\tilde{c}sk}$ predicted

²⁵The U.S. data was collected at the state level. Population and education attainment data were collected from the U.S. Census; GDP and income/compensation statistics were collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis; roadway statistics were from the Federal Highway Administration; employment data was collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Australian data was compiled from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) at the state level. Canadian data was obtained from Statistics Canada at the provincial level. Chinese statistics were taken from the Population Census and the CEIC Data at the provincial level. Brazilan data was obtained from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE) at the state level. Mexican data was collected from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI) at the state level. South Korean data was collected from the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), at the provincial level. Japanese statistics were collected from the Statistics Bureau of Japan at the prefecture level. The remaining data is at the national level, collected from sources including the World Bank. All port data was from World Port Source, and tax rates were compiled from Ernst and Young, Deloitte, KPMG, and the World Bank's Doing Business report.

by the market access, comparative advantage, and infrastructure variables.

Step 2: Constructing the expected geographic density In the second stage, we repeat Step 1 of DO's procedure to obtain a geographic distribution function for each pair of industries k and \tilde{k} . We use the predicted levels of MNC activity (either the predicted number or total employment of MNCs) in each region and industry (i.e., \hat{y}_{sk} and $\hat{y}_{s\tilde{k}}$) obtained from Step 1 as the weight when estimating the kernel function. This generates, for each pair of industries, an expected geographic density function based exclusively on the estimated effects of location characteristics. In Section 6, we compare the role of these characteristics to the roles of of agglomeration forces in determining the spatial patterns of multinational firms.

5.2 Agglomeration Economies

In addition to the location fundamentals of MP, agglomeration economies, too, can affect multinationals' location choices. The advantage of proximity can differ dramatically between multinational and domestic firms and between MNC foreign subsidiaries and domestic headquarters. For instance, multinationals often incur substantial trade costs in sourcing intermediate inputs and reaching downstream buyers. They also face significant market entry costs when relocating to a foreign country because of factors such as limited supplies of capital goods. Further, given their technology intensity, MNCs can find the technology diffusion from closely linked industries particularly attractive. We discuss below the role of each agglomeration economy in multinational firms' location choices and the proxies used to represent each force.

Vertical production linkages Marshall (1890) argued that transportation costs induce plants to locate close to inputs and customers and determine the optimal trading distance between suppliers and buyers. This can be especially true for MNCs, given their large volumes of sales and intermediate inputs.²⁶ Compared to domestic firms, multinationals are often the leading corporations in each industry. Because they tend to be the largest customers of upstream industries as well as the largest suppliers of downstream industries, the input-output relationship between MNCs (for example, Dell and Intel; Ford and Delphi) can be far stronger than that between average domestic firms.²⁷

To determine the importance of customer and supplier relationships in multinationals' agglomeration decisions, we construct a variable, $IOlinkage_{k\widetilde{k}}$, to measure the extent of the input-output relationship between each pair of industries. We use the 2002 Benchmark Input-Output Data (specifically, the Detailed-Level Make, Use and Direct Requirement Tables) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and define $IOlinkage_{k\widetilde{k}}$ as the share of industry k's inputs

²⁶ For FDI theoretical literature in this area, see, for example, Krugman (1991), Venables (1996), and Markusen and Venables (2000).

²⁷Head, Ries, and Swenson (1995) note, for example, that the dependence of Japanese manufacturers on the "just-in-time" inventory system exerts a particularly strong incentive for vertically linked Japanese firms to agglomerate abroad.

that come directly from industry k and vice versa. These shares are calculated relative to all input-output flows including those to non-manufacturing industries and final consumers. As supplier flows are not symmetrical, we take either the maximum or the mean of the input and output relationships for each pair of industries, which, as shown in Table A.5, are highly correlated. We used the mean values in our analysis, but obtained similar results when we used the maximum measure.

Externality in labor markets — Agglomeration can also yield benefits through external scale economies in labor markets. Because firms' proximity to one another shields workers from the vicissitudes of firm-specific shocks, workers in locations in which other firms stand ready to hire them are often willing to accept lower wages.²⁸ Externalities can also occur as workers move from one job to another. This is especially true between MNCs which are characterized by similar skill requirements and large expenditures on worker training. MNCs can have a particularly strong incentive to lure workers from one another because the workers tend to receive certain types of training (business practices, business culture, and so on) that are well suited for working in most multinational firms.²⁹

To examine labor market pooling forces, we follow EGK in measuring each industry pair's similarity in occupational labor requirements. We use the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) 2006 National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix (NIOEM), which reports industry-level employment across detailed occupations (such as Assemblers and Fabricators; Metal Workers and Plastic Workers; Textile, Apparel, and Furnishings Workers; Business Operations Specialists; Financial Specialists; Computer Support Specialists; and Electrical and Electronics Engineers). We convert occupational employment counts into occupational percentages for each industry, map the BLS industries to the SIC3 framework, and measure each industry pair's labor similarity, $labor_{k\widetilde{k}}$, using the correlation in occupational percentages.

Externality in capital-good markets External scale economies can also arise in capital-good markets. This force has particular relevance to multinational firms given their large involvement in capital-intensive activities. Geographically concentrated industries offer better support to providers of capital goods (such as producers of specialized components and providers of machinery maintenance) and reduce their risk of investment (due, for example, to the existence of resale markets).³⁰ Local expansion of capital-intensive activities can consequently lead to expansion of the supply of capital goods, thereby reducing the cost of capital goods.

²⁸This argument has been formally considered in Marshall (1890), Krugman (1991), and Helsley and Strange (1990). Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), for a related motivation, argue that workers can benefit because multiple firms offer protection against ex-post appropriation of investments in human capital.

²⁹The flow of workers can also lead to technology diffusion, another Marshallian force discussed below.

³⁰ Agglomeration can also create costs, for example, by increasing labor and land prices. Like benefits, these costs can be greater for industries with similar labor and capital-good demand, in which case the estimated parameters of the variables would represent the net effect of similar factor demand structures on agglomeration decisions.

To evaluate the role of capital-good market externalities, we construct a new measure of industries' similarity in capital-good demand—in a spirit similar to the measure of industries' similarity in labor demand—using capital flow data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The capital flow table (CFT), a supplement to the 1997 benchmark input-output (I-O) accounts, shows detailed purchases of capital goods (such as motors and generators, textile machinery, mining machinery and equipment, wood containers and pallets, computer storage devices, and wireless communications equipment) by using industry. We compute—for each using industry—the share of investment in each capital good and then measure each industry pair's similarity in capital-good investment, denoted by $capitalgood_{k\tilde{k}}$, using the industry pair's correlation in investment shares.³¹

Technology diffusion A fourth motive relates to the diffusion of technologies. Technology can diffuse from one firm to another through movement of workers, interaction between those who perform similar jobs, or direct interaction between firms through technology sourcing. This has been noted by Navaretti and Venables (2006), who predict that MNCs may benefit from setting up affiliates in proximity to other MNCs with advanced technology. The affiliates can benefit from technology spillovers, which can then be transferred to other parts of the company.

To capture this agglomeration force, we construct a proxy of technology diffusion frequently considered in the knowledge spillover literature (see, for example, Jaffe et al., 2000; EGK), using patent citation flow data taken from the NBER Patent Database. The data, compiled by Hall et al. (2001), includes detailed records for all patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from January 1975 to December 1999. Each patent record provides information about the invention (such as technology classification and citations of prior art) and about the inventors submitting the application (such as name and city). We construct the technology diffusion variable, that is, $technology_{k\tilde{k}}$, by measuring the extent to which technologies in industry k cite technologies in industry k, and vice versa.³² In practice, there is little directional difference in $technology_{k\tilde{k}}$ due to the extensive number of citations within a single technology field. We obtain both maximum and mean for each set of pairwise industries. We used the mean values in our analysis, but obtained similar results when using the maximum measure.

Constructing the proxies of agglomeration economies using the U.S. industry-level account data is motivated by three considerations. First, compared to firm-level input-output, factor demand, or technological information (which is typically unavailable), industry-level production, factor and technology linkages reflect standardized production technologies and are relatively

³¹Note that this measure captures a different dimension of industry-pair relatedness than vertical production linkages. Unlike vertical production linkages, industry-pair correlations in capital-good demand reflect industry pairs' similarity in capital-good demand and, thus, scope for externality in capital-good markets.

³²The concordance between the USPTO classification scheme and SIC3 industries is adopted in the construction of the variable.

stable over time, limiting the potential for the measures to endogenously respond to MNC agglomeration. Second, using the U.S. as the reference country while our analysis covers multinational activity around the world further mitigates the possibility of endogenous production, factor, and technology linkage measures, even though the assumption that the U.S. production structure carries over to other countries could potentially bias our empirical analysis against finding a significant relationship. Third, the U.S. industry accounts are more disaggregated than those of most other countries, enabling us to dissect linkages between disaggregated product categories.

Table A.4 reports the summary statistics of industry-level control variables. Table A.5 presents the correlation matrix. As shown, the proxies of agglomeration economies have very low correlations. For example, the correlation between industry-pair production linkage and similarity in capital-good demand is about 0.19 and the correlation between production linkage and technology diffusion is 0.29. This suggests that industry pairs exhibit significant variation in their relatedness in inputs, labor, capital-goods and technology. Industry pairs with strong input-output linkages often have weak linkages in capital goods and technology. This provides us a key source of variation for disentangling the effects of agglomeration economies.

6 Assessing the Roles of MP Location Fundamentals and Agglomeration Economies

We now examine the roles of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies in explaining the pairwise-industry agglomeration of MNCs and how the effects might differ across multinational foreign subsidiaries, domestic plants, and multinational headquarters.

Formally, we estimate the following empirical specification:

$$\begin{split} agglomeration_{k\widetilde{k}}(T) &= \alpha_K + \beta_1 fundamentals_{k\widetilde{k}} \\ &+ \beta_2 IOlinkage_{k\widetilde{k}} + \beta_3 labor_{k\widetilde{k}} + \beta_4 capitalgood_{k\widetilde{k}} + \beta_5 technology_{k\widetilde{k}} + \varepsilon_{ij}, \end{split}$$

where $agglomeration_{k\widetilde{k}}(T)$ is the agglomeration index of industry pairs k and \widetilde{k} at threshold distance T (relative to the counterfactuals) and the right-hand side includes (i) the agglomeration patterns predicted by MP location fundamentals ($fundamentals_{k\widetilde{k}}$) based on the two specifications considered in Section 5.1, and (ii) proxies for agglomeration forces described in Section 5.2 consisting of input-output linkages ($IOlinkage_{k\widetilde{k}}$), labor- and capital-good market similarities ($labor_{k\widetilde{k}}$ and $capitalgood_{k\widetilde{k}}$), and technology diffusion ($technology_{k\widetilde{k}}$).

Note that since our proxies of agglomeration forces are constructed based on the different degrees of relatedness (such as labor- and capital-good-demand correlations) between each pair of industries, they exhibit little or no variation for within-industry pairs (for example, $labor_{k\tilde{k}}$ and $capitalgood_{k\tilde{k}}$ —labor- and capital-good-demand correlations—would equal 1 for all $k=\tilde{k}$). As a result, estimating Equation (7) for within-industry pairs (which would yield a sample of

126 observations) is not meaningful and we thus exclude those pairs in the econometric analysis after accounting for their patterns in earlier sections.³³

In addition to the location fundamentals and the agglomeration economies considered above, other industry-specific factors such as climate requirement could also affect multinational agglomeration. We control for these factors with an industry fixed effect. Specifically, we include α_K , a vector of industry dummies that takes the value of 1 if either industry k or \widetilde{k} corresponds to a given industry and 0 otherwise. These industry dummies control for all industry-specific factors and agglomeration patterns.

6.1 MNC Offshore Agglomeration

We consider first the agglomeration of MNC foreign subsidiaries. Table 3 reports the regression results based on the first specification of location fundamentals. Agglomeration forces including vertical production linkages, capital-good market correlation, and technology diffusion all play a significant role and display the expected signs.³⁴ For example, at 200 km a 100-percentage-point increase in the level of technology diffusion—that is, the percentage of patent citations between two industries—leads to a 0.6-percentage-point increase in the agglomeration index between industries. This is equivalent to increasing the average (0.2) by a factor of 3. The location fundamental variable is significant at 1600 km, influencing the spatial patterns of MNCs at a relatively aggregate geographic level.

[Table 3 about here]

The lower panel of Table 3 reports the normalized beta coefficients.³⁵ Comparing the standardized coefficients of agglomeration forces, we find the effects of technology diffusion and capital-good market correlation to outweigh that of vertical production linkages, which suggests that, given the technology- and capital-intensive characteristics of multinational firms, it is important to take into account not only vertical production linkages but also technology diffusion and capital-good market externality in explaining MNCs' offshore agglomeration. The parameter of labor-market correlation is insignificant in the multivariate regressions.³⁶

³³In a robustness check, we included both within-industry and between-industry pairs in regressions and found the main results to be qualitatively similar to those reported in this section. This suggests that variations between industry pairs are a key source of variation for disentangling the roles of location fundamentals and various agglomeration forces.

³⁴In univariate regression results for each of our main variables, all the agglomeration variables were highly significant across the different distance threshold levels. The estimated effects also exhibited the expected signs. Across agglomeration forces, capital-good market correlation had the greatest impact across all distance thresholds, followed by labor-demand correlation, technology diffusion, and production linkages. Tables showing univariate results are suppressed from the paper due to space considerations but available upon request.

³⁵Standardized coefficients enable us to compare the changes in the outcomes associated with the metric-free changes in each covariate.

³⁶Excluding the capital-good market correlation variable, we found the technology diffusion and production linkage variables to remain positive and significant and the labor correlation coefficient to remain insignificant. This result suggests that the capital-good variable is capturing agglomeration incentives not represented by the other variables.

Comparing the estimates across distance thresholds, we find that at more aggregate geographic levels, the impact of technology diffusion diminishes and the effect of capital-good market externalities rises while the role of vertical production linkages remains mostly constant. The stronger effect of technology diffusion at shorter distance levels suggests that, compared to the other agglomeration economies, benefits from technology diffusion tend to be localized geographically. We also considered excluding the location fundamental variable and found that the coefficients and statistical significance of the agglomeration forces remain largely unchanged.

Estimation results based on the second, regional specification of location fundamentals are reported in Table 4. The estimated parameters of agglomeration economies remain largely similar to those in Table 3. The location fundamental variable, obtained from the regional-level specification, now exerts a significant effect on the agglomeration of multinational foreign subsidiaries at both 400 and 800 km. Comparing the relative importance of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies, we find that the effect of location fundamentals is outweighed by the cumulative effect of agglomeration forces. At 400 km, a one-standard-deviation increase in location fundamentals leads to a 0.025-standard-deviation increase in the level of agglomeration, while the cumulative effect of agglomeration forces is 0.076 standard deviations.³⁷

[Table 4 about here]

Thus far, we have examined MNC offshore agglomeration using the subsidiary as the unit of observation. We now take into account the different employment sizes of multinational subsidiaries, which essentially treats the worker as the unit of observation and measures the level of agglomeration among workers. This exercise, by differentiating the agglomeration incentives between individual establishments and workers, has implications for policy making targeted at influencing the geographic distribution of workers.

Tables 5 and 6 report the estimates based on the two specifications of location fundamentals. Note that in contrast to Tables 3 and 4, in which labor market correlation does not exert a significant effect, multinational subsidiaries in industries with greater potential labor market externality exhibit significantly more employment agglomeration. Technology diffusion, another force of agglomeration that involves close labor interaction and mobility, also plays a significant role in explaining the agglomeration of MNC subsidiary workers between industries. In fact, technology spillover appears to be the strongest agglomeration factor at most distance thresholds. Further, at more aggregate geographic levels, the effects of labor market externality and technology diffusion diminish, while capital-good market externality exerts a significant and positive effect.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

³⁷Comparing Tables 3 and 4, we also note that the normalized parameter of the location fundamental variable is significantly lower when the variable is constructed based on the regional estimation specification. One possible explanation is that measure 1, constructed based on country-level location characteristics and actual regional share of multinational activity, represents an upper bound of location fundamentals whereas measure 2, estimated based on observable country and regional characteristics, serves as a lower bound.

6.2 Comparing the Agglomeration of MNC Offshore and Domestic Plants

Having established the agglomeration patterns of MNC foreign subsidiaries, we now investigate how the role of agglomeration forces varies systematically between multinational and non-multinational plants. Specifically, we evaluate how the roles of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies affect MNCs relative to domestic plants by estimating the following equation:

$$agglomeration_{k\widetilde{k}}^{m}(T) - agglomeration_{k\widetilde{k}}^{d}(T)$$

$$= (\beta_{1}^{m} - \beta_{1}^{d})fundamentals_{k\widetilde{k}} + (\beta_{2}^{m} - \beta_{2}^{d})IOlinkage_{k\widetilde{k}} + (\beta_{3}^{m} - \beta_{3}^{d})labor_{k\widetilde{k}}$$

$$+ (\beta_{4}^{m} - \beta_{4}^{d})capitalgood_{k\widetilde{k}} + (\beta_{5}^{m} - \beta_{5}^{d})technology_{k\widetilde{k}} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

$$(8)$$

where $agglomeration_{k\tilde{k}}^m(T)-agglomeration_{k\tilde{k}}^d(T)$ represents the difference between the MNC and domestic pairwise-industry agglomeration indices, and the coefficient vector $\beta^m - \beta^d$ represents the difference in the effects of the covariates on multinational foreign subsidiaries and domestic plants.

The results based on the two measures of location fundamentals are reported in Tables 7 and 8. We find that proxies for capital-good market externality and technology diffusion exert a stronger effect on multinationals than on domestic plants in same industry pairs. The role of the input-output relationship is not significantly different between the two at disaggregated geographic levels, but is significantly stronger for multinationals at more aggregate geographic levels (such as 800 km). Interestingly, potential externality in the labor market, captured by industry-pair similarity in labor demand, exerts a greater effect on the agglomeration of domestic plants than on the agglomeration of multinational foreign subsidiaries. Location fundamental variables—including market size, comparative advantage, and infrastructure—also play a greater role in the agglomeration patterns of domestic plants.

These findings are consistent with the characteristics of multinational firms. Relative to their domestic counterparts, multinationals exhibit greater participation in capital- and technology-intensive activities. As a result, in industries with strong potential for capital-good market externality and technology diffusion, MNCs are more likely to realize these agglomeration economies when they agglomerate with other, productive and capital- and knowledge-intensive MNCs. In contrast, domestic plants—with lower capital- and technology-intensity—place a greater emphasis on fundamental location characteristics such as market size, production cost, and infrastructure and labor market considerations.

6.3 MNC Headquarters Agglomeration

We next examine the determinants of MNC headquarters clusters relative to MNC clusters overseas. To control for the role of location fundamentals in explaining the agglomeration of

MNC headquarters, we follow the procedure described in Section 5.1, but obtain the level of MNC activities predicted for each MNC home country and construct the expected distribution and agglomeration of MNC headquarters following the rest of the procedure.

Table 9 reports the estimation results. All variables except vertical production linkages exert a significant effect. A one-standard-deviation increase in the location fundamental variable is associated with a 0.21 standard-deviation increase in MNC headquarters agglomeration, which suggests an important role for the characteristics of headquarter countries including market size, skilled labor endowment, and access to host countries. At 200 km, both technology diffusion and labor market correlation play a positive and significant role, with a cumulative effect of about 0.06. Beyond 200 km, the effect of the labor market becomes insignificant. Again, this result is consistent with the localized feature of labor markets and with lower mobility of labor.

Comparing Table 9 with Table 3, we find that (i) location fundamentals and capital-good market externality exert a stronger effect on MNCs' offshore agglomeration than on the agglomeration of MNC headquarters and (ii) input-output relationships affect MNC subsidiaries but not headquarters. These results suggest that the agglomeration of MNC subsidiaries, with their market-seeking and input-sourcing focuses, is more influenced by market-access and comparative-advantage motives, capital-good market externalities, and vertical production linkages, whereas the agglomeration of headquarters, with their specialization in providing services such as R&D and management, is more influenced by technology diffusion.

6.4 Accounting for Trade Costs

In this subsection, we re-construct the agglomeration index based on two alternate measures of trade cost. First, we use an estimate of trade cost that accounts for other forms of trade barrier including border, tariffs, and language. The role of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies in explaining this index may be different because, for example, intermediate inputs and final goods can be more tradable than physical- and knowledge-capital.

We use a two-step procedure to estimate a comprehensive measure of trade costs for each pair of establishments. We first estimate a standard trade gravity equation given by

$$q_{ijt} = EX_{it} + IM_{jt} + \lambda Z_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \tag{9}$$

where the dependent variable q_{ijt} is the natural log of imports of country j from country i, EX_{it} denotes an exporter-year fixed effect, IM_{jt} represents an importer-year fixed effect, and $\lambda Z_{ijt} \equiv \lambda_1 \ln d_{ij} + \lambda_2 B_{ij} + \lambda_3 B_{ij} \times L_{ij} + \lambda_4 PTA_{ijt}$ with Z_{ijt} representing a vector of bilateral market access variables. In particular, Z_{ijt} includes $\ln d_{ij}$, the natural log of the distance between the capital cities of the importer and exporter countries, B_{ij} , a dummy variable that equals 1 if the trading countries share a border and 0 otherwise, L_{ij} , a dummy variable that equals 1 if

the two countries share a language, and PTA_{ijt} , an indicator of a preferential trade agreement between the two countries in year t. As in Head and Mayer (2004a), the equation allows the border effect to differ across importing countries depending on whether they speak the same language as the exporting country. The expectations are $\lambda_1 < 0$, $\lambda_2 > 0$, $\lambda_3 > 0$, and $\lambda_4 > 0$. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we estimate the gravity equation using Poisson quasi-MLE (QMLE).

A dataset that covers the trade flows amongst 80 countries is used in the estimation. We obtain the trade data from the COMTRADE database, and geographic information, including distance, border, and language, from the CEPII distance dataset. The PTA information is taken from the Tuck Trade Agreements Database and the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Dataset. Our estimates of the gravity equation are broadly consistent with the existing literature. All the bilateral market access variables exert an expected effect on trade volume.³⁸

In the second stage, we use the estimated parameters of bilateral access variables, i.e., λ_1 - λ_4 , to construct the generalized measure of trade cost. Specifically, we consider

$$\widehat{\tau}_{ij} = -\widehat{\lambda}_1 \ln d_{ij} - B_{ij}(\widehat{\lambda}_2 + \widehat{\lambda}_3 L_{ij}) - \widehat{\lambda}_4 PT A_{ijt}$$
(10)

and substitute the distance, contiguity, language, and PTA information for each pair of establishments into the equation to compute the fitted trade cost $\hat{\tau}_{ij}$. To account for home bias in intra-national trade costs, we subtract a positive constant from $\hat{\tau}_{ij}$ (in addition to assuming $B_{ii} = 1$, $L_{ii} = 1$, and $PTA_{iit} = 1$) for establishments located in the same country based on home bias estimates reported in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Because estimating the home bias for each country in our sample requires intra-national trade flow data for all the countries and is beyond the scope of this analysis, we used Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003) U.S. estimates.³⁹

Repeating the methodology described in Section 3.1, we construct a agglomeration index based on the generalized measure of trade costs (instead of distance). As shown in Table 10, we find that technology diffusion and capital-good market externality have a positive and significant effect while the effects of the labor- and production-linkages variables are insignificant. These results suggest that vertical production linkages do not play a significant role in explaining the agglomeration of MNC subsidiaries once you take into account the ease of trading intermediate inputs and final goods due to low tariffs, country contiguity, and low language barriers. For agglomeration forces to be meaningful, goods and factors must have little tradability (for example, physical capital) or, more generally, must face high trade and movement barriers.

Alternatively, we compute the agglomeration index based on distance by assuming country borders to have an infinite effect on trade cost. This essentially excludes all establishment pairs

 $^{^{38}}$ The estimation results are available upon request.

³⁹We also considered Anderson and van Wincoop's (2003) home bias estimate for Canada (which is considerably greater than that for the U.S.) and the results were qualitatively similar.

located in two different countries, regardless of their actual distance, and focuses exclusively on establishments located in the same country. As shown in Table A.1, this implies that 40 percent of establishment pairs that are located within 400 km will be dropped from the analysis. The index therefore, by design, exhibits significantly greater values than the index accounting for establishments worldwide. Regressing the index on the measures of location fundamentals and agglomeration forces, we find that sharing common location fundamentals and capital-good market correlations play particularly important roles in explaining the patterns of the index. The strong impact of location fundamentals is not surprising given that we expect multinational foreign subsidiaries to concentrate in the same countries when they share common location fundamentals. The significant effect of capital-good market variable is consistent with the hypothesis that capital goods have less tradability and mobility than general intermediate inputs.

7 Additional Econometric Analysis

7.1 Lower Distance Thresholds

In our analysis so far, we have constructed the agglomeration indices at thresholds of 200 km or more following previous work such as DO and EGK. In this subsection, we examine agglomeration patterns at more disaggregated levels and explore how the estimated effects of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies differ. Specifically, we consider three low-distance thresholds, namely, 20, 50 and 100 km. As expected, the values of the agglomeration indices diminish at lower distance thresholds. However, the patterns of agglomeration, including those presented in the stylized facts, remain largely similar.

In Table 11, we present the estimation results at the low distance thresholds. The normalized parameters suggest that the effects of input-output linkages, capital-good market externality, and technology diffusion are qualitatively similar to those reported earlier and quantitatively similar across 20, 50 and 100 km.

[Table 11 about here]

7.2 The Endogeneity of Agglomeration Economies

A potential concern with our analysis thus far is that the agglomeration economy measures might endogenously reflect the agglomeration patterns of multinational firms. For example, the input-output linkage between the apparel and cotton industries may reflect not just the inherent characteristics of apparel manufacturing, but also the agglomeration of the two industries due, for example, to the availability of raw materials leading apparel manufacturers to favor cotton over other types of fabrics. Similarly, the technology diffusion between the telecommunication and computer industries might be due not only to the intrinsic technological relationship between the two industries, but also to a historical factor that led the two industries to locate together and subsequently become familiar with each other's technologies.

This concern is mitigated in our paper by three factors. First, our analysis controls for the role of location fundamentals and industry-specific characteristics. This enables us to separate industries' geographic concentration due to location attractiveness from agglomeration activities driven by agglomeration economies. Second, our measures of agglomeration economies are constructed using U.S. industry account data while the paper examines global agglomeration patterns. U.S. industries' input-output linkages, factor market correlations, and technology diffusion are not very likely a result of agglomeration around the world. Third, the focus on MNCs reduces the possibility of reverse causation, as MNCs constitute a small subset of firms in each industry and the agglomeration economy measures are built with industry wide data that include information on domestic firms.

We nevertheless perform an additional exercise to further alleviate concerns about endogeneity. Because the global agglomeration patterns of multinational firms include the agglomeration of MNCs in the United States, we examine regional agglomeration which excludes the U.S. If U.S. domestic industry-pair relationships are affected by the agglomeration of MNCs in the United States, then one would expect the former to be less likely to be affected by the agglomeration of MNCs located in other regions such as Europe. In this case, the agglomeration economy measures constructed with U.S. industry account data are orthogonal to the agglomeration patterns observed in Europe. ⁴⁰

We proceed by repeating the procedure described in Section 3.1 to construct the agglomeration indices for MNCs located in Europe. These indices capture the degree to which MNCs in a given industry pair agglomerate in Europe at various threshold distances.

[Table 12 about here]

The results are reported in Table 12. We find the estimates to be qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 3.⁴¹ Multinational subsidiaries in industries with greater labor market correlation and technology diffusion are found to have a higher level of agglomeration, especially at the 200 and 400 km levels. Input-output production linkage and capital-good market correlation also exert a significant effect on the agglomeration of MNCs in Europe. Consistent with our earlier results, the effects of labor market externalities and technology diffusion diminish at more aggregate geographic levels. Further, labor market externality appears to be the strongest agglomeration force at disaggregated distance levels.

⁴⁰In examining the agglomeration of U.S. firms, EGK address the endogeneity of the U.S. agglomeration economy measures by instrumenting the variables with the U.K. counterpart measures. But using another country's data to instrument the agglomeration economy variables would not alleviate the potential for endogeneity in our analysis because that data would face issues similar to the issues facing the U.S. data. Using the U.S. agglomeration economy measures to predict the agglomeration patterns in a non-U.S. region would, however, mitigate the possibility of reverse causation and help identify the causal effects of agglomeration forces.

⁴¹Because we are now examining regional, rather than global, agglomeration, we consider only threshold distances up to 800 km.

7.3 The Process of MNC Agglomeration

To shed light on the formation of MNC clusters, in particular, the spatial interdependence between incumbents and entrants, we now turn from the geographic patterns to the process of multinational agglomeration. Doing so also helps us to address two econometric concerns in evaluating the determinants of agglomeration. The first is the different establishment dates of plants. Our estimates thus far take into account not only new plants' entry decisions but also incumbents' decisions to continue in their current locations. But the mix of old and new plants could create the potential for reverse causality between MNC location patterns and measures of economic fundamentals and agglomeration economies. Second, it is possible that our index of MNC agglomeration captures not only the agglomeration between MNCs, but also clustering between MNC and domestic plants.⁴² Although the low correlation between the indices of MNC agglomeration and domestic plant agglomeration reported in Section 4 suggests that this is not likely to be a significant issue, we take a further measure to address the concern.

We therefore explore in this subsection the dynamics of location decisions. Specifically, we distinguish new from incumbent plants and assess new MNC plants' propensity to agglomerate with incumbents. This enables us to identify the roles of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies in MNCs' entry decisions. Repeating the procedure described in Section 3, we construct an index of agglomeration between MNC entrants in 2004-2005 and MNC incumbents established before 2004. For each industry pair k and \tilde{k} , the index measures the propensity of new MNC subsidiaries in industry k to cluster with incumbent MNCs in industry \tilde{k} , and vice versa.

[Table 13 about here]

We compare the agglomeration index for MNC entrants against two benchmarks. First, as in Section 6, we adopt domestic plants as the benchmark and compare how MNCs agglomerate with incumbent MNCs relative to the clustering of domestic plants. Table 13 reports the estimates. The role of second-nature agglomeration forces remains robust in explaining the entry patterns of MNCs. Relative to domestic plants, multinational entrants display a stronger propensity to cluster with incumbent multinationals when technology diffusion benefits, capital-good market externality, and vertical production linkages are relatively stronger. Labor-market and location-fundamental variables, again, have a greater impact on the agglomeration of domestic plants.

⁴²A related concern here is that when multinational establishments come into existence as a result of cross-border acquisitions, their agglomeration patterns might simply reflect the agglomeration patterns of domestic establishments. We argue that MNCs' acquisition decisions, like their location choices in general, are dependent on location fundamentals and agglomeration economies. Moreover, the option to restructure (including to retain or shut down) acquired plants further enables MNCs to optimize their location decisions in response to location factors. The fact that we observe a low correlation between the agglomeration indices of MNCs and domestic plants suggests that MNCs' agglomeration patterns do not simply reflect the agglomeration patterns of domestic plants. But to provide further assurance that our analysis captures the agglomeration incentives of multinationals, we explore in this section the entry patterns of new greenfield FDI.

To address the possibility that the index of MNC agglomeration reflects clustering with domestic plants, we construct an alternative benchmark, an agglomeration index measures the propensity of new MNC subsidiaries to cluster with domestic plants. We find that for each industry pair, new MNC foreign subsidiaries exhibit a stronger tendency to agglomerate with incumbent MNC plants than with incumbent domestic plants. Moreover, the estimated effects of the location fundamentals and agglomeration economies remain largely similar.

7.4 Plant-level Agglomeration

In this subsection, we take the analysis to a more disaggregated level and examine micro-agglomeration patterns by exploring plant-level agglomeration indices. Specifically, we compute plant-level agglomeration densities to measure the degree to which a plant is proximate to other plants (in both the same and other industries) and examine how plant characteristics—such as ownership structure, size, age and the number of products—and industry characteristics—such as capital intensity, skilled-labor intensity, and R&D intensity—might jointly explain the extent of agglomeration centered around each plant.

[Table 14 about here]

Table 14 reports the estimation results based on plant-level agglomeration indices at 50 and 200 km. To control for the role of location fundamentals, a vector of region-industry dummies is included in the analysis. We find that the degree of agglomeration varies sharply across plants in the same country and industry. First, multinational foreign subsidiaries attract significantly more agglomeration than domestic plants in capital-, skilled-labor-, and R&D-intensive industries. This result, consistent with the industry-level agglomeration patterns documented in Section 4, suggests that multinational foreign subsidiaries enjoy greater agglomeration benefits than their domestic counterparts do when industrial activities are capital- and knowledge-intensive. Second, plant size also matters. At 50 km, we find that plants with larger revenue tend to attract significantly more agglomeration. This is similarly true for older plants. On the other hand, the number of products produced by each plant does not appear to have a significant effect on agglomeration.

8 Conclusion

The emergence of new multinational clusters is one of the most notable phenomena in the process of globalization. In this paper, we examine the global patterns and forces of MNC agglomeration—both offshore and at headquarters—relative to the patterns and forces of domestic-firm agglomeration. Our analysis, using a worldwide plant-level dataset and a novel index of

⁴³We also considered including a separate dummy variable to represent MNCs' domestic subsidiaries and found that the agglomeration patterns of MNC domestic subsidiaries is fairly similar to that of domestic plants in the MNC headquarters country when controlling for plant characteristics. The result is available upon request.

agglomeration, yields a number of new insights into the industrial landscape of multinational production.

First, offshore clusters of MNCs are not simply a reflection of domestic industrial clusters. Across different types of plants, multinational headquarters are, on average, most agglomerative, followed by domestic plants and multinational foreign subsidiaries. Further, the agglomeration indices of MNC foreign subsidiaries, MNC headquarters, and domestic plants exhibit only limited correlations, suggesting that multinationals follow distinctively different agglomeration patterns offshore than their domestic counterparts do. Multinational foreign subsidiaries are more agglomerative than domestic plants in capital-, skilled-labor-, and R&D-intensive industries. Second, exploring the determinants of the multinational agglomeration, we find that MP location fundamentals, although important, are not the only driving force. Multinationals' location choices are significantly affected by agglomeration economies including not only vertical production linkages but also technology diffusion and capital-market externality. Third, the importance of location fundamentals and agglomeration economies varies significantly between MNCs' offshore agglomeration and the agglomeration of MNC headquarters and domestic plants. For example, MNCs' offshore plants are significantly more influenced than non-MNC plants by capital-good market and technological agglomeration factors. Finally, multinational entrants display stronger propensities to cluster with incumbent multinationals than with incumbent local plants. Again, this is especially the case when the capital-good market externality and technology diffusion benefits are strong.

One potential extension of our analysis that is worthy of particular attention is to explore how patterns of MNC agglomeration vary across regions. For example, labor market externality can offer a stronger incentive for agglomeration in countries with more rigid and less mobile labor markets. Similarly, the varying quality of infrastructure across regions can affect the value of proximity for vertically linked industries. Firms are likely to have a stronger motive to cluster with suppliers and customers when they are in a country with poorer infrastructure. Further analysis of the role of regional characteristics in determining the clustering of MNCs could yield additional insights.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for MNC and Domestic Agglomeration Indices

| | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
|----------------------------------|---------|-----------------|------------------|-------|--------|
| | , | | | | |
| MNC Foreign Subsidiaries | (Perce | entage P | oints) | | |
| Threshold (T) = 200 km | 7938 | 0.099 | 0.239 | 0.000 | 3.060 |
| T = 400 km | 7938 | 0.219 | 0.522 | 0.000 | 6.631 |
| T=800 km | 7938 | 0.520 | 1.206 | 0.000 | 14.419 |
| T=1600 km | 7938 | 1.028 | 2.357 | 0.000 | 23.941 |
| Domestic Plants (Percenta | age Poi | $\mathrm{nts})$ | | | |
| Threshold (T) = 200 km | 7938 | 0.102 | 0.289 | 0.000 | 4.012 |
| T = 400 km | 7938 | 0.235 | 0.545 | 0.000 | 7.935 |
| T=800 km | 7938 | 0.550 | 1.384 | 0.000 | 16.539 |
| T=1600 km | 7938 | 1.210 | 2.424 | 0.000 | 26.340 |
| MNC Foreign Subsidiary | Worker | s (Perce | ntage Points |) | |
| Threshold $(T) = 200 \text{ km}$ | 7938 | 0.095 | 0.274 | 0.000 | 2.997 |
| T = 400 km | 7938 | 0.194 | 0 · - · - | 0.000 | 5.553 |
| T = 800 km | 7938 | 0.418 | 1.038 | 0.000 | 10.139 |
| T = 1600 km | 7938 | 0.742 | 1.853 | 0.000 | 17.211 |
| | | | | | |
| MNC Headquarters (Perce | entage | Points) | | | |
| Threshold (T) = 200 km | 7938 | 0.140 | 0.348 | 0.000 | 8.400 |
| T = 400 km | 7938 | 0.325 | 0.779 | 0.000 | 18.198 |
| T=800 km | 7938 | 0.782 | 1.772 | 0.000 | 39.871 |
| T=1600 km | 7938 | 1.402 | 2.987 | 0.000 | 44.693 |

Notes: The agglomeration indices are constructed by comparing the estimated distance kernel function of each industry pair with the 95 percent global confidence band of counterfactual kernel estimators at 200 km, 400 km, 800 km, and 1600 km. All industry pairs (SIC3) are included. See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.

Table 2: Correlations of MNC and Domestic Agglomeration Indices

| MNC Foreign Subsidiaries v.s. Domestic Plants | | | | | | | | |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | T=200km (Subs.) | T=400km (Subs.) | T=800km (Subs.) | T=1600km (Subs.) | T=200km (Dom.) | T=400km (Dom.) | T=800km (Dom.) | T=1600km (Dom.) |
| T=200km (Subs.) | 1.00 | | | | | | | |
| T=400 km (Subs.) | 0.99 | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| T=800 km (Subs.) | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| T=1600 km (Subs.) | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 1.00 | | | | |
| T=200 km (Dom.) | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 1.00 | | | |
| T=400 km (Dom.) | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.17 | 0.99 | 1.00 | | |
| T=800km (Dom.) | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.85 | 0.92 | 1.00 | |
| T=1600km (Dom.) | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.65 | 0.74 | 0.92 | 1.00 |

MNC Foreign Subsidiaries v.s. MNC Foreign Subsidiary Workers

| | T=200 km (Subs.) | T=400km (Subs.) | T=800km (Subs.) | T=1600km (Subs.) | T=200km (Emp.) | T=400km (Emp.) | T=800km (Emp.) | T=1600 km (Emp.) |
|--------------------|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| T=200km (Subs.) | 1.00 | | | | | | | |
| T=400 km (Subs.) | 0.99 | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| T=800 km (Subs.) | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| T=1600 km (Subs.) | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 1.00 | | | | |
| T=200 km (Emp.) | 0.42 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 1.00 | | | |
| T=400 km (Emp.) | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.98 | 1.00 | | |
| T=800 km (Emp.) | 0.60 | 0.59 | 0.58 | 0.57 | 0.89 | 0.95 | 1.00 | |
| T=1600 km (Emp.) | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.63 | 0.66 | 0.77 | 0.85 | 0.96 | 1.00 |

MNC Foreign Subsidiaries v.s. MNC Headquarters

| | T=200 km (Subs.) | T=400km (Subs.) | T=800 km (Subs.) | T=1600 km (Subs.) | T=200 km (HQ) | T=400 km (HQ) | T=800km (HQ) | T=1600 km (HQ) |
|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|----------------|
| T=200km (Subs.) | 1.00 | | | | | | | |
| T=400 km (Subs.) | 0.99 | 1.00 | | | | | | |
| T=800 km (Subs.) | 0.96 | 0.99 | 1.00 | | | | | |
| T=1600 km (Subs.) | 0.88 | 0.92 | 0.96 | 1.00 | | | | |
| T=200 km (HQ) | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 1.00 | | | |
| T=400 km (HQ) | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.99 | 1.00 | | |
| T=800 km (HQ) | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 1.00 | |
| T=1600 km (HQ) | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.59 | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.96 | 1.00 |

Notes: Obs=7,938. All industry pairs (SIC3) are included.

Table 3: Location Fundamentals, Agglomeration Economies, and MNC Offshore Agglomeration I

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T=1600 km |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| TO T : 1 | 0.0054 | 0 = 04 | 1 001 44 | 2 50244 |
| IO Linkages | 0.265* | 0.573* | 1.331** | 2.596** |
| | (0.147) | (0.306) | (0.656) | (1.296) |
| Capital Good | 0.038*** | 0.093*** | 0.241*** | 0.506*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.032) | (0.066) | (0.139) |
| Labor | -0.002 | -0.015 | -0.079 | -0.231 |
| | (0.016) | (0.035) | (0.068) | (0.160) |
| Technology | 0.609** | 1.178** | 2.521** | 4.395** |
| | (0.293) | (0.546) | (1.117) | (2.371) |
| Location Fundamentals | 0.018 | 0.019 | 0.020 | 0.021* |
| | (0.025) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.012) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.571 | 0.600 | 0.627 | 0.631 |
| | | Beta Co | efficients | |
| IO Linkages | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.013 |
| Capital Good | 0.035 | 0.039 | 0.043 | 0.046 |
| Labor | -0.002 | -0.007 | -0.015 | -0.023 |
| Technology | 0.031 | 0.027 | 0.025 | 0.022 |
| Location Fundamentals | 0.266 | 0.264 | 0.279 | 0.333 |

Table 4: Location Fundamentals, Agglomeration Economies, and MNC Offshore Agglomeration II

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T=1600 km |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|------------|
| | | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.249** | 0.541* | 1.252*** | 2.413*** |
| | (0.112) | (0.302) | (0.222) | (0.576) |
| Capital Good | 0.037** | 0.092*** | 0.237*** | 0.499*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.092) | (0.153) |
| Labor | 0.001 | -0.001 | -0.045 | 0.153 |
| | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.165) | (0.135) |
| Technology | 0.573*** | 1.101*** | 2.330*** | 3.943* |
| | (0.161) | (0.458) | (0.343) | (2.560) |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | 0.006 | 0.004*** | 0.002* | 0.001 |
| , | (0.007) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.003) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.570 | 0.600 | 0.626 | 0.630 |
| | | Beta Co | oefficients | |
| IO Linkages | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.012 |
| Capital Good | 0.034 | 0.038 | 0.042 | 0.045 |
| Labor | 0.004 | -0.001 | -0.009 | -0.015 |
| Technology | 0.029 | 0.025 | 0.023 | 0.019 |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | 0.038 | 0.025 | 0.013 | 0.006 |

Table 5: Location Fundamentals, Agglomeration Economies, and MNC Offshore Worker Agglomeration I

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T = 1600 km |
|-----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | 1 — 200 KIII | 1 — 400 KIII | 1 — 000 KIII | 1 — 1000 KIII |
| IO Linkages | -0.145 | -0.256 | -0.272 | -0.750 |
| | (0.209) | (0.403) | (0.683) | (1.160) |
| Capital Good | 0.041* | 0.109** | 0.315*** | 0.557*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.044) | (0.089) | (0.144) |
| Labor | 0.048* | 0.088* | 0.120 | 0.128 |
| | (0.026) | (0.048) | (0.104) | (0.162) |
| Technology | 2.262*** | 3.957*** | 6.243*** | 9.333*** |
| | (0.516) | (0.867) | (1.613) | (2.356) |
| Location Fundamentals | 0.0004*** | 0.0004*** | 0.0004*** | 0.0004** |
| | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0002) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.327 | 0.327 | 0.363 | 0.402 |
| | | Beta Co | efficients | |
| IO Linkages | -0.007 | -0.006 | -0.003 | -0.005 |
| Capital Good | 0.033 | 0.045 | 0.066 | 0.065 |
| Labor | 0.042 | 0.039 | 0.027 | 0.016 |
| Technology | 0.100 | 0.091 | 0.073 | 0.061 |
| Location Fundamentals | 0.315 | 0.349 | 0.390 | 0.435 |

Table 6: Location Fundamentals, Agglomeration Economies, and MNC Offshore Worker Agglomeration II

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T=1600 km |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| | | | | |
| IO Linkages | -0.151 | -0.269 | -0.299 | -0.801 |
| | (0.120) | (0.212) | (0.482) | (0.835) |
| Capital Good | 0.040*** | 0.106*** | 0.308*** | 0.544*** |
| | (0.014) | (0.018) | (0.087) | (0.176) |
| Labor | 0.057*** | 0.107** | 0.162* | 0.212 |
| | (0.022) | (0.049) | (0.077) | (0.050) |
| Technology | 2.228*** | 3.885*** | 6.083*** | 9.013*** |
| | (0.508) | (0.326) | (1.390) | (2.815) |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | 0.002 | 0.004** | 0.007* | 0.009* |
| , | (0.010) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.001) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.326 | 0.326 | 0.363 | 0.402 |
| | | Beta Co | efficients | |
| IO Linkages | -0.007 | -0.006 | -0.003 | -0.005 |
| Capital Good | 0.032 | 0.044 | 0.064 | 0.065 |
| Labor | 0.049 | 0.047 | 0.036 | 0.026 |
| Technology | 0.100 | 0.089 | 0.071 | 0.058 |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | 0.011 | 0.027 | 0.054 | 0.086 |

Table 7: Comparing MNC Foreign Subsidiaries with Domestic Plants I

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T=1600 km |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|------------|
| | | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.041 | 1.081 | 5.447** | 10.876** |
| | (0.599) | (1.306) | (2.760) | (4.437) |
| Capital Good | 0.162*** | 0.494*** | 1.335*** | 2.383*** |
| - | (0.051) | (0.113) | (0.220) | (0.366) |
| Labor | -0.110** | -0.443*** | -1.430*** | -2.130*** |
| | (0.049) | (0.112) | (0.231) | (0.410) |
| Technology | -1.214 | 2.823* | 24.272*** | 62.572*** |
| | (0.839) | (1.706) | (3.409) | (6.220) |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.047*** | -0.047*** | -0.044*** | -0.035*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.049 | 0.053 | 0.064 | 0.073 |
| | | Beta Co | pefficients | |
| IO Linkages | 0.001 | 0.008 | 0.020 | 0.023 |
| Capital Good | 0.047 | 0.067 | 0.085 | 0.086 |
| Labor | -0.034 | -0.065 | -0.099 | -0.084 |
| Technology | -0.020 | 0.021 | 0.086 | 0.126 |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.213 | -0.217 | -0.219 | -0.228 |

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normalized beta coefficients in lower panel. See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.

Table 8: Comparing MNC Foreign Subsidiaries with Domestic Plants II

| | T 2001 | T 100 1 | T | T |
|----------------------------------|---------------|-----------|------------|--------------|
| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T = 1600 km |
| | | | | |
| IO Linkages | -0.023 | 0.916 | 5.014** | 10.094** |
| | (0.603) | (1.285) | (2.515) | (4.406) |
| Capital Good | 0.183*** | 0.536*** | 1.421*** | 2.533*** |
| | (0.048) | (0.118) | (0.217) | (0.375) |
| Labor | -0.264*** | -0.774*** | -2.136*** | -3.419*** |
| | (0.045) | (0.102) | (0.225) | (0.406) |
| Technology | 0.943 | 1.252** | 20.632*** | 55.824*** |
| | (0.880) | (0.602) | (3.346) | (6.314) |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | -0.011*** | -0.010*** | -0.025*** | -0.454*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.012 | 0.016 | 0.028 | 0.034 |
| | | Beta Co | efficients | |
| IO Linkages | -0.0004 | 0.007 | 0.018 | 0.021 |
| Capital Good | 0.053 | 0.072 | 0.090 | 0.091 |
| Labor | -0.083 | -0.114 | -0.148 | -0.134 |
| Technology | 0.007 | 0.009 | 0.073 | 0.112 |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | -0.079 | -0.089 | -0.101 | -0.103 |

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normalized beta coefficients in lower panel. See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.

Table 9: Location Fundamentals, Agglomeration Economies, and MNC Headquarters Agglomeration

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T = 1600 km |
|-----------------------|-----------|-----------|------------|--------------|
| | | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.090 | 0.156 | 0.127 | 0.457 |
| | (0.174) | (0.406) | (0.815) | (1.254) |
| Capital Good | 0.026 | 0.084** | 0.261*** | 0.459*** |
| | (0.019) | (0.040) | (0.088) | (0.164) |
| Labor | 0.043** | 0.064 | 0.019 | -0.085 |
| | (0.021) | (0.044) | (0.104) | (0.180) |
| Technology | 0.793*** | 1.727*** | 3.870*** | 6.935*** |
| | (0.241) | (0.477) | (1.153) | (1.735) |
| Location Fundamentals | 0.022** | 0.023*** | 0.024* | 0.019 |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.013) | (0.018) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.639 | 0.65 | 0.664 | 0.667 |
| | | Beta Co | efficients | |
| IO Linkages | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Capital Good | 0.017 | 0.024 | 0.032 | 0.033 |
| Labor | 0.030 | 0.020 | 0.003 | -0.007 |
| Technology | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.028 |
| Location Fundamentals | 0.212 | 0.212 | 0.208 | 0.213 |

Table 10: Multinational Offshore Agglomeration Index with Estimated Trade Cost

| | T=200 km | T = 400 km | T 900 l | T 1600 l |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| | 1 = 200 km | 1 = 400 km | T=800 km | T=1600 km |
| | 0.00- | 0.000 | 0.010 | 0.4.40 |
| IO Linkages | -0.387 | -0.333 | -0.213 | -0.142 |
| | (0.431) | (0.444) | (0.753) | (0.657) |
| Capital Good | 0.101* | 0.123* | 0.133 | 0.144* |
| | (0.060) | (0.069) | (0.083) | (0.085) |
| Labor | -0.016 | -0.016 | -0.003 | -0.006 |
| | (0.126) | (0.113) | (0.114) | (0.105) |
| Technology | 6.932** | 6.943** | 7.998** | 8.145*** |
| | (3.321) | (2.917) | (3.154) | (2.702) |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.004 | -0.003 | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| | (0.037) | (0.013) | (0.006) | (0.003) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.336 | 0.342 | 0.418 | 0.413 |
| | | Beta Co | oefficients | |
| IO Linkages | -0.006 | -0.0051 | -0.003 | -0.002 |
| Capital Good | 0.028 | 0.033 | 0.030 | 0.031 |
| Labor | -0.005 | -0.005 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| Technology | 0.108 | 0.105 | 0.099 | 0.097 |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.017 | -0.027 | 0.045 | 0.081 |

Table 11: MNC Offshore Agglomeration at Lower Distance Thresholds

| | T=20 km | T=50 km | T=100 km |
|----------------------------------|----------|----------------|-----------|
| | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.030* | 0.061*** | 0.113*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.002) | (0.010) |
| Capital Good | 0.006*** | 0.012*** | 0.020*** |
| - | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.006) |
| Labor | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.006 |
| | (0.004) | (0.011) | (0.009) |
| Technology | 0.076*** | 0.153*** | 0.284*** |
| | (0.025) | (0.035) | (0.091) |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| , | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.001) |
| Obs. | 7875 | 7875 | 7875 |
| R^2 | 0.560 | 0.560 | 0.560 |
| | В | seta Coefficie | nts |
| IO Linkages | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.013 |
| Capital Good | 0.030 | 0.030 | 0.030 |
| Labor | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.006 |
| Technology | 0.033 | 0.032 | 0.031 |
| Location Fundamentals (Regional) | 0.010 | 0.015 | 0.026 |

Table 12: The Endogeneity of Agglomeration Economy Measures – the Agglomeration Patterns of MNCs in Europe

| | T=200 kms | T=400 kms | T=800 kms |
|-----------------------|------------|------------------|------------|
| | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.104 | 0.248* | 0.454** |
| | (0.079) | (0.157) | (0.209) |
| Capital Good | 0.008 | 0.031* | 0.044* |
| | (0.010) | (0.019) | (0.026) |
| Labor | 0.031*** | 0.032* | 0.036 |
| | (0.008) | (0.018) | (0.030) |
| Technology | 0.335** | 0.514** | 0.715** |
| | (0.151) | (0.262) | (0.393) |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.001 | -0.004 | -0.003 |
| | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Obs. | 7166 | 7166 | 7166 |
| R^2 | 0.635 | 0.717 | 0.853 |
| | F | Beta Coefficient | S |
| IO Linkages | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.008 |
| Capital Good | 0.014 | 0.021 | 0.014 |
| Labor | 0.055 | 0.023 | 0.012 |
| Technology | 0.030 | 0.019 | 0.013 |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.158 | -0.087 | -0.076 |

Table 13: The Process of Agglomeration – MNC Subsidiaries versus Domestic Plants

| | T=200 km | T=400 km | T=800 km | T=1600 km | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|------------|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.818 | 2.424* | 8.000*** | 16.045*** | | | |
| | (0.714) | (1.460) | (2.770) | (4.915) | | | |
| Capital Good | 0.094* | 0.289*** | 0.789*** | 1.690*** | | | |
| | (0.056) | (0.096) | (0.228) | (0.397) | | | |
| Labor | -0.183*** | -0.571*** | -1.692*** | -2.797*** | | | |
| | (0.045) | (0.097) | (0.213) | (0.417) | | | |
| Technology | 0.878 | 6.603*** | 33.455*** | 84.362*** | | | |
| | (0.781) | (1.655) | (3.244) | (6.295) | | | |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.040*** | -0.038*** | -0.033*** | -0.027*** | | | |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.002) | | | |
| Obs. | 6966 | 6966 | 6966 | 6966 | | | |
| R^2 | 0.04 | 0.043 | 0.054 | 0.068 | | | |
| | | Beta Coefficients | | | | | |
| IO Linkages | 0.015 | 0.021 | 0.032 | 0.036 | | | |
| Capital Good | 0.028 | 0.041 | 0.053 | 0.063 | | | |
| Labor | -0.060 | -0.088 | -0.122 | -0.112 | | | |
| Technology | 0.015 | 0.055 | 0.130 | 0.181 | | | |
| Location Fundamentals | -0.186 | -0.182 | -0.170 | -0.177 | | | |

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Normalized beta coefficients in lower panel. See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.

Table 14: Plant-level Agglomeration–MNC and Domestic Plants

| | T=50 km | T=50 km | T=200 km | T=200 km |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| MNC Dummy | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.006*** | -0.006*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| x IO Linkages | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.014* | 0.014* |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| x Capital Intensity | 0.005*** | 0.005*** | 0.019*** | 0.018*** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.007) | (0.007) |
| x Skilled-Labor Intensity | 0.002*** | 0.002*** | 0.008*** | 0.008*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| x RD Intensity | 0.0003* | 0.0003* | 0.001* | 0.001* |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Revenue | , , | 0.001*** | , | 0.001 |
| | | (0.000) | | (0.001) |
| Age | | 0.00004** | | 0.0002** |
| | | (0.000) | | (0.000) |
| Product Count | | 0.000 | | 0.000 |
| | | (0.000) | | (0.000) |
| State-Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Obs. | 122,426 | 122,324 | 122,426 | 122,324 |
| R^2 | 0.997 | 0.997 | 0.997 | 0.997 |

Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include region-industry fixed effect. See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.

Table A.1: Distribution of Cross-country Establishment Pairs by Distance

| | All pairs | | Pairs locat | Pairs located in two different countries | | |
|-----------------|-------------|---|-------------|--|-------|--|
| | Pairs (mil) | Pairs (mil) Ave. dist (km) Pairs (mil) Percentage A | | Ave. dist (km) | | |
| $dist \leq 200$ | 28.3 | 91.6 | 5.6 | 0.2 | 131.4 | |
| $dist \le 400$ | 54.8 | 194.1 | 24.5 | 0.4 | 268.7 | |
| $dist \le 800$ | 124.2 | 423.0 | 85.6 | 0.7 | 510.9 | |
| $dist \le 1600$ | 257.1 | 806.6 | 198.7 | 0.8 | 885.8 | |

Notes: Authors' calculations.

Table A.2: Within- and Between-Industry Agglomeration Indices

| | Withir | Within-Industry | | n-Industry |
|--|--------|-----------------|------|------------|
| | Obs. | Mean | Obs. | Mean |
| Subsidiaries (Percentage Points) | | | | |
| Threshold (T) = 200 km | 126 | 0.328 | 7875 | 0.095 |
| T = 400 km | 126 | 0.672 | 7875 | 0.213 |
| T=800 km | 126 | 1.389 | 7875 | 0.506 |
| T=1600 km | 126 | 2.433 | 7875 | 1.006 |
| Domestic Plants (Percentage Points) | | | | |
| Threshold $(T) = 200 \text{ km}$ | 126 | 0.330 | 7875 | 0.096 |
| T = 400 km | 126 | 0.680 | 7875 | 0.224 |
| T=800 km | 126 | 1.421 | 7875 | 0.531 |
| T=1600 km | 126 | 2.503 | 7875 | 1.180 |
| Subsidiaries Workers (Percentage Points) | | | | |
| Threshold $(T) = 200 \text{ km}$ | 126 | 0.369 | 7875 | 0.090 |
| T = 400 km | 126 | 0.737 | 7875 | 0.186 |
| T=800 km | 126 | 1.448 | 7875 | 0.402 |
| T=1600 km | 126 | 2.338 | 7875 | 0.717 |
| Headquarters (Percentage Points) | | | | |
| Threshold $(T) = 200 \text{ km}$ | 126 | 0.446 | 7875 | 0.135 |
| T = 400 km | 126 | 0.951 | 7875 | 0.315 |
| T=800 km | 126 | 2.027 | 7875 | 0.761 |
| T=1600 km | 126 | 3.156 | 7875 | 1.373 |

Table A.3: Top Industry Pairs by MNC Subsidiary Agglomeration Index

| | MNC Subsidiary Agglomeration Index | | | | | | | |
|------|--|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | T = 200 km | | | | | | | |
| 274 | Miscellaneous Publishing | 379 | Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment | | | | | |
| 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 367 | Electronic Components And Accessories | 225 | Knitting Mills | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | | | | | |
| | T | = 400 | km | | | | | |
| 274 | Miscellaneous Publishing | 379 | Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment | | | | | |
| 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 274 | Miscellaneous Publishing | 213 | Chewing And Smoking Tobacco And Snuff | | | | | |
| 263 | Paperboard Mills | 213 | Chewing And Smoking Tobacco And Snuff | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | MNC Subsidiary Worker Agglomeration Index $T = 200 \text{ km}$ | | | | | | | |
| 20.4 | | | | | | | | |
| 394 | Dolls, Toys, Games And Sporting | 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | | | | | |
| 394 | Dolls, Toys, Games And Sporting | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | | | | | |
| 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 394 | Dolls, Toys, Games And Sporting And Athletic | | | | | |
| | | = 400 | | | | | | |
| 394 | Dolls, Toys, Games And Sporting | 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | | | | | |
| 394 | Dolls, Toys, Games And Sporting | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | | | | | |
| 314 | Footwear, Except Rubber | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |
| 225 | Knitting Mills | 313 | Boot And Shoe Cut Stock And Findings | | | | | |

Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics for Agglomeration Economies

| | # Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
|----------------------------|--------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|
| | | | | | |
| Input-Output (IO) Linkages | 7875 | 0.003 | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.193 |
| Capital Good | 7875 | 0.476 | 0.209 | 0.004 | 1.000 |
| Labor | 7875 | 0.333 | 0.227 | 0.014 | 1.000 |
| Technology | 7875 | 0.007 | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.179 |

Notes: See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.

Table A.5: Correlations of Agglomeration Economies

| | IO Linkages | IO Linkages | Capital Good | Labor | Technology | Technology |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|-------|------------|------------|
| | | $(\max.)$ | | | | $(\max.)$ |
| IO Linkages | 1.000 | | | | | |
| IO Linkages (max.) | 0.973 | 1.000 | | | | |
| Capital Good | 0.191 | 0.189 | 1.000 | | | |
| Labor | 0.232 | 0.225 | 0.567 | 1.000 | | |
| Technology | 0.291 | 0.284 | 0.230 | 0.331 | 1.000 | |
| Technology (max.) | 0.264 | 0.257 | 0.188 | 0.297 | 0.976 | 1.000 |

Notes: Both average and maximum measures are obtained for IO linkages and technology diffusion. See text for detailed descriptions of the variables.