Psychological Influence in Negotiation: An Introduction Long Overdue

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Abstract

This paper discusses the causes and consequences of the (surprisingly) limited extent to which social influence research has penetrated the field of negotiation, and then presents a framework for bridging the gap between these two literatures. The paper notes that one of the reasons for its limited impact on negotiation research is that extant research on social influence focuses almost exclusively on economic or structural levers of influence. With this in mind, the paper seeks to achieve five objectives: (1) Define the domain of psychological influence as consisting of those tactics which do not require the influencer to change the economic or structural aspects of the bargaining situation in order to persuade the target; (2) Review prior research on behavioral decision making to identify ideas that may be relevant to the domain of psychological influence; (3) Provide a series of examples of how behavioral decision research can be leveraged to create psychological influence tactics for use in negotiation; (4) Consider the other side of influence, i.e., how targets of influence might defend against the tactics herein considered; and (5) Consider some of the ethical issues surrounding the use of psychological influence in negotiation.

Keywords: Negotiation, Influence, Social Influence, Psychological Influence, Persuasion, Attitude Change, Information Processing, Communication
PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE IN NEGOTIATION:
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If you mention that you are a negotiation researcher to a real world negotiator, her first impression is that you are in the business of teaching people how to influence others. Indeed, real world negotiators often see negotiation as synonymous with influence. And, while social scientists know a great deal about how to influence the decisions of others (Cialdini, 1993), contemporary negotiation scholars and teachers have largely ignored the influence literature. We believe that an overview of these two research literatures (negotiation and social influence) might help bring clarity regarding the nature of this disjunction. We also believe that this disjunction is a barrier to creating the most effective and useful negotiations literature. This paper attempts to prompt a better dialogue between influence and negotiation research.

Many scholars would date rigorous research in the field of negotiation back to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) classic work on games and economic behavior. A central tenet of this work, and of most game theoretic perspectives on negotiation, was that negotiators knew their preferences and would choose the course of action that maximized their expected utility (Nash, 1950). One of the limitations of the early game theoretic work was that it was overly normative in its objectives and assumed an unrealistic degree of negotiator rationality. In response, Raiffa (1982) introduced a different paradigm for negotiation research, one that has shaped much of the research that has been conducted since. Raiffa (1982) emphasized the need to move from normative claims towards prescriptive advice; prescriptions based on accurate assumptions regarding negotiator capabilities and interests. In the 25 years since the publication of Raiffa’s (1982) classic work, a vast literature has developed on the psychology of negotiation.
This research describes what the focal negotiator should anticipate in the behavior of the other side and also identifies cognitive barriers to rationality that need to be overcome in one’s own approach (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Thompson, 2005). Despite the many positive aspects of this research, its roots in earlier economic frameworks resulted in the creation of a literature in which the preferences of negotiators was assumed to be fixed – making psychological influence an irrelevant topic of study.

On a parallel track, another field of social science inquiry was born and matured – the study of influence. Research on social influence considered the forces that allow one individual to cause attitudinal and behavioral change in another individual (Deutsch & Gerard, 1958; Kelman, 1958). Deutsch & Gerard (1958) argued that there were two basic types of influence: one seeks to change what the target believes (informational influence), and the other seeks to leverage the target's desire for a particular type of relationship with the influencer (normative influence). Kelman (1958) suggested that there were three primary tactics of influence: sanctions, personal charm, and credibility. In the years that followed, classifications of influence tactics proliferated, with researchers in the fields of marketing, sales, organizational behavior, and social psychology all weighing in. Mowday (1978) proposed five influence tactics; Schilit and Locke (1982) proposed 18 different tactics. One of the more popular typologies of influence was proposed by Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980; Kipins & Schmidt, 1988). They introduced seven meaningfully distinct influence tactics: reason, coalition, ingratiation, exchange, assertiveness, higher authority, and sanctions. Because this typology is sufficiently comprehensive and representative of the various frameworks proposed across different disciplines, we will refer to its elements in our discussion below.
Meanwhile, even as many negotiation theorists have called for research into the “black box” of the negotiation process (e.g., Kochan, 1980; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990; Thompson, 2005) the vast majority of writing on negotiation has ignored the element of interpersonal influence. Since negotiators spend a great deal of time trying to persuade each other to agree to their desired outcome, this seems a glaring omission. As we noted earlier, this partly results from negotiation researchers treating the preferences of negotiators as fixed. But, in addition, research on social influence has ignored (to a large extent) exactly those elements of influence that would be most relevant to negotiation. More specifically, we suggest that extant literature on social influence has focused too much on economic or structural elements of influence and ignored psychological elements of influence (Cialdini’s work on influence represents a very important exception that we will consider in greater detail below). Thus, if influence research is to maximize its relevance to negotiation research, we must first define the domain of psychological influence.

The objectives of this article are five-fold: First, we define the domain of psychological influence. That is, we identify those elements of influence that do not require the influencer to change the economic or structural aspects of the bargaining situation in order to persuade the target. Second, we review prior research on behavioral decision making in negotiation to identify those ideas that may be relevant to influence in negotiation. Third, in the core of the paper, we provide a framework for thinking about how to leverage behavioral decision research to wield influence in negotiation. Fourth, we consider the other side of influence: how targets of influence might defend against the tactics herein considered. Fifth, because psychological influence is, by definition, aimed at achieving one’s own ends through the strategic manipulation of another’s judgment, we consider the ethical issues surrounding its application in negotiation.
I. MAPPING THE DOMAIN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

The disciplinary training in psychology of the researchers themselves notwithstanding, extant research on social influence has largely focused on economic and structural elements. Specifically, most of the identified influence tactics operate on the basis of one of two underlying mechanisms: 1) altering the target’s incentives, and/or 2) altering the target’s information set. Consider, for example, the seven tactics of influence identified by Kipnis et al. (1980).

*Exchange* and *sanctions* lead to compliance because the target is provided an incentive to change her behavior. For example, the target may be given something in return for compliance (exchange) or be threatened with punishment for non-compliance (sanctions). *Reason* and *assertiveness* lead to compliance because the target’s information set is changed. For example, the target may be given additional information to bolster the influencer’s argument (reason) or be forced to consider more carefully the arguments already made (assertiveness). The other three tactics (coalition, ingratiation, and higher authority) entail a hybrid approach in which both incentives and information may be altered. When the influencer builds a *coalition*, the target’s alternative to compliance may be worsened (incentive); at the same time, the existence of a coalition may suggest that the influencer’s argument has merit (information). If *ingratiation* increases the degree to which the target likes the influencer, this creates additional incentives to comply; ingratiation may also affect information by suggesting that the influencer has the target’s best interest in mind. Finally, appeals to a *higher authority* can change both the incentive to comply (“do this or else”) and also the perceived reasonableness of the demand (“the boss says this is a good idea”).

These tactics are clearly relevant to negotiation. For example, negotiators will often aim to build strong coalitions in order to weaken the other party’s alternatives (Lax & Sebenius,
1991; 2006), to engage in exchange in order to create value (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), and to use reason to justify their offers (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003). These tactics, however, require that the negotiator has the ability to change the game by changing the structure of the game or the incentives of the opponent. This possibility sometimes exists, but is not the modal state. Like the behavioral decision research perspective to negotiation, we take the game’s structure as fixed, and explore how the decisions of the target actor can be influenced through the use of contemporary psychological insights.

If we are to categorize extant research on social influence as focused on economic influence, then we must also define, in contrast, what we mean by psychological influence. Here, we define psychological influence as the effort to positively influence another party’s attitude towards a given idea or proposition without changing the incentives or objective information set of the other party. As we shall elaborate further below, psychological influence so defined typically entails leveraging an understanding of psychological biases and heuristics in order to frame ideas and proposals in such a way that increases their appeal to the target.i In the following section, we will provide a selective review of the literature on behavioral decision research in negotiation to identify the role that understanding biases and heuristics can play in developing a more powerful framework of the use of influence in negotiation.

II. LEVERAGING BEHAVIORAL DECISION RESEARCH

The role of psychological influence in negotiations that we envision in this paper parallels the role that behavioral decision making has played in the field of negotiation (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Thompson, 2005; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). As mentioned above, the behavioral decision perspective on negotiation broadly took the economic and
structural characteristics of the negotiation as fixed and examined how to use an understanding of human decision processes to anticipate the decision of the other party (Bazerman, 1983).

Behavioral decision research has its roots in the bounded rationality perspective of Simon (1947; March & Simon, 1958). This perspective posits that individuals attempt to act rationally but are bounded in their ability to achieve the high standards of rationality (Simon, 1957); instead, they make decisions that are inconsistent, inefficient, and based on normatively irrelevant information. Behavioral decision research made great strides starting in the 1970s as researchers started to delineate the systematic ways in which decision makers deviated from rational behavior (Dawes, 1998; Kahneman & Tverksy, 1974; Kahneman & Tverksy, 1979).

The problem, according to behavioral decision research, is that people rely on simplifying strategies, or cognitive heuristics (Bazerman & Moore, 2008). These heuristics are typically useful short cuts, but lead to predictable mistakes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). It is their systematic and predictable nature that makes these biases intriguing and important to study. Applied to negotiation, we have learned, for example, that negotiators tend to:

1. be more concessionary when a negotiation is framed positively than when it is framed negatively (Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale, 1985; De Dreu & McCusker 1997);
2. escalate commitment to a prior course of action, even when a rational analysis would dictate quitting (Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Bazerman & Neale 1983; Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman., 1999; Diekmann, Tenbrunsel, Shah, Schroth, & Bazerman., 1996);
3. be overconfident about the likelihood of attaining favorable outcomes (Bazerman et al., 2000; Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke 1993);
be affected by even irrelevant anchors (Kahneman 1992; Northcraft & Neale 1987; Ritov 1996; Whyte & Sebenius 1997; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Epley & Gilovich, 2006);

assume that the negotiation pie is fixed and miss opportunities for mutually beneficial trade-offs between the parties (Bazerman, 1983; Bazerman et al 1985; Thompson & Hastie 1990); assume that their preferences on issues are incompatible with those of their opponent, even when they are quite compatible (Thompson & Hrebec 1996);

reactively devalue any concession that is made by the opponent (Ross & Stillinger, 1991).

As this list demonstrates, psychological research on negotiation has been greatly impacted by a behavioral decision theory perspective which identifies how actual decisions are different from what would be predicted by normative models.

As we move forward, our goal is to use the behavioral decision research perspective to develop a framework for how to effectively influence people in a negotiation context. We are not the first to leverage behavioral decision research in an effort to study influence. One clear motivation for this approach is the insightful and creative work of Cialdini (1993; 2001). Cialdini’s research does not focus exclusively on psychological influence, nor does his typology of influence tactics (Cialdini, 1993) exhaust the domain of psychological influence. Nonetheless, his considerable research serves as one of the foundations for our own conceptualizing of psychological influence and its relevance to negotiation. We will combine elements of Cialdini’s work on influence with the behavioral decision research perspective to extend what we know about the psychology of negotiators into a behavioral perspective on influence in negotiation.
III. A BEHAVIORAL DECISION APPROACH TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE IN NEGOTIATION

The previous section provided a quick overview of some of the core elements of behavioral decision research that have been shown to be relevant in the negotiation context. In this section, we develop a structure for thinking about how to use our understanding of behavioral decision research for optimally influencing behavior in negotiation. The goal in this section is not to provide an exhaustive list of applications. Nor will we aim to directly mirror the biases mentioned in the preceding section. Rather, by providing a varied set of applications, we hope to highlight what we see as the best existing examples for leveraging research on psychological influence in order to further negotiation research.

The behavioral decision literature has identified a large number of systematic errors that affect decisions (Bazerman & Moore, 2008). Each bias provides insights that can be used to think about how to influence the decisions of others. In some (albeit very few) cases, this connection has already been made in the existing literature (e.g., the application of anchoring and insufficient adjustment to negotiation research by Bazerman & Neale [1982] and Galinsky & Mussweiler [2001]). Our goal is to demonstrate the breadth of potential links between behavioral decision research and influence in negotiations. The sub-sections below do not represent an exhaustive list; rather, they are illustrative of the potential. For each example, we will start with evidence for the psychological principle at hand, and then discuss potential applications of the principle in the domain of negotiation. Note that, consistent with our definition of psychological influence, these influence tactics are not designed to create incentives for compliance; nor do they change what the target knows. Rather, they aim to increase the
likelihood that the other party finds the idea or proposal more appealing based entirely on how the (objectively identical) idea or proposal is framed.

A. Influence Based on Diminishing Marginal Losses & Gains

In their seminal work on prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that individuals evaluate the prospect of winning or losing relative to salient reference points (such as the status quo). Specifically, they argued that people have diminishing marginal utility associated with gains and diminishing marginal disutility associated with losses. In other words, an “additional” gain is not as pleasurable as the initial gain and an “additional” loss is not as painful as the initial loss. The relevance of this phenomenon to psychological influence is made clear when we consider how people typically respond to the following two exercises, adapted from the work of Thaler (1985), and presented to hundreds of corporate executives:

Exercise 1: Which of these two situations would likely make you happier?

Scenario A: You are walking down the street and find a $20 bill.

Scenario B: You are walking down the street and find a $10 bill. The next day, as you are walking on a different street, you find another $10 bill.

Exercise 2: Which of these two situations would likely make you unhappier?

Scenario X: You open your wallet and discover you have lost a $20 bill.

Scenario Y: You open your wallet and discover you have lost a $10 bill. The following day you lose another $10 bill.

In Exercise 1, both scenarios have identical payoffs (each one results in a $20 gain). However, the majority of people state that they would be happier in Scenario B. In Exercise 2, both scenarios result in a loss of $20. This time, however, most people claim that they would be unhappier in Scenario Y (cf. Thaler, 1985). As these results demonstrate, people seem to prefer
receiving money in installments but losing money in one lump sum. The potential relevance of this effect to psychological influence in negotiation is easy to articulate: negotiators can disaggregate the other side’s gains to maximize total pleasure and aggregate the other side’s losses to minimize total pain (Thaler, 1985; 1999).

For example, if a negotiator has the ability to make concessions equal to $200, it would be unwise to make one $200 concession; the other party will be made happier—and thus be more willing to accept the deal—if the total sum is parceled into a series of smaller concessions. Similarly, if the negotiator has good news to deliver – “we can complete the project under budget and ahead of time” – it may be best to deliver the first piece of good news (“we will be under budget”) at one point in time, and to deliver the second piece of news (“we will be ahead of schedule”) at a later time. The opposite is true when the negotiator has to ask for concessions, impose penalties, or share bad news: it is best to deliver one big blow than to deliver multiple smaller ones. Consistent with the definition of psychological influence, the tactic of disaggregating gains and aggregating losses does not change the incentives or the information provided to the other side. We formalize the ideas above in the following propositions:

Proposition 1: Negotiators are more likely to accept an offer that includes two small gains offered by the other party than an offer that includes one gain that is equal in magnitude to the two small gains.

Proposition 2: Negotiators are more likely to accept an offer that entails a loss demanded by the other party (e.g., a cost or penalty) than an offer that requires two smaller losses that add up to the same amount.

B. Influence Based on Losses Looming Larger Than Gains
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) classic work also noted that “losses loom larger than gains” and that people are more motivated to avoid losses than they are to accrue gains. In other words, decision makers weigh information about potential losses more heavily than they do information about potential gains—even when the gains and losses are of equal magnitude. Accordingly, the principle of “loss aversion” suggests that when you frame the exact same set of information as a loss, it will be more influential than when you frame it as a gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).

In a study conducted at a medical clinic in the U.S., women were shown videos aimed at promoting HIV testing (Kalichman & Coley, 1995). In the control condition, information in the video was framed in terms of the benefits associated with getting tested. Only 23% of the women shown this version of the video chose to be tested within two weeks. In the experimental condition, the information was framed in terms of the costs and risks associated with not getting tested (e.g., “by not getting tested a woman is putting herself, the people she loves, and her unborn children if she becomes pregnant at risk.”) Among those who saw this version, 63% chose to be tested. In similar research, loss frames have been more effective than gain frames in persuading people to obtain skin cancer detection exams (Rothman, Salovey, Pronin, Zullo, & Lefell, 1996) and in encouraging women to conduct breast self-examinations (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987).

Consistent with these findings, but more relevant to the domain of negotiation, Cialdini (1993) tells of a study in which a representative from the local power company went door-to-door offering free energy audits to homeowners. After the audit, the representative would offer products and services that could help insulate the home and lower energy costs. The representative told half of the homeowners the following: “If you insulate your home, you will
save X cents per day.” (The value of X was determined by the audit.) The other half of homeowners were given a slightly different pitch: “If you fail to insulate your home, you will lose X cents per day.” While the information content of these two statements is identical, and while no incentives are being manipulated, those who were told how much they stood to lose by not complying with the recommendation were significantly more likely to purchase the insulation.

More generally, in negotiation, the principle of loss aversion can be a powerful tool of persuasion. Specifically, we offer the following proposition:

*Proposition 3:* Negotiators are more likely to gain support for their proposals if they are stated in terms of what the other side stands to lose if the proposal is rejected than if they are stated in terms of what the other side stands to gain by accepting.

This tactic is in use, for example, when a negotiator points out that “the proposal from our competitor will not give you X” instead of pointing out that “our offer will give you X.”

C. Influence Based on the Escalation of Commitment

People tend to escalate their commitment to a previous course of action. In Staw’s (1976) classic study, one group of participants made a decision to allocate research and development funds to one of two operating divisions of a company. These subjects were then told that, after a three year period of time, the investment had either proven successful or unsuccessful, and that they now faced a second allocation decision concerning the same division. A different group of study participants was told that someone else in the firm had made the initial decision (which had proven either successful or unsuccessful) and that they were to make a second allocation of funds concerning that division. When the outcome of the previous decision was negative (an unsuccessful investment), people who were responsible for the initial
decision allocated significantly more funds to the original division in the second allocation than
did participants who were not responsible for the initial decision. But, for successful initial
decisions, the amount of money allocated in the second decision did not significantly differ
across participants. Staw (1976; Staw & Ross, 1978) argued that the mechanism underlying
escalation after negative feedback was self-justification. Self–justification refers to the strong
desire individuals have to justify, even in the absence of an external audience, their past
behaviors and choices in order to maintain positive, consistent self-perceptions (Bem, 1967;
Burger & Guadagno, 2003).

Now, consider the results of the following experiment, conducted at a bar near a college
campus (Taylor & Booth-Butterfield, 1993). After the bartender had identified a set of regular
patrons, half of them were asked to sign a petition against drunk driving; the other half was not
approached with this request. Over the ensuing six weeks, the bartender tracked when any of the
identified patrons became intoxicated. Once such a patron was identified, the bartender would
make a second request: “May I call a taxi to take you home?” Among those who had not been
asked to sign a petition, only 10% agreed to wait for the taxi. In contrast, 58% of those who had
signed were willing to wait. This suggests that compliance with a request may be increased by
leveraging escalation of commitment.

When escalation of commitment is applied to the context of influence in negotiation, it is
often referred to as the “Foot-in-the Door” technique (Freedman & Fraser, 1966). The imagery
is one in which a homeowner has allowed the salesperson to step into the house to initiate the
sale, at which point the salesperson has the leverage needed to inch his way all the way inside to
complete the sale. Psychologically, the willingness to agree with one request leads to an
increased commitment to agree with additional requests that are consistent with the principles underlying the initial request.

This tactic can be used in a variety of ways in negotiation. For example, a negotiator may more easily obtain approval for a large sale after the buyer has agreed to a smaller initial purchase (Green, 1965). Consider also that an ultimatum may appear more attractive if the target negotiator has to self-justify a large (rather than a small) amount of time invested in the deal. Knowing this, a negotiator who is interested in wielding psychological influence might strategically draw out the negotiation and force the other party to invest large quantities of time and energy at the bargaining table. We formally predict that:

Proposition 4: The more time and other resources a negotiator has invested in the negotiation, the more willing the negotiator will be to accept the agreement offered.

D. Influence Based on the Status Quo Bias

Default outcomes are notoriously “sticky” (Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 2001). This is related to a bias that favors the status quo (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988; Ritov & Baron, 1992). When contemplating a change, people are more likely to be concerned about the risk of change than about the risk of failing to change, and will be motivated to preserve current systems and beliefs. The status-quo bias is a general source of opposition to change even when people regard the consequences of the change to be a net improvement (Baron & Jurney, 1993).

The power of the status quo bias was powerfully demonstrated by Johnson and Goldstein (2003) in an article titled “Do defaults save lives?” Their data compare organ donation rates in European countries which have an “opt-in” system (i.e., the default is non-donation) with those that have an “opt-out” system (i.e., the default is donation). When the default option is non-donation, donation rates range from 4% - 28%. When the default option is to donate, donation
rates are staggeringly high, ranging from 86% - 99%. Similar effects have been found in other
decision making contexts, such as investing and retirement savings (Samuelson & Zeckhauser,

In negotiation contexts, the status quo bias may play its most significant role in the
contracting phase. Negotiators who wish to wield psychological influence may be in a stronger
position to do so when their proposals happen to be the default option. Consider for example
that in many negotiations, one of the parties at the table is responsible for introducing its
“boilerplate” contract; the two sides then make revisions, as desired, on that pre-written
document. The research cited here suggests that the party who introduces its boilerplate contract
will have a significant advantage in the negotiation: even strategically placed defaults on
important contractual elements (such as contract length, penalties, and termination clauses) are
likely to be stickier when they are pre-written into the contract than when they are explicitly
open to negotiation. This implies:

*Proposition 5: In complex deals, the party that creates the first draft of the agreement or
contract will have a strategic advantage.*

*Proposition 6: Negotiators will be less likely to negotiate an issue of value to one or both
parties when a previous agreement on that issue already exists, than when the issue has
not been negotiated previously.*

**E. Influence Based on the Reciprocity Heuristic**

The norm of reciprocity appears ubiquitous across societies (Gouldner, 1960).

Considerable research suggests that people often reciprocate the acts of others even when it goes
against their self-interest (Gouldner, 1960; Ortmann, Fitzgerald, & Boeing, 2000; Pillutla,
Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003), and even in instances where the obligation-inducing initial act
was uninvited (Cialdini, 1993). While this suggests a means by which to influence others, given our focus on psychological influence, it is not sufficient to identify compliance achieved on the basis of an initial act of exchange (however uninvited). If the influencer has incurred a cost or provided a benefit to the target (cf., Malhotra, 2004), we are in the realm of economic influence. Reciprocating the generosity of others is not an error in behavior.

However, we argue that people follow this behavior heuristically, rather than on a rational basis. This creates the opportunity to influence behavior by simple means that trigger the reciprocity heuristic. Consistent with this, there is evidence to suggest that the reciprocity heuristic can be activated – and compliance achieved – even when the influencer has not actually incurred a cost or provided a benefit. Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis, and Catalan (1975) wanted to find out what would increase compliance with a moderately cumbersome request. To do so, they had research assistants approach strangers and introduce themselves as representatives of the County Youth Counseling Program. In one condition (the control), they would ask the stranger to volunteer as a chaperone for a group of juvenile delinquents on a two-hour trip to the local zoo. Only 16.7% of the respondents agreed to the request. In the experimental condition, the research assistant first imposed upon the stranger an extremely cumbersome request: to sign up as a counselor for juvenile delinquents for a period of two years. Perhaps not surprisingly, every single respondent refused this extreme request. At the point of rejection, the research assistant then made the moderately cumbersome request (chaperone the juvenile delinquents on a two-hour trip to the zoo). This time, 50% of respondents agreed to this request!

Cialdini et al. (1975) argue that the norm of reciprocity is at work here. When the research assistant starts with a more extreme request (which is sure to be rejected) and then moderates his/her stance, it triggers in the respondent the obligation to “meet halfway” and make
a concession in return. What is particularly striking here is that the research assistants in this study do not actually make any real concessions; because the target is under no obligation to comply with any request, the researcher’s decision to start the conversation with an arbitrarily extreme request should rationally be disregarded.

This psychological influence tactic, which Cialdini et al. (1975) refer to as the “Door-in-the-Face” technique, is clearly relevant to negotiations. Often, negotiators censor themselves before making an offer (thinking “why bother, they’ll never agree to that”). This research suggests that an extreme offer, when rejected, makes it more likely that a moderated demand will be evaluated more positively. In other words, without changing the information content of the proposal, or the incentives associated with agreeing, the Door-in-the-Face tactic can facilitate compliance with the desired (relatively moderate) demand. In negotiations, this implies:

*Proposition 7: Negotiators will be more likely to have an offer accepted when they have previously made an offer that was more extreme which was not accepted, but which did not end the discussion.*

**F. Influence Based on Reference Point Effects**

Consider the following two scenarios, adapted from the work of Kahneman and Tversky, (1981), which were recently presented to a group of executives (each executive responded to only one of the two scenarios):

**Scenario A:** Imagine that you are about to purchase a calculator for $50. The calculator salesperson informs you that this calculator is on sale at the store’s other branch, located a 20-minute drive away from where you are now. Assuming that you cannot negotiate the price at your current location, what is the
Scenario B: Imagine that you are about to purchase a laptop computer for $2,000. The computer salesperson informs you that this computer is on sale at the store’s other branch, located a 20-minute drive from where you are now. Assuming that you cannot negotiate the price at your current location, what is the minimum discount you would need at the other location to make it worth the 20-minute trip?

In fact, both scenarios ask the same question: how much is 20 minutes of your time worth? Nonetheless, those who read Scenario A said that they would need, on average, a discount of $20 for it to be worth driving across town. Those who read Scenario B said that they would need, on average, a discount of almost $200 for it to be worth the same trip.

The results of this exercise suggest that the way in which people value their own interests (in this case, their time) is subject to psychological influence. Going across town to save $20 may seem irrational when a big-ticket item is being purchased (e.g., a computer). But a $20 discount on something relatively cheap (such as a calculator) is very attractive. In other words, people do not objectively evaluate the cost of an item or an issue; rather, they evaluate costs in comparison to salient reference points (e.g., the total amount they are spending that day). Car salespeople are notorious for leveraging this insight when they pitch add-ons during the sale of a car. When the buyer has already agreed to pay $30,000 for the automobile, paying an additional $200-$500 for floor mats or scratch proofing does not seem like a bad idea. On the other hand, few buyers would purchase these additional items one week after having purchased the car.
More generally, objective appraisals of value are often difficult in negotiation. If you ask someone, “Is $100 a lot of money?” they are likely to respond, “It depends; what are we talking about?” Similarly, negotiators look for assistance in making judgments regarding the value of an item or idea and this assistance often comes in the form of salient reference points on which to focus. Because individuals often have the ability to influence which reference point is made salient to others in the negotiation, psychological influence of this type is likely to be prevalent at the bargaining table. Formally, this suggests the following:

Proposition 8: Controlling for the size of the concession being demanded, negotiators are more likely to agree to it when it is framed against the (larger) magnitude of the entire deal, than when it is framed against the (smaller) magnitude of the aspect of the deal currently being discussed.

G. Influence Based on the Overweighting of Social Comparisons

Festinger (1954) posited that in the absence of objective means for evaluating the appropriateness of an opinion, individuals will gravitate towards the opinion of (comparable) others. Unfortunately, we sometimes rely on social comparison in ways that deviate from rationality. For example, Bazerman, Schroth, Pradhan, Diekmann, and Tenbrunsel (1995) found that MBA students, in the decision to accept job offers, overused social comparison data (i.e., far more than rationality would dictate). As with the many other heuristics we have discussed above, the overuse of social comparisons is capable of being leveraged for the purposes of psychological influence. Cialdini (2004) tells the story of how a minor change in the wording of a pitch statement for infomercials caused a significant change in consumer behavior. As soon as the original script, “Operators are standing by, please call now” was changed to “If operators are busy, please call again”, the number of people who called to purchase the item for sale allegedly
skyrocketed. According to Cialdini, the underlying mechanism was the social comparison heuristic. Even though the two scripts are identical with regards to informational content and incentives offered, they clearly differ in the imagery that they induce in the audience. The first implies that no one else is calling (operators are standing by) and hence the appropriate course of action based on an evaluation of the behavior of others is to not make the call. The latter script implies that many viewers are calling in; if you are unsure, perhaps you should call as well.

The social comparison heuristic might be leveraged in a variety of ways in negotiation. For example, the seller of a house might limit the open-house viewing of her property to only one hour so that all potential buyers will be present at the same time. Similarly, when a potential venture capitalist asks the entrepreneur to provide a list of dates on which to schedule an initial meeting to discuss funding, the entrepreneur (who is actually desperate for cash and has a wide open schedule) provides very few available dates in the following week. In each of these examples, the negotiator signals to the other party (without altering information or incentives) that what she has to offer is in great demand.

*Proposition 9:* Controlling for the expected value of the deal that they can offer and for the actual value of the alternatives they have, negotiators who are perceived to have many (rather than few) alternatives (1) will be considered more attractive negotiation partners, (2) will be less likely to have others negotiate aggressively with them, (3) will more easily reach an agreement, and (4) will capture a higher percentage of the value in negotiations.

**H. Influence Based on the Ability and Motivation to Process Information**

Whereas behavioral research has focused primarily on the effect of biases on decision making, even more mundane psychological mechanisms involved in message processing and
attitude change can be leveraged for psychological influence in negotiation. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Heesacker, & Hughes, 1997; Petty & Wegner, 1999) posits that those who have both the ability and motivation to process information carefully will make judgments based on a systematic assessment of “central cues” (e.g., quality or strength of argument). However, if either ability or motivation is low (e.g., due to time pressure or a low level of issue importance), judgment will be based on “peripheral cues” (e.g., the credibility of the source or the number of arguments presented). Considerable research suggests that it is possible for would-be influencers to affect which of these types of information processing will dominate when the target of influence considers their argument and, as a consequence, the likelihood of successful persuasion.

Consider, for example, that the message an influencer sends usually (if not always) contains more than one piece of information: it may include one or more substantive requests, one or more justifications regarding the key demands, evidence associated with the justification, and information regarding the type and speed of response that is requested. As a result, even if the information set is held constant, a would-be influencer has a number of decisions to make regarding the order in which the information will be presented, the speed with which it will be presented, and the language (e.g., technical vs. simple) in which it will be presented. These (and other) factors can influence the persuasiveness of the message. Greenberg and Tannenbaum (1961) and Mills and Harvey (1972) find that when the source of information being provided is highly credible, arguments are more persuasive when the source is revealed at the beginning rather than the end of the message. In fact, some evidence suggests that the positive effect associated with having a credible source may be entirely eliminated if the source information is sufficiently delayed (Ward & McGinnies, 1974). Homer and Kahle’s (1990) findings suggest
that the “early revelation is better” effect for credible sources is limited to situations in which the issue at hand is of high (rather than low) importance to the target; when the issue is of low importance, persuasion is more likely when credible sources are revealed at the end of the message. The underlying mechanism, according to the ELM, is that high importance issues (but not low importance issues) trigger evaluations of central cues (e.g., argument strength) and as a result, peripheral cues (such as source credibility) are ignored unless they are presented before substantive information is made available. In the context of negotiation, this implies:

**Proposition 10:** When the issue being negotiated is of high importance to the other party, a negotiator will be more likely to have her offer accepted when strong rationales and justifications (e.g., appeals to higher authorities or strong norms) are presented early (rather than late) in the discussion.

**Proposition 11:** When the issue being negotiated is of low importance to the other party, or when only weak justifications exist, a negotiator will be more likely to have her offer accepted when rationales and justification are presented late (rather than early) in the discussion.

The ELM also suggests that the way in which a message is communicated can impact the degree to which central vs. peripheral information processing will dominate. For example, complex (as opposed to simple) messages are expected to reduce ability and motivation to engage in systematic information processing (except perhaps among high need for cognition individuals) and thus induce greater processing of peripheral rather than central cues.

In an interesting test of this proposition, Yalch and Elmore-Yalch (1984) created two different versions of a persuasive message: one quantitative and the other qualitative. They also varied the expertise of the source who was conveying the message. As predicted, targets of
influence were more likely to focus on (and be persuaded by) the degree of expertise of the source when they were provided a quantitative message. When the qualitative message was provided, there was a higher degree of message processing and no effect of source expertise. Similar effects result from manipulating the speed at which a message is conveyed (talking slow rather than fast leads to enhanced systematic processing [Smith & Shaffer, 1991]), switching the communication medium used to convey the message (written arguments as opposed to televised arguments lead to enhanced systematic processing [Andreoli & Worchel, 1978]), and introducing a distraction (distracted targets are less able to engage in systematic processing [Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976]).

These findings has important implications for psychological influence in negotiation: those who have strong arguments at their disposal should prefer to have the target engage in systematic processing, where as those who have weak substantive arguments might hope to induce heuristics-based, peripheral cue processing. More specifically, we would predict the following:

Proposition 12: A negotiator who has strong justifications and arguments will be more likely to have her demands accepted if she (1) speak slowly, (2) avoids being overly technical, (3) provides a written explanation of the core demands and justifications, and (4) avoid negotiating at a time when the other party is distracted.

Proposition 13: A negotiator who has weak strong justifications and arguments will be more likely to have her demands accepted if she (1) speak quickly, (2) uses technical language, (3) evades requests to put the offer in writing, and (4) negotiates when the other party is busy or otherwise distracted.
Collectively, these eight examples of relevant research topics and 13 testable propositions were designed to illustrate the power of behavioral decision research to create ways to psychologically influence decisions in a negotiation context. Certainly, many other examples are possible. For example, Bazerman, Tenbrunsel and Wade-Benzoni (1998) demonstrate that when people have internal conflicts between what they want to do versus what they think they should do, they tend to follow their “want” desires when evaluating one option at a time. However, when considering two or more options simultaneously, they lean toward what they “should” do. Accordingly, a would-be influencer might position her offerings vis-à-vis those of her competitors with an eye towards how the target evaluates what is being offered (i.e., is this something I want to have or something I should have). As another example, consider how car dealers leverage the vividness bias (Bazerman & Moore, 2008) to influence car purchasers to buy overpriced, unneeded car warranties. The list goes on and on. However, our purpose here is simply to highlight the (many) connections possible between behavioral decision research and psychological influence in negotiation.

V. DEFENSE AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCE TACTICS

Thus far, we have focused on the tactics available to would-be influencers and how these tactics can be applied most effectively. Indeed, this focus has dominated the literature of social influence among researchers in the fields of organizational behavior (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983; Keys & Case, 1990; Falbe & Yukl, 1992), marketing (Wagner, Klein, & Keith, 2001; McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani, 2006), negotiation (e.g., Watkins, 2001; Chaiken & Gruenfeld, 2000), and psychology (e.g., Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Aguinis, Nesler, Hosoda, & Tedeschi, 2001; Erb & Böhner, 2007). Far less attention has been paid to the perspective and needs of influence targets (cf., Cialdini, 1993; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007).
But, defending yourself against the influence attempts from the other side of the table is critically important in negotiation. While rigorous research on the topic of defense against influence is sparse, we outline five directions for future study.

The first stream of research focuses on capacity building, in the form of “persuasion knowledge”, for would-be targets of influence. Persuasion knowledge refers to how much a potential target (e.g., a consumer) knows about the arsenal of tactics available to an influencer (e.g., a salesperson). Accordingly, research on the “Persuasion Knowledge Model” (PKM) focuses on how savvy consumers – i.e., those who understand the motives and strategies of marketers and salespersons – might defend against psychological influence tactics (Friestad & Wright, 1994; 1995). While research in this domain is still in its early stages, a number of important aspects of PKM have been analyzed. For example, Hardesty, Bearden, and Carlson (2007) demonstrate the effectiveness of persuasion knowledge in response to pricing tactics employed by marketers. Campbell and Kirmani (2000) find that persuasion knowledge is most likely to help consumers when cognitive load is low. Wright, Friestad, and Boush (2005) discuss how persuasion knowledge develops in children and amasses with experience over an individual’s lifespan. Further research in this domain is likely to be of significant value. From a negotiation perspective, a better understanding of how individuals can enhance and utilize their persuasion knowledge in real-world negotiations (which are often fast-paced and cognitively taxing) would be particularly useful. For example, future research may consider: (1) whether experienced negotiators are better at defending against influence tactics (cf., Neale & Northcraft [1990] provide initial ideas on when expertise does and does not protect you from decision errors in negotiation), (2) whether negotiators are more likely to be the target of influence tactics—but also more cautious and hence less vulnerable to them—when there is distrust among the parties
(cf., Pornpitakpan, 2004), and (3) whether persuasion knowledge is a two-way street, such that negotiators who use influence tactics are also better at recognizing and defending against them when used by others.

A second stream of research looks at factors that moderate the effectiveness of influence tactics. While these studies are typically written from the perspective of would-be influencers, they actually provide important insights for would-be targets. For example, Mallalieu (2006) distinguishes between early stage consumers (those who are making judgments regarding whether they need a specific product or service) and final stage consumers (those who are choosing which product to choose) and suggests that different tactics are likely to be effective in each phase of the sale. This suggests that would-be targets should gear their defenses against those tactics to which they are most susceptible at a given stage. Reinhard, Messner, and Sporer (2006) found that attractive salespersons are more effective at influencing when they disclose their intention to influence; unattractive salespersons are more effective when they keep their intentions hidden. This suggests that would-be targets of influence should be especially wary when approached by an honest, attractive influencer (and especially suspicious of unattractive people who claim to have the target’s best interests in mind). Unlike research on persuasion knowledge, this line of research is not well organized; rather, a disparate set of findings on moderator variables exists in the literature. A more systematic approach to identifying which factors make influence tactics more/less effective would be of great benefit—not only to would-be influencers, but to would-be targets.

A third line of work originates from Cialdini (1993), who ends his discussion of each influence tactic (in his book “Influence”) with a section on “defense”. Two key ideas emerge from Cialdini’s work. First, consistent with the PKM approach, Cialdini suggests that would-be
targets should familiarize themselves with the tactics that may be employed against them and actively discount their desire to comply when the other side appears to be manipulating them. Second, Cialdini emphasizes that because responses to influence tactics are typically automatic, would-be targets stand to benefit from slowing down the pace of the interaction and evaluating the appropriate response more deliberately. Malhotra and Bazerman (2007) offer a list of defense strategies based on extant principles of sound negotiation. They encourage would-be targets to use scoring systems in evaluating offers (Raiffa, 1982), to rephrase pitch statements made by others (e.g., change the loss frame to a gain frame), to consider whether their desire to comply would be easy to justify to objective others (or to themselves at a later date), and to appoint a devil’s advocate whose role is to identify reasons not to comply.

A fourth direction comes from work in the behavioral decision research area on de-biasing. As we have suggested throughout this paper, many influence strategies rely on adjusting information presentation to leverage systematic biases that affect human judgment. This suggests that a greater awareness of the biases that affect decision making may be used to inoculate targets of influence from falling prey to the psychological influence attempts of the other side. Bazerman and Moore (2008) provide an extensive discussion of de-biasing approaches, including, acquiring experience and expertise, (2) obtaining personalized de-biasing training, (3) using analogical reasoning (Thompson, Loewenstein, & Gentner, 2000), (4) bringing in unbiased outside expertise, and (5) using systematic decision analytic tools. However, Bazerman and Moore’s (2008) prescriptions relate to de-biasing generally, and there is a need for research on how to customize this advice for influence immunization.

A fifth direction, especially relevant to the domain of negotiation, is preparation. We are most susceptible to influence attempts when we lack objective information regarding the value of
an idea or proposal. This suggests, consistent with research on persuasion knowledge, and the work of Cialdini (1993) and Malhotra and Bazerman (2007), that the more we know on our own before we meet with the other side, the less likely we are to be affected by their influence attempts. Most teachers of negotiation emphasize the importance of preparation aimed at better assessing the bargaining zone and the interests of the other side. We add the prediction that well-prepared negotiators are less likely than ill-prepared negotiators to be influenced by the (psychological) influence attempts of the other side. A corollary to this prediction is that the more time negotiators have to negotiate, the less likely is it that they will succumb to influence tactics; with more time comes an opportunity to carefully assess the content of what is being presented and to avoid heuristic responses (Higgins, 1999).

Because the focus of this paper is psychological influence, we have largely confined ourselves to the individual level of analysis. However, many organizations and industries struggle with the task of equipping their professionals to make decisions without being influenced by nefarious (or simply self-interested) other parties. For example, purchasing agents may be influenced by salespeople who insist on picking up the tab at a lavish dinner and doctors may be influenced by the treatment they receive at the hands of drug representatives (cf., Moore, Tanlu, Tetlock, & Bazerman, 2006). These gifts can contort decisions away from what is best for the organization (or patient), without any intended corruption. Even more subtly, psychological influence tactics are likely to impact decisions that may have consequences beyond those that matter to the individuals at the bargaining zone. The critical issue is that organizations and professional associations should think about the structures and incentives that increase the likelihood of their employees being affected by assorted influence attempts. Future research
should explore the relationships between organizational level variables (rules, structures, credo, etc.) and influence at the individual level.

Despite these various streams of research, there remains a paucity of research on defense tactics. This is perhaps not surprising: most scholars in business schools naturally take the perspective of the selling organization and not the consumer (Bazerman, 2001). From a negotiation perspective, however, both perspectives (that of influencer and that of the target) are equally important to consider. Accordingly, defense tactics may provide fertile ground for relevant future research.

VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Any discussion of influence naturally leads to questions of ethics in negotiation (cf., Messick & Ohme, 1988). We are sensitive to these issues, and while we have no easy answer, we do have thoughts that may be relevant for researchers and practitioners of psychological influence. Before we delve more deeply into the topic, we should make explicit three essential principles of our approach: 1) we do not endorse, recommend, or excuse lying, 2) we do not endorse, recommend, or excuse intentionally deceptive moves, and 3) we do not strive to tell others what their ethical standards in negotiations should be. With those constraints on the discussion, we present some thoughts on the issue of ethics.

Most well known negotiation frameworks focus on the need to think simultaneously about the creation and claiming of value (Walton & McKersie, 1965; Raiffa, 1982; Thompson, 2005; Lax & Sebenius, 2006; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). Value creation focuses on moves to increase the amount of resources available to the two (or more) parties in the negotiation. The value once created, however, needs to be divided. Thus, most real world negotiations have a
value claiming component, and most of the influence techniques described in this paper are most relevant to the value claiming dimension.

Towards the goal of value claiming, most negotiation teachers train students to think about each side’s best alternative to an agreement (BATNA), to calculate or estimate the reservation value for each side, and to assess the resulting bargaining zone (Lax & Sebenius, 2006). And, at least part of the message is that if you accurately assess the bargaining zone, you are more likely to be able to claim more of the zone for your side (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). Of course, in many real world contexts, we do not want to claim as much of the zone as possible; in a good marriage or in a negotiation with a trusted business partner (or co-author), we may just want what we consider to be fair. Nonetheless, in many cases, negotiators do want to claim as much as possible (we would both plead guilty to wanting to claim as much as possible when negotiating with car salespeople).

Now, assuming that you are in a situation in which you want to claim as much value as possible, is it unethical to think about your BATNA and reservation value, their BATNA and reservation value, and the bargaining zone? We believe that it is not. This approach is simply bringing logic to a natural part of the negotiation task. Similarly, we see the honest use of the psychology of influence as an appropriate and ethical set of tools in negotiation. Thus, we are in agreement with Cialdini (1993: 229), who argues that “The use of these triggers by practitioners is not necessarily exploitative. It only becomes so when the trigger is not a natural feature of the situation but is fabricated by the practitioner” (229). More specifically, all problems come with frames attached. Using knowledge of the psychology of influence is simply selecting one of multiple honest frames in your presentation of information to the other side.
In addition to using the psychology of influence to help claim value, there is also the potential of using this knowledge to create value. Even good ideas that create value for all parties involved can be stymied by closed-minded negotiators who devalue any proposal that comes from the other side of the table (Bazerman, 1983; Ross & Stillinger, 1991). In these instances, the effective framing of a proposal can help to reduce barriers and benefit all involved. More often, psychological influence tactics can help create subjective value. Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu (2006) argue that greater attention should be give to the subjective experience of negotiators, as opposed to the more common focus on objective outcomes in negotiation. In addition, parcels of folk wisdom in negotiation, as well as wise negotiation scholars (Raiffa, 1982), tell us that it is important for both parties to leave the table with the perception that they did well in the negotiation. Influence strategies can be effectively used to help the focal negotiator increase the target’s satisfaction from the deal that it struck.

In this discussion, we have briefly shared our perspective on some of the ethical issues involved of using psychological influence tactics in a negotiation context. That said, we believe it will be in the domain of empirical inquiry to better understand one of the most important elements of the ethical question: how the target perceives the use of the different influence strategies outlined in this paper. It is quite possible that targets will perceive some strategies as unethical, despite our a priori assessment. This would result in a further refinement of the perspective considered here. Perceptions of ethics matter even for reasons unrelated to ethics: influencers would be wise to consider how their tactics are affecting their reputation and the future relationships. Thus, we encourage future research that explores the perceived ethics of the strategies outlined in this paper.

VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This paper conceptualized and organized a new domain of academic inquiry—
psychological influence in negotiation—and contrasted it with extant literature on social
influence. The last fifty years of research on social influence has focused largely on economic
and structural elements of influence; how to influence individuals without altering information or
incentives has been largely ignored. However, as we have argued, not only is psychological
influence an interesting and important domain of study in its own right, it is also very relevant to
the field of negotiation research. Indeed, we anticipate that many of the advancements in our
understanding of psychological influence will be undertaken by negotiation scholars as they seek
to better understand influence in negotiation. Particularly promising in this regard is the rise of
behavioral decision research. This field has created a (still growing) wealth of raw materials for
influence researchers to utilize. In addition, the selective review of research on the role of
information processing on attitude change (see Section III. H.) suggests a number of additional
implications for psychological influence in negotiation.

We hope that this paper helps to build a broader research field of negotiation, one that
more closely matches real world views of what negotiation entails. We are struck by the fact that
Cialdini (1993) provided some excellent hints a decade and a half ago, and yet the use of
psychology to study influence escaped the attention of negotiation researchers. We see this as a
missed (but not lost) opportunity, and hope that our work begins to correct the error.
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1 According to Kelman (1958), social influence can have up to three different outcomes: compliance, identification, and internalization. Compliance refers to a change in the target’s behavior in accordance with the influencer’s desired course of action. Identification refers to a change in the target’s attitude towards the influencer’s desired course of action. Internalization is the strongest possible reaction to a social influence attempt; it entails a longer term commitment to the course of action espoused by the influencer. In this paper, we are concerned primarily with the effect of psychological influence tactics on attitudinal (identification) and behavioral (compliance) change. Because the long-term effects of psychological biases on judgment have not been studied, we make no claims regarding internalization resulting from psychological influence.


3 An alternative explanation for this result is the “contrast effect’. That is, the moderate request looks much less cumbersome when compared to the extreme request than it does when it is the only one made. The authors eliminate this possibility with the inclusion of another control condition in which both of the requests are made simultaneously and the respondents are asked to pick either one of the two options (or neither). 25% of respondents in that condition agree to the 2-hour zoo trip. This suggests that the contrast effect does operate – and is worth studying as an influence tactic in its own right – but it is less powerful than the reciprocity heuristic in this study.
There are at least two other explanations for the observed behavior. First, as Kahneman and Tversky (1981) suggest, the behavior stems from a reliance on mental accounts. When deciding whether the time-spent/money-saved tradeoff is worth making, individuals do not consider their entire wealth level; rather, they make the decision with reference to a more narrowly defined account (e.g., the account for purchasing a calculator). Second, as argued by Thaler (1985), consumers value transaction utility: there is some happiness derived merely from getting a “good deal”. It is worth pointing out that both of these mechanisms provide additional fodder for the creation of psychological influence tactics. (For example, knowing that people are more likely to purchase a $50 sweater if it used to be $100 than if it was always priced at $50, a seller may manipulate the list price of the item in order to make the actual price – $50 – more appealing.)

Cialdini (1993; 2004) uses the term “social proof” in reference to the phenomenon described here.

It is worth noting that attitude change based on persuasion is likely to be more enduring when judgments are arrived at based on the consideration of central rather than peripheral cues (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995).