Jonas Heese

Assistant Professor of Business Administration

Jonas Heese is an assistant professor of business administration in the Accounting & Management Unit. He teaches the Financial Reporting and Control course in the MBA required curriculum.

Jonas Heese is an assistant professor of business administration in the Accounting & Management Unit. He teaches the Financial Reporting and Control course in the MBA required curriculum.

In his research, Professor Heese focuses on the political economy of regulatory enforcement of accounting standards in the United States, and specifically on the preferences of regulators and the reaction of firms to these preferences. He has explored these ideas in the context of the Securities and Exchange Commission and of agencies that regulate the health-care industry. 

Professor Heese holds a Ph.D. and an M.Sc. in accounting from Maastricht University in the Netherlands.

Academic Articles

  1. Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits

    Jonas Heese, Ranjani Krishnan and Frank Moers

    We posit that nonprofits that provide a greater supply of unprofitable services (beneficent nonprofits) face lenient regulatory enforcement for mispricing in price-regulated markets. Consequently, beneficent nonprofits exploit such regulatory leniency and exhibit higher mispricing. Drawing on organizational legitimacy theory, we argue that both regulators and beneficent nonprofits seek to protect their legitimacy with stakeholders, including those who demand access to unprofitable services. Using data from hospitals, we examine mispricing via "upcoding", which involves misclassifying ailment severity. Archival analysis indicates less stringent regulatory enforcement of upcoding for beneficent nonprofit hospitals, defined as hospitals that provide higher charity care and medical education. After observing regulator leniency, beneficent hospitals demonstrate higher upcoding. Our results suggest that lenient enforcement assists beneficent nonprofits to obtain higher revenues in price-regulated markets.

    Keywords: Nonprofit Organizations; Business Earnings; Fairness; Governance Compliance;

    Citation:

    Heese, Jonas, Ranjani Krishnan, and Frank Moers. "Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits." Art. 11998. Academy of Management Proceedings (2015). View Details

Practitioner Articles

Working Papers

  1. Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits

    Jonas Heese, Ranjani Krishnan and Frank Moers

    We posit that nonprofits that provide a greater supply of unprofitable services (beneficent nonprofits) face lenient regulatory enforcement for mispricing in price-regulated markets. Consequently, beneficent nonprofits exploit such regulatory leniency and exhibit higher mispricing. Drawing on organizational legitimacy theory, we argue that both regulators and beneficent nonprofits seek to protect their legitimacy with stakeholders, including those who demand access to unprofitable services. Using data from hospitals, we examine mispricing via "upcoding", which involves misclassifying ailment severity. Archival analysis indicates less stringent regulatory enforcement of upcoding for beneficent nonprofit hospitals, defined as hospitals that provide higher charity care and medical education. After observing regulator leniency, beneficent hospitals demonstrate higher upcoding. Our results suggest that lenient enforcement assists beneficent nonprofits to obtain higher revenues in price-regulated markets.

    Keywords: Regulator leniency; nonprofit organizations; beneficence; mispricing; upcoding; Nonprofit Organizations; Fairness; Revenue;

    Citation:

    Heese, Jonas, Ranjani Krishnan, and Frank Moers. "Regulator Leniency and Mispricing in Beneficent Nonprofits." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-056, January 2015. (Winner of the Healthcare Management Division of the Academy of Management 2015 Best Paper Award.) View Details
  2. Government Preferences and SEC Enforcement

    Jonas Heese

    I examine whether political influence by the government as a response to voters' interest in employment conditions is reflected in the enforcement actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that large employers are less likely to be subject to an SEC enforcement action, after controlling for firm size, accounting quality, distance to SEC office, and political contributions, among other factors. Next, I show that large employers are less likely to face an SEC enforcement action in presidential election years if they are headquartered in politically important states. I also find that firms that employ a larger proportion of a congressional district's total workforce and are located in districts with high unemployment rates are less likely to be subject to an SEC enforcement action if the incumbent congressman serves on a committee that oversees the SEC. These findings suggest that voters' interests are reflected in SEC enforcement.

    Keywords: SEC enforcement; government preferences; employment; voters' interests; Political Elections; Accounting; Government Administration; Labor; United States;

    Citation:

    Heese, Jonas. "Government Preferences and SEC Enforcement." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-054, December 2014. (Revised April 2015.) View Details

Cases and Teaching Materials

  1. Dollar General Bids for Family Dollar

    Jonas Heese, Paula A. Price, Suraj Srinivasan and David Lane

    In spring 2015, Dollar General's CEO Rick Dreiling was looking ahead to retiring at year's end but worried about ensuring continued growth for the company he had built since 2008 into a market leader in the U.S. discount retail world. Dollar General operated over 11,500 stores in 40 states at the start of 2015, but had recently been rebuffed in a tender offer for its leading rival, Family Dollar. Though Dollar General had held talks with Famiy Dollar as early as 2013, Family Dollar shareholders chose to ignore Dollar General's more lucrative tender offer and the urging of several activist investors and sold their firm to the smaller Dollar Tree chain. Dreiling could not help but revisit some of the key decisions he and the rest of the board had made in their pursuit of Family Dollar. From a governance perspective, he was confident that the Dollar General board had fulfilled its duty to shareholders during the bidding process despite Family Dollar's decision to sell to Dollar Tree. From a strategic perspective, he wondered whether Family Dollar had been the right competitor to buy.

    Keywords: Dollar General; Family Dollar; Dollar Tree; antitrust; board of directors; corporate strategy; Activist Investors; Federal Trade Commission; Acquisition; Valuation; Retail Industry; United States;

    Citation:

    Heese, Jonas, Paula A. Price, Suraj Srinivasan, and David Lane. "Dollar General Bids for Family Dollar." Harvard Business School Case 116-007, November 2015. View Details