Doctoral Student

Henry Christian Eyring

Henry Eyring is a doctoral student in Accounting and Management at Harvard Business School. He studies the use of performance measurement, feedback, and disclosure to elicit improvement. His dissertation focuses on the effects of disclosing physicians' patient satisfaction ratings and comments. The analysis draws on proprietary data from multiple academic hospitals to test for effects on patient choice of doctors, as well as on rating and quality improvement. This extends research on disclosure to the growing realm of consumer evaluation disclosure, and informs the use of disclosure in establishing market forces in health care. He has also conducted field experiments of the application of behavioral economics to performance feedback design in online education. Those experiments extend limited empirical evidence of the effects of performance dashboards, and how their effects depend on design elements. His educational background is in math and economics, and his work experience in private equity and management consulting.

Journal Articles

  1. Unexploited Efficiencies in Higher Education

    Henry C. Eyring

    In "Unexploited Efficiencies in Higher Education," Henry C. Eyring argues that one way that the U.S. can compete globally in college attainment is to decrease cost-per-graduate. He explains how many stakeholders in higher education stand to benefit from unexploited cost-efficiencies. Eyring cites strategies implemented by Brigham Young University-Idaho as examples of ways that institutions of higher education can become more cost-efficient in producing graduates. Administrators at Brigham Young University-Idaho utilize a model called the "Graduate Fishbone" that quantifies the effect of alterations to policy, retention, and instructional delivery at Brigham Young University-Idaho on cost, students served, and annual graduates produced. That model allows analysis of the efficacy of cost-efficiency promoting strategies, and the model outline is available electronically from the author upon request. An extended version of this paper with additional charts and explanation is also available electronically from the author upon request.

    Keywords: education; performance measurement; innovation; control systems; Education; Performance Evaluation; Innovation and Invention; Education Industry; United States;

    Citation:

    Eyring, Henry C. "Unexploited Efficiencies in Higher Education." Art. 1. Contemporary Issues in Education Research 4, no. 7 (July 2011): 1–18. (Best Paper Award, March 2011 Clute Institute International Economic Conference.) View Details
  2. Let Disruption Fix Education

    Henry Eyring and Renee Hopkins Callahan

    Eyring and Hopkins Callahan apply Clayton Christensen's theory of Disruptive Innovation to Higher Education. The Spellings' Commission's 2006 report cited rising costs, lack of access, and a rift between output and the average stakeholder's needs in U.S. Higher Education. The authors recognize those as characteristics of industries ripe for disruptive innovation. Institutions of Higher Education can be disruptive by addressing the "jobs-to-be-done" of Higher Education stakeholders in a low-cost manner with the aid of new learning technology. The authors offer examples of innovative institutions of Higher Education, and explain how policy makers could act to give such institutions a better chance to lower cost and increase productivity in Higher Education.

    Keywords: disruptive innovation; higher education; education; Disruptive Innovation; Higher Education; Education Industry;

    Citation:

    Eyring, Henry, and Renee Hopkins Callahan. "Let Disruption Fix Education." Art. 1. Strategy & Innovation 6, no. 6 (September 2008): 1–6. (Feature Article.) View Details

Working Papers

  1. Disclosing Physician Ratings: Performance Effects and the Difficulty of Altering Ratings Consensus

    Henry Eyring

    In 2012, a health care system adopted a policy of publicly disclosing patient ratings of some of its physicians. This study investigates the effects of this policy. I find evidence that the disclosure leads to: 1) improvement as measured by the ratings and by objective measures of quality, and 2) a bias in a physician's ratings toward his or her published consensus rating. This study provides the first evidence of either result in the context of consumer-rating disclosure. To understand the moderating effects of public attention, I use variation in web traffic to a physician’s disclosed ratings. I find evidence consistent with public attention impeding rating improvement by reinforcing bias toward the published consensus. On average, the disclosure yields an improvement in physician ratings by 17 percentile points in a national distribution of physician ratings, and biases ratings toward the physician’s published consensus by 24 percentile points in that distribution. This study demonstrates that consumer-rating disclosure is a means of performance management, and that resulting bias is a reason to interpret subsequent trends in ratings as understated signals of trends in service.

    Keywords: "Ratings," "Disclosure," "Real Effects," "Behavioral Economics," "Health Care";