Alvin E. Roth
George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus
Al Roth is the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and in the Harvard Business School. His research, teaching, and consulting interests are in game theory, experimental economics, and market design. The best known of the markets he has designed (or, in this case, redesigned) is the National Resident Matching Program, through which approximately twenty thousand doctors a year find their first employment as residents at American hospitals. He has recently been involved in the reorganization of the market for Gastroenterology fellows, which started using a clearinghouse in 2006 for positions beginning in 2007. He helped design the high school matching system used in New York City to match approximately ninety thousand students to high schools each year, starting with students entering high school in the Fall of 2004. He helped redesign the matching system used in Boston Public Schools, adopted for students starting school in September 2006. He is one of the founders and designers of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is the chair of the American Economic Association's Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, which has designed a number of recent changes in the market for new Ph.D. economists. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, and has been a Guggenheim and Sloan fellow. He received his Ph.D at Stanford University, and came to Harvard from the University of Pittsburgh, where he was the Andrew Mellon Professor of Economics.
For further information, please go to
Al Roth's Game Theory, Experimental Economics, and Market Design Page.
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Book
| 1992
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Game Theory;
Citation: Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Paperback ed. Cambridge University Press, 1992. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Science.)
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Book
| 2002
Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom and Alvin E Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
Citation: Holmstrom, Bengt, Paul Milgrom, and Alvin E Roth, eds. Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002.
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Book
| 1997
Handbook of Experimental Economics
J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
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Book
| 1990
Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Game Theory;
Citation: Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.)
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Book
| 1988
The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Body of Literature;
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Book
| 1987
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
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Book
| 1985
Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
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Book
| 1979
Axiomatic Models of Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
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Article
| American Economic Review
| Forthcoming
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth
Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of the organ waiting list might impact the donation rate. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
Keywords: Health;
Giving and Philanthropy;
Decision Making;
Resource Allocation;
Mathematical Methods;
United States;
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Article
| American Economic Review
| Forthcoming
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth
Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of the organ waiting list might impact the donation rate. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
Keywords: Health;
Giving and Philanthropy;
Decision Making;
Resource Allocation;
Mathematical Methods;
United States;
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Article
| American Economic Review
| Forthcoming
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate
Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth
Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of the organ waiting list might impact the donation rate. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.
Keywords: Health;
Giving and Philanthropy;
Decision Making;
Resource Allocation;
Mathematical Methods;
United States;
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Editorial
| American Journal of Transplantation
|
NEAD Chains in Transplantation
Itai Ashlagi, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Citation: Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. " NEAD Chains in Transplantation." American Journal of Transplantation 11 (December 2011): 2780–2781. (Letter to the Editor.)
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Article
| Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation
|
Kidney Paired Donation
C. Bradley Wallis, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the U.S. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced by living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipients. This review provides a basic overview of the concepts and challenges faced by KPD as we prepare for a national pilot program with the United Network for Organ Sharing. Several different algorithms have been creatively implemented in the U.S. and elsewhere to transplant paired donors, each method uniquely contributing to the success of KPD. As the paired donor pool grows, the problem of determining allocation strategies that maximize equity and utility will become increasingly important as the transplant community seeks to balance quality and quantity in choosing the best matches. Financing for paired donation is a major issue, as philanthropy alone cannot support the emerging national system. We also discuss the advent of altruistic or non-directed donors in KPD, and the important role of chains in addition to exchanges. This review is designed to provide insight into the challenges that face the emerging national KPD system in the U.S., now five years into its development.
Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy;
Health Care and Treatment;
Growth and Development Strategy;
Success;
Problems and Challenges;
Programs;
System;
United States;
Citation: Wallis, C. Bradley, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. " Kidney Paired Donation." Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation 26, no. 7 (July 2011): 2091–2099.
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Article
| American Journal of Transplantation
|
Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited
Itai Ashlagi, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees
Since 2008 kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of non-directed donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously ("domino paired donation," DPD) or nonsimultaneously ("nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor chains," NEAD). NEAD chains create "bridge donors" whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients
Keywords: Health Care and Treatment;
Supply Chain;
Risk and Uncertainty;
Logistics;
United States;
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Article
| Games
|
A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
Eyal Ert, Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth
Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games: one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment and clarifies the descriptive value of some baseline models. The best baseline model assumes that each choice is made based on one of several rules. The rules include rational choice, level-1 reasoning, an attempt to maximize joint payoff, and an attempt to increase fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that the most popular rule is rational choice; it is used in about half the cases. To participate in the competitions, researchers are asked to email the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is December 1, 2011; the results of the competition experiment will not be revealed until that date. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competitions will be invited to write a paper that describes their model.
Keywords: Forecasting and Prediction;
Behavior;
Decision Choices and Conditions;
Competition;
Motivation and Incentives;
Game Theory;
Fairness;
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Journal Article
| American Journal of Transplantation
|
Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?
Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth
The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney markets and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets, and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval towards certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal, and 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are not more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval towards certain transactions-including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally non-market exchanges, such as food preparation.
Keywords: Moral Sensibility;
Policy;
Health;
Market Transactions;
Attitudes;
Trust;
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Journal Article
| Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
|
A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description
Ido Erev, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West and Christian Lebiere
Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on three related choice tasks: one-shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one-shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each competition was based on two experimental datasets: an estimation dataset and a competition dataset. The studies that generated the two datasets used the same methods and subject pool and examined decision problems randomly selected from the same distribution. After collecting the experimental data to be used for estimation, the organizers posted them on the Web, together with their fit with several baseline models, and challenged other researchers to compete to predict the results of the second (competition) set of experimental sessions. Fourteen teams responded to the challenge: the last seven authors of this paper are members of the winning teams. The results highlight the robustness of the difference between decisions from description and decisions from experience. The best predictions of decisions from descriptions were obtained with a stochastic variant of prospect theory assuming that the sensitivity to the weighted value decreases with the distance between the cumulative payoff functions. The best predictions of decisions from experience were obtained with models that assume reliance on small samples. Merits and limitations of the competition method are discussed.
Keywords: Experience and Expertise;
Decision Choices and Conditions;
Forecasting and Prediction;
Mathematical Methods;
Risk and Uncertainty;
Competition;
Citation: Erev, Ido, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West, and Christian Lebiere. " A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description." Special Issue on Decisions from Experience. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 23, no. 1 (January 2010).
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Journal Article
| Games
|
A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction
Ido Erev, Eyal Ert and Alvin E. Roth
A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of several baseline models. The experimental results reveal the robustness of eight behavioral tendencies that were documented in previous studies of market entry games and individual decisions from experience. The best baseline model (I-SAW) assumes reliance on small samples of experiences, and strong inertia when the recent results are not surprising. The competition experiment will be run in May 2010 (after the completion of this introduction), but they will not be revealed until September. To participate in the competition, researchers are asked to E-mail the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competition will be invited to publish a paper that describes their model.
Keywords: Experience and Expertise;
Decision Choices and Conditions;
Forecasting and Prediction;
Learning;
Market Entry and Exit;
Game Theory;
Behavior;
Competition;
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Journal Article
| American Economic Review
|
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tie breaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions;
Secondary Education;
Marketplace Matching;
Performance Efficiency;
Mathematical Methods;
Motivation and Incentives;
Strategy;
Balance and Stability;
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Article
| American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
|
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance
Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Markets;
Performance;
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Article
| New England Journal of Medicine
|
A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain
Michael A. Rees, Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Unver and Robert A. Montgomery
Citation: Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, et al. " A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain." New England Journal of Medicine 360, no. 11 (March 12, 2009): 1096–1101.
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Article
| Games and Economic Behavior
|
If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design
Brit Grosskopf and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Contracts;
Design;
Rights;
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Article
| Gastroenterology
|
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: The First Two Years
Muriel Niederle, Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Health;
Education;
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Journal Article
| Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery: American Volume
|
Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?
Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu
Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were dissolved by the NRMP due to the gradual decline in participation, leaving approximately seventy percent of applicants in a non-match, decentralized system. This leaves Hand Surgery, Shoulder and Elbow, and Foot and Ankle as the only three orthopaedic subspecialties still in some match program. This has created an extremely complicated hiring environment for all residents. This paper focuses on the current state of fellowship employment and hiring in orthopaedic surgery, on the likely effects of reinstituting a match, and on how this might be accomplished. For this purpose, we present the results of surveys we conducted of fellowship directors and residents, discuss how the present market for orthopaedic surgery fellows resembles the market for medical residents prior to the introduction of the NRMP, and discuss how another fellowship market has successfully reinstituted a match after experiencing a comparable failure.
Keywords: Medical Specialties;
Recruitment;
Selection and Staffing;
Employment;
Market Timing;
Marketplace Matching;
Health Industry;
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Article
| International Journal of Game Theory
|
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.
Keywords: History;
Market Design;
Labor;
System;
Practice;
Performance;
Theory;
Boston;
New York (city, NY);
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Journal Article
| Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society)
|
What Have We Learned from Market Design?
Alvin E. Roth
This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.
Keywords: Risk Management;
Market Design;
Market Participation;
Market Transactions;
Failure;
Safety;
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Article
| RAND Journal of Economics
|
Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls
Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Keywords: Entertainment;
Sports Industry;
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Article
| Economic Theory
|
Learning and Equilibrium as Useful Approximations: Accuracy of Prediction on Randomly Selected Constant Sum Games
Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, R. Slonim and Greg Barron
Keywords: Learning;
Forecasting and Prediction;
Outcome or Result;
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Journal Article
| Harvard Business Review
|
The Art of Designing Markets
Alvin E. Roth
Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design—a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created market-like allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets—like those for jobs and dating—proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.
Keywords: Market Design;
Market Participation;
Market Transactions;
Information Technology;
Online Technology;
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market
A. E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.
Keywords: Organizational Structure;
Size;
Emotions;
Human Needs;
Health Care and Treatment;
Health Testing and Trials;
Infrastructure;
Supply Chain Management;
Fairness;
Performance Improvement;
Health Industry;
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Article
| Journal of Economic Perspectives
|
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Markets;
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Article
| Artificial Intelligence
|
Multi-agent Learning and the Descriptive Value of Simple Models
Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Value;
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Article
| University of Chicago Law Review
|
The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Markets;
Jobs and Positions;
Law;
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Article
| American Journal of Transplantation
|
Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through 'Chain' Paired Kidney Exchanges
Alvin E Roth, Tayfun Sonmez, M. Utku Unver, Francis L. Delmonico and Susan L. Saidman
Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy;
Health Care and Treatment;
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Cooperation;
Learning;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
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Article
| Games and Economic Behavior
|
Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction
Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Bids and Bidding;
Auctions;
Online Technology;
Theory;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
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Article
| Transplantation
|
Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges
Susan L. Saidman, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver and Francis L. Delmonico
Keywords: Opportunities;
Health;
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Article
| Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control
|
The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market
Ernan E. Haruvy, Alvin E Roth and M. Utku Unver
Keywords: Law;
Information;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Markets;
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Article
| Gastroenterology
|
What Will Be Needed for the New GI Fellowship Match to Succeed?
Muriel Niederle, Deborah D. Proctor and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Health;
Education;
Success;
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Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
Pairwise Kidney Exchange
A. E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver
Keywords: Health;
Health Industry;
Citation: Roth, A. E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver. " Pairwise Kidney Exchange." Journal of Economic Theory 125, no. 2 (December 2005): 151–188.
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)
C. Nicholas McKinney, Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Health;
Labor;
Failure;
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
The New York City High School Match
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Education;
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
The Boston Public School Match
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Keywords: Education;
Boston;
Citation: Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. " The Boston Public School Match." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 368–371.
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?
Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Health;
Education;
Markets;
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Article
| American Economic Review
|
A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England
Alvin E Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver
Keywords: Health;
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Article
| RAND Journal of Economics
|
An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions
Dan Ariely, Axel Ockenfels and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Theory;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Online Technology;
Web;
Auctions;
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Article
| Journal of Economic Education
|
Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered via the Internet
John Asker, Brit Grosskopf, C. Nicholas McKinney, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and George Weizsäcker
Keywords: Teaching;
Auctions;
Strategy;
Online Technology;
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Article
| Management Science
|
Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions
Elena Katok and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Auctions;
Goods and Commodities;
Profit;
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Article
| Gastroenterology
|
The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How It Failed, and Why It Could Succeed Once Again
Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Health;
Education;
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Article
| Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
Kidney Exchange
Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Ünver
Keywords: Health Care and Treatment;
Health Industry;
Citation: Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, and Utku Ünver. " Kidney Exchange." Quarterly Journal of Economics 19, no. 2 (May 2004): 457–488.
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Journal Article
| Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
|
The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective
Charles A. Holt and Alvin E. Roth
Citation: Holt, Charles A., and Alvin E. Roth. " The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101, no. 12 (March 23, 2004): 3999–4002.
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Article
| Journal of Political Economy
|
Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match
Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Labor;
Markets;
Health Care and Treatment;
Health Industry;
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Article
| Games and Economic Behavior
|
Bargaining under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game
Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
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Article
| Experimental Economics
|
Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games
David J. Cooper, Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth and Rami Zwick
Keywords: Strategy;
Behavior;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
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Article
| JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association
|
Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships
Muriel Niederle and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits;
Education;
Learning;
Health Industry;
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Article
| JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association
|
The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Health Industry;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet
Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels
Keywords: Auctions;
Bids and Bidding;
Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;
Web;
Online Technology;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation As Tools of Design Economics
Alvin E Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
Economics;
Mathematical Methods;
Design;
-
Article
| International Journal of Forecasting
|
Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models
Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim and Greg Barron
Keywords: Value;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Theory;
-
Article
| AI Magazine
|
The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents
Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Auctions;
Bids and Bidding;
Online Technology;
Markets;
Design;
Behavior;
Web;
-
Article
| University of Chicago Law Review
|
The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
A. E. Roth, Christopher Avery and Christine Jolls
Keywords: Jobs and Positions;
Law;
-
Article
| Behavioral and Brain Sciences
|
Form and Function in Experimental Design
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Design;
-
Article
| Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment
John H. Kagel and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Markets;
Restructuring;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
A. E. Roth and E. Peranson
Keywords: Design;
Markets;
Health;
Engineering;
Economics;
United States;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
|
The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning
Ido Erev, Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Learning;
Information;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants
A. E. Roth and U. G. Rothblum
Keywords: Strategy;
Markets;
Communication;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria
Ido Erev and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Forecasting and Prediction;
Learning;
Strategy;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
R. Slonim and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Learning;
Slovakia;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets
Y. Blum, A. E. Roth and U. G. Rothblum
Keywords: Labor;
Markets;
Balance and Stability;
-
Article
| JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association
|
The Effects of the Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm
A. E. Roth and Elliott Peranson
Keywords: Change;
Mathematical Methods;
-
Article
| Journal of Political Economy
|
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in he Market for Clinical Psychologists
A. E. Roth and X. Xing
Keywords: Markets;
Health;
-
Article
| Revista de econometria
|
Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Citation: Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment." Revista de econometria 16, no. 2 (November 1996): 1–24.
-
Article
| JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association
|
The National Resident Matching Program as a Labor Market
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Labor;
Markets;
Programs;
-
Article
| Games and Economic Behavior
|
Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term
A. E. Roth and I. Erev
Keywords: Learning;
Data and Data Sets;
-
Article
| Empirical Economics
|
Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions
A. E. Roth and X. Xing
Keywords: Market Transactions;
-
Article
| SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
|
Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
A. E. Roth, U. G. Rothblum and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords: Mathematical Methods;
-
Article
| Journal of the History of Economic Thought
|
On the Early History of Experimental Economics
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Business History;
Economics;
-
Article
| Quarterly Journal of Economics
|
Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games
V. Prasnikar and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Fairness;
Strategy;
Data and Data Sets;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment
J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Auctions;
Information;
Behavior;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study
A. E. Roth, V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and S. Zamir
Keywords: Markets;
Behavior;
Information;
Israel;
Pittsburgh;
Tokyo;
Slovenia;
-
Article
| Economic Theory
|
Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms
A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives;
-
Article
| Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society)
|
Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Theory;
Economics;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Labor;
Markets;
Health;
United Kingdom;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism
S. Mongell and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Groups and Teams;
-
Article
| Science (Weekly)
|
New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Markets;
Organizations;
Health Care and Treatment;
Health Industry;
-
Journal Article
| Econometrica
|
Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
A. E. Roth and J. H. Vande Vate
-
Article
| Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
|
Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty;
Relationships;
Negotiation;
-
Journal Article
| Games and Economic Behavior
|
Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences
A. E. Roth
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining
J. Ochs and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
The College Admissions Problem Revisited
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Higher Education;
Problems and Challenges;
-
Article
| Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society)
|
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
Information;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence
A. E. Roth, J. K. Murnighan and F. Schoumaker
Keywords: Negotiation;
Information;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Keywords: Markets;
-
Article
| Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
|
Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
J. K. Murnighan, A. E. Roth and F. Schoumaker
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty;
Information;
-
Journal Article
| Econometrica
|
On the Non-Transferable Utility: A Replay to Aumann
A. E. Roth
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Health;
Markets;
Health Industry;
-
Article
| Economics Letters
|
A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints
S. J. Mongell and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Budgets and Budgeting;
-
Article
| Negotiation Journal
|
Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternatives: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Cognition and Thinking;
Labor and Management Relations;
Negotiation;
Entertainment;
Sports Industry;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternatives: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball." Negotiation Journal 1, no. 4 (October 1985): 359–362.
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
The College Admissions Problem Is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Problems and Challenges;
Higher Education;
-
Article
| Negotiation Journal
|
Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements
A. E. Roth
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements." Negotiation Journal 1, no. 3 (July 1985): 245–247.
-
Article
| European Economic Review
|
Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Conflict of Interests;
Markets;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty;
Negotiation;
-
Article
| Mathematics of Operations Research
|
Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Conflict and Resolution;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Balance and Stability;
Problems and Challenges;
-
Article
| Journal of Political Economy
|
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Labor;
Markets;
Theory;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Employment;
-
Article
| Management Science
|
Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Some Further Comment
A. E. Roth and F. Schoumaker
Keywords: Theory;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| American Economic Review
|
Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
A. E. Roth and F. Schoumaker
Keywords: Negotiation;
Reputation;
-
Article
| Science (Weekly)
|
Towards a Theory of Bargaining: An Experimental Study in Economics
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Information;
Economics;
-
Article
| Journal of Conflict Resolution
|
Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Three Models
J. K. Murnighan and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
A. E. Roth and J. K. Murnighan
Keywords: Information;
-
Article
| Mathematical Social Sciences
|
Scale Changes and Shared Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
A. E. Roth and M. Malouf
Keywords: Change;
Information;
Negotiation;
-
Article
| Journal of Risk and Insurance
|
Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts
R. Kihlstrom and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty;
Negotiation;
Insurance;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
A. E. Roth and U. Rothblum
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty;
Negotiation;
Outcome or Result;
-
Article
| Economics Letters
|
Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Motivation and Incentives;
Markets;
Goods and Commodities;
-
Article
| Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
|
A Note on the Maximum Value of Two Person, Zero-Sum Games
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Value;
-
Article
| Mathematics of Operations Research
|
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Balance and Stability;
Motivation and Incentives;
Economics;
-
Article
| Bell Journal of Economics
|
Strike Two: Labor Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball
L. M. DeBrock and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: Labor and Management Relations;
Negotiation;
Entertainment;
Sports Industry;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
|
Sociological Versus Strategic Factors in Bargaining
A. E. Roth, M. Malouf and J. K. Murnighan
Keywords: Strategy;
Society;
Negotiation;
-
Article
| Journal of Conflict Resolution
|
Disagreement in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
M. Malouf and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Value;
Money;
Information;
-
Article
| Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
|
The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game
J. K. Murnighan and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Groups and Teams;
Negotiation;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Communication;
-
Article
| International Journal of Game Theory
|
An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Problems and Challenges;
-
Article
| Journal of Accounting Research
|
The Shapley Value as Applied to Cost Allocation: A Reinterpretation
A. E. Roth and R. E. Verrecchia
Keywords: Value;
Cost;
-
Article
| Algebra Universalis
|
An Extension and Simple Proof of a Constrained Lattice Fix-Point Theorem
C. Blair and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Mathematical Methods;
-
Article
| Psychological Review
|
Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining
A. E. Roth and M. K. Malouf
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Negotiation;
Information;
-
Article
| Journal of Conflict Resolution
|
Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game
J. K. Murnighan and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Groups and Teams;
Negotiation;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Article
| Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B
|
Two Person Games on Graphs
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Journal of Mathematical Psychology
|
Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma
A. E. Roth and J. K. Murnighan
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Behavior;
-
Article
| Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
|
A Note Concerning Asymmetric Games on Graphs
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
Utility Functions for Simple Games
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Journal of Economic Theory
|
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Problems and Challenges;
-
Article
| Journal of Mathematical Psychology
|
Bargaining Ability, the Utility of Playing a Game, and Models of Coalition Formation
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
|
A Note on Values and Multilinear Extensions
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Value;
-
Article
| Management Science
|
The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three Person Game
J. K. Murnighan and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Communication;
Information;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Journal of Mathematical Economics
|
Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods
A. E. Roth and A. Postlewaite
Keywords: Markets;
Goods and Commodities;
-
Article
| Econometrica
|
The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Value;
Mathematical Methods;
-
Article
| Mathematics of Operations Research
|
Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Problems and Challenges;
-
Article
| SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics
|
Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
-
Article
| Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society
|
A Lattice Fixed-Point Theorem with Constraints
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Mathematical Methods;
-
Chapter
| The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics
| Forthcoming
Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?
Alvin E. Roth
The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.
Keywords: Economics;
History;
Science;
Citation: Roth, Alvin E. "Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" In The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, edited by Guillaume R. Frechette, and Andrew Schotter. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
-
Chapter
| The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics
| Forthcoming
Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?
Alvin E. Roth
The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.
Keywords: Economics;
History;
Science;
Citation: Roth, Alvin E. "Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" In The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, edited by Guillaume R. Frechette, and Andrew Schotter. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
-
Chapter
| The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics
| Forthcoming
Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?
Alvin E. Roth
The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.
Keywords: Economics;
History;
Science;
Citation: Roth, Alvin E. "Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" In The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, edited by Guillaume R. Frechette, and Andrew Schotter. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
-
Chapter
| Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Transplant Recipients
| 2010
New Sources in Living Kidney Donation
Ruthanne L. Hanto, Alvin E. Roth, M. Utku Ünver and Francis L. Delmonico
Keywords: Health Care and Treatment;
Giving and Philanthropy;
Health Industry;
-
Chapter
| Better Living through Economics
| 2010
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice
Alvin E. Roth
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.
Keywords: Labor;
Market Design;
Marketplace Matching;
Failure;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice." In Better Living through Economics, edited by John J. Siegfried, 206–222. Harvard University Press, 2010.
-
Chapter
| Studies of Labor Market Intermediation
| 2009
The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating and when it was not. After the GI match ended, the market unraveled. Contracts were signed earlier each year, at diffuse times, often with exploding offers. The market became less national, more local. This allows us to discern the effect of the clearinghouse: it coordinated the timing of the market in a way that increased its thickness and scope. The clearinghouse does not seem to have had an effect on wages. As this became known among gastroenterologists, an opportunity arose to reorganize the market to once again use a centralized clearinghouse. However it proved necessary to adopt policies that would allow employers to safely delay hiring and coordinate on using the clearinghouse. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.
Keywords: Labor;
Market Timing;
Marketplace Matching;
Failure;
Citation: Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." In Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, edited by David H. Autor, 273–306. University of Chicago Press, 2009.
-
Chapter
| The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
| 2008
Matching and Market Design
Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix market failures. Studying how markets fail also gives us insight into how market places work well. They need to provide a thick, uncongested market in which it is safe to participate. Clearinghouses that do this have been designed for many entry-level professional labor markets, for the assignment of children to public schools, and for exchange of live-donor kidneys for transplantation if available.
Keywords: Market Design;
Marketplace Matching;
Outcome or Result;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "Matching and Market Design." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd ed. Edited by Steven Derlauf, and Larry Blume. Hampshire, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
-
Chapter
| Social Psychology and Economics
| 2006
Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration
J. Keith Murnighan and Alvin E. Roth
Keywords: History;
Social Psychology;
Collaborative Innovation and Invention;
Economics;
Citation: Murnighan, J. Keith, and Alvin E. Roth. "Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration." In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by David de Cremer, J. Keith Murnighan, and Marcel Zeelenberg, 321–333. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006.
-
Chapter
| Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership
| 2005
Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care
Alvin E Roth
Keywords: Health Care and Treatment;
Resource Allocation;
Health Industry;
Citation: Roth, Alvin E. "Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care." In Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership, edited by P. Reid, W. Compton, J. Grossman, and G. Fanjiang, 237–239. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005.
-
Chapter
| Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory
| 2000
Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
Market Design;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design." In Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory, edited by Fioravante Patrone, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, and Stef Tijs, 7–18. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
-
Chapter
| Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport
| 1999
On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach
Ido Erev and A. E. Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
Cognition and Thinking;
Learning;
Citation: Erev, Ido, and A. E. Roth. "On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach." In Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick, 53–77. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999.
-
Chapter
| The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference
| 1996
Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Attitudes;
Behavior;
Strategy;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field." In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference, edited by K. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt, 255–273. Macmillan Publishers, 1996.
-
Chapter
| Handbook of Experimental Economics
| 1995
Introduction to Experimental Economics
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
-
Chapter
| Handbook of Experimental Economics
| 1995
Bargaining Experiments
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Citation: Roth, A. E. " Bargaining Experiments." In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John Kagel, and Alvin E. Roth, 253–348. Princeton University Press, 1995.
-
Chapter
| Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
| 1992
Two Sided Matching
A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor
Citation: Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. " Two Sided Matching." In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edited by Robert Aumann, and Sergiu Hart, 485–541. Elsevier/North-Holland, 1992.
-
Chapter
| Handbook of Negotiation Research
| 1991
An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Economics;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining." In Handbook of Negotiation Research. Vol. 3, edited by M. H. Bazerman, R. J. Lewicki, and B. H. Sheppard, 35–67. Research on Negotiation in Organizations. JAI Press, 1991.
-
Chapter
| Game Theory and Applications
| 1990
Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Marketplace Matching;
Two-Sided Platforms;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence." In Game Theory and Applications, edited by T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman, and Y. Tauman, 232–251. San Diego: Academic Press, 1990.
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Chapter
| The Shapely Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley
| 1988
The Expected Utility of Playing a Game
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Motivation and Incentives;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "The Expected Utility of Playing a Game." In The Shapely Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, edited by A. E. Roth, 51–70. Cambridge University Press, 1988.
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Chapter
| Laboratory Experiments in Economics: Six Points of View
| 1987
Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Theory;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory." In Laboratory Experiments in Economics: Six Points of View, edited by A. E. Roth, 14–41. Cambridge University Press, 1987.
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Chapter
| Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World of Congress
| 1987
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
Research;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics." In Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World of Congress, edited by Truman Bewley, 269–299. Cambridge University Press, 1987.
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Chapter
| Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective
| 1987
Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Economics;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory." In Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, edited by Nicholas Rescher, 147–167. Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1987.
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Chapter
| Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
| 1985
Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Negotiation;
Game Theory;
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Chapter
| Coalitions and Collective Action
| 1984
Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Alliances;
Balance and Stability;
Theory;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory." In Coalitions and Collective Action, edited by M. Holler, 228–234. Wuerzberg: Physica-Verlag, 1984.
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Chapter
| Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making: Proceedings, Winzenhohl, FRG
| 1983
Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining
A. E. Roth and J. K. Murnighan
Keywords: Negotiation;
Information;
Motivation and Incentives;
Citation: Roth, A. E., and J. K. Murnighan. "Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining." In Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making: Proceedings, Winzenhohl, FRG, edited by R. Tietz. Springer-Verlag, 1983.
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Chapter
| Game Theory and Mathematical Economics
| 1981
Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
R. Kihlstrom, A. E. Roth and D. Schmeidler
Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty;
Negotiation;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Kihlstrom, R., A. E. Roth, and D. Schmeidler. "Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem." In Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin, and D. Pallaschke, 65–71. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1981.
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Chapter
| Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis
| 1980
The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Mathematical Methods;
Negotiation Style;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining." In Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis, edited by A. V. Fiacco, and K.O. Kortanek, 306–311. Springer-Verlag, 1980.
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Chapter
| Game Theory and Political Science
| 1978
Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Power and Influence;
Status and Position;
Game Theory;
Games, Gaming, and Gambling;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game." In Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. C. Ordeshook. New York: New York University Press, 1978.
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Chapter
| Fixed Points: Algorithms and Applications
| 1977
A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games
A. E. Roth
Keywords: Game Theory;
Balance and Stability;
Cooperation;
Citation: Roth, A. E. "A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games." In Fixed Points: Algorithms and Applications, edited by S. Karamardian, 165–180. Academic Press, 1977.
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Working Paper
| 2012
The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange
Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth
It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has grown in practice, cycles among n>3 pairs have proved useful, and long chains initiated by non-directed, altruistic donors have proven to be very effective. We explore why this is the case, both empirically and theoretically. We provide an analytical model of exchange when there are many highly sensitized patients and show that large cycles of exchange or long chains can significantly increase efficiency when the opportunities for exchange are sparse. As very large cycles of exchange cannot be used in practice, long non-simultaneous chains initiated by non-directed donors significantly increase efficiency in patient pools of the size and composition that presently exist. Most importantly, long chains benefit highly sensitized patients without harming low-sensitized patients.
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Working Paper
| 2011
Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange
Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.
Keywords: Health Care and Treatment;
Resource Allocation;
Market Participation;
Marketplace Matching;
Organizations;
Networks;
Motivation and Incentives;
Health Industry;
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Working Paper
| 2010
Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions
Alvin E. Roth
This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. I'll conclude with open questions about the role of marketplace institutions and the timing of transactions.
Keywords: Talent and Talent Management;
Market Timing;
Market Transactions;
Marketplace Matching;
Competitive Strategy;
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Working Paper
| HBS Working Paper Series
| 2010
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.
Keywords: Labor;
Marketplace Matching;
Quality;
Competition;
Balance and Stability;
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Working Paper
| HBS Working Paper Series
| 2010
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried
This paper provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the American Economic Association (AEA) in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based "scramble" to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information.
Keywords: Cost Management;
Information;
Surveys;
Jobs and Positions;
Job Interviews;
Job Search;
Emerging Markets;
Market Platforms;
Service Operations;
Search Technology;
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Working Paper
| 2010
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
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Working Paper
| 2009
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.
Keywords: Labor;
Marketplace Matching;
Quality;
Competition;
Balance and Stability;
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Working Paper
| 2007
The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth
New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, programs hired fellows earlier each year, eventually almost a year earlier than when the match was operating. It became customary for GI program directors to make very short offers, rarely exceeding two weeks and often much shorter. Consequently many potential fellows had to accept positions before they finished their planned interviews, and most programs experienced cancellations of interviews they had scheduled. Furthermore, without a match, many programs hired more local fellows, and fewer from other hospitals and cities than they did during the match. Wages, however, seem not to have been affected. To restart the match, we proposed a policy, subsequently adopted by the gastroenterology professional organizations, that even if applicants had accepted offers prior to the match, they could subsequently decline those offers and participate in the match. This made it safe for programs to delay hiring until the match, confident that programs that did not participate would not be able to "capture" the most desirable candidates beforehand. Consequently it appears that most programs waited for the match in an orderly way in 2006, when the GI match was reinstated. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.
Keywords: Health;
Employment;
Marketplace Matching;
Selection and Staffing;
Job Offer;
Compensation and Benefits;
Health Industry;
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Working Paper
| 2006
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez
Citation: Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 11965, January 2006.
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