Elon Kohlberg

Royal Little Professor of Business Administration

Elon Kohlberg is the Royal Little Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School. His research is mainly in Game Theory, in particular the study of non-cooperative equilibrium.

Professor Kohlberg has taught many courses in the MBA, Ph.D., and executive programs at Harvard Business School, including, Managerial Economics, Competitive Decision Making, Strategy, and Finance.  He is currently teaching the Advanced Microeconomics course in the doctoral program, as well as the elective MBA course Games of Chance and Games of Strategy.

Professor Kohlberg serves on the board of directors of Medinol and Digi-Block, Inc.  Previously, he served on the boards of Teva Pharmaceuticals and Ormat Technologies.

He received a B.Sc., M.Sc., and Ph.D. in mathematics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Journal Articles

Book Chapters

  1. The Future Evolution of the Central Office Switching Industry

    Keywords: Innovation and Invention; Communication Technology; Forecasting and Prediction; Telecommunications Industry;

    Citation:

    Hausman, Jerry A., and Elon Kohlberg. "The Future Evolution of the Central Office Switching Industry." In Future Competition in Telecommunications, edited by Stephen P. Bradley and Jerry A. Hausman. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1989. View Details

Working Papers

  1. The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games

    Since the seminal paper of Shapley, the theory of stochastic games has been developed in many different directions. However, there has been practically no work on the interplay between stochastic games and cooperative game theory. Our purpose here is to make a first step in this direction. We show that the Harsanyi-Shapley-Nash cooperative solution to one-shot strategic games can be extended to stochastic games. While this extension applies to general n-person stochastic games, it does not rely on Nash equilibrium analysis in such games. Rather, it only makes use of minmax analysis in two-person (zero-sum) stochastic games. This will become clear in the sequel.

    Citation:

    Kohlberg, Elon, and Abraham Neyman. "The NTU-Value of Stochastic Games." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 15-014, September 2014. View Details
  2. Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game

    Noncooperative games are examined from the point of view of an outside observer who believes that the players are rational and that they know at least as much as the observer. The observer is assumed to be able to observe many instances of the play of the game; these instances are identical in the sense that the observer cannot distinguish between the settings in which different plays occur. If the observer does not believe that he will be able to offer beneficial advice then he must believe that the players are playing a correlated equilibrium, though he may not initially know which correlated equilibrium. If the observer also believes that, in a certain sense, there is nothing connecting the players in a particular instance of the game then he must believe that the correlated equilibrium they are playing is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Game Theory; Cooperation;

    Citation:

    Hillas, John, Elon Kohlberg, and John W. Pratt. "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08-005, July 2007. View Details

Cases and Teaching Materials

Other Publications and Materials