George P. Baker

Senior Lecturer of Business Administration

George P. Baker is a Senior Lecturer at Harvard Business School. Until 2010, he was the Herman C. Krannert Professor of Business Administration. He has published works on management incentives, leveraged buyouts, organizational economics, and the relationship between a firm's ownership structure and its management. Baker's work focuses on the problem of managerial performance measurement, and its role in the design of incentive systems and on the structure and performance of organizations. He is also the author of a book on the firm of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. published by Cambridge University Press. Baker is currently working in the clean tech industry, and teaches a course on renewable energy.

Journal Articles

  1. Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between 'Islands of Conscious Power'

    Strategic alliances range from unstructured collaborations, through consortia and joint ventures that superimpose new governance structures on existing firms, to transactions that restructure firm boundaries and asset ownership. In this paper, we draw on detailed discussions with practitioners to describe and analyze a rich collection of feasible governance structures. Our model focuses on two issues emphasized by practitioners: spillover effects (as opposed to hold-ups motivated by specific investments) and contracting problems ex post (as opposed to only ex ante). By considering the allocation of assets, decision rights, and payoffs, we generate a large number of potential governance structures, including strategic divestitures, total divestitures, licensing agreements, and royalty agreements. For the broad range of parameter values and payoff functions we consider, we show that each of these possible strategic alliances could be optimal. We expect that, given institutional knowledge about a particular setting, our broad theoretical framework can be specialized to deliver testable predictions for that setting (as has occurred in some analogous work on vertical integration, for example).

    Keywords: Governance; Contracts; Agreements and Arrangements; Alliances; Strategy; Theory;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Strategic Alliances: Bridges Between 'Islands of Conscious Power'." Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 22, no. 2 (June 2008): 146–163.
  2. The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers

    Keywords: Change; Law; Employees; Personal Development and Career; Organizational Structure; Legal Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Rachel Parkin. "The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers." North Carolina Law Review 84 (May 2006).
  3. Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking

    Keywords: Assets; Ownership; Technology; Governance; Contracts; Transportation Industry; United States;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Thomas Hubbard. "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking." Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 4 (November 2004).
  4. CEO Incentives and Firm Size

    Keywords: Management; Motivation and Incentives; Size; Business Ventures;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Brian J. Hall. "CEO Incentives and Firm Size." Journal of Labor Economics (October 2004).
  5. Make v. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information

    Keywords: Assets; Ownership; Jobs and Positions; Design; Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Thomas Hubbard. "Make v. Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information." American Economic Review 93, no. 3 (June 2003).
  6. Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Motivation and Incentives; Contracts;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Journal of Human Resources 37, no. 4 (fall 2002).
  7. Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper

    Keywords: Economics;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Robert E. Kennedy. "Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 18, no. 2 (fall 2002).
  8. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

    Keywords: Contracts; Theory; Business Ventures;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics CXV, no. 1 (February 2002).
  9. Bringing the Market Inside the Firm?

    Keywords: Markets; Business Ventures;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Bringing the Market Inside the Firm?" American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (May 2001).
  10. Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm.

    Keywords: Strategy; Economics; Information; Business Ventures;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Thomas Hubbard. "Empirical Strategies in Contract Economics: Information and the Boundary of the Firm." American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (May 2001).
  11. The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting

    Keywords: Performance; Measurement and Metrics; Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P. "The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting." American Economic Review 90, no. 2 (May 2000).
  12. Informal Authority in Organizations

    Keywords: Organizations;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Informal Authority in Organizations." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 15, no. 1 (March 1999).
  13. Incentives and Cooperation: The Joint Effects of Task and Reward Interdependence on Group Performance

    Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Cooperation; Groups and Teams; Performance;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Ruth Wageman. "Incentives and Cooperation: The Joint Effects of Task and Reward Interdependence on Group Performance." Journal of Organizational Behavior 18, no. 2 (March 1997).
  14. Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Theory;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Bengt Holmstrom. "Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts." American Economic Review 85, no. 2 (January 1995).
  15. The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data

    Keywords: Economics; Business Ventures;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (November 1994).
  16. The Wage Policy of a Firm

    Keywords: Policy; Business Ventures; Wages;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. "The Wage Policy of a Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (November 1994).
  17. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

    Keywords: Performance; Motivation and Incentives; Measurement and Metrics;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (November 1994).
  18. Hierarchies and Compensation: A Case Study

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Michael Gibbs, and Bengt Holmstrom. "Hierarchies and Compensation: A Case Study." European Economic Review 37, nos. 2-3 (April 1993).
  19. Growth, Corporate Policies and the Investment Opportunity Set

    Keywords: Growth and Development; Policy; Investment;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P. "Growth, Corporate Policies and the Investment Opportunity Set." Journal of Accounting & Economics 16, nos. 1-3 (January–July 1993).
  20. Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value

    Keywords: Value;

  21. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement

    Keywords: Contracts; Performance; Measurement and Metrics; Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement." Journal of Political Economy (June 1992).
  22. Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott

    Keywords: Learning; Leveraged Buyouts;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Karen Wruck. "Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott." Continental Bank Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 4, no. 1 (spring 1991).
  23. Pay for Performance: Causes and Consequences

    Keywords: Performance;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P. "Pay for Performance: Causes and Consequences." Continental Bank Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 3, no. 3 (fall 1990).
  24. Organizational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of O.M. Scott & Sons Company

    Keywords: Change; Value; Borrowing and Debt; Financial Instruments; Leveraged Buyouts;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Karen Wruck. "Organizational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of O.M. Scott & Sons Company." Journal of Financial Economics 25 (December 1989).
  25. Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Motivation and Incentives; Practice; Theory;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory." Journal of Finance 63, no. 3 (July 1988): 593–616. (Reprinted in Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy, Harvard University Press, 1998.)
  26. Discussion of 'An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts'

    Keywords: Measurement and Metrics; Contracts; Markets; Executive Compensation; Accounting; Performance;

Book Chapters

  1. The Behavioral Economics of the Labor Market:Central Findings and Their Policy Implications by Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette, and Christian Zehnder

    Keywords: Economics; Behavior; Labor; Policy; Government and Politics;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P. Comment on "The Behavioral Economics of the Labor Market:Central Findings and Their Policy Implications by Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette, and Christian Zehnder." Policymaking Insights from Behavioral Economics, edited by Christopher L. Foote, Lorenz Goette, and Stephan Meier, 241–244. Boston, MA: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 2009.
  2. Leveraged Management Buyouts at KKR: Historical Perspectives on Patient Equity, Debt, Discipline, and LBO Governance.

    Keywords: Governance; History; Leveraged Buyouts; Executive Compensation; Borrowing and Debt;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and George Smith. "Leveraged Management Buyouts at KKR: Historical Perspectives on Patient Equity, Debt, Discipline, and LBO Governance." In Private Equity and Venture Capital, edited by Rick Lake and Ronald Lake. London: Euromoney Books, 2000.
  3. Organizations and Markets at Harvard Business School, 1984-1996

    Keywords: Higher Education; Markets; Organizations;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Michael C. Jensen, Carliss Y. Baldwin, and Karen H. Wruck. "Organizations and Markets at Harvard Business School, 1984-1996." In The Intellectual Venture Capitalist: John H. McArthur and the Work of the Harvard Business School, 1980-1995, edited by T. K. McCraw and J. L. Cruikshank. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999.
  4. Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott

    Keywords: Leveraged Buyouts;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Karen H. Wruck. "Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott." In Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance Systems: A Comparison of the U.S., Japan, and Europe, edited by Donald Chew. Oxford University Press, 1997.
  5. Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott

    Keywords: Leveraged Buyouts;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Karen H. Wruck. "Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott." In The New Corporate Finance: Where Theory Meets Practice, edited by D. Chew. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993.
  6. Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott

    Keywords: Leveraged Buyouts;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Karen H. Wruck. "Lessons from a Middle-Market LBO: The Case of O.M. Scott." In The Challenge of Organizational Change: How Companies Experience It and Leaders Guide It, by R. M. Kanter, B. Stein, and T. D. Jick. New York: Free Press, 1992.
  7. Organizational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of O.M. Scott & Sons Company

    Keywords: Leveraged Buyouts; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Value Creation;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Karen H. Wruck. "Organizational Changes and Value Creation in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of O.M. Scott & Sons Company." In Performance Measurement, Evaluation and Incentives, edited by William J. Bruns. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.

Working Papers

  1. Conglomerates and LBO Associations: A Comparison of Organizational Forms

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Cynthia A. Montgomery. "Conglomerates and LBO Associations: A Comparison of Organizational Forms." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-024, September 2009.
  2. Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Thomas Hubbard. "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in US Trucking." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7634, April 2000.
  3. Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Robert E. Kennedy. "Survivorship and the Economic Grim Reaper." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 99-088, February 1999.
  4. CEO Incentives and Firm Size

    What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO incentives (the dollar change in CEO wealth per dollar change in firm value) falls by a factor of ten between firms in the smallest and largest deciles in our sample, another measure of CEO incentives (the value of CEO equity stakes) increases by roughly the same magnitude. We resolve the confusion about which of these measures better reflects CEO incentives by developing and solving a model that allows CEO productivity to differ for firms of different sizes. The crucial parameter is shown to be the elasticity of CEO productivity with respect to firm size. Our empirical results suggest that CEO marginal products rise significantly, and overall CEO incentives are roughly constant or decline slightly with firm size. We also show that the appropriate measure of incentives depends on the type of CEO activity being considered. For activities whose dollar impact is the same for large and small firms (such as the purchase of a corporate jet), the dollars-on-dollars measure is appropriate, and large firms suffer significant agency problems due to their weak incentives. For activities whose percentage impact is similar across firms of different sizes (such as a corporate reorganization) the equity stake measure is better, and the incentive problem faced by large firms is not as severe. Finally, using a multi-task model, we discuss the implication of our findings for the design of control systems.

    Keywords: Business Ventures; Motivation and Incentives; Executive Compensation; Size; Management Systems;

    Citation:

    Hall, Brian, and George P. Baker. "CEO Incentives and Firm Size." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 6868, December 1998.
  5. CEO Incentives and Firm Size

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Brian J. Hall. "CEO Incentives and Firm Size." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 99-060, November 1998.

Cases and Teaching Materials

  1. O.M. Scott & Sons Co. Leveraged Buyout

    Documents the organizational changes that took place at O.M. Scott & Sons Co. in response to their leveraged buyout. Provides the opportunity for students to discuss the effects of high leverage on management decision making, and the differences between operating as a small subsidiary of a large conglomerate and as a free-standing company. Focuses on the role of the LBO sponsor in the management of the company, the role of restrictive debt covenants, and the effect of changes in the compensation system at the company.

    Keywords: Leveraged Buyouts; Capital Structure; Borrowing and Debt; Organizational Structure; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Management; Business Conglomerates; Cost of Capital; Financial Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, and Karen Wruck. "O.M. Scott & Sons Co. Leveraged Buyout." Harvard Business School Case 190-148, March 1990. (Revised November 2004.)
  2. K-III: A Leveraged Build-Up

    Explores the strategy, financing, and governance of a new type of organizational form, dubbed the Leveraged Build-Up by its inventor, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. The company makes leveraged acquisitions of small publishing companies, managing them in a very decentralized way. It has grown dramatically between 1989 and 1993. K-III's organization and governance structure combines many of the characteristics of leveraged buyouts with those of venture-backed companies. Each individual operating company is highly leveraged, achieving the discipline of debt and avoidance of free cash flow problems that otherwise plague pubishing companies. At the same time, the top management mandate is to acquire companies, requiring continual infusions of cash. Explores the tension between the debt repayment obligations and the demand for additional financing.

    Keywords: Debt Securities; Financial Management; Leveraged Buyouts; Cash Flow; Organizational Structure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Corporate Governance; Financial Strategy; Corporate Finance; Publishing Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, Nicola Bamford, and Nicolas Greenspan. "K-III: A Leveraged Build-Up." Harvard Business School Case 295-067, November 1994. (Revised May 2002.)
  3. RKO Warner Video, Inc.: Incentive Compensation Plan TN

    Teaching Note for (9-190-067).

    Keywords: Media; Compensation and Benefits; Media and Broadcasting Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "RKO Warner Video, Inc.: Incentive Compensation Plan TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 190-190, January 1990. (Revised October 1999.)
  4. Value Creation: Abridged

    Asks students to value a strategic plan while considering the capital investment required to complete the plan. Cummins Engine is used as an example.

    Keywords: Investment; Strategic Planning; Valuation; Value Creation;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, Michael C. Jensen, Karen Wruck, and Perry Fagan. "Value Creation: Abridged." Harvard Business School Case 898-185, March 1998.
  5. Employment and Social Welfare

    Keywords: Welfare or Wellbeing; Employment;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "Employment and Social Welfare." Harvard Business School Exercise 195-128, September 1994. (Revised November 1997.)
  6. Cambridge Technology Partners (A)

    Cambridge Technology Partners uses a highly innovative product strategy, supported by a human resources strategy, that has been very successful. However, high growth rates jeopardize product quality while tension about relative compensation levels between sales and operations threatens the firm's culture.

    Keywords: Growth Management; Compensation and Benefits; Organizational Culture; Quality; Human Resources; Relationships; Innovation and Invention; Consulting Industry; Massachusetts;

    Citation:

    Amabile, Teresa M., George P. Baker III, and Michael Beer. "Cambridge Technology Partners (A)." Harvard Business School Case 496-005, July 1995. (Revised April 1996.)
  7. Cambridge Technology Partners (B)

    Supplements the (A) case.

    Keywords: Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, Teresa M. Amabile, and Michael Beer. "Cambridge Technology Partners (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 496-006, July 1995. (Revised April 1996.)
  8. San Francisco Bay Consulting TN

    Teaching Note for (9-195-096).

    Keywords: Consulting Industry; Computer Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, and Karin B Monsler. "San Francisco Bay Consulting TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 195-263, June 1995.
  9. San Francisco Bay Consulting

    San Francisco Bay Consulting leads the field of economic consulting and litigation support in the application of powerful computers and cutting edge software to manipulate and analyze large data sets. The transfer pricing system, used to facilitate the purchasing and payment of computer resources, is falling apart as computer prices drop and consultant demands broaden. Researchers, forbidden to go outside for their hardware or software needs, range from frustrated to furious when they can't get the software they want or when transfer prices yield charges to clients that are greater than their computer's current market price. The case presents the company as it evaluates the system and discusses possible changes in pricing and sourcing policies.

    Keywords: Fair Value Accounting; Profit; Marketing; Fluctuation; Consulting Industry; Computer Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, and Karin B Monsler. "San Francisco Bay Consulting." Harvard Business School Case 195-096, July 1994. (Revised April 1995.)
  10. Visionary Design Systems: Are Incentives Enough? TN

    Teaching Note for (9-495-011).

    Keywords: San Francisco;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, and Karin B Monsler. "Visionary Design Systems: Are Incentives Enough? TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 495-050, April 1995.
  11. Visionary Design Systems: Are Incentives Enough?

    A compensation case about Visionary Design Systems (VDS), a small, high-tech full service systems integration firm based in Silicon Valley with eleven offices throughout the country. All employees, including engineers, administrators, and receptionists, received a significant portion of their income from commissions and bonuses, and all were shareholders. The company espoused a philosophy of empowerment, under which all employees were given substantial decision-making authority, and were expected to act in the interests of the firm. This case examines one group that, although it had both the authority and the incentives to exploit a new market opportunity, continued to wait for top management's instructions and approval before making decisions or taking action.

    Keywords: Decision Making; Cost vs Benefits; Compensation and Benefits; Employee Stock Ownership Plan; San Francisco;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, and Karin B Monsler. "Visionary Design Systems: Are Incentives Enough?" Harvard Business School Case 495-011, October 1994. (Revised April 1995.)
  12. RKO Warner Video, Inc.: Incentive Compensation Plan

    Details the design and implementation of an incentive bonus plan for video store managers. The problem for top management of the chain is to induce the store managers to "sweat the details," to keep the stores neat and well organized, and to deal courteously and efficiently with customers. The design of the bonus plan is simple: rather than try to measure the neatness of the stores or the quality of customer service directly, give the managers a fraction of the revenue from the store and let them worry about the details themselves. The case ends after a six-month experimental period with the new plan, and leaves the top managers of the chain saying that although revenues have increased, the store management has not improved in terms of managing the details.

    Keywords: Acquisition; Change; Strategic Planning; Performance Improvement; Sales; Management; Employee Relationship Management; Situation or Environment; Success; Motion Pictures and Video Industry; Entertainment and Recreation Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "RKO Warner Video, Inc.: Incentive Compensation Plan." Harvard Business School Case 190-067, October 1989. (Revised June 1993.)
  13. O.M. Scott & Sons Co. Leveraged Buyout, Teaching Note

    Teaching Note for (9-190-148).

    Keywords: Financial Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III, and Karen Wruck. "O.M. Scott & Sons Co. Leveraged Buyout, Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 191-216, June 1991.
  14. Charles River Co.

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "Charles River Co." Harvard Business School Case 189-179, May 1989. (Revised March 1990.)
  15. Four Star Management TN

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "Four Star Management TN." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 190-152, March 1990.
  16. McMullen and Worby (A) (Abridged)

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "McMullen and Worby (A) (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 190-025, August 1989.
  17. Charles River Co., Teaching Note

    Keywords: Teaching; Information;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "Charles River Co., Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 189-182, May 1989.
  18. Wilkinson Transport (A) and (B), Teaching Note

    Keywords: Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., III. "Wilkinson Transport (A) and (B), Teaching Note." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 190-153, April 1988. (Revised April 1988.)

Presentations

  1. Wage Policies and Incentives to Invest in Firm-Specific Human Capital

    Keywords: Wages; Policy; Motivation and Incentives; Human Capital;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Nancy D. Beaulieu, and Cristian Voicu. "Wage Policies and Incentives to Invest in Firm-Specific Human Capital." Paper presented at the HBS Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Seminar, Harvard Business School, November 02, 2005.

Other Publications and Materials

  1. Wage Policies and Incentives to Invest in Firm-Specific Human Capital

    Keywords: Human Capital; Wages; Investment; Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Cristian Voicu. "Wage Policies and Incentives to Invest in Firm-Specific Human Capital." January 2007.
  2. Volatility, Noise, and Incentives

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Bjorn Jorgensen. "Volatility, Noise, and Incentives." March 2003.
  3. Relational Contracts in Strategic Alliances

    Keywords: Contracts; Alliances;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. "Relational Contracts in Strategic Alliances." August 2002.
  4. Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information

    Keywords: Truck Transportation; Decision Choices and Conditions; Ownership; Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Thomas N. Hubbard. "Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information." January 2002.
  5. Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Thomas Hubbard. "Make versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design and Information."
  6. Conglomerates and LBO Associations: A Comparison of Organizational Forms

    Citation:

    Baker, George P., and Cynthia Montgomery. "Conglomerates and LBO Associations: A Comparison of Organizational Forms."