Assistant Professor of Business Administration
Hong Luo is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration in the Strategy Unit. She teaches the Strategy course in the MBA required curriculum.
Professor Luo’s research explores how innovators develop and commercialize their ideas, with an emphasis on how far an entrepreneur should develop an idea before selling it. Her findings have strategic implications both for the entrepreneurs and for the firms or investors who acquire their ideas.
Professor Luo received her Ph.D. in Economics from Stern School of Business, New York University, where she was a recipient of the Kauffman Dissertation Fellowship in Entrepreneurship Research. A native of China, she earned an MA in Economics from Beijing University and a BA in Finance from Renmin University of China.
When to Sell Your Idea: Theory and Evidence from the Movie Industry
I study a model of investment and sale of ideas and test its empirical implications using a novel data set from the market for original movie ideas. Consistent with the theoretical results, I find that buyers are reluctant to meet unproven sellers for early-stage ideas, which restricts sellers to either developing the ideas fully (to sell them later) or abandoning them. In contrast, experienced sellers can attract buyers at any stage and they sell worse ideas sooner and better ideas later. These results have important managerial implications for buyers and sellers and show that, in such contexts, policy interventions that discourage buyer participation—such as stronger intellectual-property protection—may diminish the market for ideas and hurt inexperienced sellers.
Entertainment and Recreation Industry;
Patent Publication and the Market for Ideas
In this paper, we study the effect of invention disclosure—through patent publication—on the market for ideas. We do so by analyzing the effects of the American Inventor's Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), which required U.S. patent applications be published 18 months after their filing date rather than at patent grant, on the timing of licensing deals in the biomedical industry. We find that post-AIPA, U.S. patent applications are significantly more likely to be licensed before patent grant and shortly after 18-month publication. Licensing delays are reduced by about ten months, on average, after AIPA's enactment. These findings suggest a hitherto unexplored benefit of the patent system: by requiring inventions to be published through a credible, standardized, and centralized repository, it mitigates information costs for buyers and sellers and thus facilitates transactions in the market for ideas.
Keywords: Market Transactions;
Innovation and Invention;
Invest in It or Wing It? The Value of Informed Pricing in the Secondary Market
This paper studies the managerial problem of dynamic pricing in the secondary durable-goods market, where sellers typically have limited information about item-specific heterogeneity. It develops a structural model of dynamic pricing that features the seller learning about item-specific demand through initial assessment and active learning in the sale process. The model is estimated using novel panel data of a leading used-car dealership. Policy experiments are conducted to quantify the value of the dealer's initial information about item-specific demand and of lowering the price-adjustment cost. With the dealer's average net profit per car in the estimation sample being around $740, the initial information about item-specific demand worth roughly $243, and cutting the dealer's price-adjustment cost by half would increase its profit by about $103.
Demand and Consumers;
Goods and Commodities;