Matthew Rhodes-Kropf

Associate Professor of Business Administration

Professor Matthew Rhodes-Kropf is an Associate Professor in the Entrepreneurial Management Unit at Harvard Business School, and a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Currently, Professor Rhodes-Kropf teaches courses on Venture Capital and Private Equity in the MBA elective curriculum and in executive education programs.  He was formerly the Daniel W. Stanton Associate Professor of Business at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business, where he received the Dean’s Award for Teaching Excellence.

Professor Rhodes-Kropf specializes in mergers and acquisitions, venture capital, and corporate governance. His work seeks to understand how capital markets interact with the creation of new firms, their financing, growth, governance, and their ultimate exit through a successful IPO or sale or through failure.  He has published in leading finance and economic journals, including The Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial Studies, The RAND Journal of Economics, and The Journal of Business. His 2004 paper "Market Valuation and Merger Waves," published in The Journal of Finance, was nominated for the Brattle Prize for Best Paper in Corporate Finance in 2005.

Professor Rhodes-Kropf is also an advisor or board member for Ada Investment Management, Correlation Ventures, Xenex, Neighborhood Trust, and Duke University’s Graduate School.

A graduate of Duke University, Professor Rhodes-Kropf holds a BA in computer science and economics and an MA and Ph.D. in economics.

 

Journal Articles

  1. The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity

    This paper explores the private equity and venture capital (VC) markets and extends the standard principal-agent problem between the investors and venture capitalist to show how it alters the interaction between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Since the investor-VC contract is set before the VC finds any investments, we show that it is the entrepreneur who must compensate the venture capitalist for any extra risk in the project even though it is the investor who requires the VC to hold the risk and even though the entrepreneur holds all of the market power in the model. Furthermore, although perfectly competitive investors expect zero alpha in equilibrium, the nature of the three way interaction results in a correlation between total risk and investor returns even net of fees. Thus, we show how and why diversifiable risk should be priced in VC deals even though investors are fully diversified. We then take our theory to a unique data set and show that while investors do earn zero alpha on average there is a strong correlation between realized risk and investor returns, exactly as predicted by the theory.

    Keywords: Price; Risk and Uncertainty; Venture Capital; Private Equity; Contracts; Investment; Competition; Agency Theory; Investment Return; Forecasting and Prediction; Theory; Diversification;

    Citation:

    Ewens, Michael, Charles Jones, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity." Review of Financial Studies (forthcoming).
  2. Governance and CEO Turnover: Do Something or Do the Right Thing?

    We study how corporate governance affects firm value through the decision of whether to fire or retain the CEO. We present a model in which weak governance—which prevents shareholders from controlling the board—protects inferior CEOs from dismissal, while at the same time insulates the board from pressures by biased or uninformed shareholders. Whether stronger governance improves retain/replace decisions depends on which of these effects dominates. We use our theoretical framework to assess the effect of governance on the quality of firing and hiring decisions using data on the CEO dismissals of large U.S. corporations during 1994–2007. Our findings are most consistent with a beneficent effect of weak governance on CEO dismissal decisions, suggesting that insulation from shareholder pressure may allow for better long-term decision making.

    Citation:

    Fisman, Ray, Rakesh Khurana, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Soojin Yim. "Governance and CEO Turnover: Do Something or Do the Right Thing?" Management Science (forthcoming).
  3. Investment Cycles and Startup Innovation

    We find that VC-backed firms receiving their initial investment in hot markets are more likely to go bankrupt, but conditional on going public are valued higher on the day of their IPO, have more patents, and have more citations to their patents. Our results suggest that VCs invest in riskier and more innovative startups in hot markets (rather than just worse firms). This is true even for the most experienced VCs. Furthermore, our results suggest that the flood of capital in hot markets also plays a causal role in shifting investments to more novel startups—by lowering the cost of experimentation for early stage investors and allowing them to make riskier, and more novel, investments.

    Keywords: venture capital; innovation; Market Cycles; Financing Risk; Business Startups; Venture Capital; Initial Public Offering; Investment; Innovation and Invention; Patents; Risk and Uncertainty;

    Citation:

    Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Investment Cycles and Startup Innovation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–032, December 2012. (Forthcoming, Journal of Financial Economics.)
  4. Concentrating on Governance

    This paper develops a novel trade-off view of corporate governance. Using a simple model that integrates agency costs and bargaining benefits of management friendly provisions, we identify the economic determinants of the resulting trade-offs for shareholder value. Consistent with the theory, our empirical analysis shows that provisions that allow managers to delay takeovers have a significant bargaining effect and a positive relation with shareholder value in concentrated industries. By contrast, non-delay provisions have an unambiguously negative relation with value, and more so in concentrated industries. Overall, our analysis suggests that there are governance trade-offs for shareholders, and industry concentration is an important determinant of their severity.

    Citation:

    Kadyrzhanova, Dalida, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Concentrating on Governance." Journal of Finance 66, no. 5 (October 2011): 1649–1685.
  5. The Market for Mergers and the Boundaries of the Firm

    We relate the property rights theory of the firm to empirical regularities in the market for mergers and acquisitions. We first show that high market-to-book acquirers typically do not purchase low market-to-book targets. Instead, mergers pair together firms with similar ratios. We then build a continuous-time model of investment and merger activity combining search, scarcity, and asset complementarity to explain this like-buys-like result. We test the model by relating like-buys-like to search frictions. Search frictions and assortative matching vary inversely, supporting the model over standard explanations.

    Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Assets; Investment; Property; Mathematical Methods; Boundaries;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and David Robinson. "The Market for Mergers and the Boundaries of the Firm." Journal of Finance 63, no. 3 (June 2008): 1169–1211.
  6. Do Funds-of-Funds Deserve Their Extra Fees?

    Since the after-fee returns of funds-of-funds are, on average, lower than hedge fund returns, it is easy to conclude that funds-of-funds do not add value compared to hedge funds. However, funds-of-funds should not be evaluated relative to hedge fund returns in publicly reported databases. Instead, the correct funds-of-funds benchmark is the set of direct hedge fund investments an investor could achieve on her own without recourse to funds-of-funds. We use asset allocation concepts to estimate characteristics of the funds-of-funds benchmark distribution. Since the benchmark characteristics are reasonable, we conclude that funds-of-funds, on average, deserve their fees-of-fees.

    Keywords: Investment Funds; Investment Return; Value; Assets; Resource Allocation;

    Citation:

    Ang, Andrew, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Rui Zhao. "Do Funds-of-Funds Deserve Their Extra Fees?" Journal of Investment Management 6, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 2008).
  7. A New Measure for Measuring

    Keywords: Measurement and Metrics;

    Citation:

    Ang, Andrew, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Rui Zhao. "A New Measure for Measuring." Alpha (July–August 2006).
  8. Price Improvement in Dealership Markets

    Price improvement refers to the practice whereby dealers order executions that improve on quoted prices. Why are these improvements given? Standard thinking is that competition causes dealers to give better prices to customers with less information. This paper contrasts this with a novel theory in which customers negotiate improvements and differential pricing arises from differences in customers' market power. Each theory impacts the formation of bid/ask spreads in empirically distinguishable ways. Understanding price improvement and its impact on market participants is critical the regulation of markets, particularly since equal execution is such an important stated goal of the SEC.

    Keywords: Price; Markets; Competition; Information; Customers; Negotiation; Mission and Purpose; Practice; Theory; Performance Improvement; Bids and Bidding; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew. "Price Improvement in Dealership Markets." Journal of Business 78, no. 4 (July 2005): 1137–1172.
  9. Valuation Waves and Merger Activity: The Empirical Evidence

    To test recent theories suggesting that valuation errors affect merger activity, we develop a decomposition that breaks the market-to-book ratio (M/B) into three components: the firm-specific pricing deviation from short-run industry pricing; sector-wide, short-run deviations from firms' long-run pricing; and long-run pricing to book. We find strong support for recent theories by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (forthcoming) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003), which predict that misvaluation drives mergers. So much of the behavior of M/B is driven by firmspecific deviations from short-run industry pricing, that long-run components of M/B run counter to the conventional wisdom: Low long-run value to book firms buy high long-run value-to-book firms. Misvaluation affects who buys whom, as well as method of payment, and combines with neoclassical explanations to explain aggregate merger activity.

    Keywords: Valuation; Mergers and Acquisitions; Forecasting and Prediction; Price; Theory; Behavior;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, David Robinson, and S. Viswanathan. "Valuation Waves and Merger Activity: The Empirical Evidence." Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005): 561–603.
  10. Financing Auction Bids

    In many auctions, bidders do not have enough cash to pay their bid. If bidders have asymmetric cash positions and independent private values then auctions will be inefficient. However, what happens if bidders have access to financial markets? We characterize efficient auctions and show that in an efficient auction the information rent that a bidder earns depends generally on both his valuation and his cash position. In contrast a competitive capital market that is efficient must have information rents that only depend on valuation. This tension between information rents in an efficient auction and zero profits in a competitive equilibrium implies that most often, competitive financing is not efficient.

    Keywords: Financing and Loans; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Financial Markets; Valuation; Cash; Capital Markets; Profit; Competition;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and S. Viswanathan. "Financing Auction Bids." RAND Journal of Economics 36, no. 4 (winter 2005): 789–815.
  11. Market Valuation and Merger Waves

    Does valuation affect mergers? Data suggest that periods of stock merger activity are correlated with high market valuations. The naïve explanation that overvalued bidders wish to use stock is incomplete because targets should not be eager to accept stock. However, we show that potential market value deviations from fundamental values on both sides of the transaction can rationally lead to a correlation between stock merger activity and market valuation. Merger waves and waves of cash and stock purchases can be rationally driven by periods of over- and undervaluation of the stock market. Thus, valuation fundamentally impacts mergers.

    Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Valuation; Market Transactions; Value; Cash; Stocks; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact; Bids and Bidding; Market Design; Stock Shares; Accounting Audits; Performance Evaluation;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and S. Viswanathan. "Market Valuation and Merger Waves." Journal of Finance 59, no. 6 (December 2004): 2685–2718.
  12. Corporate Reorganizations and Non-Cash Auctions

    This paper extends the theory of non-cash auctions by considering the revenue and efficiency of using different securities. Research on bankruptcy and privatization suggests using non-cash auctions to increase cash-constrained bidder participation. We examine this proposal and demonstrate that securities may lead to higher revenue. However, bidders pool unless bids include debt, which results in possible repossession by the seller. This suggests all-equity outcomes are unlikely and explains the high debt of reorganized firms. Securities also inefficiently determine bidders' incentive contracts and the firm's capital structure. Therefore, we recommend a new cash auction for an incentive contract.

    Keywords: Auctions; Revenue; Debt Securities; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Privatization; Capital Structure; Bids and Bidding; Motivation and Incentives; Performance Efficiency; Contracts;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and S. Viswanathan. "Corporate Reorganizations and Non-Cash Auctions." Journal of Finance 55, no. 4 (August 2000): 1807–1849.

Working Papers

  1. Is a VC Partnership Greater Than the Sum of Its Partners?

    This paper investigates whether individual venture capitalists have repeatable investment skill and to what extent their skill is impacted by the VC firm where they work. We examine a unique dataset that tracks the performance of individual venture capitalists' investments across time and as they move between firms. We find evidence of skill differences and exit style differences even among venture partners investing while employed at the same VC firm at the same time. Furthermore, our estimates suggest the partner's human capital is two to five times more important than the VC firm's organizational capital in explaining performance.

    Keywords: venture capital; Investing; Persistence; Performance Persistence; Theory of the Firm; Venture Capital; Organizations; Human Capital; Performance Evaluation;

    Citation:

    Ewens, Michael, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Is a VC Partnership Greater Than the Sum of Its Partners?" Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–097, April 2012. (Revised January 2013. Revise and Resubmit Journal of Finance.)
  2. Innovation and the Financial Guillotine

    We examine how investors' tolerance for failure impacts the types of projects they are willing to fund. We show that actions that reduce short-term accountability and thus encourage agents to experiment more simultaneously reduce the level of experimentation financial backers are willing to fund. Failure tolerance has an equilibrium price that increases in the level of experimentation. More experimental projects that don't generate enough to pay the price cannot be started. In fact, an endogenous equilibrium can arise in which all competing financiers choose to be failure tolerant in the attempt to attract entrepreneurs, leaving no capital to fund the most radical, experimental projects in the economy. The tradeoff between failure tolerance and a sharp guillotine help explain when and where radical innovation occurs.

    Keywords: innovation; venture capital; Investing; abandonment option; failure tolerance;

    Citation:

    Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Innovation and the Financial Guillotine." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–038, October 2012. (Revised November 2012.)
  3. Governing Misvalued Firms

    Equity overvaluation is thought to create the potential for manager misbehavior, while monitoring and corporate governance curb misbehavior. Thus, the effects of corporate governance should be greatest when firms become overvalued. We test this simple yet powerful idea. Using proxies of firm and industry price deviations from fundamentals and standard measures of corporate governance, we demonstrate that firm performance seems most impacted by governance when firm and industry deviations are high. Our findings suggest that misvaluation may modulate the fundamental governance relationship between shareholders and CEOs.

    Citation:

    Kadyrzhanova, Dalida, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Governing Misvalued Firms." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–037, October 2012.
  4. Financing Risk and Innovation

    Technological revolutions and waves of creative destruction are associated with new ventures and the destruction of mature firms, but also with the failure of numerous startups, suggesting a time of increased experimentation in the economy. We provide a model of investment into new ventures that demonstrates why some places, times and industries should be associated with a greater degree of experimentation by investors. Investors respond to increases in the forecasted probability of future funding by funding more innovative ideas. We propose that extremely novel technologies may need 'hot' finnancial markets to get through the initial period of discovery or diffusion.

    Keywords: Business Startups; Venture Capital; Financial Markets; Financing and Loans; Investment; Price Bubble; Innovation and Invention; Technological Innovation; Risk and Uncertainty;

    Citation:

    Nanda, Ramana, and Matthew Rhodes-Kropf. "Financing Risk and Innovation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11–013, August 2010. (Revised July 2012.)
  5. Financial vs. Strategic Buyers

    Within the great oscillations of overall merger activity there is a shifting pattern of activity between strategic (operating firms) and financial (private equity) acquirers. What are the economic factors that drive either financial or strategic buyers to dominant positions in M&A activity? We introduce debt market misvaluation in M&A activity. Debt misvaluation might seem limited since both types of acquirer (and the target) can access misvalued debt markets. However, moral hazard and insurance effect differences between types of buyers interact with potential debt misvaluation debt, leading to a dominance of financial versus strategic buyers that depends on debt market conditions.

    Keywords: Misvaluation; Mergers and Acquisitions; Private Equity;

    Citation:

    Martos-Vila, Marc, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Jarrad Harford. "Financial vs. Strategic Buyers." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–098, April 2012. (Revise and Resubmit Journal of Finance.)

Cases and Teaching Materials

  1. Brazos Partners and the Tri-Northern Exit

    Randall Fojtasek, a partner at the Dallas-based Brazos Private Equity Partners, must decide whether now is the time to sell his firm's investment in Tri-Northern Distribution. Brazos, a middle-market leveraged buyout group, created the company two years earlier through the acquisition of two electronic security distribution companies: Tri-Ed Distribution and Northern Video Systems. Twenty-four months after successfully integrating the two companies, Brazos has received two attractive offers for the combined distributor. With the company's management projecting double-digit growth for 2012, however, it is far from clear that now is the optimal time to exit for the firm's third fund.

    Keywords: Private Equity Exit; LBO; Leveraged Buyout Transaction; Texas; Distribution, Security; Brazos; Tri-Northern; Tri-Ed; Northern Video; private equity;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Nathaniel Burbank. "Brazos Partners and the Tri-Northern Exit." Harvard Business School Case 813-157, March 2013.
  2. Iris Running Crane: December 2009 (TN)

    Citation:

    Lerner, Josh, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Ann Leamon. "Iris Running Crane: December 2009 (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 812-087, December 2011.
  3. Grove Street Advisors: September 2009 (TN)

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Ann Leamon. "Grove Street Advisors: September 2009 (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 812-094, November 2011.
  4. VCPE Strategy Vignettes: 2012

    Keywords: Strategy;

    Citation:

    Lerner, Josh, Felda Hardymon, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Ann Leamon, and Lisa Strope. "VCPE Strategy Vignettes: 2012." Harvard Business School Compilation 812-073, November 2011.
  5. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and Lighthouse Capital Partners Spreadsheet Supplement (CW)

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew. "Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and Lighthouse Capital Partners Spreadsheet Supplement (CW)." Harvard Business School Spreadsheet Supplement 812-702, October 2011.
  6. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and Lighthouse Capital Partners (TN)

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Ann Leamon. "Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and Lighthouse Capital Partners (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 812-066, October 2011.
  7. Hardina Smythe and the Healthcare Investment Conundrum

    Hardina Smythe, a recent MBA graduate, has just joined a top-tier venture capital firm in the difficult environment of late 2010. Her first assignment is to evaluate three different deals and make recommendations to the partners. Each potential investment has strengths and drawbacks for both the firm and Hardina.

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, Ann Leamon, and Lisa Strope. "Hardina Smythe and the Healthcare Investment Conundrum." Harvard Business School Case 811-073, June 2011. (Revised from original February 2011 version.)
  8. Investcorp and the Moneybookers Bid

    In January 2007, Hazem Ben-Gacem, managing director and co-head of Investcorp Technology Partners (ITP), needs to decide what to bid at an auction for Moneybookers Limited, one of the top three e-payment solution providers in Europe. However, approximately 70% of Moneybookers revenues were related to transactions from online gaming sites (down from 100% in 2002). Although the thesis was that e-commerce transactions would soon make up a much larger chunk of the company's revenues, high gaming revenue still raised some questions. Between now and when Ben-Gacem had first submitted a bid of 60 million for Moneybookers back in November 2006, the U.S. Congress had enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act putting pressure on e-payment firms with gambling exposure. How would investors in ITP view this transaction? Ben-Gacem also worried about whether Moneybookers could manage the growth of its business and the evolution of regulation around monetary transactions. Moneybookers had effectively become a type of bank with deposit accounts and capital adequacy requirements and all the reporting that went along with it. But could an internet startup maintain the compliance and accounting standards necessary to handle such scrutiny? Could it succeed-and if it did, what would it be worth?

    Keywords: Business Startups; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Private Equity; Investment; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Valuation; Europe; United States;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Carin-Isabel Knoop. "Investcorp and the Moneybookers Bid." Harvard Business School Case 811-013, March 2013. (Revised from original February 2011 version.)
  9. Iris Running Crane: December 2009

    Iris Running Crane, an MBA candidate, must choose among three different job offers in private equity. One is with a top-tier megafund buyout operation; the second with a geographically focused mid-market fund; and the third with a one-time top-tier fund that is trying to reposition itself as a turnaround expert, starting with its own portfolio. Iris must consider the advantages and drawbacks of each position, and how each will help her achieve her personal goals.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Private Equity; Compensation and Benefits; Job Offer; Personal Development and Career; Financial Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, Josh Lerner, and Ann Leamon. "Iris Running Crane: December 2009." Harvard Business School Case 810-073, February 2011. (Revised from original December 2009 version.)
  10. VCPE Strategy Vignettes I

    These three vignettes present various issues around the strategy and management of venture capital and private equity firms. In one, the general partners must decide whether to invest in an intriguing opportunity that lies outside the firm's carefully developed investment strategy; in the second, a new associate must decide whether or not to keep a promising but under-performing investment in the portfolio and in the third, a minority investor in an Chinese company considers removing a politically connected but ineffective controller

    Keywords: Venture Capital; Private Equity; Financial Strategy; Projects; Decision Choices and Conditions; Partners and Partnerships; Opportunities; Investment Portfolio; Business or Company Management; China;

    Citation:

    Lerner, Josh, G. Felda Hardymon, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Ann Leamon, and Lisa Strope. "VCPE Strategy Vignettes I." Harvard Business School Compilation 811-043, December 2010.
  11. VCPE Strategy Vignettes II

    These three vignettes present various issues around the strategy and management of venture capital and private equity firms. In one, a senior partner must decide how to manage an over-extended colleague and how to reduce the risk of the firm's portfolio; the second examines the problem of dividing stock among founders and the last summarizes the experience of Simmons Bedding, a US company that declared bankruptcy after 25 years of rotating private equity ownership.

    Keywords: Venture Capital; Private Equity; Cost vs Benefits; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Investment Portfolio; Ownership; Partners and Partnerships; Risk Management; Stocks; Problems and Challenges; United States;

    Citation:

    Lerner, Josh, G. Felda Hardymon, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, Ann Leamon, and Lisa Strope. "VCPE Strategy Vignettes II." Harvard Business School Compilation 811-054, December 2010.
  12. Grove Street Advisors: September 2009

    The investment committee of Grove Street Advisors, a pioneer in the provision of customized private equity funds-of-funds for pension fund clients, must decide how to respond to the market opportunities and challenges presented by the turmoil of 2008 and 2009. How can they shift their strategy to fill new market niches, or should they stay with their successful approach thus far, even though the market is getting crowded? The case also presents background about the roles of intermediaries in private equity.

    Keywords: Private Equity; Expansion; Investment Funds; Financial Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Ann Leamon. "Grove Street Advisors: September 2009." Harvard Business School Case 810-064, October 2010. (Revised from original October 2009 version.)
  13. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and Lighthouse Capital Partners

    In fall 2008, a venture lender must decide whether to make a loan to Avid, a small but promising venture-backed life sciences firm. In reviewing her proposal, Cristy Barnes considers the company's characteristics and how they differ from a typical investment. At the same time, the CEO and the venture capitalist are exploring the true costs and benefits of taking the loan, particularly in the uncertain economic climate of the time.

    Keywords: Business Startups; Decision Choices and Conditions; Financial Crisis; Venture Capital; Private Equity; Financing and Loans; Investment; Financial Services Industry; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Ann Leamon. "Avid Radiopharmaceuticals and Lighthouse Capital Partners." Harvard Business School Case 810-054, September 2010. (Revised from original September 2009 version.)
  14. Milliway Capital & Martin Smith: November 2008

    Martin Smith, a recent MBA graduate, has just joined a top-tier venture capital firm in the difficult environment of late 2008. One of his first assignments is to review three companies in a partner's portfolio and recommend strategies for managing them. In addition, the partner also has an opportunity to invest in a long-desired company at a good price. Each company presents different potential risks and rewards, both financial and reputational, for Milliway, the partner, and Martin.

    Keywords: Investment Portfolio; Financial Management; Private Equity; Business Strategy; Partners and Partnerships; Venture Capital; Business or Company Management;

    Citation:

    Hardymon, G. Felda, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, and Ann Leamon. "Milliway Capital & Martin Smith: November 2008." Harvard Business School Case 810-088, December 2009.
  15. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals: The Venture Debt Question

    The CEO of a promising biotech company must decide how to respond to the macro-economic slump of late 2008. He had planned to pursue an aggressive schedule, moving the firm's Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease imaging compounds through clinical trials and into the market. This involved expanding the firm's facilities and headcount, and he planned to fund this by taking venture debt. Although clinical trial data is extremely encouraging, questions about raising his next venture round and the overall environment has made him question the wisdom of this plan. This case provides students an opportunity to explore the true cost of venture debt and when it is best used to achieve the goals of all parties—venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and venture lenders.

    Keywords: Financial Crisis; Entrepreneurship; Borrowing and Debt; Venture Capital; Financial Management; Investment; Health Testing and Trials; Expansion; Biotechnology Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry;

    Citation:

    Rhodes-Kropf, Matthew, and Ann Leamon. "Avid Radiopharmaceuticals: The Venture Debt Question." Harvard Business School Case 809-086, February 2009.