Julie M. Wulf

Visiting Scholar

Julie Wulf is an Associate Professor at Harvard Business School and is a Visiting Associate Professor at MIT Sloan this academic year. She is a Co-Editor of The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization and a Faculty Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Wulf’s research examines internal governance, leadership, and the strategy and performance of organizations. She has published papers on the evolution of corporate structure, financial and non-financial incentives, the allocation of decision rights, innovation and incentives, internal capital and labor markets, mergers and acquisitions, and behavioral aspects of organizations. Wulf’s research has been published in academic journals in the fields of economics, finance and strategy/management such as the Journal of Labor Economics; American Economic Journal; Review of Economics and Statistics; Journal of Financial Economics; Review of Financial Studies; Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization; and Management Science.  She has also published in practitioner publications such as Harvard Business Review and California Management Review. Select articles have been highlighted in the media including The Economist, Business Week, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, CNN International, Bloomberg TV, and the NBER Digest.

Wulf currently teaches the MBA elective course Corporate Strategy and Organization and also teaches in the school's executive education program Building and Sustaining Competitive Advantage. Prior to coming to HBS, Wulf was on the faculty at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania where she taught the first-year MBA core course in Competitive Strategy for which she won a student teaching award in 2004. While at Wharton, she also taught a number of courses to both full-time and executive MBAs. 

Before receiving her Ph.D. in Economics from Columbia University, Wulf held several positions in the private sector including Vice President of Corporate Planning and Development at American Express and Senior Associate at Booz & Co. She also co-founded a private-equity real estate investment firm, served as a director and member of the compensation committee, and remains a principal shareholder. 

Wulf lives in Brookline, MA with her husband, son, and daughter.

Journal Articles

  1. Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management

    Top management structures in large U.S. firms have changed significantly since the mid-1980s. While the size of the executive team—the group of managers reporting directly to the CEO—doubled during this period, this growth was driven primarily by an increase in functional managers rather than general managers, a phenomenon we term "functional centralization." Using panel data on senior management positions, we show that changes in the structure of the executive team are tightly linked to changes in firm diversification and IT investments. These relationships depend crucially on the function involved: those closer to the product ("product" functions, e.g., marketing, R&D) behave differently from functions further from the product ("administrative" functions, e.g., finance, law, HR). We argue that this distinction is driven by differences in the information-processing activities associated with each function and apply this insight to refine and extend existing theories of centralization. We also discuss the implications of our results for organizational forms beyond the executive team.

    Keywords: communication; organizational design; functions; centralization; M-form; hierarchy; top management team; C-Suite; information technology; activities; diversification; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Diversification; Managerial Roles; Organizational Design; Information Technology; Organizational Structure; Management Teams; United States;

    Citation:

    Guadalupe, Maria, Hongyi Li, and Julie Wulf. "Who Lives in the C-Suite? Organizational Structure and the Division of Labor in Top Management." Management Science 60, no. 4 (April 2014): 824–844. View Details
  2. The Flattening Firm—Not As Advertised

    For decades, management consultants and the popular business press have urged large firms to flatten their hierarchies. Flattening (or delayering, as it is also known) typically refers to the elimination of layers in a firm's organizational hierarchy and the broadening of managers' spans of control. The alleged benefits of flattening flow primarily from pushing decisions downward to enhance customer and market responsiveness and to improve accountability and morale. Has flattening delivered on its promise to push decisions downward? In this article, I present evidence suggesting that while firms have delayered, flattened firms can exhibit more control and decision making at the top. Managers take note. Flattening can lead to exactly the opposite effects from what it promises to do.

    Keywords: Organizational Structure; Governance Controls; Decision Making;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie. "The Flattening Firm—Not As Advertised." California Management Review 55, no. 1 (Fall 2012): 5–23. View Details
  3. How Many Direct Reports?

    If senior executives are feeling ever more pressed for time, why would they add more to their plates? It might sound counterintuitive, but research by Booz & Company's Gary L. Neilson and me shows that over the past 20 years the CEO's average span of control, measured by the number of direct reports, has doubled. It stands at almost 10 today. This gives fresh relevance to a perennial question for senior leaders: Just how much should they take on? We suggest five areas to consider: Where are you in the senior executive life cycle? How much cross-organization collaboration is required? How much time do you spend on activities outside your direct span of control? What's the scope of your role? What's the best mix of roles for your team? A diagnostic tool provides guidance for leaders considering these questions and can help them estimate their optimal span of control. The issues explored are ones many senior executives-not just CEOs-should revisit throughout their careers. The best leaders stay mindful of the evolving demands of their job and continually tweak their team as they go.

    Keywords: Leadership; Governance Controls; Managerial Roles; Adaptation; Personal Development and Career; Cooperation; Management Teams;

    Citation:

    Neilson, Gary L., and Julie Wulf. "How Many Direct Reports?" Harvard Business Review 90, no. 4 (April 2012). View Details
  4. How Do Acquirers Retain Successful Target CEOs? The Role of Governance

    The resource-based view argues that acquisitions can build competitive advantage partially through retention of valuable human capital of the target firm. However, making commitments to retain and motivate successful top managers is a challenge when contracts are not enforceable. Investigating the conditions under which target CEOs are retained in a sample of mergers in the 1990s, we find greater retention of better-performing and higher-paid CEOs-both measures of valuable human capital. We also show that the performance-retention link is stronger when the acquirer's governance provisions support managers and when the acquirer's CEO owns more equity. While it is not common for acquirers to retain target CEOs, we argue that they are more likely to do so when their governance environment maintains managerial discretion. Based on a joint analysis of retention and governance, our findings are largely consistent with the managerial human capital explanation of retention.

    Keywords: Capital; Mergers and Acquisitions; Acquisition; Equity; Management Analysis, Tools, and Techniques; Contracts; Performance; Governance; Legal Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie, and Harbir Singh. "How Do Acquirers Retain Successful Target CEOs? The Role of Governance." Management Science 57, no. 12 (December 2011): 2101–2114. View Details
  5. The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Corporate Hierarchies

    This paper establishes a causal effect of product market competition on various characteristics of organizational design. Using a unique panel-dataset on firm hierarchies of large U.S. firms (1986-1999) and a quasi-natural experiment (trade liberalization), we find that competition leads firms to flatten their hierarchies: firms reduce the number of positions between the CEO and division managers and increase the number of positions reporting directly to the CEO. The results illustrate how firms redesign their organizational structure through a set of complementary choices in response to changes in their environment. We discuss several possible interpretations of these changes.

    Keywords: Business Ventures; Product; Markets; Competition; Organizational Design; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Rank and Position; Organizational Structure; Decision Choices and Conditions; Change; Trade; United States;

    Citation:

    Guadalupe, Maria, and Julie Wulf. "The Flattening Firm and Product Market Competition: The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Corporate Hierarchies." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, no. 4 (October 2010). View Details
  6. Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market

    I model inefficient resource allocations in M-form organizations due to influence activities by division managers that skew capital budgets in their favor. Corporate headquarters receives two types of signals about investment opportunities: private signals that can be distorted by managers, and public signals that are undistorted but noisy. Headquarters faces a tradeoff between the cost of attaining an accurate private signal and the value of the information the signal provides. In contrast to existing models of "socialism" in internal capital markets, I show that investment sensitivity to Tobin's Q is higher than first-best in firms where division managers hold equity (a result consistent with evidence presented in Scharfstein, 1998). When managers face high private costs from distorting information (equity holdings), headquarters may commit to investment contracts that place "too little" weight on private signals and "too much" weight on public signals (i.e. ). This result has implications for managers in the design of capital budgeting processes and incentive compensation systems.

    Keywords: Capital Markets; Resource Allocation; Business Processes; Capital Budgeting; Business Headquarters; Investment; Opportunities; Cost; Value; Motivation and Incentives; Equity;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie. "Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72, no. 1 (October 2009): 305–321. View Details
  7. Trade-offs in Staying Close: Corporate Decision Making and Geographic Dispersion

    We document the role of geographic dispersion on corporate decision-making. Our findings include: (i) geographically dispersed firms are less employee friendly; (ii) dismissals of divisional employees are less common in divisions located closer to corporate headquarters; and (iii) firms appear to adopt a "pecking-order" and divest out-of-state entities before in-state. To explain these findings, we consider both information and social factors. We find that firms are more likely to protect proximate employees in soft information industries (i.e. when information is difficult to transfer over long distances). However, employee protection only holds when headquarters is located in a less-populated county suggesting a role for social factors. Additionally, stock markets respond favorably to divestitures of in-state divisions. Our findings suggest that social factors work alongside informational considerations in making geographic dispersion an important factor in corporate decision-making.

    Keywords: Business Divisions; Business Headquarters; Decision Choices and Conditions; Geographic Location; Employees; Resignation and Termination; Retention;

    Citation:

    Landier, Augustin, Vinay Nair, and Julie Wulf. "Trade-offs in Staying Close: Corporate Decision Making and Geographic Dispersion." Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 3 (March 2009): 1119–1148. View Details
  8. Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D

    Beginning in the late 1980s, American corporations began increasingly linking the compensation of central research personnel to the economic objectives of the corporation. This paper examines the impact of the shifting compensation of the heads of corporate research and development. Among firms with centralized R&D organizations, a clear relationship emerges: more long-term incentives (e.g. stock options and restricted stock) are associated with more heavily cited patents. These incentives also appear to be associated with more patent filings and patents of greater originality. Short-term incentives appear to be unrelated to measures of innovation.

    Keywords: Innovation and Invention; Motivation and Incentives; Goals and Objectives; Research and Development; Patents; Employee Stock Ownership Plan;

    Citation:

    Lerner, Josh, and Julie Wulf. "Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D." Review of Economics and Statistics 89, no. 4 (November 2007): 634–644. View Details
  9. Authority, Risk, and Performance Incentives: Evidence from Division Manager Positions inside Firms

    I show that performance incentives vary by decision-making authority of division managers. For division managers with broader authority, i.e., those designated as corporate officers, both the sensitivity of pay to global performance measures and the relative importance of global to local measures are larger, relative to non-officers. There is no difference in sensitivity of pay to local measures by officer status. These results support theories suggesting that authority over project selection combined with incentives designed to maximize firm performance, as well as induce effort for the division, are important in incentive design for division managers. Consistent with earlier findings, the evidence strongly supports one of the main predictions of the principal-agent model, that is, a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives.

    Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Performance; Risk and Uncertainty; Business Model; Globalization; Measurement and Metrics; Status and Position; Forecasting and Prediction; Business Divisions;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie. "Authority, Risk, and Performance Incentives: Evidence from Division Manager Positions inside Firms." Journal of Industrial Economics 55, no. 1 (March 2007): 169–196. View Details
  10. The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies

    Using a detailed database of managerial job descriptions, reporting relationships, and compensation structures in over 300 large U.S. firms, we find that firm hierarchies are becoming flatter. The number of positions reporting directly to the CEO has gone up significantly over time while the number of levels between the division heads and the CEO has decreased. More of these managers now report directly to the CEO and more are being appointed officers of the firm, reflecting a delegation of authority. Moreover, division managers who move closer to the CEO receive higher pay and greater long-term incentives, suggesting that all this is not simply a change in organizational charts with no real consequences. Importantly, flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization. We discuss several possible explanations that may account for some of these changes.

    Keywords: Geographic Location; Change; Business Ventures; Compensation and Benefits; Rank and Position; Wages; Motivation and Incentives; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Jobs and Positions; United States;

    Citation:

    Rajan, Raghuram G., and Julie Wulf. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies." Review of Economics and Statistics 88, no. 4 (November 2006): 759–773. View Details
  11. Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?

    A widespread view is that executive perks exemplify agency problems--they are a route through which managers misappropriate a firm's surplus. Accordingly, firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external monitoring should offer fewer perks. The evidence for agency as an explanation of perks is, at best, mixed. Perks are, however, offered in situations in which they enhance managerial productivity. While we cannot rule out the occasional aberration, and while we have little to say on the overall level of perks, our findings suggest that treating perks purely as managerial excess is incorrect.

    Keywords: Problems and Challenges; Cash Flow; Business or Company Management; Situation or Environment; Performance Productivity; Investment; Executive Compensation;

    Citation:

    Rajan, Raghuram G., and Julie Wulf. "Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?" Journal of Financial Economics 79, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–33. (Winner of the Second Place 2006 Jensen Prize for "Best Paper on Corporate Finance and Organizations" presented by Journal of Financial Economics .) View Details
  12. Measuring the Effect of Multimarket Contact on Competition: Evidence from Mergers Following Radio Broadcast Ownership Deregulation

    This paper examines the effects of multimarket contact on advertising prices in the U.S. radio broadcasting industry. While it is in general difficult to measure the effect of multimarket contact on competition, the 1996 Telecommunications Act substantially relaxed local radio ownership restrictions, giving rise to a major and exogenous consolidation wave. Between the years of 1995 to 1998, the average extent of multimarket contact in major U.S. media markets increased by 2.5 times. Importantly, the extent of change in multimarket contact varies across markets, and the change in multimarket contact varies separately from the change in concentration. Using a panel data set on 248 geographic U.S. radio broadcast markets, 1995-1998, we find that multimarket contact has little effect on advertising prices. This paper contributes to the empirical literature on multimarket contact by analyzing a different industrial context and using longitudinal data surrounding an ownership deregulation.

    Keywords: Marketing Communications; Markets; Geographic Location; Advertising; Ownership; Price; Telecommunications Industry; Media and Broadcasting Industry; United States;

    Citation:

    Waldfogel, Joel, and Julie Wulf. "Measuring the Effect of Multimarket Contact on Competition: Evidence from Mergers Following Radio Broadcast Ownership Deregulation." Art. 17. Contributions B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 5, no. 1 (2006). View Details
  13. Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 'Mergers of Equals'

    I analyze chief executive officer (CEO) incentives to negotiate shared control in the postmerger governance of the surviving firm. In order to do this, I study abnormal returns in a sample of "mergers of equals" (MOEs) transactions in which the two firms are approximately equal in postmerger board representation. These transactions are friendly mergers generally characterized by premerger negotiations that result in both greater shared control (board and management) and more equal sharing of merger gains between the two firms. On average, the value created measured by combined event returns is no different between MOEs and a matched sample of transactions. However, target shareholders capture less of the gains measured by event returns in transactions with shared governance. Moreover, target shareholders' share of the gains is systematically related to variables representing postmerger control rights, and shared governance is more likely in transactions in which CEOs face greater incentives for control. The evidence suggests that CEOs trade power for premium by negotiating shared control in the merged firm in exchange for lower shareholder premiums.

    Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Negotiation; Governance Controls; Power and Influence; Value Creation; Business and Shareholder Relations; Governing and Advisory Boards; Motivation and Incentives; Market Transactions;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie. "Do CEOs in Mergers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from 'Mergers of Equals'." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 20, no. 1 (April 2004): 60–101. View Details
  14. Internal Capital Markets and Firm-Level Compensation Incentives for Division Managers

    Do multidivisional firms structure compensation contracts for division managers to mitigate incentive problems in their internal capital markets? I find evidence that compensation and investment incentives are substitutes: firms providing a stronger link to firm performance in incentive compensation for division managers also provide weaker investment incentives through the capital budgeting process. Specifically, as the proportion of incentive pay for division managers that is based on firm performance increases, division investment is less responsive to division profitability. These findings are generally consistent with a model of influence activities by division managers in interdivisional capital allocation decisions.

    Keywords: Capital Markets; Executive Compensation; Capital Budgeting; Motivation and Incentives; Profit; Decisions; Resource Allocation; Performance; Investment; Contracts;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie. "Internal Capital Markets and Firm-Level Compensation Incentives for Division Managers." Journal of Labor Economics 20, no. 2 (April 2002): S219–S262. View Details

Working Papers

  1. Pay Harmony: Peer Comparison and Executive Compensation

    This study suggests that peer comparison affects both wage setting and productivity within firms. We report three changes in division manager compensation following a 1991–1992 controversy over executive pay. We argue that this controversy increased wage comparisons within firms, particularly those with geographically dispersed managers—managers with the greatest information frictions. Following the controversy, pay in dispersed firms co-moves more and is less sensitive to individual performance. Relatedly, pay disparity between managers located in different states decreases relative to that of co-located managers. Finally, division productivity falls in dispersed firms, particularly among managers at the low end of the wage distribution.

    Keywords: Executive Compensation; Pay-for-Performance; internal labor markets; Peer Comparison; Firm Geography; Behavior; Executive Compensation; Policy;

    Citation:

    Gartenberg, Claudine, and Julie Wulf. "Pay Harmony: Peer Comparison and Executive Compensation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13-041, November 2012. (Revised May 2013, March 2014.) View Details
  2. Earnings Management from the Bottom Up: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO

    Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm's reported earnings. The previous literature has focused primarily on Chief Executive Officers, but managers further down in the firm hierarchy—division managers and Chief Financial Officers—are likely to have similar incentives, and perhaps even greater opportunity to influence reported earnings in a manner that maximizes these managers' personal income. Moreover, previous research focuses on equity incentives and largely ignores other elements of incentive pay. We contribute to this literature by analyzing all forms of incentive pay for several types of managerial positions and include additional measures of earnings manipulation—end-of-year excess sales and class action litigation—in addition to the standard measure of discretionary accounting accruals. We find that the association between high-powered incentives and earnings manipulation varies by both type of incentive pay and position. Our findings have important policy implications and suggest that compensation committees should review pay policies of other managerial positions in addition to CEOs. Importantly, if the committees wanted to weaken incentive pay to get more truthful reporting, diluting the CFO's bonus and stock options would be one place to start.

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Interests; Business and Shareholder Relations; Motivation and Incentives; Earnings Management; Performance Evaluation; Stock Options;

    Citation:

    Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Julie Wulf. "Earnings Management from the Bottom Up: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO ." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-056, January 2012. (Revised August 2012.) View Details
  3. Span of Control and Span of Attention

    Using novel data on CEO time use, we document the relationship between the size and composition of the executive team and the attention of the CEO. We combine information about CEO span of control for a sample of 65 companies with detailed data on how CEOs allocate their time, which we define as their span of attention. CEOs with larger executive teams do not save time for personal use, or to cultivate external constituencies. Instead, CEOs with broader spans of control invest more in a "team" model of interaction. They spend more time internally, specifically in pre-planned meetings that have more participants from different functions. The complementarity between span of control and the team model of interaction is more prevalent in larger firms.

    Keywords: Conferences; Data and Data Sets; Leadership Style; Management Style; Managerial Roles; Time Management; Planning;

    Citation:

    Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun, and Julie Wulf. "Span of Control and Span of Attention." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12-053, December 2011. (Revised April 2014.) View Details

Cases and Teaching Materials

  1. Alibaba Group

    Discusses how Alibaba Group successfully managed new business ventures to become a leader in China's online marketplaces. Students follow Alibaba Group's transition from a startup to a multibusiness firm with over 15,000 employees in just over a decade. They analyze the evolving dynamics of internal competition and cooperation among Alibaba Group's subsidiaries. Students are also asked to address Alibaba Group's strategy, the role of its corporate center and how to incentivize subsidiary executives.

    Keywords: History; Business Subsidiaries; Competition; Multinational Firms and Management; Corporate Strategy; Executive Compensation; Business Headquarters; Cooperation; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Growth and Development Strategy; China;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M. "Alibaba Group." Harvard Business School Case 710-436, March 2010. (Revised April 2010.) View Details
  2. Alibaba Group (TN)

    Teaching Note for 710436.

    Keywords: Business Startups; Business Subsidiaries; Competition; Motivation and Incentives; Online Technology; Growth and Development; Corporate Strategy; Organizational Structure; Retail Industry; China;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M. "Alibaba Group (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 711-466, December 2010. (Revised March 2012.) View Details
  3. Alibaba's Taobao (A)

    Examines the decision of Alibaba Group to diversify from an international business-to-business (B2B) exchange (Alibaba.com) into a B2C and C2C exchange (Taobao.com) for Chinese retailers and consumers. In China, Taobao had managed to displace the once dominant eBay, the world's largest consumer marketplace. However, the company had little revenue because it offered services free of charge.

    Keywords: Business Model; Demand and Consumers; Market Transactions; Service Operations; Diversification; Web; China;

    Citation:

    Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Julie M. Wulf. "Alibaba's Taobao (A)." Harvard Business School Case 709-456, January 2009. (Revised July 2009.) View Details
  4. Citibank: Weathering the Commercial Real Estate Crisis of the Early 1990s

    Keywords: Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Crisis Management; Banking Industry; Real Estate Industry;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M., and Ian McKown Cornell. "Citibank: Weathering the Commercial Real Estate Crisis of the Early 1990s." Harvard Business School Case 712-446, February 2012. (Revised March 2012.) View Details
  5. Organization and Strategy at Millennium (A)

    This case examines Millennium's strategic and organizational responses to the rapid evolution of the biopharmaceutical industry. In the early 2000s, as Millennium's competitive advantage in early-stage research slipped away and its losses mounted, founder and CEO Mark Levin moved the firm downstream away from research and towards drug development and commercialization, while narrowing horizontal breadth from over a dozen therapeutic classes to just three. In 2005, Levin hired Deborah Dunsire from Novartis as CEO to lead Millennium's continuing transformation. Students are asked to put themselves in the shoes of incoming CEO Dunsire and to provide organizational recommendations to execute the new strategy.

    Keywords: Transformation; Leading Change; Management Succession; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Competitive Strategy; Competitive Advantage; Biotechnology Industry; Pharmaceutical Industry;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M., and Scott Waggoner. "Organization and Strategy at Millennium (A)." Harvard Business School Case 710-415, February 2010. (Revised April 2010.) View Details
  6. Organization and Strategy at Millennium (B)

    This case examines Millennium's strategic and organizational responses to the rapid evolution of the biopharmaceutical industry. In the early 2000s, as Millennium's competitive advantage in early-stage research slipped away and its losses mounted, founder CEO Mark Levin moved the firm downstream away from research and towards drug development and commercialization, while narrowing horizontal breadth from over a dozen therapeutic classes to just three. In 2005, Levin hired Deborah Dunsire from Novartis as CEO to lead Millennium's continuing transformation. Students are asked to put themselves in the shoes of incoming CEO Dunsire and to provide organizational recommendations to execute the new strategy.

    Keywords: Leading Change; Transformation; Decision Choices and Conditions; Crisis Management; Competitive Advantage; Commercialization; Selection and Staffing; Product Development; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Pharmaceutical Industry;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M., and Scott Waggoner. "Organization and Strategy at Millennium (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 710-418, February 2010. View Details
  7. Corporate Strategy at Berkshire Partners

    The managing directors of Berkshire Partners, a mid-sized private equity firm, address strategic and organizational challenges in response to turbulent market conditions, rapid firm growth, and the transition of leadership from its founding partners to the next generations. To address some of these dynamics, and to protect Berkshire's corporate advantage, the managing directors established three executive oversight committees, developed new specialized corporate functions, and incubated an internal hedge fund group. Students are given the opportunity to assess Berkshire's recent changes in corporate strategy and organizational design and to formulate recommendations going forward.

    Keywords: Private Equity; Management Teams; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Organizational Design; Organizational Structure; Competitive Advantage; Corporate Strategy; Financial Services Industry; Boston;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M., and Scott Waggoner. "Corporate Strategy at Berkshire Partners." Harvard Business School Case 710-414, February 2010. View Details
  8. Corporate Strategy at Berkshire Partners (TN)

    Teaching Note for 710-414.

    Keywords: Leadership; Growth and Development; Corporate Strategy; Organizational Design; Problems and Challenges; Organizational Culture; Groups and Teams; Financial Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Wulf, Julie M. "Corporate Strategy at Berkshire Partners (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 711-467, December 2010. View Details