Benjamin G. Edelman

Associate Professor of Business Administration, Marvin Bower Fellow

Ben is an associate professor at the Harvard Business School in the Negotiation, Organizations & Markets unit.  His research explores the public and private forces shaping Internet architecture and business opportunities, with particular focus on online advertising, competition, regulation, and consumer protection.

Ben is an associate professor at the Harvard Business School in the Negotiation, Organizations & Markets unit.

Ben's current research explores the public and private forces shaping Internet architecture and business opportunities. He has written about the implications of growing market concentration in Internet search and resulting risks for advertisers. Examining the mechanisms that allocate pay-per-click advertising, Ben compared the revenue of alternative pricing rules, quantifying the losses from early inefficient auction systems. He has also analyzed the stability and truth-telling properties of modern online advertising systems, and he designed a simulated bidding environment to evaluate bidding strategies empirically.

Ben's recent online privacy investigations uncovered a series of privacy violations including Google Toolbar continuing to track user browsing even after users "disable" the toolbar, as well as Facebook revealing users' names and details to advertisers (even after specifically promising the contrary).

Ben's work on Internet infrastructure includes devising policies and institutions to mitigate the worst effects of scarcity of IPv4 addresses, the numeric identifiers most computers currently use to connect to the Internet. Previously, Ben flagged systemic flaws in Internet filtering systems used in US libraries and schools , and his software performed the first large-scale testing of international Internet filtering (in China and Saudi Arabia). Ben's empirical analyses uncovered the extent of expired domain names subsequently used for pornography and registered with intentionally inaccurate WHOIS data.

Ben has sought to block deceptive advertising software ("spyware" and "adware") by chronicling vendors' various unsavory tactics. He was the first to assemble video proof of nonconsensual software installations through security exploits and through "confirmation" screens that install software even when a user specifically declined. Exploring the revenue streams for deceptive software, he documented advertisers supporting spyware, advertising intermediaries funding spyware, affiliate commission fraud, and click fraud.

Ben's consumer protection writings include critiquing online "safety" certifications that fail to adequately protect users as well as flagging numerous deceptive advertising practices.

As a Student Fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Ben analyzed the formative documents and activities of ICANN, ran Berkman Center webcasts, and developed software tools for real-time use in meetings, classes, and special events. He oversaw ICANN Public Meeting webcasts and operated the technology used at ICANN's first twelve quarterly meetings.

Ben's consulting practice focuses on preventing and detecting online fraud (especially advertising fraud). Representative clients include the ACLU, AOL, the City of Los Angeles, the National Association of Broadcasters, Microsoft, the National Football League, the New York Times, Universal Music Group, the Washington Post, and Wells Fargo.

Ben teaches an MBA elective course entitled The Online Economy, a survey of all manner of online business. Ben, Peter Coles, and Al Roth jointly convene a periodic Market Design Workshop. Ben teaches in HBS executive education programs Delivering Information Systems and Taking Marketing Digital.

Ben holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Economics at Harvard University, a J.D. from the Harvard Law School, an A.M. in Statistics from the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and an A.B. in Economics from Harvard College (summa cum laude). He is a member of the Massachusetts Bar.

 

Journal Articles

  1. Convergence of Position Auctions under Myopic Best-Response Dynamics

    We study the dynamics of multi-round position auctions, considering both the case of exogenous click-through rates and the case in which click-through rates are determined by an endogenous consumer search process. In both contexts, we demonstrate that the dynamic auctions converge to their associated static, envy-free equilibria. Furthermore, convergence is efficient, and the entry of low-quality advertisers does not slow convergence. Because our approach predominantly relies on assumptions common in the sponsored search literature, our results suggest that dynamic position auctions converge more generally.

    Keywords: sponsored search; advertising; google; equilibrium selection; Online Advertising; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Cary, Matthew, Aparna Das, Benjamin Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna Karlin, Scott Kominers, Claire Mathieu, and Michael Schwarz. "Convergence of Position Auctions under Myopic Best-Response Dynamics." ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (forthcoming).
  2. Antitrust Scrutiny of Google

    I evaluate antitrust claims against Google and propose possible remedies. While Google's specific tactics are often novel, I show connections to practices deemed unlawful over a period of decades, and I identify remedies well grounded in antitrust precedent.

    Keywords: competition; antitrust; google; search; non-price terms; Online Advertising; Lawsuits and Litigation; Advertising Industry; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Antitrust Scrutiny of Google." Journal of Law 2, no. 2 (2012): 445–464.
  3. Earnings and Ratings at Google Answers

    I analyze all questions and answers from the inception of the Google Answers service through November 2003, and I find notable trends in answerer behavior: more experienced answerers provide answers with the characteristics askers most value, receiving higher ratings as a result. Answerer earnings increase in experience, consistent with learning on the job. Answerers who focus on particular question categories provide answers of higher quality but earn lower pay per hour (perhaps reflecting a lack of versatility). Answers provided during the business day receive higher payments per hour (a compensating differential for working when outside options are most attractive), but more experienced answerers tend to forego these opportunities.

    Keywords: Service Delivery; Opportunities; Behavior; Value; Jobs and Positions; Wages; Business Earnings;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Earnings and Ratings at Google Answers." Economic Inquiry (April 2012): 309–320. (draft as first circulated in 2004.)
  4. Using Internet Data for Economic Research

    The data used by economists can be broadly divided into two categories. First, structured datasets arise when a government agency, trade association, or company can justify the expense of assembling records. The Internet has transformed how economists interact with these datasets by lowering the cost of storing, updating, distributing, finding, and retrieving this information. Second, some economic researchers affirmatively collect data of interest. Historically, assembling a dataset might involve delving through annual reports or archives that had not previously been organized into a format ready for research: in some cases, surveying stores, factories, consumers, or workers, or in other cases, carrying out an experiment. For researcher-collected data, the Internet opens exceptional possibilities both by increasing the amount of information available for researchers to gather and by lowering researchers' costs of collecting information. In this paper, I explore the Internet's new datasets, present methods for harnessing their wealth, and survey a sampling of the research questions these data help to answer.

    Keywords: Data and Data Sets; Research; Internet; Cost Management; Information Management; Factories, Labs, and Plants; Reports; Archives; Surveys; Economics;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Using Internet Data for Economic Research." Journal of Economic Perspectives (spring 2012): 189–206.
  5. Internet Protocol Numbers and the American Registry for Internet Numbers: Suggested Guidance for Bankruptcy Trustees, Debtors-in-Possession, and Receivers

    Bankruptcy trustees, debtors-in-possession, and receivers are seeing an increase in efforts to sell Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, also referred to "IP Numbers." IP Numbers are the unique numeric identifiers associated with computers connected to the Internet. While sales of IP Numbers can deliver value to the estate, IP Numbers are unusual in that their value, use, and transfer are enhanced by applicable contract and policy. Ignoring the contracts and policies can delay the sale process and reduce or negate the value of IP Numbers. This article seeks to provide an overview of issues associated with IP Number sales, as well as suggesting an approach for permissible and straightforward sales to obtain the highest value.

    Keywords: Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Internet; Sales; Value; Policy; Contracts;

    Citation:

    Ryan, Steven M., Matthew Martel, and Benjamin G. Edelman. "Internet Protocol Numbers and the American Registry for Internet Numbers: Suggested Guidance for Bankruptcy Trustees, Debtors-in-Possession, and Receivers." BNA's Bankruptcy Law Reporter (January 5, 2012).
  6. Advertising Disclosures: Measuring Labeling Alternatives in Internet Search Engines

    In an online experiment, we measure users' interactions with search engines, both in standard configurations and in modified versions with clearer labels identifying search engine advertisements. In particular, for a random subset of users, we change "Sponsored links" or "Ads" labels to instead read "Paid Advertisements." Relative to users receiving the "Sponsored link" or "Ad" labels, users receiving the "Paid Advertisement" label click 25% and 27% fewer advertisements, respectively. Users seeing "Paid Advertisement" labels also correctly report that they click fewer advertisements, controlling for the number of advertisements they actually click. Results are most pronounced for commercial searches and for vulnerable users with low education and little online experience.

    Keywords: Corporate Disclosure; Online Advertising; Measurement and Metrics; Internet; Search Technology; Education; Labels;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Duncan S. Gilchrist. "Advertising Disclosures: Measuring Labeling Alternatives in Internet Search Engines." Information Economics and Policy 24 (2012).
  7. Adverse Selection in Online 'Trust' Certifications and Search Results

    Widely used online "trust" authorities issue certifications without substantial verification of recipients' actual trustworthiness. This lax approach gives rise to adverse selection: the sites that seek and obtain trust certifications are actually less trustworthy than others. Using an original dataset on web site safety, I demonstrate that sites certified by the best-known authority, TRUSTe, are more than twice as likely to be untrustworthy as uncertified sites. This difference remains statistically and economically significant when restricted to "complex" commercial sites. Meanwhile, search engines create an implied endorsement in their selection of ads for display, but I show that search engine advertisements tend to be less safe than the corresponding organic listings.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Policy; Safety; Trust; Internet; Search Technology; Web Sites;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Adverse Selection in Online 'Trust' Certifications and Search Results." Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 10, no. 1 (January–February 2011): 17–25.
  8. Bias in Search Results?: Diagnosis and Response

    I explore allegations of search engine bias, including understanding a search engine's incentives to bias results, identifying possible forms of bias, and evaluating methods of verifying whether bias in fact occurs. I then consider possible legal and policy responses, and I assess search engines' likely defenses. I conclude that regulatory intervention is justified in light of the importance of search engines in referring users to all manner of other sites, and in light of striking market concentration among search engines.

    Keywords: Prejudice and Bias; Motivation and Incentives; Outcome or Result; Markets; Legal Liability; Policy; Search Technology; Performance Evaluation; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;

  9. Least-Cost Avoiders in Online Fraud and Abuse

    Web users face considerable fraud, malfeasance, and economic harm that system operators could prevent or mitigate. Although the legal system can respond, regulations have mixed results. I examine the applicable legal rules that constrain online fraud and the economic underpinnings to identify whether those rules assign responsibility to the parties best positioned to take action.

    Keywords: Online Technology; Crime and Corruption; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Economics; Law;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Least-Cost Avoiders in Online Fraud and Abuse." IEEE Security & Privacy (July–August 2010).
  10. The Pathologies of Online Display Advertising Marketplaces

    Display advertising marketplaces place "banner" ads on all manner of popular sites. While these services are widely used, they suffer significant challenges, including weak user response and low accountability for both advertisers and web site publishers. I survey a few major challenges, flagging possible areas for future research.

    Keywords: Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Online Advertising; Cost; Corporate Accountability; Information Publishing; Consumer Behavior; Relationships; Web Sites;

  11. Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

    We characterize the optimal (revenue maximizing) auction for sponsored search advertising. We show that a search engine's optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders and independent of the rate at which click-through rate declines over positions. We separate the effects of reserve price increases into direct effects (on the low bidder) and indirect effects (on others), and we show that most of the incremental revenue from setting reserve price optimally comes from indirect effects.

    Keywords: Auctions; Revenue; Advertising; Search Technology; Price; Bids and Bidding;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Michael Schwarz. "Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions." American Economic Review 100, no. 2 (May 2010). (First circulated in 2006 as Optimal Auction Design in a Multi-unit Environment: The Case of Sponsored Search Auctions.)
  12. Measuring the Perpetrators and Funders of Typosquatting

    Keywords: Measurement and Metrics; Online Technology; Web;

  13. Red Light States: Who Buys Online Adult Entertainment?

    This paper studies the adult online entertainment industry, particularly the consumption side of the market. In particular, it focuses on the demographics and consumption patterns of those who subscribe to adult entertainment websites. On the surface, this business would seem to face a number of obstacles. Regulatory and legal barriers have already been mentioned. In addition, those charging for access to adult entertainment face competition from similar content available without a fee. In the context of adult entertainment, free access offers consumers an extra benefit: online payments tend to create records documenting the fact of a customer's purchase; consumers of free content may feel more confident that their purchases will remain confidential. More broadly, measured levels of religiosity in American are high. On the other hand, social critics often argue that the rise of Internet pornography is contributing to a coarsening of American culture. Do consumption patterns of online adult entertainment reveal two separate Americas? Or is the consumption of online adult entertainment widespread, regardless of legal barriers, potential for embarrassment, and even religious conviction?

    Keywords: Online Technology; Segmentation; Film Entertainment; Demographics; Web Sites; Competition; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Demand and Consumers; Legal Liability; Culture; Religion; Entertainment and Recreation Industry; United States;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Red Light States: Who Buys Online Adult Entertainment?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no. 1 (winter 2009): 209–220.
  14. Who Owns Metrics?: Building a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers

    I offer five rights to protect advertisers from increasingly powerful ad networks-avoiding fraudulent charges for services not rendered, guaranteeing data portability so advertisers get the best possible value, and assuring price transparency so advertisers know what they're buying. I explain the need for these rights by presenting specific practices causing particular concern.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Crime and Corruption; Price; Measurement and Metrics; Technology Networks; Value; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Who Owns Metrics?: Building a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers." Journal of Advertising Research 49, no. 4 (December 2009). (Adapted from Towards a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers.)
  15. How to Combat Online Ad Fraud

    Online advertisers frequently fall victim to dishonest, tech-savvy publishers. Here's a sampling of common scams with some advice on how to outwit their perpetrators.

    Keywords: Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Online Advertising; Ethics; Marketing; Behavior;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "How to Combat Online Ad Fraud." Harvard Business Review 87, no. 12 (December 2009): 24.
  16. The Dark Underbelly of Online Advertising

    The Internet is sold to advertisers as a highly measurable medium that is the most efficient way to target exactly the right customers. But online advertising is also easily subverted-letting fraudsters claim advertising fees for work they did not actually do. The trickiest frauds deceive advertisers so effectively that measurements of ad effectiveness report the fraudsters as exceptionally productive and high quality, rather than revealing that their traffic was actually worthless. This is a quiet scandal. In a time of tightening ad budgets, losses to advertising fraud come straight from the bottom line-but savings can be equally dramatic. Here's a look behind the veil-an explanation of ad practices that have cheated even the Web's largest advertisers. Advertising scams take plenty of victims, both witting and not, but I offer strategies to help determined marketers protect themselves.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Internet; Measurement and Metrics; Performance Effectiveness; Budgets and Budgeting; Customers; Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Performance Productivity; Saving; Management Practices and Processes; Reports; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "The Dark Underbelly of Online Advertising." HBR Now (December 2009).
  17. Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears

    Online advertisers face substantial difficulty in selecting and supervising small advertising partners. Fraud can be well hidden, and limited reputation systems reduce accountability. But partners are not paid until after their work is complete, and advertisers can extend this delay both to improve detection of improper partner practices and to punish partners who turn out to be rule-breakers. I capture these relationships in a screening model with delayed payments and probabilistic delayed observation of agents' types. I derive conditions in which an advertising principal can set its payment delay to deter rogue agents and to attract solely or primarily good-type agents. Through the savings from excluding rogue agents, the principal can increase its profits while offering increased payments to good-type agents. I estimate that a leading affiliate network could have invoked an optimal payment delay to eliminate 71% of fraud without decreasing profit.

    Keywords: Advertising; Online Advertising; Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Accounting Audits; Cost Accounting; Cost Management; Partners and Partnerships; Profit; Wages; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Deterring Online Advertising Fraud Through Optimal Payment in Arrears." Financial Cryptography and Data Security: Proceedings of the International Conference (September 2009). (Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science.) (Featured in Working Knowledge: Reducing Risk with Online Advertising.)
  18. Priced and Unpriced Online Markets

    With forces both supporting and opposing zero prices, typical Internet-related activities—like surfing the web, web searches, and e-mail, along with behind-the-scenes practices like domain names and the allocation of IP (Internet Protocol) addresses—present a natural context to reevaluate our sense of the tradeoffs that arise between free and a positive price. In this piece, I offer a series of specific examples of resources offered without charge, for a positive price, or for a flat fee ("all-you-can-eat"). I conclude by assessing the characteristics that shape pricing structure for these resources.

    Keywords: Cost vs Benefits; Price; Market Transactions; Service Operations; Internet;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Priced and Unpriced Online Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives (summer 2009): 21–36.
  19. Fraud in Online Advertising

    At first glance, online advertising seems to be as measurable a medium as any ever invented. Advertisers can count how many times an ad was sent, then measure sales—yielding an analysis that seems to report the value of an online ad campaign. But the reality is considerably more complicated.

    Keywords: Advertising Campaigns; Online Advertising; Crime and Corruption; Measurement and Metrics; Value;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Fraud in Online Advertising." Business Standard (April 27, 2009).
  20. Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What To Do About It

    The Internet's current numbering system is nearing exhaustion: Existing protocols allow only a finite set of computer numbers ("IP addresses"), and central authorities will soon deplete their supply. I evaluate a series of possible responses to this shortage: Sharing addresses impedes new Internet applications and does not seem to be scalable. A new numbering system ("IPv6") offers greater capacity, but network incentives impede transition. Paid transfers of IP addresses would better allocate resources to those who need them most, but unrestricted transfers might threaten the Internet's routing system. I suggest policies to create an IP address "market" while avoiding major negative externalities—mitigating the worst effects of v4 scarcity, while obtaining price discovery and allocative efficiency benefits of market transactions.

    Keywords: Internet; Performance Capacity; Technology Networks; Market Transactions; Resource Allocation; Policy; Price; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Running Out of Numbers: Scarcity of IP Addresses and What To Do About It." Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications 14 (2009): 95–106. (Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Science.) (Featured in Working Knowledge: When the Internet Runs Out of IP Addresses) (Circulated in 2008 as Running Out of Numbers? The Impending Scarcity of IP Addresses and What To Do About It.)
  21. Adverse Selection in Online 'Trust' Certifications

    Widely used online "trust" authorities issue certifications without substantial verification of recipients' actual trustworthiness. This lax approach gives rise to adverse selection: the sites that seek and obtain trust certifications are actually less trustworthy than others. Using a new dataset on web site safety, I demonstrate that sites certified by the best-known authority, TRUSTe, are more than twice as likely to be untrustworthy as uncertified sites. This difference remains statistically and economically significant when restricted to "complex" commercial sites. In contrast, competing certification system BBBOnline imposes somewhat stricter requirements and appears to provide a certification of positive, albeit limited, value.

    Keywords: Online Technology; Web Sites; Trust; Governance Compliance; Value; Complexity;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Adverse Selection in Online 'Trust' Certifications." Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Commerce (2009): 205–212. (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series.)
  22. Towards a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers

    Online advertising presents remarkable efficiencies—better targeting, improved measurement and greater return on investment. Yet there are challenges, particularly when networks of intermediaries place ads through convoluted relationships, and all the more so when small advertisers cannot effectively negotiate terms dictated by advertising powerhouses. The result is a troubling mess of ads gone wrong—advertisers charged in ways they didn't fairly agree to, and on terms they didn't meaningfully accept. But online advertising doesn't have to be a wild west. I propose five specific rights advertisers should demand as they buy online placements.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Rights; Measurement and Metrics; Investment Return; Negotiation; Networks; Problems and Challenges; Performance Efficiency; Law; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Towards a Bill of Rights for Online Advertisers." Advertising Week (2009).
  23. Typosquatting: Unintended Adventures in Browsing

    "Typosquatting" is the practice of registering domain names, identical to or confusingly similar to trademarks and famous names, in hopes that users will accidentally request these sites—whereupon they will receive, typically, advertisements. This piece presents the basic typosquatting business model, based on my analysis of more than 80,000 typosquatting domain names. I analyze the advertising intermediaries that make typosquatting profitable, and I assess the legislation and litigation that are beginning to put a check on this practice.

    Keywords: Web; Advertising; Business Model; Lawsuits and Litigation; Profit; Practice;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Typosquatting: Unintended Adventures in Browsing." Cybercrime Gets Personal McAfee Security Journal (fall 2008): 34–37.
  24. Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

    We investigate the "generalized second-price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to the GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.

    Keywords: Auctions; Search Technology; Online Advertising; Strategy; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords." American Economic Review 97, no. 1 (March 2007): 242–259.
  25. Strategic Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions

    We examine sponsored search auctions run by Overture (now part of Yahoo!) and Google and present evidence of strategic bidder behavior in these auctions. Between June 15, 2002, and June 14, 2003, we estimate that Overture's revenue from sponsored search might have been higher if it had been able to prevent this strategic behavior. We present a specific alternative mechanism that could reduce the amount of strategizing by bidders, raise search engines' revenue, and also increase the overall efficiency of the market. We conclude by showing that advertisers' strategic behavior has not disappeared over time; rather, such behavior remains present on both search engines.

    Keywords: Auctions; Strategy; Behavior; Revenue; Performance Efficiency; Bids and Bidding; Search Technology;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Ostrovsky. "Strategic Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions." Decision Support Systems 43, no. 1 (February 2007): 192–198. (Winner of Emerald Citations of Excellence.)
  26. Greedy Bidding Strategies for Keyword Auctions

    How should players bid in keyword auctions such as those used by Google, Yahoo! and MSN? We consider greedy bidding strategies for a repeated auction on a single keyword, where in each round, each player chooses some optimal bid for the next round, assuming that the other players merely repeat their previous bid. We study the revenue, convergence and robustness properties of such strategies. Most interesting among these is a strategy we call the balanced bidding strategy (bb): it is known that bb has a unique fixed point with payments identical to those of the VCG mechanism. We show that if all players use the bb strategy and update each round, bb converges when the number of slots is at most 2, but does not always converge for 3 or more slots. On the other hand, we present a simple variant which is guaranteed to converge to the same fixed point for any number of slots. In a model in which only one randomly chosen player updates each round according to the bb strategy, we prove that convergence occurs with probability 1. We complement our theoretical results with empirical studies.

    Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Strategy; Revenue; Search Technology;

    Citation:

    Cary, Matthew, Aparna Das, Benjamin G. Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna Karlin, Claire Mathieu, and Michael Schwarz. "Greedy Bidding Strategies for Keyword Auctions." Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Commerce (2007).
  27. Internet Filtering in China

    The Chinese government has made few official statements about its filtering of Internet content, but this report explores the scope, depth, and various methods used to selectively bar Internet access through networks in China.

    Keywords: Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Government and Politics; Networks; Internet; China;

    Citation:

    Zittrain, Jonathan, and Benjamin Edelman. "Internet Filtering in China." IEEE Internet Computing 7, no. 2 (March/April 2003).
  28. The Effect of Editorial Discretion Book Promotion on Sales at Amazon.com

    A new dataset collected by the author allows estimation of the effect on book sales of promotional listing on Amazon's editorial discretion pages. Following Goolsbee and Chevalier (2001), sales quantities are inferred from sales rank data freely available on Amazon's web site, and an automated system tracks which books are promoted when, where, and how often. The results indicate that promotion of books on editorial discretion pages within Amazon's web site yields increases in sales, and more frequent promotion of a book is associated with larger increases in sales. Increases in sales are greatest for newly-released hardcover books; increases are larger for childrens' books, books in stock, and books more favorably priced at Amazon than at its foremost competitor, Barnes & Noble. Increases in sales are larger during the period between Thanksgiving and Christmas than before or after the holiday season, and promotion has a larger effect when editorial discretion pages feature only a few books than when they feature many. Finally, the average short-run effect of promotion on one of Amazon's editorial discretion pages is found to be roughly one third as large as the effect of an appearance in the New York Times Book Review, and the annual sum of Amazon's editorial discretion promotional activities shows a total short-run impact on sales roughly three fifths as large as the totality of annual Times book reviews.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Sales; Marketing Strategy; Web Sites; Competition; Books;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin. "The Effect of Editorial Discretion Book Promotion on Sales at Amazon.com." 2002. (Winner of Seymour E. and Ruth B. Harris Prize For outstanding senior honors thesis in economics at Harvard presented by Harvard University. Winner of Thomas T. Hoopes Prize Awarded to Harvard undergraduates on the basis of outstanding scholarly work or research presented by Harvard University.)

Book Chapters

  1. The Design of Online Advertising Markets

    Because the market for online advertising is both new and fast-changing, participants experiment with all manner of variations. Should an advertiser's payment reflect the number of times an ad was shown, the number of times it was clicked, the number of sales that resulted, or the dollar value of those sales? Should ads be text, images, video, or something else entirely? Should measurement be performed by an ad network, an advertiser, or some intermediary? Market participants have chosen all these options at various points, and prevailing views have changed repeatedly. Online advertising therefore presents a natural environment in which to evaluate alternatives for these and other design choices. In this piece, I review the basics of online advertising, then turn to design decisions as to ad pricing, measurement, incentives, and fraud.

    Keywords: Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Online Advertising; Price; Market Design; Measurement and Metrics; Sales; Motivation and Incentives; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "The Design of Online Advertising Markets." In The Handbook of Market Design. Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
  2. Online Advertising: Rustlers and Sheriffs in the New Wild West

    Read the news of recent computer security guffaws, and it's striking how many problems stem from online advertising. Advertising is the bedrock of web sites that are provided without charge to end users, so advertising is everywhere. But advertising security gaps are equally widespread: from "malvertisement" banner ads pushing rogue anti-spyware software, to click fraud, to spyware and adware, the security lapses of online advertising are striking.

    During the past five years, I have uncovered hundreds of online advertising scams defrauding thousands of users—not to mention all the web's top merchants. This chapter summarizes some of what I've found—and what users and advertisers can do to protect themselves.

    Keywords: Misleading and Fraudulent Advertising; Online Advertising; Crime and Corruption; Ethics;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Online Advertising: Rustlers and Sheriffs in the New Wild West." In Beautiful Security, edited by John Viega. O'Reilly Media, Inc., 2009. (Korean translation.)
  3. Assessing and Improving the Safety of Internet Search Engines

    Keywords: Internet; Search Technology; Performance Evaluation; Performance Improvement; Safety; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin. "Assessing and Improving the Safety of Internet Search Engines." In The Power of Search Engines, edited by Marcel Machill, and Markus Beiler, 259–277. Koln, Germany: Herbert von Halem Verlag, 2007.

Working Papers

  1. Exclusive Preferential Placement as Search Diversion: Evidence from Flight Search

    We analyze the incentives for a two-sided intermediary to divert consumers to its favored destinations. Applied to Internet search engines, we investigate a diversion mechanism based on Google's exclusive award of preferential placement to its own services. Using web traffic data from a quasi-experiment involving the introduction of Flight Search, a Google travel search service, we identify and measure the impact of diverting search away from non-paid algorithmic links to competing online travel agencies. Controlling for search intent, we find that Google's differential placement of Flight Search across similar search queries led to an 85% increase in click-through rates for paid advertising and a 65% decrease in click-through rates for non-paid algorithmic search links to competing online travel agencies. As search engines increase monetization of clicks by integrating specialized services into search results, our analysis suggests that exclusive preferential placement disproportionately impacts traffic to top sites most likely relevant to users' requests.

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Zhenyu Lai. "Exclusive Preferential Placement as Search Diversion: Evidence from Flight Search." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–087, April 2013. (data appendix.)
  2. Pricing and Efficiency in the Market for IP Addresses

    We consider market rules for the transfer of IP addresses, numeric identifiers required by all computers connected to the Internet. Excessive fragmentation of IP address blocks causes growth in the Internet's routing table, which is socially costly, so an IP address market should discourage subdividing IP address blocks more than necessary. Yet IP address transfer rules also need to facilitate purchase by the networks that need the addresses most, from the networks that value them least. We propose a market rule that avoids excessive fragmentation while almost achieving social efficiency, and we argue that implementation of this rule is feasible despite the limited powers of central authorities. We also offer a framework for the price trajectory of IP addresses. In a world without uncertainty, the unit price of IP addresses is constant until all addresses are in use and begins decreasing at that time. With uncertainty, the price before that time is a martingale, and the price trajectory afterwards is a supermartingale. Finally, we explore the role of rental markets in sharing information about address value and assuring allocative efficiency.

    Keywords: Price; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Markets; Performance Efficiency; Internet; Technology Networks; Technology Industry; Telecommunications Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Schwarz. "Pricing and Efficiency in the Market for IP Addresses." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–020, September 2011. (Revised November 2012.)
  3. To Groupon or Not to Groupon: The Profitability of Deep Discounts

    We examine the profitability and implications of online discount vouchers, a new marketing tool that offers consumers large discounts when they prepay for participating merchants' goods and services. Within a model of repeat experience good purchase, we examine two mechanisms by which a discount voucher service can benefit affiliated merchants: price discrimination and advertising. For vouchers to provide successful price discrimination, the valuations of consumers who have access to vouchers must systematically differ from-and typically be lower than-those of consumers who do not have access to vouchers. Offering vouchers is more profitable for merchants which are patient or relatively unknown, and for merchants with low marginal costs. Extensions to our model accommodate the possibilities of multiple voucher purchases and merchant price re-optimization.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Price; Profit; Marketing Strategy; Retail Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., Sonia Jaffe, and Scott Duke Kominers. "To Groupon or Not to Groupon: The Profitability of Deep Discounts." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 11–063, December 2010. (Revised June 2011, October 2011. Featured in Working Knowledge: Is Groupon Good for Retailers?. Excerpted in HBR Blogs: To Groupon or Not To Groupon: New Research on Voucher Profitability.)
  4. Competing Ad Auctions

    We present a two-stage model of competing ad auctions. Search engines attract users via Cournot-style competition. Meanwhile, each advertiser must pay a participation cost to use each ad platform, and advertiser entry strategies are derived using symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium that lead to the VCG outcome of the ad auctions. Consistent with our model of participation costs, we find empirical evidence that multi-homing advertisers are larger than single-homing advertisers. We then link our model to search engine market conditions: we derive comparative statics on consumer choice parameters, presenting relationships between market share, quality, and user welfare. We also analyze the prospect of joining auctions to mitigate participation costs, and we characterize when such joins do and do not increase welfare.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Auctions; Market Participation; Market Platforms; Mathematical Methods; Competition;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, Benjamin G. Edelman, and Hoan Lee. "Competing Ad Auctions." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10–055, January 2010. (Revised May 2010, February 2011.)
  5. Demographics, Career Concerns or Social Comparison: Who Games SSRN Download Counts?

    We use a unique database of every SSRN paper download over the course of seven years, along with detailed resume data on a random sample of SSRN authors, to examine the role of demographic factors, career concerns, and social comparisons on the commission of a particular type of gaming: the self-downloading of an author's own SSRN working paper solely to inflate the paper's reported download count. We find significant evidence that authors are more likely to inflate their papers' download counts when a higher count greatly improves the visibility of a paper on the SSRN network. We also find limited evidence of gaming due to demographic factors and career concerns, and strong evidence of gaming driven by social comparisons with various peer groups. These results indicate the importance of including psychological factors in the study of deceptive behavior.

    Keywords: Ethics; Personal Development and Career; Behavior; Competitive Strategy; Competitive Advantage;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Ian Larkin. "Demographics, Career Concerns or Social Comparison: Who Games SSRN Download Counts?" Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09–096, February 2009.
  6. CPC/CPA Hybrid Bidding in a Second Price Auction

    We develop a model of online advertising in which each advertiser chooses from multiple advertising measurement metrics - paying either for each click on its ads (CPC), or for each purchase that follows an ad‐click (CPA). Our analysis extends classic auction results by allowing players to make bids using two different pricing schemes, while the driving information for bidders' endogenous selection - the conversion rate - is hidden from the seller. We show that the advertisers with the most productive sites prefer to pay CPC, while advertisers with lower quality sites prefer to pay CPA - a result that may be viewed as counterintuitive since low quality sites cannot proudly tout their conversion rates. This result holds even if an ad platform's assessment of site quality is correct in expectation. We also show that by offering both CPC and CPA, an ad platform can weakly increase its revenues compared to offering either alternative alone.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Measurement and Metrics; Quality; Mathematical Methods; Web Sites;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Hoan Lee. "CPC/CPA Hybrid Bidding in a Second Price Auction." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09–074, December 2008.
  7. On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions

    How should players bid in keyword auctions such as those used by Google, Yahoo! and MSN? We model ad auctions as a dynamic game of incomplete information, so we can study the convergence and robustness properties of various strategies. In particular, we consider best-response bidding strategies for a repeated auction on a single keyword, where in each round, each player chooses some optimal bid for the next round, assuming that the other players merely repeat their previous bids. We focus on a strategy we call Balanced Bidding (BB). If all players use the BB strategy, we show that bids converge to a bid vector that obtains in a complete information static model proposed by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz. We prove that convergence occurs with probability 1, and we compute the expected time until convergence.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods; Competitive Strategy;

    Citation:

    Cary, Matthew, Aparna Das, Benjamin G. Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna R. Karlin, Claire Mathieu, and Michael Schwarz. "On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 08–056, January 2008.

Cases and Teaching Materials

  1. Ad Classification at Right Media

    Right Media considers systems and policies to make sure that ads are only shown on web sites where they are appropriate, and vice versa. Setting standards is particularly challenging given the large and growing marketplace, the numerous participants, their diverse requirements, and the dynamics of policy enforcement when market participants are competing intensely.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Policy; Market Participation; Standards; Web Sites;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Ad Classification at Right Media." Harvard Business School Case 909-032, June 2009. (Revised from original December 2008 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  2. Ad Classification at Right Media (TN)

    Teaching Note for [909032].

    Keywords: Advertising; Technology; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Ad Classification at Right Media (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 909-037, December 2010. (Revised from original February 2009 version.)
  3. Ad Classification at Right Media - pre-class slides - supplement

    Right Media considers systems and policies to make sure that ads are only shown on web sites where they are appropriate, and vice versa. Setting standards is particularly challenging given the large and growing marketplace, the numerous participants, their diverse requirements, and the dynamics of policy enforcement when market participants are competing intensely.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Market Participation; Negotiation Tactics; Marketing Communications; Communication; Media; Advertising Industry; Media and Broadcasting Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Ad Classification at Right Media - pre-class slides - supplement." Harvard Business School PowerPoint Supplement 911-037, December 2010.
  4. Ad Classification at Right Media - slide supplement

    Right Media considers systems and policies to make sure that ads are only shown on web sites where they are appropriate, and vice versa. Setting standards is particularly challenging given the large and growing marketplace, the numerous participants, their diverse requirements, and the dynamics of policy enforcement when market participants are competing intensely.

    Keywords: Media; Online Advertising; Market Participation; Negotiation Tactics; Marketing Communications; Communication; Advertising Industry; Media and Broadcasting Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Ad Classification at Right Media - slide supplement." Harvard Business School PowerPoint Supplement 911-038, December 2010.
  5. Airbnb (A)

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Luca. "Airbnb (A)." Harvard Business School Case 912-019, March 2012. (Revised from original December 2011 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  6. Airbnb (B)

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Luca. "Airbnb (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 912-020, March 2012. (Revised from original December 2011 version.)
  7. Airbnb (TN) (A) and (B)

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Luca. "Airbnb (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 912-021, December 2011.
  8. Akamai Technologies

    As the leading content delivery network, Akamai helps Internet companies deliver Web site content to end users with fewer delays and lower costs. Describes the strategic management challenges facing Akamai in early 2004. The company is poised to offer its next generation of services for enterprise customers, which will allow them to run Internet-enabled applications ("Web services")--on demand, with minimal capital investment--from Akamai's network of 15,000 servers located in ISP facilities at the Internet's "edge"--close to end users. Many large enterprise software companies have developed proprietary platforms for creating and managing Web services. Akamai must decide which of these software companies would be attractive partners and whether it can and should remain uncommitted to a platform as it helps customers deploy Web services. A rewritten version of an earlier case.

    Keywords: Market Platforms; Partners and Partnerships; Strategy; Internet; Technology Networks;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., Thomas R. Eisenmann, and Eric J. Van den Steen. "Akamai Technologies." Harvard Business School Case 804-158, June 2010. (Revised from original March 2004 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  9. Attack of the Clones: Birchbox Defends Against Copycat Competitors

    Keywords: Competition;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., and Benjamin Edelman. "Attack of the Clones: Birchbox Defends Against Copycat Competitors." Harvard Business School Case 912-010, November 2011. (request a courtesy copy.)
  10. Consumer Payment Systems - Japan

    In 2008, the Japanese consumer payments landscape featured ongoing widespread use of cash, limited use of credit cards and rapid rise of e-money systems based on contactless technology embedded in cards and especially mobile phones. The case details the alliances that created new products, as well as the regulations that sometimes stood in the way. Throughout, the case identifies incentives for both consumers and merchants, including direct costs, efficiency benefits, rebates, and treatment in case of loss or fraud.

    Keywords: Personal Finance; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Two-Sided Platforms; Alliances; Competitive Strategy; Hardware; Mobile Technology; Japan;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Andrei Hagiu. "Consumer Payment Systems - Japan." Harvard Business School Case 909-007, May 2009. (Revised from original August 2008 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  11. Consumer Payment Systems - United States

    In 2008, the U.S. consumer payments landscape was characterized by the ongoing prevalence of credit and debit card networks, the decline of checks, the rise of stored value cards, and the growth of new payment methods such as PayPal, Bill Me Later, and decoupled debit. This case presents the structure of these payment methods, focusing on incentives for both consumers and merchants, including direct costs, efficiency benefits, rebates, and treatment in case of loss or fraud.

    Keywords: Borrowing and Debt; Financial Management; Personal Finance; Market Platforms; Motivation and Incentives; Competitive Strategy; Online Technology; United States;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Andrei Hagiu. "Consumer Payment Systems - United States." Harvard Business School Case 909-006, July 2011. (Revised from original August 2008 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  12. Consumer Payment Systems - United States and Japan (TN)

    Teaching Note for [909006] and [909007].

    Keywords: Cash; Cost; Motivation and Incentives; Performance Efficiency; Technology; Alliances; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; United States; Japan;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Andrei Hagiu. "Consumer Payment Systems - United States and Japan (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 909-039, January 2009.
  13. Distribution at American Airlines (A)

    American Airlines sought to reduce the fees it pays to global distribution services (GDSs)—such as SABRE—to reach travel agents. But GDSs held significant tactical advantages. For example, GDSs had signed long-term exclusive contracts with the corporate customers who were American's best customers. Furthermore, travel agents tended to favor whichever GDS offered the highest commissions—impeding price competition among GDSs. Against this backdrop, American considered how best to cut its GDS costs.

    Keywords: Price; Globalized Firms and Management; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Distribution; Service Operations; Competition; Air Transportation Industry; Travel Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Distribution at American Airlines (A)." Harvard Business School Case 909-035, June 2009. (Revised from original January 2009 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  14. Distribution at American Airlines (B)

    Supplements the (A) case.

    Keywords: Distribution; Air Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Distribution at American Airlines (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 909-036, June 2009. (Revised from original January 2009 version.)
  15. Distribution at American Airlines (C)

    Presents 2011-2012 updates to American's distribution strategy including new challenges and disputes

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin. "Distribution at American Airlines (C)." Harvard Business School Supplement 913-034, May 2013. (Revised from original March 2013 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  16. Distribution at American Airlines (D)

    Supplements the (C) case

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin. "Distribution at American Airlines (D)." Harvard Business School Supplement 913-035, March 2013.
  17. Distribution at American Airlines (TN) (A) and (B)

    Teaching Note for [909035] and [909036].

    Keywords: Distribution; Air Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Distribution at American Airlines (TN) (A) and (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 909-059, January 2011. (Revised from original April 2009 version.)
  18. eBay Partner Network (A)

    eBay considers adjustments to the structure and rules of its affiliate marketing program, eBay Partner Network (ePN). In particular, eBay reevaluates affiliate compensation structure, the role of bonuses for especially productive affiliates, and the overall rationale for outsourcing online marketing efforts to independent affiliates. The case presents the history and development of ePN, ePN's importance to eBay, and the mechanics of online affiliate marketing.

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Marketing Strategy; Partners and Partnerships; Motivation and Incentives; Online Technology; Service Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Ian Larkin. "eBay Partner Network (A)." Harvard Business School Case 910-008, August 2010. (Revised from original September 2009 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  19. eBay Partner Network (B)

    Supplements the (A) case.

    Keywords: Online Technology; Web; Networks;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Ian Larkin. "eBay Partner Network (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 910-009, August 2010. (Revised from original September 2009 version.)
  20. eBay Partner Network (C)

    Supplements the (A) case.

    Keywords: Online Technology; Web; Networks;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Ian Larkin. "eBay Partner Network (C)." Harvard Business School Supplement 910-012, August 2010. (Revised from original September 2009 version.)
  21. eBay Partner Network (TN) (A), (B), and (C)

    Teaching Note for [910008], [910009], and [910012].

    Keywords: Online Technology; Web; Networks; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Ian Larkin. "eBay Partner Network (TN) (A), (B), and (C)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 910-025, November 2010. (Revised from original January 2010 version.)
  22. eBay Partner Network - slide supplement

    eBay considers adjustments to the structure and rules of its affiliate marketing program, eBay Partner Network (ePN). In particular, eBay reevaluates affiliate compensation structure, the role of bonuses for especially productive affiliates, and the overall rationale for outsourcing online marketing efforts to independent affiliates. The case presents the history and development of ePN, ePN's importance to eBay, and the mechanics of online affiliate marketing.

    Keywords: History; Job Cuts and Outsourcing; Online Technology; Markets; Marketing Channels; Negotiation Participants; Marketing; Compensation and Benefits; Service Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "eBay Partner Network - slide supplement." Harvard Business School PowerPoint Supplement 911-039, December 2010.
  23. Google Inc.

    Describes Google's history, business model, governance structure, corporate culture, and processes for managing innovation. Reviews Google's recent strategic initiatives and the threats they pose to Yahoo, Microsoft, and others. Asks what Google should do next. One option is to stay focused on the company's core competence, i.e., developing superior search solutions and monetizing them through targeted advertising. Another option is to branch into new arenas, for example, build Google into a portal like Yahoo or MSN; extend Google's role in e-commerce beyond search, to encompass a more active role as an intermediary (like eBay) facilitating transactions; or challenge Microsoft's position on the PC desktop by developing software to compete with Office and Windows.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Business Model; Growth and Development Strategy; Network Effects; Mission and Purpose; Expansion; Search Technology; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Thomas R. Eisenmann. "Google Inc." Harvard Business School Case 910-036, April 2011. (Revised from original January 2010 version.) (Winner of ECCH 2011 Award for Outstanding Contribution to the Case Method - Strategy and General Management.)
  24. Google Inc. (Abridged)

    Describes Google's history, business model, governance structure, corporate culture, and processes for managing innovation. Reviews Google's recent strategic initiatives and the threats it poses to Yahoo, Microsoft, and others. Asks what Google should do next. One option is to stay focused on the company's core competence, i.e., developing superior search solutions and monetizing them through targeted advertising. Another option is to branch into new arenas, for example, build Google into a portal like Yahoo or MSN; extend Google's role in e-commerce beyond search to encompass a more active role as an intermediary (like eBay) facilitating transactions; or challenge Microsoft's position on the PC desktop by developing software to compete with Office and Windows.

    Keywords: Business Model; Corporate Entrepreneurship; Corporate Governance; Organizational Culture; Organizational Structure; Competitive Strategy; Search Technology; Web Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Thomas R. Eisenmann. "Google Inc. (Abridged)." Harvard Business School Case 910-032, December 2010. (Revised from original February 2010 version.)
  25. Google Inc. and Google Inc. (Abridged) (TN)

    Teaching Note for [910032] and [910036].

    Keywords: Web Services Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Thomas R. Eisenmann. "Google Inc. and Google Inc. (Abridged) (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 910-050, June 2010.
  26. The iPhone at IVK (TN)

    Teaching Note for 911-413.

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "The iPhone at IVK (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 911-414, October 2010.
  27. Microsoft adCenter

    Microsoft considers alternatives to expand its presence in online advertising, especially text-based pay-per-click advertising. Google dominates, and it is unclear how Microsoft can grow, despite considerable technical and financial resources. Microsoft considers a set of alternatives, each with clear benefits but also serious challenges.

    Keywords: Online Advertising; Growth and Development Strategy; Competition; Advertising Industry;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter, and Benjamin G. Edelman. "Microsoft adCenter." Harvard Business School Case 908-049, February 2010. (Revised from original January 2008 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  28. Microsoft adCenter (TN)

    Teaching Note for [908049].

    Keywords: Technology; Advertising; Software; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., and Benjamin G. Edelman. "Microsoft adCenter (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 908-062, February 2010. (Revised from original April 2008 version.)
  29. Mobilizing Networked Businesses

    This module note presents six strategies for mobilizing networked businesses.

    Keywords: Business Model; Business Plan; Entrepreneurship; Networks; Internet;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., and Benjamin G. Edelman. "Mobilizing Networked Businesses." Harvard Business School Module Note 911-048, March 2011. (request a courtesy copy.)
  30. The Online Economy: Strategy and Entrepreneurship - Course Architecture Note

    This note provides an overview of the Harvard Business School course "The Online Economy: Strategy and Entrepreneurship." It covers the framework for the course, key principles within each course module, and a synopsis of each case, along with the lessons the case is meant to convey.

    Keywords: Business Model; Business Plan; Business Education; Curriculum and Courses; Entrepreneurship; Business Strategy; Information Technology; Internet; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., and Benjamin G. Edelman. "The Online Economy: Strategy and Entrepreneurship - Course Architecture Note." Harvard Business School Course Overview Note 911-069, May 2012. (Revised from original April 2011 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  31. Online Marketing at Big Skinny

    Describes a wallet maker's application of seven Internet marketing technologies: display ads, algorithmic search, sponsored search, social media, interactive content, online distributors, and A/B testing. Provides concise introductions to the key features of each technology, and asks which forms of online marketing the company should prioritize in the future. Discusses similarities and differences between online and off-line marketing, as well as issues of marketing campaign evaluation.

    Keywords: Advertising Campaigns; Online Advertising; Resource Allocation; Marketing Strategy; Performance Evaluation; Internet; Retail Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Online Marketing at Big Skinny." Harvard Business School Case 911-033, February 2012. (Revised from original February 2011 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  32. Online Marketing at Big Skinny (TN)

    Teaching Note for 911033.

    Keywords: Marketing; Online Advertising;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G., and Scott Kominers. "Online Marketing at Big Skinny (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 911-034, October 2011. (Revised from original February 2011 version.)
  33. Online Marketing at Big Skinny – Slide Supplement

    Slide Supplement for 911-034

    Keywords: Consumer Products Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin, and Scott Duke Kominers. "Online Marketing at Big Skinny – Slide Supplement." Harvard Business School PowerPoint Supplement 912-006, October 2011.
  34. Online Restaurant Promotions

    A variety of services offer consumers benefits for dining at participating restaurants. This case examines four such services: Entertainment Book, Restaurant.com, Rewards Network, and OpenTable. Despite key functional similarities, each of the services chooses an importantly different approach-different pricing, different benefits to consumers, different benefits to restaurants, and different underlying technologies.

    Keywords: Marketing Strategy; Two-Sided Platforms; Service Delivery; Service Operations; Internet; Food and Beverage Industry; Service Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Online Restaurant Promotions." Harvard Business School Case 909-034, October 2010. (Revised from original January 2009 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  35. Online Restaurant Promotions (TN)

    Teaching Note for [909034].

    Keywords: Service Operations; Customer Satisfaction; Entertainment; Networks; Price; Corporate Strategy; Technology; Service Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Online Restaurant Promotions (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 909-063, June 2009.
  36. Opening Dot EU (A)

    EURid considers possible market mechanisms to allocate initial domain names within the Internet's newly-created "dot EU." European Union regulations and community norms substantially constrain EURid's approach, preventing the use of the most natural economic mechanisms (such as auctions).

    Keywords: Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Resource Allocation; Auctions; Internet; Information Industry; Europe;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Opening Dot EU (A)." Harvard Business School Case 908-052, April 2008. (Revised from original March 2008 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  37. Opening Dot EU (B)

    EURid considers possible market mechanisms to allocate initial domain names within the Internet's newly-created "dot EU." European Union regulations and community norms substantially constrain EURid's approach, preventing the use of the most natural economic mechanisms (such as auctions).

    Keywords: Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Internet; Resource Allocation; Auctions; Information Industry; Europe;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Opening Dot EU (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 908-053, April 2008. (Revised from original March 2008 version.)
  38. Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd.

    Personal Rapid Transport (PRT) vehicles—often called "driverless taxis"—sought to combine the best characteristics of cars, taxis, and trains, while adding features unavailable in any existing transportation system. Like cars and taxis, PRT vehicles carried small groups—often just a single passenger—with no need to wait for a shared vehicle to arrive or for others to board. Yet PRT followed train systems in using an exclusive right of way that avoided delays from other traffic. Where would such systems be most useful? Could system designers successfully compete with well-established networks of trains, buses, cars, and roads?

    Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Network Effects; Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Transportation Networks; Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd." Harvard Business School Case 910-010, September 2010. (Revised from original November 2009 version.) (Featured in Working Knowledge: Can Entrepreneurs Drive People Movers to Success?) (request a courtesy copy.)
  39. Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Inc.

    PRT vehicles -- often called "driverless taxis" -- sought to combine the best characteristics of cars, taxis, and trains, while adding features unavailable in any existing transportation system. Like cars and taxis, PRT vehicles carried small groups -- often just a single passenger -- with no need to wait for a shared vehicle to arrive or for others to board. Yet PRT followed train systems in using an exclusive right of way that avoided delays from other traffic. Where would such systems be most useful? Could system designers successfully compete with well-established networks of trains, buses, cars, and roads?

    Keywords: Competitive Strategy; Corporate Strategy; Entrepreneurship; Network Effects; Transportation Networks; Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Inc." 2009. (Featured in Working Knowledge: Can Entrepreneurs Drive People Movers to Success?)
  40. Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd. (TN)

    Teaching Note for [910010].

    Keywords: Transportation Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Personal Rapid Transport at Vectus, Ltd. (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 910-024, February 2010. (Revised from original January 2010 version.)
  41. Pricing and Partnership at Zillow, Inc.

    As Zillow's real estate search service gains user adoption, some real estate professionals question Zillow's policies, fees, and power. Dissatisfied real estate professionals could remove listings from Zillow, reducing the service's value to users. Should Zillow adjust its approach in order to address complaints?

    Keywords: Business Strategy; Multi-Sided Platforms; Property; United States;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter, and Benjamin Edelman. "Pricing and Partnership at Zillow, Inc." Harvard Business School Case 913-021, November 2012. (Revised from original November 2012 version.)
  42. SaferTaxi: Connecting Taxis and Passengers in South America

    SaferTaxi, a taxi booking service in South America must develop its mobilization strategy; that is, it must attract enough passengers and drivers to make its service worthwhile for all. Drivers hesitate to pay for SaferTaxi's smartphones and service unless these will deliver passenger bookings—and passengers have no reason to sign up unless drivers are available. Meanwhile, regulators question the permissibility of online taxi booking in light of regulatory requirements, and some existing taxi booking vendors feel threatened by SaferTaxi's efforts to enter the market. As SaferTaxi attempts to satisfy these diverse constituents, international competition looms. What should SaferTaxi's founders do next?

    Keywords: taxi booking; smartphone; Transportation Networks; Network Effects; Laws and Statutes; South America; Argentina; Brazil; Chile;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter, and Benjamin Edelman. "SaferTaxi: Connecting Taxis and Passengers in South America." Harvard Business School Case 913-041, April 2013.
  43. Symbian, Google & Apple in the Mobile Space (A)

    Symbian, maker of a leading mobile smartphone operating system, faces new competition from Google and Apple. Symbian evaluates changes to its software and its relationships with distributors in order to meet these competitors.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Distribution; Competitive Strategy; Mobile Technology; Software;

    Citation:

    Suarez, Fernando, Benjamin G. Edelman, and Arati Srinivasan. "Symbian, Google & Apple in the Mobile Space (A)." Harvard Business School Case 909-055, April 2009. (request a courtesy copy.)
  44. Symbian, Google & Apple in the Mobile Space (B)

    Supplements the (A) case.

    Keywords: Network Effects; Networks; Strategy; Telecommunications Industry;

    Citation:

    Suarez, Fernando, Benjamin G. Edelman, and Arati Srinivasan. "Symbian, Google & Apple in the Mobile Space (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 909-056, April 2009.
  45. TheLadders

    Despite strong appeal among job seekers and outside recruiters, TheLadders' corporate job listings seem to lag. Could raising prices help solve the problem? TheLadders considers this strategic paradox.

    Keywords: Customer Satisfaction; Price; Recruitment; Job Search; Marketing Strategy; Employment Industry;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., Benjamin G. Edelman, Brian J. Hall, and Nicole Bennett. "TheLadders." Harvard Business School Case 908-061, April 2010. (Revised from original April 2008 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)
  46. TheLadders (TN)

    Teaching Note for [908061].

    Keywords: Job Search; Web; Employment Industry;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., and Benjamin G. Edelman. "TheLadders (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 909-005, June 2009. (Revised from original July 2008 version.)
  47. Windows Vista

    Microsoft designs, modifies, publicizes, and distributes Windows Vista-against a backdrop of consumers already largely satisfied with their existing Windows XP systems. Microsoft must decide what features to include and what to drop, how to compete with its own installed base, and how to mobilize partners to offer Vista-compatible systems.

    Keywords: Product Launch; Demand and Consumers; Partners and Partnerships; Competition; Software; Computer Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Windows Vista." Harvard Business School Case 909-038, December 2010. (Revised from original February 2009 version.) (request a courtesy copy.)

Testimony and Regulatory Submissions

  1. Towards Improvement in Singapore's Transportation Efficiency and Environmental Impact

    I evaluate the suitability of Personal Rapid Transport (PRT) for transportation problems in Singapore, and I propose short-term and long-term applications.

    Keywords: Performance Efficiency; Performance Improvement; Environmental Sustainability; Transportation; Transportation Industry; Singapore;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Towards Improvement in Singapore's Transportation Efficiency and Environmental Impact." October 2011. (Submission to the National Climate Change Secretariat of Singapore.)
  2. Competition among Sponsored Search Services

    Keywords: Search Technology; Competition; Information Technology Industry;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Competition among Sponsored Search Services." U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Task Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws, June 2008. (Hearing cancelled.) (Reprinted in Working Knowledge: Google-Yahoo Ad Deal is Bad for Online Advertising.)
  3. Spyware and Adware

    Keywords: Software;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Spyware and Adware." Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Government Testimony Series, 2008.
  4. Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing Offers

    Keywords: Ethics; Crime and Corruption; Market Transactions;

    Citation:

    Edelman, Benjamin G. "Deception in Post-Transaction Marketing Offers." U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, November 2009.