Deepak Malhotra
Eli Goldston Professor of Business Administration
Deepak Malhotra is a Professor in the Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit at the Harvard Business School. He teaches Negotiation in the MBA program, and in a wide variety of executive programs including the Owner/President Management Program (OPM), Changing the Game and Families in Business. Deepak has won numerous awards for his teaching, including the HBS Faculty Award by Harvard Business School's MBA Class of 2011, and the Charles M. Williams Award from the Harvard Business School. In both 2011 and 2012, the MBA students selected Deepak to give the "Best of EC Year" speech to graduating students. Deepak's first book (with Max Bazerman), Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond, was awarded the 2008 Outstanding Book Award by the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Deepak's most recent book, I Moved Your Cheese, is now a Wall Street Journal Best-Seller, and has sold translation rights in over 15 languages. Deepak's research focuses on negotiation strategy, trust development, competitive escalation, and international and ethnic dispute resolution, and has been published in top journals in the fields of management, psychology, conflict resolution, and foreign policy. His work has also received considerable media attention, including multiple appearances by Deepak on CNBC. Deepak's professional activities include training, consulting, and advisory work for firms across the globe. You can follow Deepak on Twitter: www.twitter.com/Prof_Malhotra
-
Book
| 2011
I Moved Your Cheese: For Those Who Refuse to Live as Mice in Someone Else's Maze
Deepak Malhotra
Now a Wall Street Journal Best-seller! If you were a mouse trapped in a maze and someone kept moving the cheese, what would you do? Over a decade ago, the best-selling business fable Who Moved My Cheese? offered its answer to the question: accept that change is inevitable and beyond your control, don't waste your time wondering why things are the way they are, keep your head down, and start looking for the cheese. I Moved Your Cheese takes a different point of view. This stand-alone book tells the inspiring story of a new generation of mice who begin to reexamine what others have taken for granted and to ask the important questions. Rather than simply accepting their fate and dutifully chasing after cheese, Max, Zed, and Big break the rules, challenge the limitations and constraints others have accepted, and set out to create new realities This book is motivated by a simple observation: Leadership, innovation, entrepreneurship, creativity, problem solving, business growth—and even personal development—almost always depend on the ability to challenge accepted notions, reshape the environment, and play by a different set of rules... our own. To succeed in these endeavors, we need to understand the ways in which we unwittingly limit ourselves. As Zed explains to Max, "The problem is not that the mouse is in the maze, but that the maze is in the mouse."
Keywords: Leadership;
Success;
Personal Development and Career;
Problems and Challenges;
Opportunities;
Creativity;
-
Book
| 2007
Negotiation Genius
Deepak Malhotra and M. H. Bazerman
Whether you've “seen it all” or are just starting out, Negotiation Genius will dramatically improve your negotiating skills and confidence. Drawing on decades of behavioral research plus the experience of thousands of business clients, the authors take the mystery out of preparing for and executing negotiations—whether they involve multimillion-dollar deals or improving your next salary offer.
Keywords: Experience and Expertise;
Negotiation Preparation;
Negotiation Process;
Negotiation Tactics;
Behavior;
Citation: Malhotra, Deepak, and M. H. Bazerman. Negotiation Genius. Bantam Books, 2007. (Winner of International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. CPR Award for Outstanding Book presented by International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Published in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, and Italian.)
-
Editorial
| Forbes.com
|
Why There Are So Many Conflicts in Pro Sports (And What to Do About Them)
Deepak Malhotra
-
Article
| Communication Research
|
Deception and Its Detection: Effects of Monetary Incentives and Personal Relationship History
Lyn M. Van Swol, Deepak Malhotra and Michael T. Braun
The study examined detection of deception in unsanctioned, consequential lies between either friends or strangers using an ultimatum game. The sender was given an amount of money to divide with the receiver. The receiver did not know the precise amount the sender had to divide, and the sender had the ability to deceive the receiver about the monetary amount. Not surprisingly, senders were more likely to deceive strangers than friends, and receivers were more suspicious of strangers than friends. When senders lied, they stated their offer more times and gave more supporting statements for their offer. Receivers had a strong truth bias, although the majority of senders were truthful, and friends had more of a truth bias than strangers. Receivers were not able to detect deception at a rate above chance. Friends were not better at detecting deception than strangers. However, because most participants were truthful and there was a strong truth bias, a high percentage of participants were able to detect when their partner was truthful, in confirmation of the veracity effect.
-
Article
| Discourse Processes
|
Evidence for the Pinocchio Effect: Linguistic Differences Between Lies, Deception by Omissions, and Truths
Lyn M. Van Swol, Michael T. Braun and Deepak Malhotra
The study used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count and Coh-Metrix software to examine linguistic differences with deception in an ultimatum game. In the game, the Allocator was given an amount of money to divide with the Receiver. The Receiver did not know the precise amount the Allocator had to divide, and the Allocator could use deception. Allocators either lied, deceived through omission, or were truthful with the Receiver with their allocation decision. Liars used a higher percentage of third-person pronouns, numbers, and profanity than other participants. Participants using deception by omission used fewer words and a lower percentage of causation words than other participants. Support was found for the "Pinocchio effect": liars generally used more words than other participants, although truthful Allocators with suspicious partners did not significantly differ from liars on word count. Allocators with suspicious partners used more negative emotion words and profanity. Mixed support was found for indexes from Coh-Metrix that measured whether liars had a higher cognitive load. Results are discussed in terms of strategic and non-strategic linguistic cues.
-
Article
| Administrative Science Quarterly
|
The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships
D. Malhotra and F. Gino
Across three laboratory studies, this paper illustrates how a common strategic decision aimed at increasing one's own power—investing in outside options—can lead to opportunistic behavior in exchange relationships. We show that the extent to which individuals have invested in creating outside options increases the likelihood that they will exploit their current exchange partners, even after controlling for the leverage provided by the outside options. Our results demonstrate that having previously sunk investments in an outside option leads to a heightened sense of entitlement, even when the outside option has been foregone. In turn, feelings of entitlement result in higher aspirations for what is to be gained in the current relationship, and these aspirations fuel opportunism. Finally, we show that other parties may fail to anticipate these effects, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation.
Keywords: Crime and Corruption;
Motivation and Incentives;
Opportunities;
Relationships;
-
Article
| Academy of Management Learning & Education
|
Economics Education and Greed
Long Wang, Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan
The recent financial crisis, and repeated corporate scandals, raise serious questions about whether a business school education contributes to what some have described as a culture of greed. The dominance of economic-related courses in MBA curricula led us to assess the effects of economics education on greed in three studies using multiple methods. Study 1 found that economics majors and students who had taken multiple economics courses kept more money in a money allocation task (the Dictator Game). Study 2 found that economics education was associated with more positive attitudes toward greed and toward one's own greedy behavior. Study 3 found that a short statement on the societal benefits of self-interest led to more positive ratings of greed's moral acceptability, even for noneconomics students. These effects suggest that economics education may have serious, albeit unintended consequences on our students' attitudes toward greed.
Citation: Wang, Long, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. " Economics Education and Greed." Academy of Management Learning & Education 10, no. 4 (December 2011): 643–660.
-
Article
| Organization Science
|
Foundations of Organizational Trust: What Matters to Different Stakeholders?
Michael Pirson and Deepak Malhotra
Prior research on organizational trust has not rigorously examined the context specificity of trust nor distinguished between the potentially varying dimensions along which different stakeholders base their trust. As a result, dominant conceptualizations of organizational trust are overly generalized. Building on existing research on organizational trust and stakeholder theory, we introduce a more nuanced perspective on the nature of organizational trust. We develop a framework that distinguishes between organizational stakeholders along two dimensions: depth of the relationship (deep or shallow) and locus (internal or external). The framework identifies which of six dimensions of trustworthiness (benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency, and identification) will be relevant to which stakeholder type. We test the predictions of our framework using original survey data from 1,298 respondents across four stakeholder groups from four different organizations. The results reveal that the relevant dimensions of trustworthiness vary systematically across different stakeholder types and provide strong support for the validity of the depth and locus dimensions.
Keywords: Competency and Skills;
Forecasting and Prediction;
Ethics;
Framework;
Data and Data Sets;
Surveys;
Organizations;
Business and Stakeholder Relations;
Identity;
Perspective;
Trust;
-
Article
| Forbes.com
|
Mistaking Mistrust for Greed: How to Solve the NFL Dispute
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Entertainment;
Sports Industry;
-
Article
| Strategic Management Journal
|
Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution
Fabrice Lumineau and Deepak Malhotra
This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contractual detail affects the type of dispute resolution approach that is adopted when conflict arises, and that different approaches are associated with different costs for resolving the dispute. We also find that the effect of contract structure on dispute resolution approach is moderated by the degree of coordination required in the relationship, and that the effect of dispute approach on resolution costs is moderated by the degree of power asymmetry between the parties. Thus, even after controlling for various attributes of the exchange relationship and the dispute, the choice of contracting structure has important strategic implications.
Keywords: Governance Controls;
Contracts;
Rights;
Negotiation;
Conflict and Resolution;
Power and Influence;
-
Article
| Academy of Management Journal
|
Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure
Deepak Malhotra and Fabrice Lumineau
Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between control and coordination functions of contracts, (b) separating goodwill-based and competence-based trust, and (c) evaluating the effects of contract structure on relational outcomes in the context of disputes. We find that control provisions increase competence-based trust, but reduce goodwill-based trust, resulting in a net decrease in the likelihood of continued collaboration. Coordination provisions increase competence-based trust, leading to an increased likelihood of continued collaboration.
Keywords: Competency and Skills;
Conflict and Resolution;
Contracts;
Trust;
Research;
-
Article
| Judgment and Decision Making
|
Preferring Balanced vs. Advantageous Peace Agreements: A Study of Israeli Attitudes Towards a Two-State Solution
Deepak Malhotra and Jeremy Ginges
The paper extends research on fixed-pie perceptions by suggesting that disputants may prefer proposals that are perceived to be equally attractive to both parties (i.e., balanced) rather than one-sided, because balanced agreements are seen as more likely to be successfully implemented. We test our predictions using data on Israeli support for the Geneva Accords, an agreement for a two-state solution negotiated by unofficial delegations of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 2003. The results demonstrate that Israelis are more likely to support agreements that are seen favorably by other Israelis, but—contrary to fixed-pie predictions—Israeli support for the accords does not diminish simply because a majority of Palestinians favors (rather than opposes) the accords. We show that implementation concerns create a demand among Israelis for balance in the degree to which each side favors (or opposes) the agreement. The effect of balance is noteworthy in that it creates considerable support for proposals even when survey respondents are told that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians oppose the deal.
Keywords: Agreements and Arrangements;
Conflict and Resolution;
Government and Politics;
Balance and Stability;
Forecasting and Prediction;
Attitudes;
Israel;
-
Article
| Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
|
The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation and Behavior
Deepak Malhotra
The paper theoretically elaborates and empirically investigates the "competitive arousal" model of decision making, which argues that elements of the strategic environment (e.g., head-to-head rivalry and time pressure) can fuel competitive motivations and behavior. Study 1 measures real-time motivations of online auction bidders and finds that the "desire to win" (even when winning is costly and will provide no strategic upside) is heightened when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 2 is a field experiment that alters the text of e-mail alerts sent to bidders who have been outbid; the text makes competitive (vs. non-competitive) motivations salient. Making the desire to win salient triggers additional bidding, but only when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 3, a laboratory study, demonstrates that the desire to win mediates the effect of rivalry and time pressure on over-bidding.
Keywords: Decision Making;
Auctions;
Bids and Bidding;
Behavior;
Motivation and Incentives;
Personal Characteristics;
Competition;
-
Journal Article
| Judgment and Decision Making
|
(When) Are Religious People Nicer? Religious Salience and the 'Sunday Effect' on Pro-social Behavior
Deepak Malhotra
Prior research has found mixed evidence for the long-theorized link between religiosity and pro-social behavior. To help overcome this divergence, we hypothesize that pro-social behavior is linked not to religiosity per se, but rather to the salience of religion and religious norms. We report on a field experiment that examines when auction participants will respond to an appeal to continue bidding for secular charitable causes. The results reveal that religious individuals are more likely than non-religious individuals to respond to an appeal for charity only on days that they visit their place of worship; on other days of the week, religiosity has no effect. Notably, the result persists after controlling for a host of factors that may influence bidding, but disappears when the appeal for charity is replaced by an appeal to bid for other reasons. Implications for the link between religion and pro-social behavior are discussed.
Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy;
Auctions;
Bids and Bidding;
Religion;
Behavior;
Societal Protocols;
-
Article
| Foreign Affairs
|
Without Conditions: The Case for Negotiating with the Enemy
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Journal Article
| Harvard Business Review
|
When Contracts Destroy Trust
Deepak Malhotra
Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely enough, incentives can end up being just plain insulting.
Keywords: Contracts;
Negotiation;
Trust;
-
Editorial
| Wall Street Journal
|
Auto CEOs Aren't Making Their Case
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Management;
-
Article
| Journal of Management
|
Psychological Influence in Negotiation: An Introduction Long Overdue
Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman
This paper discusses the causes and consequences of the (surprisingly) limited extent to which social influence research has penetrated the field of negotiation and then presents a framework for bridging the gap between these two literatures. The paper notes that one of the reasons for its limited impact on negotiation research is that extant research on social influence focuses almost exclusively on economic or structural levers of influence. With this in mind, the paper seeks to achieve five objectives: (1) Define the domain of psychological influence as consisting of those tactics which do not require the influencer to change the economic or structural aspects of the bargaining situation in order to persuade the target; (2) Review prior research on behavioral decision making to identify ideas that may be relevant to the domain of psychological influence; (3) Provide a series of examples of how behavioral decision research can be leveraged to create psychological influence tactics for use in negotiation; (4) Consider the other side of influence, i.e., how targets of influence might defend against the tactics herein considered; and (5) Consider some of the ethical issues surrounding the use of psychological influence in negotiation.
Keywords: Social Issues;
Research;
Framework;
Negotiation Tactics;
Decisions;
Power and Influence;
Behavior;
Ethics;
-
Journal Article
| MIT Sloan Management Review
|
Unconventional Insights for Managing Stakeholder Trust
Michael Pirson and Deepak Malhotra
Initiatives to build and maintain trust with various stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers and investors, are at the top of the executive agenda at many organizations. But most companies don't really understand how to manage stakeholder trust effectively. In fact, the authors' research suggests that many trust-building initiatives and approaches that organizations invest in may be of questionable value. Others might actually be counterproductive. Managing stakeholder trust is difficult because there are many different stakeholder groups, each with its own particular needs and perspective. That is, trust is multidimensional, and it's not obvious which dimension executives need to focus on when dealing with any particular constituency. To answer such questions, the authors conducted a study of stakeholder trust in four different organizations. They analyzed the relevance (if any) of various factors: benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency and value congruence. In essence, the study asked what matters -- and to whom. Some of the results were unexpected, and a few were even counterintuitive, leading to the following key insights: Transparency is overrated; integrity is not enough; the right kind of competence matters; building trust with one group can destroy it with another; and value congruence matters across the board. The new framework challenges some existing beliefs and sheds light on areas that companies would be wise not to ignore. Indeed, as the authors illustrate, fundamental misunderstandings about stakeholder trust have tripped up corporations such as Coca-Cola, Google, Apple, Delta Air Lines, Mattel and Sprint. A deeper knowledge of stakeholder trust will help businesses reap numerous benefits, including improved cooperation with suppliers, increased motivation and productivity among employees, enhanced loyalty from customers and higher levels of support from investors.
Keywords: Values and Beliefs;
Knowledge Use and Leverage;
Organizational Culture;
Business and Stakeholder Relations;
Perspective;
Trust;
Cooperation;
-
Journal Article
| Harvard Business Review
|
When Winning Is Everything
Deepak Malhotra, Gillian Ku and J. Keith Murnighan
In the heat of competition, executives can easily become obsessed with beating their rivals. This adrenaline-fueled emotional state, which the authors call competitive arousal, often leads to bad decisions. Managers can minimize the potential for competitive arousal and the harm it can inflict by avoiding certain types of interaction and targeting the causes of a win-at-all-costs approach to decision making. Through an examination of companies such as Boston Scientific and Paramount, and through research on auctions, the authors identified three principal drivers of competitive arousal: intense rivalry, especially in the form of one-on-one competitions; time pressure, found in auctions and other bidding situations, for example; and being in the spotlight - that is, working in the presence of an audience. Individually, these factors can seriously impair managerial decision making; together, their consequences can be dire, as evidenced by many high-profile business disasters. It's not possible to avoid destructive competitions and bidding wars completely. But managers can help prevent competitive arousal by anticipating potentially harmful competitive dynamics and then restructuring the deal-making process. They can also stop irrational competitive behavior from escalating by addressing the causes of competitive arousal. When rivalry is intense, for instance, managers can limit the roles of those who feel it most. They can reduce time pressure by extending or eliminating arbitrary deadlines. And they can deflect the spotlight by spreading the responsibility for critical competitive decisions among team members. Decision makers will be most successful when they focus on winning contests in which they have a real advantage - and take a step back from those in which winning exacts too high a cost.
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions;
Auctions;
Bids and Bidding;
Behavior;
Emotions;
Personal Characteristics;
Competitive Strategy;
Competitive Advantage;
Citation: Malhotra, Deepak, Gillian Ku, and J. Keith Murnighan. " When Winning Is Everything." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 5 (May 2008).
-
Article
| SENSEX
|
To Be a Negotiation Genius
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
Citation: Malhotra, Deepak. "To Be a Negotiation Genius." SENSEX 1, no. 6 (2008): 50–52.
-
Journal Article
| Harvard Business Review
|
Investigative Negotiation
Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman
This article includes a one-page preview that quickly summarizes the key ideas and provides an overview of how the concepts work in practice along with suggestions for further reading. Negotiators often fail to achieve results because they channel too much effort into selling their own position and too little into understanding the other party's perspective. To get the best deal--or, sometimes, any deal at all--negotiators need to think like detectives, digging for information about why the other side wants what it does. This investigative approach entails a mind-set and a methodology, say Harvard Business School professors Malhotra and Bazerman. Inaccurate assumptions about the other side's motivations can lead negotiators to propose solutions to the wrong problems, needlessly give away value, or derail deals altogether. Consider, for example, the pharmaceutical company that deadlocked with a supplier over the issue of exclusivity in an ingredient purchase. Believing it was a ploy to raise the price, the drug maker upped its offer--unsuccessfully. In fact, the supplier was balking because a relative's company needed a small amount of the ingredient to make a local product. Once the real motivation surfaced, a compromise quickly followed. Understanding the other side's motives and goals is the first principle of investigative negotiation. The second is to figure out what constraints the other party faces. Often when your counterpart's behavior appears unreasonable, his hands are tied somehow, and you can reach agreement by helping overcome those limitations. The third is to view onerous demands as a window into what the other party prizes most--and use that information to create opportunities. The fourth is to look for common ground; even fierce competitors may have complementary interests that lead to creative agreements. Finally, if a deal appears lost, stay at the table and keep trying to learn more. Even if you don't win, you can gain insights into a customer's future needs, the interests of similar customers, or the strategies of competitors.
Keywords: Knowledge Acquisition;
Knowledge Use and Leverage;
Negotiation Process;
Negotiation Tactics;
Motivation and Incentives;
Perspective;
Pharmaceutical Industry;
Citation: Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. " Investigative Negotiation." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 9 (September 2007).
-
Column
| Negotiation
|
Pitch Your Offer—and Close the Deal
Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman
The article offers several strategies on how to be a good negotiator and decision maker for business developments. The strategies that are presented were an extract from the book Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond. The primary tip "unbundle gains, bundle losses," refers to gaining money in installments but losing money in one lump sum. This is followed by "leverage the power of justification," which focuses on negotiators' failure in providing a justification for their offers and proposals. And lastly, the strategy called "issue token or gifts," which is familiarly known as giving away gifts to counterparts. It was noted that a negotiator should see to it that his counterpart would not feel insulted by the offered gifts.
Keywords: Decision Making;
Negotiation;
Negotiation Offer;
Negotiation Tactics;
Strategy;
-
Journal Article
| Negotiation
|
Leverage Time to Your Advantage
Deepak Malhotra
-
Article
| Times of India
|
Beware of Competitive Arousal
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Competition;
-
Journal Article
| Times of India
|
The 'Winning at Any Cost' Syndrome
Deepak Malhotra
-
Article
| Negotiation
|
The Perils of Negotiating to Win
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Journal Article
| Negotiation
|
Is Your Counterpart Irrational...Really?
Deepak Malhotra
-
Article
| Negotiation
|
The Fine Art of Making Concessions
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Column
| Negotiation
|
It's Not Intuitive: Strategies for Negotiating More Rationally
M. H. Bazerman and Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
Strategy;
Cognition and Thinking;
-
Article
| Journal of Conflict Resolution
|
Peace Workshops in Protracted Conflicts: A Study of Long-Term Effects
Deepak Malhotra and Sumanisiri Liyanage
Keywords: Conflict and Resolution;
-
Article
| Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
|
Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions
Gillian Ku, Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan
Keywords: Competition;
Decision Making;
Auctions;
Online Technology;
-
Journal Article
| Negotiation
|
Making Threats Credible
Deepak Malhotra
-
Journal Article
| Negotiation
|
Make Your Weak Position Strong
Deepak Malhotra
-
Journal Article
| Negotiation
|
Accept or Reject?
Deepak Malhotra
-
Article
| Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
|
Trust and Reciprocity Decisions: The Differing Perspectives of Trustors and Trusted Parties
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Trust;
Decision Making;
Perspective;
-
Article
| Negotiation
|
Smart Alternatives to Lying in Negotiation
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Article
| Negotiation
|
Risky Business: Trust in Negotiation
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Trust;
Negotiation;
-
Article
| Negotiation
|
Will You Negotiate or Litigate?
Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Negotiation;
Lawsuits and Litigation;
-
Article
| Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
|
Attributions of Trust and the Calculus of Reciprocity
Madan M. Pillutla, Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan
Keywords: Trust;
-
Article
| Administrative Science Quarterly
|
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust
Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan
Keywords: Contracts;
Trust;
-
Article
| Negotiation Journal
|
The On-Line Auction Phenomenon: Growth, Strategies, Promise, and Problems
Gillian Ku and Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Online Technology;
Auctions;
Growth and Development;
Strategy;
Problems and Challenges;
-
Chapter
| Social Psychology and Economics
| 2006
Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society Pays
Max H. Bazerman and Deepak Malhotra
Keywords: Economics;
Social Psychology;
Society;
Cost vs Benefits;
Citation: Bazerman, Max H., and Deepak Malhotra. "Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society Pays." In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by David de Cremer, J. Keith Murnighan, and Marcel Zeelenberg, 263–280. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006.
-
Chapter
| Research in Organizational Behavior
| 2000
Normal Acts of Irrational Trust: Motivated Attributions and the Trust Development Process
Mark J. Weber, Deepak Malhotra and J. Keith Murnighan
Keywords: Trust;
Motivation and Incentives;
Attitudes;
Citation: Weber, Mark J., Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. "Normal Acts of Irrational Trust: Motivated Attributions and the Trust Development Process." In Research in Organizational Behavior. Vol. 22, edited by B. Staw, and R. Sutton, 75–101. Elsevier Science, 2000.
-
Chapter
| Trust and Distrust Across Organizational Contexts: Dilemmas and Approaches
| 2004
Paradoxes of Trust: Empirical and Theoretical Departures from a Traditional Model
J. Keith Murnighan, Deepak Malhotra and J. Mark Weber
Keywords: Trust;
Mathematical Methods;
Citation: Murnighan, J. Keith, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Mark Weber. "Paradoxes of Trust: Empirical and Theoretical Departures from a Traditional Model." In Trust and Distrust Across Organizational Contexts: Dilemmas and Approaches, edited by Roderick M Kramer, and Karen S Cook. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004.
-
Teaching Note
| HBS Case Collection
|
2012
Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown (TN)
Noam Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
-
Tutorial
|
2012
Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown
Noam Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
-
Teaching Note
| HBS Case Collection
|
2010
Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (TN) (A), (B) & (C)
Deepak Malhotra
Teaching Note for [908064], [908065], and [908066].
Keywords: Negotiation;
-
Teaching Note
| HBS Case Collection
|
2010
Hamilton Real Estate (TN)
Deepak Malhotra
Teaching Note for [905052] and [905053].
Keywords: Real Estate Industry;
-
Module Note
|
2010
Strategies of Influence
Deepak Malhotra
Strategies of Influence (SOI) is a stand-alone session that teaches students about the psychology of persuasion. Students are presented a series of mini-case vignettes, each of which illustrates a specific strategy that negotiators can use to make their ideas, offers, proposals, and requests more compelling—i.e., more likely to elicit a “yes” rather than a “no”. The session is designed as an efficient method for discussing psychological influence, and is easy to incorporate into almost any course: it can be lengthened or shortened to fit most reasonable time constraints (from as little as ~30 minutes to 90+ minutes). The session involves extensive student participation, but requires no advance preparation on the part of students.
Keywords: Leadership;
Management Teams;
Negotiation;
Groups and Teams;
Power and Influence;
Strategy;
-
Case
| HBS Case Collection
|
2010
(Revised from original 2008 version)
Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (A)
Brian J. Hall, Deepak Malhotra and Nicole Bennett
MBA student Monroe Davies is asked by a potential employer to determine his own compensation package. This case follows Jim Hummer, President and CEO of Whole Health Management and Davies through a unique recruitment process that raises questions of compensation and employee incentives, negotiation strategy, and human resources management.
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits;
Recruitment;
Job Interviews;
Negotiation Process;
Personal Development and Career;
Motivation and Incentives;
Value;
-
Supplement
| HBS Case Collection
|
2010
(Revised from original 2008 version)
Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (B)
Brian J. Hall, Deepak Malhotra and Nicole Bennett
Supplements the (A) case.
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits;
Negotiation;
Health;
Price;
Health Industry;
-
Supplement
| HBS Case Collection
|
2010
(Revised from original 2008 version)
Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (C)
Brian J. Hall, Deepak Malhotra and Nicole Bennett
Supplements the (A) and (B) cases.
Keywords: Compensation and Benefits;
Negotiation;
Health;
Price;
Health Industry;
-
Teaching Note
| HBS Case Collection
|
2009
Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (TN) (A) & (B)
Deepak Malhotra
Teaching Note for [906038] and [906039].
Keywords: Sports Industry;
-
Teaching Note
| HBS Case Collection
|
2009
Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown (TN)
Noam T. Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
Teaching Note for [809020].
Keywords: Equity;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Investment;
Groups and Teams;
Entrepreneurship;
Contracts;
Ownership Stake;
-
Supplement
| HBS Case Collection
|
2012
(Revised from original 2008 version)
UpDown: Confidential Instructions for MICHAEL
Noam Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.
Keywords: Negotiation Participants;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Business Startups;
Ownership Stake;
-
Supplement
| HBS Case Collection
|
2012
(Revised from original 2008 version)
UpDown: Confidential Instructions for GEORG
Noam Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.
Keywords: Negotiation Participants;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Business Startups;
Ownership Stake;
-
Supplement
| HBS Case Collection
|
2012
(Revised from original 2008 version)
UpDown: Confidential Instructions for PHUC
Noam Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.
Keywords: Negotiation Participants;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Business Startups;
Ownership Stake;
-
Case
| HBS Case Collection
|
2012
(Revised from original 2008 version)
Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown
Noam Wasserman and Deepak Malhotra
Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.
Keywords: Business Startups;
Entrepreneurship;
Capital;
Venture Capital;
Equity;
Compensation and Benefits;
Negotiation;
Partners and Partnerships;
Citation: Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. " Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown." Harvard Business School Case 809-020, November 2012. (Revised from original July 2008 version.)
-
Exercise
|
2008
The Book Deal: Confidential Instructions for the PUBLISHER
Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman
A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a one-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.
Keywords: Ethics;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Negotiation Preparation;
Negotiation Tactics;
Negotiation Types;
Publishing Industry;
-
Exercise
|
2008
The Book Deal: Confidential Instructions for the AGENT
Deepak Malhotra and Max H. Bazerman
A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a one-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.
Keywords: Ethics;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Negotiation Preparation;
Negotiation Tactics;
Negotiation Types;
Publishing Industry;
-
Module Note
|
2007
(Revised from original 2007 version)
Negotiating Effectively in Family Business Systems
Deepak Malhotra and John A. Davis
Explores how families in business can apply five principles of negotiation that are used effectively by non-family members. The distinctive characteristics of family relationships and of family business systems--which affect the use of these principles--are described.
Keywords: Family Business;
Negotiation;
Family Ownership;
-
Case
| HBS Case Collection
|
2006
Matthew B. Hunter
John A. Davis and Deepak Malhotra
Matthew Hunter, CEO of a second-generation family business, must manage the performance of a key manager in his company. Looks at the impact of family relationships on performance management.
Keywords: Family Business;
Performance Evaluation;
Crisis Management;
Business or Company Management;
Conflict Management;
Corporate Governance;
Family and Family Relationships;
Partners and Partnerships;
Negotiation Process;
Citation: Davis, John A., and Deepak Malhotra. " Matthew B. Hunter." Harvard Business School Case 806-204, June 2006.
-
Exercise
|
2006
Matthew A. Hunter
John A. Davis and Deepak Malhotra
Matthew Hunter, CEO of a second-generation family business, must manage the performance of a key manager in his company. Looks at the impact of family relationships on performance management.
Keywords: Family and Family Relationships;
Conflict Management;
Negotiation;
Family Business;
Performance;
Managerial Roles;
Citation: Davis, John A., and Deepak Malhotra. " Matthew A. Hunter." Harvard Business School Exercise 806-203, June 2006.
-
Case
| HBS Case Collection
|
2006
(Revised from original 2006 version)
Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (A)
Deepak Malhotra and Maly Hout
On September 15, 2004, the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the National Hockey League (NHL) and the National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA) expired. Because the two sides had failed to negotiate a new CBA by that date, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman locked out the players--no hockey would be played, no revenues would be collected, and no salaries would be paid. The key issues in the negotiation were the league's demand for a salary cap and for the linking of salaries to league revenues. The players opposed both of these demands. After months of near-fruitless negotiation, Bettman threatened to cancel the entire season, a move that would destroy billions in revenue. Provides a rich history of the two sides' relationship and an account of the negotiations that led up to the season cancellation threat. Asks students to analyze the power tactics that each side has used to its advantage in prior negotiations and to propose strategies that might help either side pull off a successful negotiation in the current context, which involves entrenched positions, complex issues, and severe distrust.
Keywords: Negotiation Tactics;
Negotiation Participants;
Trust;
Sports;
Compensation and Benefits;
Sports Industry;
United States;
-
Supplement
| HBS Case Collection
|
2006
(Revised from original 2006 version)
Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (B)
Deepak Malhotra and Maly Hout
Keywords: Negotiation;
Compensation and Benefits;
Sports;
Sports Industry;
-
Exercise
|
2005
Hamilton Real Estate: Confidential Role Information for the CEO of Estate One (BUYER)
Deepak Malhotra
Presents a two-party negotiation between the executive VP of Pearl Investments and the CEO of Estate One for the sale of real estate in the town of Hamilton.
Keywords: Ethics;
Price;
Information;
Contracts;
Managerial Roles;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Sales;
Strategy;
Value;
Real Estate Industry;
-
Exercise
|
2005
Hamilton Real Estate: Confidential Role Information for the Executive VP of Pearl Investments (SELLER)
Deepak Malhotra
Presents a two-party negotiation between the executive VP of Pearl Investments and the CEO of Estate One for the sale of real estate in the town of Hamilton.
Keywords: Ethics;
Price;
Information;
Contracts;
Managerial Roles;
Agreements and Arrangements;
Strategy;
Value;
Real Estate Industry;
|
|