Deepak Malhotra

Eli Goldston Professor of Business Administration

Deepak Malhotra is a Professor in the Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit at the Harvard Business School. He teaches Negotiation in the MBA program, and in a wide variety of executive programs including the Owner/President Management Program (OPM), Changing the Game and Families in Business.  Deepak has won numerous awards for his teaching, including the HBS Faculty Award by Harvard Business School's MBA Class of 2011, and the Charles M. Williams Award from the Harvard Business School.  In both 2011 and 2012, the MBA students selected Deepak to give the end-of-year speech to graduating students. 

In 2014, Deepak was chosen by Poets & Quants to be among their "40 under 40", a listing of the world's best business school professors under the age of 40.

Deepak's first book (with Max Bazerman), Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond, was awarded the 2008 Outstanding Book Award by the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution.

Deepak's most recent book, I Moved Your Cheese, is a Wall Street Journal Best-Seller, and has sold translation rights in over 20 languages.

Deepak's research focuses on negotiation strategy, trust development, competitive escalation, and international and ethnic dispute resolution, and has been published in top journals in the fields of management, psychology, conflict resolution, and foreign policy.  His work has also received considerable media attention, including multiple appearances by Deepak on CNBC.  

Deepak's professional activities include training, consulting, and advisory work for firms across the globe.

You can follow Deepak on Twitter: www.twitter.com/Prof_Malhotra

Books

  1. I Moved Your Cheese: For Those Who Refuse to Live as Mice in Someone Else's Maze

    Now a Wall Street Journal Best-seller! If you were a mouse trapped in a maze and someone kept moving the cheese, what would you do? Over a decade ago, the best-selling business fable Who Moved My Cheese? offered its answer to the question: accept that change is inevitable and beyond your control, don't waste your time wondering why things are the way they are, keep your head down, and start looking for the cheese. I Moved Your Cheese takes a different point of view. This stand-alone book tells the inspiring story of a new generation of mice who begin to reexamine what others have taken for granted and to ask the important questions. Rather than simply accepting their fate and dutifully chasing after cheese, Max, Zed, and Big break the rules, challenge the limitations and constraints others have accepted, and set out to create new realities This book is motivated by a simple observation: Leadership, innovation, entrepreneurship, creativity, problem solving, business growth—and even personal development—almost always depend on the ability to challenge accepted notions, reshape the environment, and play by a different set of rules... our own. To succeed in these endeavors, we need to understand the ways in which we unwittingly limit ourselves. As Zed explains to Max, "The problem is not that the mouse is in the maze, but that the maze is in the mouse."

    Keywords: Leadership; Success; Personal Development and Career; Problems and Challenges; Opportunities; Creativity;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. I Moved Your Cheese: For Those Who Refuse to Live as Mice in Someone Else's Maze. Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2011. (Wall Street Journal Best-Seller; Translated in ~20 languages.)
  2. Negotiation Genius

    Whether you've “seen it all” or are just starting out, Negotiation Genius will dramatically improve your negotiating skills and confidence. Drawing on decades of behavioral research plus the experience of thousands of business clients, the authors take the mystery out of preparing for and executing negotiations—whether they involve multimillion-dollar deals or improving your next salary offer.

    Keywords: Experience and Expertise; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Tactics; Behavior;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and M. H. Bazerman. Negotiation Genius. Bantam Books, 2007. (Winner of International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. CPR Award for Outstanding Book presented by International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Published in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, and Italian.)

Journal Articles

  1. 15 Rules for Negotiating a Job Offer

    The author, a professor of negotiation at Harvard Business School, offers specific pieces of advice for job candidates: • Don't underestimate the importance of likability. • Help prospective employers understand why you deserve what you're requesting. • Make it clear that they can get you. • Understand the person across the table from you. • Understand his or her constraints. • Be prepared for tough questions. • Focus on the questioner's intent, not on the question. • Consider the whole deal. • Negotiate multiple issues simultaneously, not serially. • Don't negotiate just for the sake of negotiating (a pitfall for recent MBA graduates). • Think through the timing of offers. • Avoid, ignore, or downplay ultimatums. • Remember that your interviewer isn't out to get you. • Stay at the table. • Maintain a sense of perspective.

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "15 Rules for Negotiating a Job Offer." Harvard Business Review 92, no. 4 (April 2014): 117–120.
  2. How to Negotiate with VCs

    VC-entrepreneur partnership agreements often contain flaws that become highly damaging as the parties come up against issues of power, trust, and much more. Yet many of the flaws are systematic and predictable—and hence preventable. The author, a longtime consultant to the VC industry, outlines four recommendations for entrepreneurs sitting down at the table with prospective funders.

    Understand your leverage. Your leverage is not only a function of your alternatives; it has a lot to do with the VC's as well. Seek to understand them, and be prepared to educate the VC about why his exercising too much power could hurt both parties in the long term.

    Maximize trust. Beneath all the financial projections, the VC negotiation is a process in which people are deciding whom they want to associate with for years to come. If the VC is vulnerable, use the opportunity to build trust rather than to take advantage.

    Focus on value-not just valuation. Nonfinancial considerations such as control are also important.

    Strive for understanding. Seemingly abstruse provisions can be highly consequential. And bear in mind that the choices a VC makes when negotiating can contain important clues about her assessments and expectations.

    Above all, when you're negotiating with a VC, think not only about what will look good in a press release today but also about what will help you create and capture value over the long run.

    Keywords: Venture Capital; Negotiation Tactics; Entrepreneurship;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "How to Negotiate with VCs." Harvard Business Review 91, no. 5 (May 2013): 84–90.
  3. Why There Are So Many Conflicts in Pro Sports (And What to Do About Them)

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Why There Are So Many Conflicts in Pro Sports (And What to Do About Them)." Forbes.com (October 21, 2012).
  4. Deception and Its Detection: Effects of Monetary Incentives and Personal Relationship History

    The study examined detection of deception in unsanctioned, consequential lies between either friends or strangers using an ultimatum game. The sender was given an amount of money to divide with the receiver. The receiver did not know the precise amount the sender had to divide, and the sender had the ability to deceive the receiver about the monetary amount. Not surprisingly, senders were more likely to deceive strangers than friends, and receivers were more suspicious of strangers than friends. When senders lied, they stated their offer more times and gave more supporting statements for their offer. Receivers had a strong truth bias, although the majority of senders were truthful, and friends had more of a truth bias than strangers. Receivers were not able to detect deception at a rate above chance. Friends were not better at detecting deception than strangers. However, because most participants were truthful and there was a strong truth bias, a high percentage of participants were able to detect when their partner was truthful, in confirmation of the veracity effect.

    Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Money; Ethics; Relationships;

    Citation:

    Van Swol, Lyn M., Deepak Malhotra, and Michael T. Braun. "Deception and Its Detection: Effects of Monetary Incentives and Personal Relationship History." Communication Research 39, no. 2 (2012): 217–238.
  5. Evidence for the Pinocchio Effect: Linguistic Differences Between Lies, Deception by Omissions, and Truths

    The study used Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count and Coh-Metrix software to examine linguistic differences with deception in an ultimatum game. In the game, the Allocator was given an amount of money to divide with the Receiver. The Receiver did not know the precise amount the Allocator had to divide, and the Allocator could use deception. Allocators either lied, deceived through omission, or were truthful with the Receiver with their allocation decision. Liars used a higher percentage of third-person pronouns, numbers, and profanity than other participants. Participants using deception by omission used fewer words and a lower percentage of causation words than other participants. Support was found for the "Pinocchio effect": liars generally used more words than other participants, although truthful Allocators with suspicious partners did not significantly differ from liars on word count. Allocators with suspicious partners used more negative emotion words and profanity. Mixed support was found for indexes from Coh-Metrix that measured whether liars had a higher cognitive load. Results are discussed in terms of strategic and non-strategic linguistic cues.

    Keywords: Communication Intention and Meaning; Cognition and Thinking;

    Citation:

    Van Swol, Lyn M., Michael T. Braun, and Deepak Malhotra. "Evidence for the Pinocchio Effect: Linguistic Differences Between Lies, Deception by Omissions, and Truths." Discourse Processes 49, no. 2 (2012): 79–106.
  6. The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships

    Across three laboratory studies, this paper illustrates how a common strategic decision aimed at increasing one's own power—investing in outside options—can lead to opportunistic behavior in exchange relationships. We show that the extent to which individuals have invested in creating outside options increases the likelihood that they will exploit their current exchange partners, even after controlling for the leverage provided by the outside options. Our results demonstrate that having previously sunk investments in an outside option leads to a heightened sense of entitlement, even when the outside option has been foregone. In turn, feelings of entitlement result in higher aspirations for what is to be gained in the current relationship, and these aspirations fuel opportunism. Finally, we show that other parties may fail to anticipate these effects, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation.

    Keywords: Crime and Corruption; Motivation and Incentives; Opportunities; Relationships;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, D., and F. Gino. "The Pursuit of Power Corrupts: How Investing in Outside Options Motivates Opportunism in Relationships." Special Issue on "Social Psychological Perspectives on Power and Hierarchy". Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4 (December 2011): 559–592.
  7. Economics Education and Greed

    The recent financial crisis, and repeated corporate scandals, raise serious questions about whether a business school education contributes to what some have described as a culture of greed. The dominance of economic-related courses in MBA curricula led us to assess the effects of economics education on greed in three studies using multiple methods. Study 1 found that economics majors and students who had taken multiple economics courses kept more money in a money allocation task (the Dictator Game). Study 2 found that economics education was associated with more positive attitudes toward greed and toward one's own greedy behavior. Study 3 found that a short statement on the societal benefits of self-interest led to more positive ratings of greed's moral acceptability, even for noneconomics students. These effects suggest that economics education may have serious, albeit unintended consequences on our students' attitudes toward greed.

    Keywords: Behavior; Ethics; Attitudes; Business Education; Economics;

    Citation:

    Wang, Long, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. "Economics Education and Greed." Academy of Management Learning & Education 10, no. 4 (December 2011): 643–660.
  8. Foundations of Organizational Trust: What Matters to Different Stakeholders?

    Prior research on organizational trust has not rigorously examined the context specificity of trust nor distinguished between the potentially varying dimensions along which different stakeholders base their trust. As a result, dominant conceptualizations of organizational trust are overly generalized. Building on existing research on organizational trust and stakeholder theory, we introduce a more nuanced perspective on the nature of organizational trust. We develop a framework that distinguishes between organizational stakeholders along two dimensions: depth of the relationship (deep or shallow) and locus (internal or external). The framework identifies which of six dimensions of trustworthiness (benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency, and identification) will be relevant to which stakeholder type. We test the predictions of our framework using original survey data from 1,298 respondents across four stakeholder groups from four different organizations. The results reveal that the relevant dimensions of trustworthiness vary systematically across different stakeholder types and provide strong support for the validity of the depth and locus dimensions.

    Keywords: Competency and Skills; Forecasting and Prediction; Ethics; Framework; Data and Data Sets; Surveys; Organizations; Business and Stakeholder Relations; Identity; Perspective; Trust;

    Citation:

    Pirson, Michael, and Deepak Malhotra. "Foundations of Organizational Trust: What Matters to Different Stakeholders?" Organization Science 22, no. 4 (July–August 2011): 1087–1104.
  9. Mistaking Mistrust for Greed: How to Solve the NFL Dispute

    Keywords: Entertainment; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Mistaking Mistrust for Greed: How to Solve the NFL Dispute." Forbes.com (March 14, 2011).
  10. Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution

    This paper investigates how contract structure influences inter-firm dispute resolution processes and outcomes by examining a unique dataset consisting of over 150,000 pages of documents relating to 102 business disputes. We find that the level of contractual detail affects the type of dispute resolution approach that is adopted when conflict arises, and that different approaches are associated with different costs for resolving the dispute. We also find that the effect of contract structure on dispute resolution approach is moderated by the degree of coordination required in the relationship, and that the effect of dispute approach on resolution costs is moderated by the degree of power asymmetry between the parties. Thus, even after controlling for various attributes of the exchange relationship and the dispute, the choice of contracting structure has important strategic implications.

    Keywords: Governance Controls; Contracts; Rights; Negotiation; Conflict and Resolution; Power and Influence;

    Citation:

    Lumineau, Fabrice, and Deepak Malhotra. "Shadow of the Contract: How Contract Structure Shapes Inter-Firm Dispute Resolution." Strategic Management Journal 32 (2011): 532–555.
  11. Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure

    Leveraging a longitudinal dataset concerning 102 inter-firm disputes, we evaluate the effects of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We theoretically refine and empirically extend prior research by (a) distinguishing between control and coordination functions of contracts, (b) separating goodwill-based and competence-based trust, and (c) evaluating the effects of contract structure on relational outcomes in the context of disputes. We find that control provisions increase competence-based trust, but reduce goodwill-based trust, resulting in a net decrease in the likelihood of continued collaboration. Coordination provisions increase competence-based trust, leading to an increased likelihood of continued collaboration.

    Keywords: Competency and Skills; Conflict and Resolution; Contracts; Trust; Research;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Fabrice Lumineau. "Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Conflict: The Effects of Contract Structure." Academy of Management Journal 54, no. 5 (2011).
  12. Preferring Balanced vs. Advantageous Peace Agreements: A Study of Israeli Attitudes Towards a Two-State Solution

    The paper extends research on fixed-pie perceptions by suggesting that disputants may prefer proposals that are perceived to be equally attractive to both parties (i.e., balanced) rather than one-sided, because balanced agreements are seen as more likely to be successfully implemented. We test our predictions using data on Israeli support for the Geneva Accords, an agreement for a two-state solution negotiated by unofficial delegations of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 2003. The results demonstrate that Israelis are more likely to support agreements that are seen favorably by other Israelis, but—contrary to fixed-pie predictions—Israeli support for the accords does not diminish simply because a majority of Palestinians favors (rather than opposes) the accords. We show that implementation concerns create a demand among Israelis for balance in the degree to which each side favors (or opposes) the agreement. The effect of balance is noteworthy in that it creates considerable support for proposals even when survey respondents are told that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians oppose the deal.

    Keywords: Agreements and Arrangements; Conflict and Resolution; Government and Politics; Balance and Stability; Forecasting and Prediction; Attitudes; Israel;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Jeremy Ginges. "Preferring Balanced vs. Advantageous Peace Agreements: A Study of Israeli Attitudes Towards a Two-State Solution." Judgment and Decision Making 5, no. 6 (October 2010): 420–427.
  13. The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation and Behavior

    The paper theoretically elaborates and empirically investigates the "competitive arousal" model of decision making, which argues that elements of the strategic environment (e.g., head-to-head rivalry and time pressure) can fuel competitive motivations and behavior. Study 1 measures real-time motivations of online auction bidders and finds that the "desire to win" (even when winning is costly and will provide no strategic upside) is heightened when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 2 is a field experiment that alters the text of e-mail alerts sent to bidders who have been outbid; the text makes competitive (vs. non-competitive) motivations salient. Making the desire to win salient triggers additional bidding, but only when rivalry and time pressure coincide. Study 3, a laboratory study, demonstrates that the desire to win mediates the effect of rivalry and time pressure on over-bidding.

    Keywords: Decision Making; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Behavior; Motivation and Incentives; Personal Characteristics; Competition;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "The Desire to Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation and Behavior." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 111 (2010): 139–146.
  14. (When) Are Religious People Nicer? Religious Salience and the 'Sunday Effect' on Pro-social Behavior

    Prior research has found mixed evidence for the long-theorized link between religiosity and pro-social behavior. To help overcome this divergence, we hypothesize that pro-social behavior is linked not to religiosity per se, but rather to the salience of religion and religious norms. We report on a field experiment that examines when auction participants will respond to an appeal to continue bidding for secular charitable causes. The results reveal that religious individuals are more likely than non-religious individuals to respond to an appeal for charity only on days that they visit their place of worship; on other days of the week, religiosity has no effect. Notably, the result persists after controlling for a host of factors that may influence bidding, but disappears when the appeal for charity is replaced by an appeal to bid for other reasons. Implications for the link between religion and pro-social behavior are discussed.

    Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Religion; Behavior; Societal Protocols;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "(When) Are Religious People Nicer? Religious Salience and the 'Sunday Effect' on Pro-social Behavior." Judgment and Decision Making 5, no. 2 (2010): 138–143.
  15. Without Conditions: The Case for Negotiating with the Enemy

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Without Conditions: The Case for Negotiating with the Enemy." Foreign Affairs 88, no. 5 (September–October 2009): 84–90.
  16. When Contracts Destroy Trust

    Contracts exist to foster trust, but they can actually do the opposite. Overly detailed contracts leave no room for spontaneous acts of kindness to create goodwill between parties; too-rigid contracts leave parties unable to respond to the unanticipated; and, strangely enough, incentives can end up being just plain insulting.

    Keywords: Contracts; Negotiation; Trust;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "When Contracts Destroy Trust." Harvard Business Review 87, no. 5 (May 2009): 25.
  17. Auto CEOs Aren't Making Their Case

    Keywords: Management;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Auto CEOs Aren't Making Their Case." Wall Street Journal (December 4, 2008).
  18. Psychological Influence in Negotiation: An Introduction Long Overdue

    This paper discusses the causes and consequences of the (surprisingly) limited extent to which social influence research has penetrated the field of negotiation and then presents a framework for bridging the gap between these two literatures. The paper notes that one of the reasons for its limited impact on negotiation research is that extant research on social influence focuses almost exclusively on economic or structural levers of influence. With this in mind, the paper seeks to achieve five objectives: (1) Define the domain of psychological influence as consisting of those tactics which do not require the influencer to change the economic or structural aspects of the bargaining situation in order to persuade the target; (2) Review prior research on behavioral decision making to identify ideas that may be relevant to the domain of psychological influence; (3) Provide a series of examples of how behavioral decision research can be leveraged to create psychological influence tactics for use in negotiation; (4) Consider the other side of influence, i.e., how targets of influence might defend against the tactics herein considered; and (5) Consider some of the ethical issues surrounding the use of psychological influence in negotiation.

    Keywords: Social Issues; Research; Framework; Negotiation Tactics; Decisions; Power and Influence; Behavior; Ethics;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. "Psychological Influence in Negotiation: An Introduction Long Overdue." Journal of Management 34, no. 3 (June 2008): 509–531.
  19. Unconventional Insights for Managing Stakeholder Trust

    Initiatives to build and maintain trust with various stakeholders, including customers, employees, suppliers and investors, are at the top of the executive agenda at many organizations. But most companies don't really understand how to manage stakeholder trust effectively. In fact, the authors' research suggests that many trust-building initiatives and approaches that organizations invest in may be of questionable value. Others might actually be counterproductive. Managing stakeholder trust is difficult because there are many different stakeholder groups, each with its own particular needs and perspective. That is, trust is multidimensional, and it's not obvious which dimension executives need to focus on when dealing with any particular constituency. To answer such questions, the authors conducted a study of stakeholder trust in four different organizations. They analyzed the relevance (if any) of various factors: benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency and value congruence. In essence, the study asked what matters -- and to whom. Some of the results were unexpected, and a few were even counterintuitive, leading to the following key insights: Transparency is overrated; integrity is not enough; the right kind of competence matters; building trust with one group can destroy it with another; and value congruence matters across the board. The new framework challenges some existing beliefs and sheds light on areas that companies would be wise not to ignore. Indeed, as the authors illustrate, fundamental misunderstandings about stakeholder trust have tripped up corporations such as Coca-Cola, Google, Apple, Delta Air Lines, Mattel and Sprint. A deeper knowledge of stakeholder trust will help businesses reap numerous benefits, including improved cooperation with suppliers, increased motivation and productivity among employees, enhanced loyalty from customers and higher levels of support from investors.

    Keywords: Values and Beliefs; Knowledge Use and Leverage; Organizational Culture; Business and Stakeholder Relations; Perspective; Trust; Cooperation;

    Citation:

    Pirson, Michael, and Deepak Malhotra. "Unconventional Insights for Managing Stakeholder Trust." MIT Sloan Management Review 49, no. 4 (summer 2008): 43–50.
  20. When Winning Is Everything

    In the heat of competition, executives can easily become obsessed with beating their rivals. This adrenaline-fueled emotional state, which the authors call competitive arousal, often leads to bad decisions. Managers can minimize the potential for competitive arousal and the harm it can inflict by avoiding certain types of interaction and targeting the causes of a win-at-all-costs approach to decision making. Through an examination of companies such as Boston Scientific and Paramount, and through research on auctions, the authors identified three principal drivers of competitive arousal: intense rivalry, especially in the form of one-on-one competitions; time pressure, found in auctions and other bidding situations, for example; and being in the spotlight - that is, working in the presence of an audience. Individually, these factors can seriously impair managerial decision making; together, their consequences can be dire, as evidenced by many high-profile business disasters. It's not possible to avoid destructive competitions and bidding wars completely. But managers can help prevent competitive arousal by anticipating potentially harmful competitive dynamics and then restructuring the deal-making process. They can also stop irrational competitive behavior from escalating by addressing the causes of competitive arousal. When rivalry is intense, for instance, managers can limit the roles of those who feel it most. They can reduce time pressure by extending or eliminating arbitrary deadlines. And they can deflect the spotlight by spreading the responsibility for critical competitive decisions among team members. Decision makers will be most successful when they focus on winning contests in which they have a real advantage - and take a step back from those in which winning exacts too high a cost.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Behavior; Emotions; Personal Characteristics; Competitive Strategy; Competitive Advantage;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, Gillian Ku, and J. Keith Murnighan. "When Winning Is Everything." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 5 (May 2008).
  21. To Be a Negotiation Genius

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "To Be a Negotiation Genius." SENSEX 1, no. 6 (2008): 50–52.
  22. Investigative Negotiation

    This article includes a one-page preview that quickly summarizes the key ideas and provides an overview of how the concepts work in practice along with suggestions for further reading. Negotiators often fail to achieve results because they channel too much effort into selling their own position and too little into understanding the other party's perspective. To get the best deal--or, sometimes, any deal at all--negotiators need to think like detectives, digging for information about why the other side wants what it does. This investigative approach entails a mind-set and a methodology, say Harvard Business School professors Malhotra and Bazerman. Inaccurate assumptions about the other side's motivations can lead negotiators to propose solutions to the wrong problems, needlessly give away value, or derail deals altogether. Consider, for example, the pharmaceutical company that deadlocked with a supplier over the issue of exclusivity in an ingredient purchase. Believing it was a ploy to raise the price, the drug maker upped its offer--unsuccessfully. In fact, the supplier was balking because a relative's company needed a small amount of the ingredient to make a local product. Once the real motivation surfaced, a compromise quickly followed. Understanding the other side's motives and goals is the first principle of investigative negotiation. The second is to figure out what constraints the other party faces. Often when your counterpart's behavior appears unreasonable, his hands are tied somehow, and you can reach agreement by helping overcome those limitations. The third is to view onerous demands as a window into what the other party prizes most--and use that information to create opportunities. The fourth is to look for common ground; even fierce competitors may have complementary interests that lead to creative agreements. Finally, if a deal appears lost, stay at the table and keep trying to learn more. Even if you don't win, you can gain insights into a customer's future needs, the interests of similar customers, or the strategies of competitors.

    Keywords: Knowledge Acquisition; Knowledge Use and Leverage; Negotiation Process; Negotiation Tactics; Motivation and Incentives; Perspective; Pharmaceutical Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. "Investigative Negotiation." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 9 (September 2007).
  23. Pitch Your Offer—and Close the Deal

    The article offers several strategies on how to be a good negotiator and decision maker for business developments. The strategies that are presented were an extract from the book Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond. The primary tip "unbundle gains, bundle losses," refers to gaining money in installments but losing money in one lump sum. This is followed by "leverage the power of justification," which focuses on negotiators' failure in providing a justification for their offers and proposals. And lastly, the strategy called "issue token or gifts," which is familiarly known as giving away gifts to counterparts. It was noted that a negotiator should see to it that his counterpart would not feel insulted by the offered gifts.

    Keywords: Decision Making; Negotiation; Negotiation Offer; Negotiation Tactics; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. "Pitch Your Offer—and Close the Deal." Negotiation 10, no. 8 (August 2007).
  24. Leverage Time to Your Advantage

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Leverage Time to Your Advantage." Negotiation 10, no. 6 (June 2007).
  25. Beware of Competitive Arousal

    Keywords: Competition;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Beware of Competitive Arousal." Times of India (January 13, 2007), 1.
  26. The 'Winning at Any Cost' Syndrome

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "The 'Winning at Any Cost' Syndrome." Times of India (January 13, 2007), 20.
  27. The Perils of Negotiating to Win

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "The Perils of Negotiating to Win." Negotiation 10, no. 3 (2007).
  28. Is Your Counterpart Irrational...Really?

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Is Your Counterpart Irrational...Really?" Negotiation 9, no. 3 (2006).
  29. The Fine Art of Making Concessions

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "The Fine Art of Making Concessions." Negotiation 9, no. 1 (2006).
  30. It's Not Intuitive: Strategies for Negotiating More Rationally

    Keywords: Negotiation; Strategy; Cognition and Thinking;

    Citation:

    Bazerman, M. H., and Deepak Malhotra. "It's Not Intuitive: Strategies for Negotiating More Rationally." Negotiation 9, no. 5 (2006).
  31. Peace Workshops in Protracted Conflicts: A Study of Long-Term Effects

    Keywords: Conflict and Resolution;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Sumanisiri Liyanage. "Peace Workshops in Protracted Conflicts: A Study of Long-Term Effects." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (December 2005): 1–17.
  32. Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions

    Keywords: Competition; Decision Making; Auctions; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Ku, Gillian, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. "Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 96, no. 2 (March 2005): 89–103.
  33. Making Threats Credible

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Making Threats Credible." Negotiation 8, no. 3 (March 2005).
  34. Make Your Weak Position Strong

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Make Your Weak Position Strong." Negotiation 8, no. 7 (2005).
  35. Accept or Reject?

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Accept or Reject?" Negotiation 7, no. 8 (August 2004).
  36. Trust and Reciprocity Decisions: The Differing Perspectives of Trustors and Trusted Parties

    Keywords: Trust; Decision Making; Perspective;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Trust and Reciprocity Decisions: The Differing Perspectives of Trustors and Trusted Parties." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 94, no. 2 (July 2004): 61–73.
  37. Smart Alternatives to Lying in Negotiation

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Smart Alternatives to Lying in Negotiation." Negotiation 7, no. 5 (May 2004).
  38. Risky Business: Trust in Negotiation

    Keywords: Trust; Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Risky Business: Trust in Negotiation." Negotiation 7, no. 2 (February 2004).
  39. Will You Negotiate or Litigate?

    Keywords: Negotiation; Lawsuits and Litigation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Will You Negotiate or Litigate?" Negotiation 7, no. 10 (2004).
  40. Attributions of Trust and the Calculus of Reciprocity

    Keywords: Trust;

    Citation:

    Pillutla, Madan M., Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. "Attributions of Trust and the Calculus of Reciprocity." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39, no. 5 (September 2003): 448–455.
  41. The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust

    Keywords: Contracts; Trust;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and J. Keith Murnighan. "The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust." Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 3 (September 2002): 534–559.
  42. The On-Line Auction Phenomenon: Growth, Strategies, Promise, and Problems

    Keywords: Online Technology; Auctions; Growth and Development; Strategy; Problems and Challenges;

    Citation:

    Ku, Gillian, and Deepak Malhotra. "The On-Line Auction Phenomenon: Growth, Strategies, Promise, and Problems." Negotiation Journal 17, no. 4 (October 2001): 349–361.

Book Chapters

  1. Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society Pays

    Keywords: Economics; Social Psychology; Society; Cost vs Benefits;

    Citation:

    Bazerman, Max H., and Deepak Malhotra. "Economics Wins, Psychology Loses, and Society Pays." In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by David de Cremer, J. Keith Murnighan, and Marcel Zeelenberg, 263–280. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006.
  2. Normal Acts of Irrational Trust: Motivated Attributions and the Trust Development Process

    Keywords: Trust; Motivation and Incentives; Attitudes;

    Citation:

    Weber, Mark J., Deepak Malhotra, and J. Keith Murnighan. "Normal Acts of Irrational Trust: Motivated Attributions and the Trust Development Process." In Research in Organizational Behavior. Vol. 22, edited by B. Staw and R. Sutton, 75–101. Elsevier Science, 2000.
  3. Paradoxes of Trust: Empirical and Theoretical Departures from a Traditional Model

    Keywords: Trust; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. Keith, Deepak Malhotra, and J. Mark Weber. "Paradoxes of Trust: Empirical and Theoretical Departures from a Traditional Model." In Trust and Distrust Across Organizational Contexts: Dilemmas and Approaches, edited by Roderick M Kramer and Karen S Cook. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004.

Working Papers

  1. When 3+1>4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Field

    Do higher wages elicit reciprocity and hence higher effort? In a field experiment with 266 employees, we find that paying above-market wages, per se, does not have an effect on effort relative to paying market wages. However, structuring a portion of the wage as a clear and unexpected gift (by offering a raise with no further conditions after the employee has accepted the contract—with no future employment) does lead to higher effort for the duration of the job. Targeted gifts are more efficient than hiring more workers. However, the mechanism makes this unlikely to explain persistent above-market wages.

    Keywords: Wages; Employees;

    Citation:

    Gilchrist, Duncan, Michael Luca, and Deepak Malhotra. "When 3+1>4: Gift Structure and Reciprocity in the Field." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 14-030, September 2013. (Revised November 2013.)

Cases and Teaching Materials

  1. Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. "Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown ." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 812-048, March 2012. (Revised March 2014.)
  2. Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown. Harvard Business School Tutorial 812-701, March 2012.
  3. Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (TN) (A), (B) & (C)

    Teaching Note for [908064], [908065], and [908066].

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (TN) (A), (B) & (C)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 910-038, March 2010.
  4. Hamilton Real Estate (TN)

    Teaching Note for [905052] and [905053].

    Keywords: Real Estate Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Hamilton Real Estate (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 910-037, February 2010.
  5. Strategies of Influence

    Strategies of Influence (SOI) is a stand-alone session that teaches students about the psychology of persuasion. Students are presented a series of mini-case vignettes, each of which illustrates a specific strategy that negotiators can use to make their ideas, offers, proposals, and requests more compelling—i.e., more likely to elicit a “yes” rather than a “no”. The session is designed as an efficient method for discussing psychological influence, and is easy to incorporate into almost any course: it can be lengthened or shortened to fit most reasonable time constraints (from as little as ~30 minutes to 90+ minutes). The session involves extensive student participation, but requires no advance preparation on the part of students.

    Keywords: Leadership; Management Teams; Negotiation; Groups and Teams; Power and Influence; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Strategies of Influence." Harvard Business School Module Note 910-039, February 2010.
  6. Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (A)

    MBA student Monroe Davies is asked by a potential employer to determine his own compensation package. This case follows Jim Hummer, President and CEO of Whole Health Management and Davies through a unique recruitment process that raises questions of compensation and employee incentives, negotiation strategy, and human resources management.

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Recruitment; Job Interviews; Negotiation Process; Personal Development and Career; Motivation and Incentives; Value;

    Citation:

    Hall, Brian J., Deepak Malhotra, and Nicole Bennett. "Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (A)." Harvard Business School Case 908-064, June 2008. (Revised January 2010.)
  7. Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (B)

    Supplements the (A) case.

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Negotiation; Health; Price; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Hall, Brian J., Deepak Malhotra, and Nicole Bennett. "Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 908-065, June 2008. (Revised January 2010.)
  8. Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (C)

    Supplements the (A) and (B) cases.

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Negotiation; Health; Price; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Hall, Brian J., Deepak Malhotra, and Nicole Bennett. "Name Your Price: Compensation Negotiation at Whole Health Management (C)." Harvard Business School Supplement 908-066, June 2008. (Revised January 2010.)
  9. Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (TN) (A) & (B)

    Teaching Note for [906038] and [906039].

    Keywords: Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (TN) (A) & (B)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 909-061, June 2009.
  10. Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown (TN)

    Teaching Note for [809020].

    Keywords: Equity; Agreements and Arrangements; Investment; Groups and Teams; Entrepreneurship; Contracts; Ownership Stake;

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam T., and Deepak Malhotra. "Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 809-133, June 2009.
  11. UpDown: Confidential Instructions for MICHAEL

    Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

    Keywords: Negotiation Participants; Agreements and Arrangements; Business Startups; Ownership Stake;

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. "UpDown: Confidential Instructions for MICHAEL." Harvard Business School Supplement 809-021, July 2008. (Revised November 2012.)
  12. UpDown: Confidential Instructions for GEORG

    Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

    Keywords: Negotiation Participants; Agreements and Arrangements; Business Startups; Ownership Stake;

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. "UpDown: Confidential Instructions for GEORG." Harvard Business School Supplement 809-022, July 2008. (Revised November 2012.)
  13. UpDown: Confidential Instructions for PHUC

    Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

    Keywords: Negotiation Participants; Agreements and Arrangements; Business Startups; Ownership Stake;

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. "UpDown: Confidential Instructions for PHUC." Harvard Business School Supplement 809-023, July 2008. (Revised November 2012.)
  14. Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown

    Michael Reich is having severe doubts about how he split the equity with his co-founders two months ago, when they completed a one-page "November Agreement." Since then, Michael has found an angel investor and has worked non-stop on the business, while one co-founder was off enjoying the winter break with his family and the other worked on lucrative consulting contracts for other companies. Michael has just sent his co-founders a proposal that would re-allocate the equity within their founding team, and all three founders are getting ready to reopen a negotiation they thought had been finalized.

    Keywords: Business Startups; Entrepreneurship; Capital; Venture Capital; Equity; Compensation and Benefits; Negotiation; Partners and Partnerships;

    Citation:

    Wasserman, Noam, and Deepak Malhotra. "Negotiating Equity Splits at UpDown." Harvard Business School Case 809-020, July 2008. (Revised November 2012.)
  15. The Book Deal: Confidential Instructions for the PUBLISHER

    A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a one-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.

    Keywords: Ethics; Agreements and Arrangements; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Tactics; Negotiation Types; Publishing Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. "The Book Deal: Confidential Instructions for the PUBLISHER." Harvard Business School Exercise 908-050, March 2008.
  16. The Book Deal: Confidential Instructions for the AGENT

    A two-party negotiation between an Agent representing a new author and an Editor at a large Publishing Firm. The exercise involves a one-issue, zero-sum negotiation concerning the advance on royalties that the publisher will pay to the author.

    Keywords: Ethics; Agreements and Arrangements; Negotiation Preparation; Negotiation Tactics; Negotiation Types; Publishing Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Max H. Bazerman. "The Book Deal: Confidential Instructions for the AGENT." Harvard Business School Exercise 908-051, March 2008.
  17. Negotiating Effectively in Family Business Systems

    Explores how families in business can apply five principles of negotiation that are used effectively by non-family members. The distinctive characteristics of family relationships and of family business systems--which affect the use of these principles--are described.

    Keywords: Family Business; Negotiation; Family Ownership;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and John A. Davis. "Negotiating Effectively in Family Business Systems." Harvard Business School Module Note 807-144, March 2007. (Revised October 2007.)
  18. Matthew B. Hunter

    Matthew Hunter, CEO of a second-generation family business, must manage the performance of a key manager in his company. Looks at the impact of family relationships on performance management.

    Keywords: Family Business; Performance Evaluation; Crisis Management; Business or Company Management; Conflict Management; Corporate Governance; Family and Family Relationships; Partners and Partnerships; Negotiation Process;

    Citation:

    Davis, John A., and Deepak Malhotra. "Matthew B. Hunter." Harvard Business School Case 806-204, June 2006.
  19. Matthew A. Hunter

    Matthew Hunter, CEO of a second-generation family business, must manage the performance of a key manager in his company. Looks at the impact of family relationships on performance management.

    Keywords: Family and Family Relationships; Conflict Management; Negotiation; Family Business; Performance; Managerial Roles;

    Citation:

    Davis, John A., and Deepak Malhotra. "Matthew A. Hunter." Harvard Business School Exercise 806-203, June 2006.
  20. Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (A)

    On September 15, 2004, the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the National Hockey League (NHL) and the National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA) expired. Because the two sides had failed to negotiate a new CBA by that date, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman locked out the players--no hockey would be played, no revenues would be collected, and no salaries would be paid. The key issues in the negotiation were the league's demand for a salary cap and for the linking of salaries to league revenues. The players opposed both of these demands. After months of near-fruitless negotiation, Bettman threatened to cancel the entire season, a move that would destroy billions in revenue. Provides a rich history of the two sides' relationship and an account of the negotiations that led up to the season cancellation threat. Asks students to analyze the power tactics that each side has used to its advantage in prior negotiations and to propose strategies that might help either side pull off a successful negotiation in the current context, which involves entrenched positions, complex issues, and severe distrust.

    Keywords: Negotiation Tactics; Negotiation Participants; Trust; Sports; Compensation and Benefits; Sports Industry; United States;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Maly Hout. "Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (A)." Harvard Business School Case 906-038, February 2006. (Revised March 2006.)
  21. Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (B)

    Keywords: Negotiation; Compensation and Benefits; Sports; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak, and Maly Hout. "Negotiating on Thin Ice: The 2004-2005 NHL Dispute (B)." Harvard Business School Supplement 906-039, February 2006. (Revised March 2006.)
  22. Hamilton Real Estate: Confidential Role Information for the CEO of Estate One (BUYER)

    Presents a two-party negotiation between the executive VP of Pearl Investments and the CEO of Estate One for the sale of real estate in the town of Hamilton.

    Keywords: Ethics; Price; Information; Contracts; Managerial Roles; Agreements and Arrangements; Sales; Strategy; Value; Real Estate Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Hamilton Real Estate: Confidential Role Information for the CEO of Estate One (BUYER)." Harvard Business School Exercise 905-052, January 2005.
  23. Hamilton Real Estate: Confidential Role Information for the Executive VP of Pearl Investments (SELLER)

    Presents a two-party negotiation between the executive VP of Pearl Investments and the CEO of Estate One for the sale of real estate in the town of Hamilton.

    Keywords: Ethics; Price; Information; Contracts; Managerial Roles; Agreements and Arrangements; Strategy; Value; Real Estate Industry;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Hamilton Real Estate: Confidential Role Information for the Executive VP of Pearl Investments (SELLER)." Harvard Business School Exercise 905-053, January 2005.

Other Publications and Materials

  1. Negotiating in the Shadow of Terrorism: How Violent Extremism Makes Peace Negotiations Possible and Improbable

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malhotra, Deepak. "Negotiating in the Shadow of Terrorism: How Violent Extremism Makes Peace Negotiations Possible and Improbable."