Alvin E. Roth

George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus

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Al Roth is the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and in the Harvard Business School. His research, teaching, and consulting interests are in game theory, experimental economics, and market design. The best known of the markets he has designed (or, in this case, redesigned) is the National Resident Matching Program, through which approximately twenty thousand doctors a year find their first employment as residents at American hospitals. He has recently been involved in the reorganization of the market for Gastroenterology fellows, which started using a clearinghouse in 2006 for positions beginning in 2007. He helped design the high school matching system used in New York City to match approximately ninety thousand students to high schools each year, starting with students entering high school in the Fall of 2004. He helped redesign the matching system used in Boston Public Schools, adopted for students starting school in September 2006. He is one of the founders and designers of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is the chair of the American Economic Association's Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, which has designed a number of recent changes in the market for new Ph.D. economists. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, and has been a Guggenheim and Sloan fellow. He received his Ph.D at Stanford University, and came to Harvard from the University of Pittsburgh, where he was the Andrew Mellon Professor of Economics.

For further information, please go to Al Roth's Game Theory, Experimental Economics, and Market Design Page.

Publications

Books

  1. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

    A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Paperback ed. Cambridge University Press, 1992. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Science.) View Details
  2. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

    A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.) View Details

Journal Articles

  1. Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

    Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

    Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." Games 4, no. 2 (June, 2013): 243–282. (Special Issue on Games and Matching Markets.) View Details
  2. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

    Fuhito Kojima, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth

    Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.

    Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (November 2013): 1585–1632. View Details
  3. The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective

    Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried

    This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our Committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based 'scramble' to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information and other design issues that may arise in the market for new economists.

    Keywords: market design; Market Design;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective." Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 187–206. View Details
  4. Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

    Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth

    Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of the organ waiting list might impact the donation rate. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.

    Keywords: Health; Giving and Philanthropy; Decision Making; Resource Allocation; Mathematical Methods; United States;

    Citation:

    Kessler, Judd B., and Alvin E. Roth. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate." American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (August 2012): 2018–2047. View Details
  5. Kidney Paired Donation

    C. Bradley Wallis, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees

    Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the U.S. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced by living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipients. This review provides a basic overview of the concepts and challenges faced by KPD as we prepare for a national pilot program with the United Network for Organ Sharing. Several different algorithms have been creatively implemented in the U.S. and elsewhere to transplant paired donors, each method uniquely contributing to the success of KPD. As the paired donor pool grows, the problem of determining allocation strategies that maximize equity and utility will become increasingly important as the transplant community seeks to balance quality and quantity in choosing the best matches. Financing for paired donation is a major issue, as philanthropy alone cannot support the emerging national system. We also discuss the advent of altruistic or non-directed donors in KPD, and the important role of chains in addition to exchanges. This review is designed to provide insight into the challenges that face the emerging national KPD system in the U.S., now five years into its development.

    Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy; Health Care and Treatment; Growth and Development Strategy; Success; Problems and Challenges; Programs; System; United States;

    Citation:

    Wallis, C. Bradley, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. "Kidney Paired Donation." Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation 26, no. 7 (July 2011): 2091–2099. View Details
  6. Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited

    Itai Ashlagi, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth and Michael A. Rees

    Since 2008 kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of non-directed donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously ("domino paired donation," DPD) or nonsimultaneously ("nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor chains," NEAD). NEAD chains create "bridge donors" whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Supply Chain; Risk and Uncertainty; Logistics; United States;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. "Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited." American Journal of Transplantation 11, no. 5 (May 2011): 984–994. View Details
  7. A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction

    Eyal Ert, Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth

    Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games: one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment and clarifies the descriptive value of some baseline models. The best baseline model assumes that each choice is made based on one of several rules. The rules include rational choice, level-1 reasoning, an attempt to maximize joint payoff, and an attempt to increase fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that the most popular rule is rational choice; it is used in about half the cases. To participate in the competitions, researchers are asked to email the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is December 1, 2011; the results of the competition experiment will not be revealed until that date. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competitions will be invited to write a paper that describes their model.

    Keywords: Forecasting and Prediction; Behavior; Decision Choices and Conditions; Competition; Motivation and Incentives; Game Theory; Fairness;

    Citation:

    Ert, Eyal, Ido Erev, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 2, no. 3 (September 2011): 257–276. View Details
  8. Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?

    Stephen Leider and Alvin E. Roth

    The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney markets and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets, and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval towards certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal, and 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are not more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval towards certain transactions-including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally non-market exchanges, such as food preparation.

    Keywords: Moral Sensibility; Policy; Health; Market Transactions; Attitudes; Trust;

    Citation:

    Leider, Stephen, and Alvin E. Roth. "Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?" American Journal of Transplantation 10 (May 2010): 1221–1227. View Details
  9. A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description

    Ido Erev, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West and Christian Lebiere

    Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on three related choice tasks: one-shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one-shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each competition was based on two experimental datasets: an estimation dataset and a competition dataset. The studies that generated the two datasets used the same methods and subject pool and examined decision problems randomly selected from the same distribution. After collecting the experimental data to be used for estimation, the organizers posted them on the Web, together with their fit with several baseline models, and challenged other researchers to compete to predict the results of the second (competition) set of experimental sessions. Fourteen teams responded to the challenge: the last seven authors of this paper are members of the winning teams. The results highlight the robustness of the difference between decisions from description and decisions from experience. The best predictions of decisions from descriptions were obtained with a stochastic variant of prospect theory assuming that the sensitivity to the weighted value decreases with the distance between the cumulative payoff functions. The best predictions of decisions from experience were obtained with models that assume reliance on small samples. Merits and limitations of the competition method are discussed.

    Keywords: Experience and Expertise; Decision Choices and Conditions; Forecasting and Prediction; Mathematical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty; Competition;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West, and Christian Lebiere. "A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description." Special Issue on Decisions from Experience. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 23, no. 1 (January 2010). View Details
  10. A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction

    Ido Erev, Eyal Ert and Alvin E. Roth

    A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of several baseline models. The experimental results reveal the robustness of eight behavioral tendencies that were documented in previous studies of market entry games and individual decisions from experience. The best baseline model (I-SAW) assumes reliance on small samples of experiences, and strong inertia when the recent results are not surprising. The competition experiment will be run in May 2010 (after the completion of this introduction), but they will not be revealed until September. To participate in the competition, researchers are asked to E-mail the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competition will be invited to publish a paper that describes their model.

    Keywords: Experience and Expertise; Decision Choices and Conditions; Forecasting and Prediction; Learning; Market Entry and Exit; Game Theory; Behavior; Competition;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Eyal Ert, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 1, no. 2 (2010): 117–136. View Details
  11. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

    Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth

    The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tie breaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Secondary Education; Marketplace Matching; Performance Efficiency; Mathematical Methods; Motivation and Incentives; Strategy; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009). (AER links to access the Appendix and Downloadable Data Set.) View Details
  12. A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain

    Michael A. Rees, Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, Oleh G. Pankewycz, Janet Hiller, Alvin E. Roth, Tuomas Sandholm, Utku Unver and Robert A. Montgomery

    Citation:

    Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, et al. "A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain." New England Journal of Medicine 360, no. 11 (March 12, 2009): 1096–1101. View Details
  13. If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design

    Brit Grosskopf and Alvin E. Roth

    Keywords: Contracts; Design; Rights;

    Citation:

    Grosskopf, Brit, and Alvin E. Roth. "If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design." Special Issue in Honor of Martin Shubik. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (January 2009): 176–204. View Details
  14. Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?

    Christopher D. Harner, Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa and Serena S. Hu

    Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were dissolved by the NRMP due to the gradual decline in participation, leaving approximately seventy percent of applicants in a non-match, decentralized system. This leaves Hand Surgery, Shoulder and Elbow, and Foot and Ankle as the only three orthopaedic subspecialties still in some match program. This has created an extremely complicated hiring environment for all residents. This paper focuses on the current state of fellowship employment and hiring in orthopaedic surgery, on the likely effects of reinstituting a match, and on how this might be accomplished. For this purpose, we present the results of surveys we conducted of fellowship directors and residents, discuss how the present market for orthopaedic surgery fellows resembles the market for medical residents prior to the introduction of the NRMP, and discuss how another fellowship market has successfully reinstituted a match after experiencing a comparable failure.

    Keywords: Medical Specialties; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Employment; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Harner, Christopher D., Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa, and Serena S. Hu. "Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?" Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery: American Volume 90 (June 2008): 1375–1384. View Details
  15. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

    Alvin E. Roth

    The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

    Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY);

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions." Prepared for Gale's Feast: A Day in Honor of the 85th Birthday of David Gale. International Journal of Game Theory 36, nos. 3-4 (March 2008): 537–569. View Details
  16. What Have We Learned from Market Design?

    Alvin E. Roth

    This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.

    Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?" Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society) 118, no. 527 (March 2008): 285–310. (Hahn Lecture.) View Details
  17. Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls

    Guillaume R. Frechette, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

    Keywords: Entertainment; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Frechette, Guillaume R., Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls." RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 4 (winter 2007): 967–982. View Details
  18. Learning and Equilibrium as Useful Approximations: Accuracy of Prediction on Randomly Selected Constant Sum Games

    Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth, R. Slonim and Greg Barron

    Keywords: Learning; Forecasting and Prediction; Outcome or Result;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, R. Slonim, and Greg Barron. "Learning and Equilibrium as Useful Approximations: Accuracy of Prediction on Randomly Selected Constant Sum Games." Special Issue on Behavioral Game Theory. Economic Theory 33 (October 2007): 29–51. View Details
  19. The Art of Designing Markets

    Alvin E. Roth

    Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design—a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created market-like allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets—like those for jobs and dating—proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.

    Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "The Art of Designing Markets." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 10 (October 2007): 118–126. View Details
  20. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

    A. E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver

    Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

    Keywords: Organizational Structure; Size; Emotions; Human Needs; Health Care and Treatment; Health Testing and Trials; Infrastructure; Supply Chain Management; Fairness; Performance Improvement; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market." American Economic Review 97, no. 3 (June 2007): 828–851. View Details
  21. Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through 'Chain' Paired Kidney Exchanges

    Alvin E Roth, Tayfun Sonmez, M. Utku Unver, Francis L. Delmonico and Susan L. Saidman

    Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy; Health Care and Treatment;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez, M. Utku Unver, Francis L. Delmonico, and Susan L. Saidman. "Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through 'Chain' Paired Kidney Exchanges." American Journal of Transplantation 6, no. 11 (November 2006): 2694–2705. View Details
  22. Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction

    Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth

    Keywords: Bids and Bidding; Auctions; Online Technology; Theory; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;

    Citation:

    Ockenfels, Axel, and Alvin E. Roth. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction." Games and Economic Behavior 55, no. 2 (May 2006): 297–320. View Details
  23. Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges

    Susan L. Saidman, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver and Francis L. Delmonico

    Keywords: Opportunities; Health;

    Citation:

    Saidman, Susan L., Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, and Francis L. Delmonico. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges." Transplantation 81, no. 5 (March 15, 2006): 773–782. View Details
  24. The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market

    Ernan E. Haruvy, Alvin E Roth and M. Utku Unver

    Keywords: Law; Information; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Markets;

    Citation:

    Haruvy, Ernan E., Alvin E Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market." Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 30, no. 3 (March 2006): 457–486. View Details
  25. Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered via the Internet

    John Asker, Brit Grosskopf, C. Nicholas McKinney, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and George Weizsäcker

    Keywords: Teaching; Auctions; Strategy; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Asker, John, Brit Grosskopf, C. Nicholas McKinney, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and George Weizsäcker. "Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered via the Internet." Journal of Economic Education 35, no. 4 (fall 2004): 330–342. View Details
  26. Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match

    Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Health Care and Treatment; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match." Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 6 (December 2003): 1342–1352. View Details
  27. Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games

    David J. Cooper, Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth and Rami Zwick

    Keywords: Strategy; Behavior; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Cooper, David J., Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, and Rami Zwick. "Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games." Experimental Economics 6, no. 2 (October 2003): 181–207. View Details
  28. Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships

    Muriel Niederle and A. E. Roth

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Education; Learning; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and A. E. Roth. "Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships." JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association 290, no. 9 (September 3, 2003). View Details
  29. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet

    Alvin E. Roth and Axel Ockenfels

    Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Web; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E., and Axel Ockenfels. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet." American Economic Review 92, no. 4 (September 2002): 1093–1103. View Details
  30. The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

    A. E. Roth and E. Peranson

    Keywords: Design; Markets; Health; Engineering; Economics; United States;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and E. Peranson. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design." American Economic Review 89, no. 4 (September 1999): 748–780. View Details
  31. The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning

    Ido Erev, Yoella Bereby-Meyer and Alvin E. Roth

    Keywords: Learning; Information;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39, no. 1 (May 1999): 111–128. View Details
  32. Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria

    Ido Erev and A. E. Roth

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Forecasting and Prediction; Learning; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, and A. E. Roth. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria." American Economic Review 88, no. 4 (September 1998): 848–881. View Details
  33. Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study

    A. E. Roth, V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and S. Zamir

    Keywords: Markets; Behavior; Information; Israel; Pittsburgh; Tokyo; Slovenia;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review 81, no. 5 (December 1991): 1068–1095. View Details
  34. Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternatives: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball

    A. E. Roth

    Keywords: Cognition and Thinking; Labor and Management Relations; Negotiation; Entertainment; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternatives: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball." Negotiation Journal 1, no. 4 (October 1985): 359–362. View Details
  35. The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game

    J. K. Murnighan and A. E. Roth

    Keywords: Groups and Teams; Negotiation; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Communication;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. K., and A. E. Roth. "The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39 (1980): 92–103. View Details

Book Chapters

  1. Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

    Alvin E. Roth

    The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.

    Keywords: Economics; History; Science;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" In The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, edited by Guillaume R. Frechette and Andrew Schotter. Oxford University Press, forthcoming. View Details
  2. New Sources in Living Kidney Donation

    Ruthanne L. Hanto, Alvin E. Roth, M. Utku Ünver and Francis L. Delmonico

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Giving and Philanthropy; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Hanto, Ruthanne L., Alvin E. Roth, M. Utku Ünver, and Francis L. Delmonico. "New Sources in Living Kidney Donation." Chap. 8 in Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Transplant Recipients, edited by D. McKay and S. Steinberg, pp. 103–17. Springer Science + Business Media, 2010. View Details
  3. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice

    Alvin E. Roth

    The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

    Keywords: Labor; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Failure; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice." In Better Living through Economics, edited by John J. Siegfried, 206–222. Harvard University Press, 2010. View Details
  4. The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

    Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth

    New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating and when it was not. After the GI match ended, the market unraveled. Contracts were signed earlier each year, at diffuse times, often with exploding offers. The market became less national, more local. This allows us to discern the effect of the clearinghouse: it coordinated the timing of the market in a way that increased its thickness and scope. The clearinghouse does not seem to have had an effect on wages. As this became known among gastroenterologists, an opportunity arose to reorganize the market to once again use a centralized clearinghouse. However it proved necessary to adopt policies that would allow employers to safely delay hiring and coordinate on using the clearinghouse. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

    Keywords: Labor; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Failure;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." In Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, edited by David H. Autor, 273–306. University of Chicago Press, 2009. View Details
  5. Matching and Market Design

    Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sonmez

    Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix market failures. Studying how markets fail also gives us insight into how market places work well. They need to provide a thick, uncongested market in which it is safe to participate. Clearinghouses that do this have been designed for many entry-level professional labor markets, for the assignment of children to public schools, and for exchange of live-donor kidneys for transplantation if available.

    Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "Matching and Market Design." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd ed. Edited by Steven Derlauf and Larry Blume. Hampshire, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. View Details
  6. Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration

    J. Keith Murnighan and Alvin E. Roth

    Keywords: History; Social Psychology; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Economics;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. Keith, and Alvin E. Roth. "Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration." In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by David de Cremer, J. Keith Murnighan, and Marcel Zeelenberg, 321–333. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006. View Details
  7. Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care

    Alvin E Roth

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Resource Allocation; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care." In Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership, edited by P. Reid, W. Compton, J. Grossman, and G. Fanjiang, 237–239. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005. View Details
  8. On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach

    Ido Erev and A. E. Roth

    Keywords: Game Theory; Cognition and Thinking; Learning;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, and A. E. Roth. "On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach." In Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick, 53–77. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999. View Details
  9. Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field

    A. E. Roth

    Keywords: Attitudes; Behavior; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field." In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference, edited by K. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt, 255–273. Macmillan Publishers, 1996. View Details
  10. Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining

    A. E. Roth and J. K. Murnighan

    Keywords: Negotiation; Information; Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and J. K. Murnighan. "Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining." In Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making: Proceedings, Winzenhohl, FRG, edited by R. Tietz. Springer-Verlag, 1983. View Details
  11. Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

    R. Kihlstrom, A. E. Roth and D. Schmeidler

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Negotiation; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Kihlstrom, R., A. E. Roth, and D. Schmeidler. "Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem." In Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, 65–71. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1981. View Details

Working Papers

  1. Don't Take 'No' for an Answer: An Experiment with Actual Organ Donor Registrations

    Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth

    Over 10,000 people in the U.S. die each year while waiting for an organ. Attempts to increase organ transplantation have focused on changing the registration question from an opt-in frame to an active choice frame. We analyze this change in California and show it decreased registration rates. Similarly, a "field in the lab" experiment run on actual organ donor registration decisions finds no increase in registrations resulting from an active choice frame. In addition, individuals are more likely to support donating the organs of a deceased who did not opt-in than one who said "no" in an active choice frame.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Health Care and Treatment; Giving and Philanthropy; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Kessler, Judd B., and Alvin E. Roth. "Don't Take 'No' for an Answer: An Experiment with Actual Organ Donor Registrations." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 20378, August 2014. View Details
  2. The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange

    Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees and Alvin E. Roth

    It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has grown in practice, cycles among n>3 pairs have proved useful, and long chains initiated by non-directed, altruistic donors have proven to be very effective. We explore why this is the case, both empirically and theoretically. We provide an analytical model of exchange when there are many highly sensitized patients and show that large cycles of exchange or long chains can significantly increase efficiency when the opportunities for exchange are sparse. As very large cycles of exchange cannot be used in practice, long non-simultaneous chains initiated by non-directed donors significantly increase efficiency in patient pools of the size and composition that presently exist. Most importantly, long chains benefit highly sensitized patients without harming low-sensitized patients.

    Keywords: Networks; Complexity; Performance Efficiency; Medical Specialties; Health Care and Treatment; Giving and Philanthropy;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 18202, July 2012. View Details
  3. Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

    Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth

    As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Resource Allocation; Market Participation; Marketplace Matching; Organizations; Networks; Motivation and Incentives; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. "Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16720, January 2011. View Details
  4. Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions

    Alvin E. Roth

    This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. I'll conclude with open questions about the role of marketplace institutions and the timing of transactions.

    Keywords: Talent and Talent Management; Market Timing; Market Transactions; Marketplace Matching; Competitive Strategy;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16556, November 2010. View Details
  5. Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

    Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

    Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

    Keywords: Labor; Marketplace Matching; Quality; Competition; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-095, May 2010. View Details
  6. The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective

    Peter A. Coles, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and John J. Siegfried

    This paper provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the American Economic Association (AEA) in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based "scramble" to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information.

    Keywords: Cost Management; Information; Surveys; Jobs and Positions; Job Interviews; Job Search; Emerging Markets; Market Platforms; Service Operations; Search Technology;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-096, May 2010. View Details
  7. Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

    Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth and M. Utku Unver

    Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

    Keywords: Labor; Marketplace Matching; Quality; Competition; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 15006, May 2009. View Details
  8. The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

    Muriel Niederle and Alvin E. Roth

    New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, programs hired fellows earlier each year, eventually almost a year earlier than when the match was operating. It became customary for GI program directors to make very short offers, rarely exceeding two weeks and often much shorter. Consequently many potential fellows had to accept positions before they finished their planned interviews, and most programs experienced cancellations of interviews they had scheduled. Furthermore, without a match, many programs hired more local fellows, and fewer from other hospitals and cities than they did during the match. Wages, however, seem not to have been affected. To restart the match, we proposed a policy, subsequently adopted by the gastroenterology professional organizations, that even if applicants had accepted offers prior to the match, they could subsequently decline those offers and participate in the match. This made it safe for programs to delay hiring until the match, confident that programs that did not participate would not be able to "capture" the most desirable candidates beforehand. Consequently it appears that most programs waited for the match in an orderly way in 2006, when the GI match was reinstated. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

    Keywords: Health; Employment; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Job Offer; Compensation and Benefits; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 13529, October 2007. View Details

Other Publications and Materials

  1. Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set

    A. E. Roth and Ido Erev

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Strategy; Game Theory; Learning;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and Ido Erev. "Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set." 2006. (Presented at the Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.) View Details

    Research Summary

    1. Awarded the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics with Lloyd Shapley for their research on market design and matching theory.

    2. Winner of the 1990 Lanchester Prize for Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (with M. Sotomayor, Cambridge University Press - both the paperback edition in 1992 and the 1990 edition).