Alvin E. Roth

George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration, Emeritus

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Al Roth is the George Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration in the Department of Economics at Harvard University, and in the Harvard Business School. His research, teaching, and consulting interests are in game theory, experimental economics, and market design. The best known of the markets he has designed (or, in this case, redesigned) is the National Resident Matching Program, through which approximately twenty thousand doctors a year find their first employment as residents at American hospitals. He has recently been involved in the reorganization of the market for Gastroenterology fellows, which started using a clearinghouse in 2006 for positions beginning in 2007. He helped design the high school matching system used in New York City to match approximately ninety thousand students to high schools each year, starting with students entering high school in the Fall of 2004. He helped redesign the matching system used in Boston Public Schools, adopted for students starting school in September 2006. He is one of the founders and designers of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange, for incompatible patient-donor pairs. He is the chair of the American Economic Association's Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, which has designed a number of recent changes in the market for new Ph.D. economists. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, and has been a Guggenheim and Sloan fellow. He received his Ph.D at Stanford University, and came to Harvard from the University of Pittsburgh, where he was the Andrew Mellon Professor of Economics.

For further information, please go to Al Roth's Game Theory, Experimental Economics, and Market Design Page.

Publications

Books

  1. The Handbook of Market Design

    Citation:

    Vulkan, Nir, Alvin E. Roth and Zvika Neeman, eds. The Handbook of Market Design. Oxford University Press, 2013. View Details
  2. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Paperback ed. Cambridge University Press, 1992. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Science.) View Details
  3. Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Holmstrom, Bengt, Paul Milgrom, and Alvin E Roth, eds. Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002. View Details
  4. Handbook of Experimental Economics

    Keywords: Economics;

    Citation:

    Kagel, J. H., and A. E. Roth, eds. Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, 1997. View Details
  5. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press, 1990. (Winner of Frederick W. Lanchester Prize Awarded for the best contribution to operations research and the management sciences published in English presented by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences.) View Details
  6. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley

    Keywords: Body of Literature;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., ed. The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge University Press, 1988. View Details
  7. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View

    Keywords: Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., ed. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: Six Points of View. Cambridge University Press, 1987. View Details
  8. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., ed. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press, 1985. View Details
  9. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Springer-Verlag, 1979. View Details

Journal Articles

  1. Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

    Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." Games 4, no. 2 (June, 2013): 243–282. (Special Issue on Games and Matching Markets.) View Details
  2. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

    Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. This article's main result is that a stable matching exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples.

    Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Balance and Stability; Jobs and Positions; Family and Family Relationships; Health Care and Treatment; Employment Industry; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (November 2013): 1585–1632. View Details
  3. The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective

    This paper, written by the members of the American Economic Association (AEA) Ad Hoc Committee on the Job Market, provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the AEA in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our Committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based 'scramble' to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information and other design issues that may arise in the market for new economists.

    Keywords: market design; Market Design;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective." Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 4 (fall 2010): 187–206. View Details
  4. Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate

    Organ donations from deceased donors (cadavers) provide the majority of transplanted organs in the United States, and one deceased donor can save numerous lives by providing multiple organs. Nevertheless, most Americans are not registered organ donors despite the relative ease of becoming one. We study in the laboratory an experimental game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor and investigate how changes in the management of the organ waiting list might impact the donation rate. We find that an organ allocation policy giving priority on waiting lists to those who previously registered as donors has a significant positive impact on registration.

    Keywords: Health; Giving and Philanthropy; Decision Making; Resource Allocation; Mathematical Methods; United States;

    Citation:

    Kessler, Judd B., and Alvin E. Roth. "Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate." American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (August 2012): 2018–2047. View Details
  5. NEAD Chains in Transplantation

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. "NEAD Chains in Transplantation." American Journal of Transplantation 11 (December 2011): 2780–2781. (Letter to the Editor.) View Details
  6. Kidney Paired Donation

    Kidney paired donation (KPD) was first suggested in 1986, but it was not until 2000 when the first paired donation transplant was performed in the U.S. In the past decade, KPD has become the fastest growing source of transplantable kidneys, overcoming the barrier faced by living donors deemed incompatible with their intended recipients. This review provides a basic overview of the concepts and challenges faced by KPD as we prepare for a national pilot program with the United Network for Organ Sharing. Several different algorithms have been creatively implemented in the U.S. and elsewhere to transplant paired donors, each method uniquely contributing to the success of KPD. As the paired donor pool grows, the problem of determining allocation strategies that maximize equity and utility will become increasingly important as the transplant community seeks to balance quality and quantity in choosing the best matches. Financing for paired donation is a major issue, as philanthropy alone cannot support the emerging national system. We also discuss the advent of altruistic or non-directed donors in KPD, and the important role of chains in addition to exchanges. This review is designed to provide insight into the challenges that face the emerging national KPD system in the U.S., now five years into its development.

    Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy; Health Care and Treatment; Growth and Development Strategy; Success; Problems and Challenges; Programs; System; United States;

    Citation:

    Wallis, C. Bradley, Kannan P. Samy, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. "Kidney Paired Donation." Nephrology, Dialysis, Transplantation 26, no. 7 (July 2011): 2091–2099. View Details
  7. Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited

    Since 2008 kidney exchange in America has grown in part from the incorporation of non-directed donors in transplant chains rather than simple exchanges. It is controversial whether these chains should be performed simultaneously ("domino paired donation," DPD) or nonsimultaneously ("nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor chains," NEAD). NEAD chains create "bridge donors" whose incompatible recipients receive kidneys before the bridge donor donates, and so risk reneging by bridge donors, but offer the opportunity to create more transplants by overcoming logistical barriers inherent in simultaneous chains. Gentry et al. simulated whether DPD or NEAD chains would produce more transplants when chain segment length was limited to three transplants and reported that DPD performed at least as well as NEAD chains. As this contrasts with the experience of several groups involved in kidney paired donation, we performed simulations that allowed for longer chain segments and used actual patient data from the Alliance for Paired Donation. When chain segments of 4-6 are allowed in the simulations, NEAD chains produce more transplants than DPD. Our simulations showed not only more transplants as chain length increased, but also that NEAD chains produced more transplants for highly sensitized and blood type O recipients

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Supply Chain; Risk and Uncertainty; Logistics; United States;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, Duncan S. Gilchrist, Alvin E. Roth, and Michael A. Rees. "Nonsimultaneous Chains and Dominos in Kidney Paired Donation—Revisited." American Journal of Transplantation 11, no. 5 (May 2011): 984–994. View Details
  8. A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction

    Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games: one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment and clarifies the descriptive value of some baseline models. The best baseline model assumes that each choice is made based on one of several rules. The rules include rational choice, level-1 reasoning, an attempt to maximize joint payoff, and an attempt to increase fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that the most popular rule is rational choice; it is used in about half the cases. To participate in the competitions, researchers are asked to email the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is December 1, 2011; the results of the competition experiment will not be revealed until that date. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competitions will be invited to write a paper that describes their model.

    Keywords: Forecasting and Prediction; Behavior; Decision Choices and Conditions; Competition; Motivation and Incentives; Game Theory; Fairness;

    Citation:

    Ert, Eyal, Ido Erev, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 2, no. 3 (September 2011): 257–276. View Details
  9. Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?

    The shortage of transplant kidneys has spurred debate about legalizing monetary payments to donors to increase the number of available kidneys. However, buying and selling organs faces widespread disapproval. We survey a representative sample of Americans to assess disapproval for several forms of kidney markets and to understand why individuals disapprove by identifying factors that predict disapproval, including disapproval of markets for other body parts, dislike of increased scope for markets, and distrust of markets generally. Our results suggest that while the public is potentially receptive to compensating kidney donors, among those who oppose it, general disapproval towards certain kinds of transactions is at least as important as concern about specific policy details. Between 51% and 63% of respondents approve of the various potential kidney markets we investigate, between 42% and 58% want such markets to be legal, and 38% of respondents disapprove of at least one market. Respondents who distrust markets generally are not more disapproving of kidney markets; however we find significant correlations between kidney market disapproval and attitudes reflecting disapproval towards certain transactions-including both other body markets and market encroachment into traditionally non-market exchanges, such as food preparation.

    Keywords: Moral Sensibility; Policy; Health; Market Transactions; Attitudes; Trust;

    Citation:

    Leider, Stephen, and Alvin E. Roth. "Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and Why?" American Journal of Transplantation 10 (May 2010): 1221–1227. View Details
  10. A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description

    Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on three related choice tasks: one-shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one-shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each competition was based on two experimental datasets: an estimation dataset and a competition dataset. The studies that generated the two datasets used the same methods and subject pool and examined decision problems randomly selected from the same distribution. After collecting the experimental data to be used for estimation, the organizers posted them on the Web, together with their fit with several baseline models, and challenged other researchers to compete to predict the results of the second (competition) set of experimental sessions. Fourteen teams responded to the challenge: the last seven authors of this paper are members of the winning teams. The results highlight the robustness of the difference between decisions from description and decisions from experience. The best predictions of decisions from descriptions were obtained with a stochastic variant of prospect theory assuming that the sensitivity to the weighted value decreases with the distance between the cumulative payoff functions. The best predictions of decisions from experience were obtained with models that assume reliance on small samples. Merits and limitations of the competition method are discussed.

    Keywords: Experience and Expertise; Decision Choices and Conditions; Forecasting and Prediction; Mathematical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty; Competition;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Eyal Ert, Alvin E. Roth, Ernan E. Haruvy, Stefan Herzog, Robin Hau, Ralph Hertwig, Terrence Steward, Robert West, and Christian Lebiere. "A Choice Prediction Competition: Choices from Experience and from Description." Special Issue on Decisions from Experience. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 23, no. 1 (January 2010). View Details
  11. A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction

    A choice prediction competition is organized that focuses on decisions from experience in market entry games (http://sites.google.com/site/gpredcomp/ and http://www.mdpi.com/si/games/predict-behavior/). The competition is based on two experiments: An estimation experiment, and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of several baseline models. The experimental results reveal the robustness of eight behavioral tendencies that were documented in previous studies of market entry games and individual decisions from experience. The best baseline model (I-SAW) assumes reliance on small samples of experiences, and strong inertia when the recent results are not surprising. The competition experiment will be run in May 2010 (after the completion of this introduction), but they will not be revealed until September. To participate in the competition, researchers are asked to E-mail the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competition will be invited to publish a paper that describes their model.

    Keywords: Experience and Expertise; Decision Choices and Conditions; Forecasting and Prediction; Learning; Market Entry and Exit; Game Theory; Behavior; Competition;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Eyal Ert, and Alvin E. Roth. "A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction." Special Issue on Predicting Behavior in Games. Games 1, no. 2 (2010): 117–136. View Details
  12. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

    The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tie breaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Secondary Education; Marketplace Matching; Performance Efficiency; Mathematical Methods; Motivation and Incentives; Strategy; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009). (AER links to access the Appendix and Downloadable Data Set.) View Details
  13. Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance

    Keywords: Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Markets; Performance;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1, no. 2 (August 2009). View Details
  14. A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain

    Citation:

    Rees, Michael A., Jonathan E. Kopke, Ronald P. Pelletier, Dorry L. Segev, Matthew E. Rutter, Alfredo J. Fabrega, Jeffrey Rogers, et al. "A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain." New England Journal of Medicine 360, no. 11 (March 12, 2009): 1096–1101. View Details
  15. If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design

    Keywords: Contracts; Design; Rights;

    Citation:

    Grosskopf, Brit, and Alvin E. Roth. "If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation of Contract Design." Special Issue in Honor of Martin Shubik. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (January 2009): 176–204. View Details
  16. The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: The First Two Years

    Keywords: Health; Education;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: The First Two Years." Gastroenterology 135, no. 2 (August 2008): 344–346. View Details
  17. Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?

    Currently, approximately ninety percent of the six hundred twenty graduating orthopaedic residents are planning on entering a post-graduate fellowship. Since January of 2005, two of the largest fellowship match programs, Sports Medicine and Spine Surgery, were dissolved by the NRMP due to the gradual decline in participation, leaving approximately seventy percent of applicants in a non-match, decentralized system. This leaves Hand Surgery, Shoulder and Elbow, and Foot and Ankle as the only three orthopaedic subspecialties still in some match program. This has created an extremely complicated hiring environment for all residents. This paper focuses on the current state of fellowship employment and hiring in orthopaedic surgery, on the likely effects of reinstituting a match, and on how this might be accomplished. For this purpose, we present the results of surveys we conducted of fellowship directors and residents, discuss how the present market for orthopaedic surgery fellows resembles the market for medical residents prior to the introduction of the NRMP, and discuss how another fellowship market has successfully reinstituted a match after experiencing a comparable failure.

    Keywords: Medical Specialties; Recruitment; Selection and Staffing; Employment; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Harner, Christopher D., Anil S. Ranawat, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, Peter J. Stern, Shepard R. Hurwitz, William Levine, G. Paul DeRosa, and Serena S. Hu. "Current State of Fellowship Hiring: Is a Universal Match Necessary? Is It Possible?" Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery: American Volume 90 (June 2008): 1375–1384. View Details
  18. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

    The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

    Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY);

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions." Prepared for Gale's Feast: A Day in Honor of the 85th Birthday of David Gale. International Journal of Game Theory 36, nos. 3-4 (March 2008): 537–569. View Details
  19. What Have We Learned from Market Design?

    This essay discusses some things we have learned about markets, in the process of designing marketplaces to fix market failures. To work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e. they need to attract a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to engage in costly and risky strategic behavior. I'll draw on recent examples of market design ranging from labor markets for doctors and new economists, to kidney exchange, and school choice in New York City and Boston.

    Keywords: Risk Management; Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Failure; Safety;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?" Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society) 118, no. 527 (March 2008): 285–310. (Hahn Lecture.) View Details
  20. Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls

    Keywords: Entertainment; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Frechette, Guillaume R., Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matchings: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls." RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 4 (winter 2007): 967–982. View Details
  21. Learning and Equilibrium as Useful Approximations: Accuracy of Prediction on Randomly Selected Constant Sum Games

    Keywords: Learning; Forecasting and Prediction; Outcome or Result;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, R. Slonim, and Greg Barron. "Learning and Equilibrium as Useful Approximations: Accuracy of Prediction on Randomly Selected Constant Sum Games." Special Issue on Behavioral Game Theory. Economic Theory 33 (October 2007): 29–51. View Details
  22. The Art of Designing Markets

    Traditionally, markets have been viewed as simply the confluence of supply and demand. But to function properly, they must be able to attract a sufficient number of buyers and sellers, induce participants to make their preferences clear, and overcome congestion by providing both enough time to make choices and a speedy means of registering them. Solutions to these challenges are the province of market design—a blend of game theory and experimental economics. Roth, a professor of both business and economics at Harvard, is a leading market designer. He and his colleagues have rescued failing markets by, for example, designing labor clearinghouses through which U.S. doctors get their first jobs and auctions through which the Federal Communications Commission sells licenses for parts of the radio broadcast spectrum. They have also created market-like allocation procedures that involve neither prices nor an exchange of money; these include systems for assigning children to schools in Boston and New York and for facilitating exchanges of kidneys. Computers enable the design of "smart markets" that combine the inputs of users in complex ways: In kidney exchange, they run through every possible match of donors and recipients to arrange the greatest possible number of transplants. In the future, computers may make it possible to auction bundled goods, such as airport takeoff and landing slots. As online markets—like those for jobs and dating—proliferate, a growing understanding of markets in general will provide virtually limitless opportunities for market design.

    Keywords: Market Design; Market Participation; Market Transactions; Information Technology; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "The Art of Designing Markets." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 10 (October 2007): 118–126. View Details
  23. Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

    Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a "double coincidence of wants." Developing infrastructure to perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than 3-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

    Keywords: Organizational Structure; Size; Emotions; Human Needs; Health Care and Treatment; Health Testing and Trials; Infrastructure; Supply Chain Management; Fairness; Performance Improvement; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market." American Economic Review 97, no. 3 (June 2007): 828–851. View Details
  24. Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets

    Keywords: Markets;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets." Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (summer 2007): 37–58. View Details
  25. Multi-agent Learning and the Descriptive Value of Simple Models

    Keywords: Value;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, and Alvin E. Roth. "Multi-agent Learning and the Descriptive Value of Simple Models." Special Issue on Foundations of Multi-Agent Learning. Artificial Intelligence 171, no. 7 (May 2007): 423–428. View Details
  26. The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

    Keywords: Markets; Jobs and Positions; Law;

    Citation:

    Avery, Christopher, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth. "The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks." University of Chicago Law Review 74 (spring 2007): 447–486. View Details
  27. Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through 'Chain' Paired Kidney Exchanges

    Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy; Health Care and Treatment;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez, M. Utku Unver, Francis L. Delmonico, and Susan L. Saidman. "Utilizing List Exchange and Undirected Good Samaritan Donation through 'Chain' Paired Kidney Exchanges." American Journal of Transplantation 6, no. 11 (November 2006): 2694–2705. View Details
  28. Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation

    Keywords: Cooperation; Learning; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Bereby-Meyer, Yoella, and Alvin E. Roth. "Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation." American Economic Review 96, no. 4 (September 2006): 1029–1042. View Details
  29. Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction

    Keywords: Bids and Bidding; Auctions; Online Technology; Theory; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms;

    Citation:

    Ockenfels, Axel, and Alvin E. Roth. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second-Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction." Games and Economic Behavior 55, no. 2 (May 2006): 297–320. View Details
  30. Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges

    Keywords: Opportunities; Health;

    Citation:

    Saidman, Susan L., Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, and Francis L. Delmonico. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges." Transplantation 81, no. 5 (March 15, 2006): 773–782. View Details
  31. The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market

    Keywords: Law; Information; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Markets;

    Citation:

    Haruvy, Ernan E., Alvin E Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market." Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 30, no. 3 (March 2006): 457–486. View Details
  32. What Will Be Needed for the New GI Fellowship Match to Succeed?

    Keywords: Health; Education; Success;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Deborah D. Proctor, and Alvin E. Roth. "What Will Be Needed for the New GI Fellowship Match to Succeed?" Gastroenterology 130 (January 2006): 218–224. View Details
  33. Pairwise Kidney Exchange

    Keywords: Health; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange." Journal of Economic Theory 125, no. 2 (December 2005): 151–188. View Details
  34. The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)

    Keywords: Health; Labor; Failure;

    Citation:

    McKinney, C. Nicholas, Muriel Niederle, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare)." American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (June 2005): 878–889. View Details
  35. The New York City High School Match

    Keywords: Education;

    Citation:

    Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "The New York City High School Match." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005). View Details
  36. The Boston Public School Match

    Keywords: Education; Boston;

    Citation:

    Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "The Boston Public School Match." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 368–371. View Details
  37. The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?

    Keywords: Health; Education; Markets;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Market: Should There Be a Match?" American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 372–375. View Details
  38. A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England

    Keywords: Health;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez, and M. Utku Unver. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England." American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 376–380. View Details
  39. An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions

    Keywords: Theory; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Online Technology; Web; Auctions;

    Citation:

    Ariely, Dan, Axel Ockenfels, and A. E. Roth. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions." RAND Journal of Economics 36, no. 4 (winter 2005): 891–908. View Details
  40. Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered via the Internet

    Keywords: Teaching; Auctions; Strategy; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Asker, John, Brit Grosskopf, C. Nicholas McKinney, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and George Weizsäcker. "Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered via the Internet." Journal of Economic Education 35, no. 4 (fall 2004): 330–342. View Details
  41. Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions

    Keywords: Auctions; Goods and Commodities; Profit;

    Citation:

    Katok, Elena, and A. E. Roth. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative "Dutch" Auctions." Management Science 50, no. 8 (August 2004): 1044–1063. View Details
  42. The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How It Failed, and Why It Could Succeed Once Again

    Keywords: Health; Education;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How It Failed, and Why It Could Succeed Once Again." Gastroenterology 127, no. 2 (August 2004): 658–666. View Details
  43. Kidney Exchange

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sönmez, and Utku Ünver. "Kidney Exchange." Quarterly Journal of Economics 19, no. 2 (May 2004): 457–488. View Details
  44. The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective

    Citation:

    Holt, Charles A., and Alvin E. Roth. "The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101, no. 12 (March 23, 2004): 3999–4002. View Details
  45. Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Health Care and Treatment; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match." Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 6 (December 2003): 1342–1352. View Details
  46. Bargaining under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Gneezy, Uri, Ernan Haruvy, and A. E. Roth. "Bargaining under a Deadline: Evidence from the Reverse Ultimatum Game." Special Issue in Honor of Robert W. Rosenthal. Games and Economic Behavior 45, no. 2 (November 2003): 347–368. View Details
  47. Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games

    Keywords: Strategy; Behavior; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Cooper, David J., Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, and Rami Zwick. "Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games." Experimental Economics 6, no. 2 (October 2003): 181–207. View Details
  48. Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships

    Keywords: Compensation and Benefits; Education; Learning; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and A. E. Roth. "Relationship Between Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships." JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association 290, no. 9 (September 3, 2003). View Details
  49. The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match

    Keywords: Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The Origins, History, and Design of the Resident Match." JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association 289, no. 7 (February 19, 2003): 909–912. View Details
  50. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet

    Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Governing Rules, Regulations, and Reforms; Web; Online Technology;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E., and Axel Ockenfels. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet." American Economic Review 92, no. 4 (September 2002): 1093–1103. View Details
  51. The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimental Economics and Computation As Tools of Design Economics

    Keywords: Game Theory; Economics; Mathematical Methods; Design;

  52. Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models

    Keywords: Value; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Theory;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Alvin E. Roth, Robert L. Slonim, and Greg Barron. "Predictive Value and the Usefulness of Game Theoretic Models." International Journal of Forecasting 18, no. 3 (July– September 2002): 359–368. View Details
  53. The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents

    Keywords: Auctions; Bids and Bidding; Online Technology; Markets; Design; Behavior; Web;

    Citation:

    Ockenfels, Axel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Timing of Bids in Internet Auctions: Market Design, Bidder Behavior, and Artificial Agents." AI Magazine (June 2002). View Details
  54. The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

    Keywords: Jobs and Positions; Law;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., Christopher Avery, and Christine Jolls. "The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks." University of Chicago Law Review 68, no. 3 (summer 2001): 793–902. View Details
  55. Form and Function in Experimental Design

    Keywords: Design;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Form and Function in Experimental Design." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24, no. 3 (June 2001). View Details
  56. The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment

    Keywords: Markets; Restructuring;

    Citation:

    Kagel, John H., and A. E. Roth. "The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment." Quarterly Journal of Economics (February 2000): 201–235. View Details
  57. The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design

    Keywords: Design; Markets; Health; Engineering; Economics; United States;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and E. Peranson. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design." American Economic Review 89, no. 4 (September 1999): 748–780. View Details
  58. The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning

    Keywords: Learning; Information;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effect of Adding a Constant to All Payoffs: Experimental Investigation, and a Reinforcement Learning Model with Self-Adjusting Speed of Learning." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39, no. 1 (May 1999): 111–128. View Details
  59. Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants

    Keywords: Strategy; Markets; Communication;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and U. G. Rothblum. "Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets--In Search of Advice for Participants." Econometrica 67 (January 1999): 21–43. View Details
  60. Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Forecasting and Prediction; Learning; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, and A. E. Roth. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria." American Economic Review 88, no. 4 (September 1998): 848–881. View Details
  61. Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic

    Keywords: Learning; Slovakia;

    Citation:

    Slonim, R., and A. E. Roth. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic." Econometrica 63, no. 3 (May 1998): 569–596. View Details
  62. Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Blum, Y., A. E. Roth, and U. G. Rothblum. "Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets." Journal of Economic Theory 76, no. 2 (October 1997): 362–411. View Details
  63. The Effects of the Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm

    Keywords: Change; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and Elliott Peranson. "The Effects of the Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm." JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association (September 1997): 729–732. View Details
  64. Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in he Market for Clinical Psychologists

    Keywords: Markets; Health;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and X. Xing. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in he Market for Clinical Psychologists." Journal of Political Economy 105 (April 1997): 284–329. View Details
  65. Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: A Unified Treatment." Revista de econometria 16, no. 2 (November 1996): 1–24. View Details
  66. The National Resident Matching Program as a Labor Market

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Programs;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The National Resident Matching Program as a Labor Market." JAMA, the Journal of the American Medical Association 275, no. 13 (April 1996): 1054–1056. View Details
  67. Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term

    Keywords: Learning; Data and Data Sets;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and I. Erev. "Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term." Special Issue on Nobel Symposium. Games and Economic Behavior 8 (January 1995): 164–212. View Details
  68. Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ

    Keywords: Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Let's Keep the Con Out of Experimental Econ." Empirical Economics 19, no. 2 (March 1994): 279–289. View Details
  69. Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions

    Keywords: Market Transactions;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and X. Xing. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions." American Economic Review 84, no. 4 (January 1994): 992–1044. View Details
  70. Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming

    Keywords: Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., U. G. Rothblum, and J. H. Vande Vate. "Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming." SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 18 (November 1993): 803–828. View Details
  71. On the Early History of Experimental Economics

    Keywords: Business History; Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "On the Early History of Experimental Economics." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 15 (fall 1993): 184–209. View Details
  72. Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games

    Keywords: Fairness; Strategy; Data and Data Sets; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Prasnikar, V., and A. E. Roth. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games." Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1992): 865–888. View Details
  73. Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment

    Keywords: Auctions; Information; Behavior;

    Citation:

    Kagel, J. H., and A. E. Roth. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment." American Economic Review 82, no. 5 (January 1992): 1379–1391. View Details
  74. Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study

    Keywords: Markets; Behavior; Information; Israel; Pittsburgh; Tokyo; Slovenia;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and S. Zamir. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review 81, no. 5 (December 1991): 1068–1095. View Details
  75. Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms

    Keywords: Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Incentives in Two-Sided Matching with Random Stable Mechanisms." Economic Theory 1, no. 1 (March 1991): 31–44. View Details
  76. Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Theory; Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Game Theory as a Part of Empirical Economics." Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society) 101 (January 1991): 107–114. View Details
  77. A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K.

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Health; United Kingdom;

  78. Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism

    Keywords: Groups and Teams;

    Citation:

    Mongell, S., and A. E. Roth. "Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching Mechanism." American Economic Review 81, no. 3 (January 1991): 441–464. View Details
  79. New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization

    Keywords: Markets; Organizations; Health Care and Treatment; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "New Physicians: A Natural Experiment in Market Organization." Science 250 (December 1990): 1524–1528. View Details
  80. Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and J. H. Vande Vate. "Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching." Econometrica 58, no. 6 (November 1990): 1475–1480. View Details
  81. Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Relationships; Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Risk Aversion and the Relationship between Nash's Solution and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Sequential Bargaining." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 2, no. 4 (December 1989): 353–365. View Details
  82. Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Two-Sided Matching with Incomplete Information about Others' Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior 1, no. 2 (June 1989): 191–209. View Details
  83. An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Ochs, J., and A. E. Roth. "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining." American Economic Review 79, no. 3 (June 1989): 355–384. View Details
  84. The College Admissions Problem Revisited

    Keywords: Higher Education; Problems and Challenges;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "The College Admissions Problem Revisited." Econometrica 57, no. 3 (May 1989): 559–570. View Details
  85. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview

    Keywords: Economics; Information;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview." Economic Journal (Royal Economic Society) 98, no. 393 (December 1988): 974–1031. View Details
  86. The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence

    Keywords: Negotiation; Information;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., J. K. Murnighan, and F. Schoumaker. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (September 1988): 806–823. View Details
  87. Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets

    Keywords: Markets;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Interior Points in the Core of Two-Sided Matching Markets." Journal of Economic Theory 45 (August 1988): 85–101. View Details
  88. Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Information;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. K., A. E. Roth, and F. Schoumaker. "Risk Aversion in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (March 1988): 101–124. View Details
  89. On the Non-Transferable Utility: A Replay to Aumann

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "On the Non-Transferable Utility: A Replay to Aumann." Econometrica 54, no. 4 (July 1986): 981–984. View Details
  90. On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets

    Keywords: Health; Markets; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets." Econometrica 54, no. 2 (March 1986): 425–427. View Details
  91. A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints

    Keywords: Budgets and Budgeting;

    Citation:

    Mongell, S. J., and A. E. Roth. "A Note on Job Matching with Budget Constraints." Economics Letters 21, no. 2 (1986): 135–138. View Details
  92. Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternatives: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball

    Keywords: Cognition and Thinking; Labor and Management Relations; Negotiation; Entertainment; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Further Thoughts on the Power of Alternatives: An Example from Labor-Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball." Negotiation Journal 1, no. 4 (October 1985): 359–362. View Details
  93. The College Admissions Problem Is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem

    Keywords: Problems and Challenges; Higher Education;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The College Admissions Problem Is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem." Journal of Economic Theory 36 (August 1985): 277–288. View Details
  94. Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements." Negotiation Journal 1, no. 3 (July 1985): 245–247. View Details
  95. Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets

    Keywords: Conflict of Interests; Markets;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Common and Conflicting Interests in Two-Sided Matching Markets." European Economic Review 27, no. 1 (February 1985): 75–96. View Details
  96. A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining." Econometrica 53, no. 1 (January 1985): 207–211. View Details
  97. Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions

    Keywords: Conflict and Resolution;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions." Mathematics of Operations Research 10 (1985): 379–389. View Details
  98. Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem

    Keywords: Balance and Stability; Problems and Challenges;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Misrepresentation and Stability in the Marriage Problem." Journal of Economic Theory 34 (December 1984): 383–387. View Details
  99. The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory

    Keywords: Labor; Markets; Theory; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory." Journal of Political Economy 92, no. 6 (December 1984): 991–1016. View Details
  100. Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching

    Keywords: Employment;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching." Econometrica 52, no. 1 (January 1984): 47–57. View Details
  101. Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Some Further Comment

    Keywords: Theory; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and F. Schoumaker. "Subjective Probability and the Theory of Games: Some Further Comment." Management Science 29, no. 11 (November 1983): 1337–1340. View Details
  102. Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

    Keywords: Negotiation; Reputation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and F. Schoumaker. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review 73, no. 3 (June 1983): 362–372. View Details
  103. Towards a Theory of Bargaining: An Experimental Study in Economics

    Keywords: Negotiation; Information; Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Towards a Theory of Bargaining: An Experimental Study in Economics." Science 220, no. 13 (May 1983): 687–691. View Details
  104. Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Three Models

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. K., and A. E. Roth. "Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner's Dilemma Games: A Test of Three Models." Journal of Conflict Resolution 27 (1983): 279–300. View Details
  105. The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

    Keywords: Information;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and J. K. Murnighan. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." Econometrica 50, no. 5 (September 1982): 1123–1142. View Details
  106. Scale Changes and Shared Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

    Keywords: Change; Information; Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Malouf. "Scale Changes and Shared Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." Mathematical Social Sciences 3 (September 1982): 157–177. View Details
  107. Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Negotiation; Insurance;

    Citation:

    Kihlstrom, R., and A. E. Roth. "Risk Aversion and the Negotiation of Insurance Contracts." Journal of Risk and Insurance 49 (September 1982): 372–387. View Details
  108. Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Negotiation; Outcome or Result;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and U. Rothblum. "Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes." Econometrica 50, no. 3 (May 1982): 639–647. View Details
  109. Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods

    Keywords: Motivation and Incentives; Markets; Goods and Commodities;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible Goods." Economics Letters 9, no. 2 (1982): 127–132. View Details
  110. A Note on the Maximum Value of Two Person, Zero-Sum Games

    Keywords: Value;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "A Note on the Maximum Value of Two Person, Zero-Sum Games." Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 29 (1982): 521–527. View Details
  111. The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

    Keywords: Balance and Stability; Motivation and Incentives; Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives." Mathematics of Operations Research, no. 7 (1982): 617–628. View Details
  112. Strike Two: Labor Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball

    Keywords: Labor and Management Relations; Negotiation; Entertainment; Sports Industry;

    Citation:

    DeBrock, L. M., and Alvin E. Roth. "Strike Two: Labor Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball." Bell Journal of Economics 12, no. 2 (autumn 1981): 413–425. View Details
  113. Sociological Versus Strategic Factors in Bargaining

    Keywords: Strategy; Society; Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., M. Malouf, and J. K. Murnighan. "Sociological Versus Strategic Factors in Bargaining." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2, no. 2 (June 1981): 153–177. View Details
  114. Disagreement in Bargaining: An Experimental Study

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Malouf, M., and A. E. Roth. "Disagreement in Bargaining: An Experimental Study." Journal of Conflict Resolution 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 329–348. View Details
  115. Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts

    Keywords: Value; Money; Information;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Values for Games Without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts." Econometrica 48, no. 2 (March 1980): 457–465. View Details
  116. The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game

    Keywords: Groups and Teams; Negotiation; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Communication;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. K., and A. E. Roth. "The Effect of Group Size and Communication Availability on Coalition Bargaining in a Veto Game." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39 (1980): 92–103. View Details
  117. An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games

    Keywords: Negotiation; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games." International Journal of Game Theory 8, no. 3 (September 1979): 129–132. View Details
  118. Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

    Keywords: Negotiation; Problems and Challenges;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Proportional Solutions to the Bargaining Problem." Econometrica 47, no. 3 (May 1979): 775–778. View Details
  119. The Shapley Value as Applied to Cost Allocation: A Reinterpretation

    Keywords: Value; Cost;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and R. E. Verrecchia. "The Shapley Value as Applied to Cost Allocation: A Reinterpretation." Journal of Accounting Research 17, no. 1 (spring 1979): 295–303. View Details
  120. An Extension and Simple Proof of a Constrained Lattice Fix-Point Theorem

    Keywords: Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Blair, C., and A. E. Roth. "An Extension and Simple Proof of a Constrained Lattice Fix-Point Theorem." Algebra Universalis 9 (1979): 131–132. View Details
  121. Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Negotiation; Information;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. K. Malouf. "Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining." Psychological Review 86 (1979): 574–594. View Details
  122. Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game

    Keywords: Groups and Teams; Negotiation; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. K., and A. E. Roth. "Large Group Bargaining in a Characteristic Function Game." Journal of Conflict Resolution 22, no. 2 (June 1978): 299–317. View Details
  123. The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The Nash Solution and the Utility of Bargaining." Econometrica 46, no. 3 (May 1978): 587–594, 983. View Details
  124. Two Person Games on Graphs

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Two Person Games on Graphs." Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B 24, no. 2 (April 1978): 238–241. View Details
  125. Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Behavior;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and J. K. Murnighan. "Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 17 (April 1978): 189–198. View Details
  126. A Note Concerning Asymmetric Games on Graphs

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "A Note Concerning Asymmetric Games on Graphs." Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 25 (1978): 365–367. View Details
  127. Utility Functions for Simple Games

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Utility Functions for Simple Games." Journal of Economic Theory 16 (December 1977): 481–489. View Details
  128. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

    Keywords: Negotiation; Problems and Challenges;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem." Journal of Economic Theory 16 (December 1977): 247–251. View Details
  129. Bargaining Ability, the Utility of Playing a Game, and Models of Coalition Formation

    Keywords: Negotiation; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Bargaining Ability, the Utility of Playing a Game, and Models of Coalition Formation." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 16 (October 1977): 153–160. View Details
  130. A Note on Values and Multilinear Extensions

    Keywords: Value;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "A Note on Values and Multilinear Extensions." Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 24 (September 1977): 517–520. View Details
  131. The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three Person Game

    Keywords: Communication; Information; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. K., and A. E. Roth. "The Effects of Communication and Information Availability in an Experimental Study of a Three Person Game." Management Science 23, no. 12 (August 1977): 1336–1348. View Details
  132. Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods

    Keywords: Markets; Goods and Commodities;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and A. Postlewaite. "Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods." Journal of Mathematical Economics 4 (August 1977): 131–137. View Details
  133. The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility

    Keywords: Value; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility." Econometrica 45 (April 1977): 657–664. View Details
  134. Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem

    Keywords: Negotiation; Problems and Challenges;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem." Mathematics of Operations Research 2, no. 1 (1977): 64–65. View Details
  135. Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games

    Keywords: Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games." SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 1 (February 1976): 43–49. View Details
  136. A Lattice Fixed-Point Theorem with Constraints

    Keywords: Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "A Lattice Fixed-Point Theorem with Constraints." Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 81 (January 1975): 136–138. View Details

Book Chapters

  1. In 100 Years

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "In 100 Years." Chap. 7 in In 100 Years: Leading Economists Predict the Future, edited by Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 109–119. MIT Press, 2013. View Details
  2. Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?

    The question that is the title of this essay already suggests that experimental economics has at least reached a sufficient state of maturity that we can try to take stock of its progress and consider how that progress matches the anticipations we may have had for the field several decades ago, when it and we were younger. So it will help to begin by reconstructing what some of those anticipations were.

    Keywords: Economics; History; Science;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Is Experimental Economics Living Up to Its Promise?" In The Methods of Modern Experimental Economics, edited by Guillaume R. Frechette and Andrew Schotter. Oxford University Press, forthcoming. View Details
  3. New Sources in Living Kidney Donation

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Giving and Philanthropy; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Hanto, Ruthanne L., Alvin E. Roth, M. Utku Ünver, and Francis L. Delmonico. "New Sources in Living Kidney Donation." Chap. 8 in Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Transplant Recipients, edited by D. McKay and S. Steinberg, pp. 103–17. Springer Science + Business Media, 2010. View Details
  4. Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice

    The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

    Keywords: Labor; Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Failure; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice." In Better Living through Economics, edited by John J. Siegfried, 206–222. Harvard University Press, 2010. View Details
  5. The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

    New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990s, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating and when it was not. After the GI match ended, the market unraveled. Contracts were signed earlier each year, at diffuse times, often with exploding offers. The market became less national, more local. This allows us to discern the effect of the clearinghouse: it coordinated the timing of the market in a way that increased its thickness and scope. The clearinghouse does not seem to have had an effect on wages. As this became known among gastroenterologists, an opportunity arose to reorganize the market to once again use a centralized clearinghouse. However it proved necessary to adopt policies that would allow employers to safely delay hiring and coordinate on using the clearinghouse. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

    Keywords: Labor; Market Timing; Marketplace Matching; Failure;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Central Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." In Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, edited by David H. Autor, 273–306. University of Chicago Press, 2009. View Details
  6. Matching and Market Design

    Matching is the part of economics concerned with who transacts with whom and how. Models of matching, starting with the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, have been particularly useful in studying labour markets and in helping design clearinghouses to fix market failures. Studying how markets fail also gives us insight into how market places work well. They need to provide a thick, uncongested market in which it is safe to participate. Clearinghouses that do this have been designed for many entry-level professional labor markets, for the assignment of children to public schools, and for exchange of live-donor kidneys for transplantation if available.

    Keywords: Market Design; Marketplace Matching; Outcome or Result; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "Matching and Market Design." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 2nd ed. Edited by Steven Derlauf and Larry Blume. Hampshire, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. View Details
  7. Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration

    Keywords: History; Social Psychology; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Economics;

    Citation:

    Murnighan, J. Keith, and Alvin E. Roth. "Ancient History of Experimental Economics and Social Psychology: Reminiscences and Analysis of a Fruitful Collaboration." In Social Psychology and Economics, edited by David de Cremer, J. Keith Murnighan, and Marcel Zeelenberg, 321–333. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006. View Details
  8. Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Resource Allocation; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Matching and Allocation in Medicine and Health Care." In Building a Better Delivery System: A New Engineering/Health Care Partnership, edited by P. Reid, W. Compton, J. Grossman, and G. Fanjiang, 237–239. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005. View Details
  9. Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design

    Keywords: Game Theory; Market Design;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design." In Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory, edited by Fioravante Patrone, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, and Stef Tijs, 7–18. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. View Details
  10. On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach

    Keywords: Game Theory; Cognition and Thinking; Learning;

    Citation:

    Erev, Ido, and A. E. Roth. "On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach." In Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by D. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick, 53–77. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999. View Details
  11. Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field

    Keywords: Attitudes; Behavior; Strategy;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Adaptive Behavior and Strategic Rationality: Evidence from the Laboratory and the Field." In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior: Proceedings of the IEA Conference, edited by K. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, and C. Schmidt, 255–273. Macmillan Publishers, 1996. View Details
  12. Introduction to Experimental Economics

    Keywords: Economics;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Introduction to Experimental Economics." In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 3–109. Princeton University Press, 1995. View Details
  13. Bargaining Experiments

    Keywords: Negotiation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Bargaining Experiments." In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, 253–348. Princeton University Press, 1995. View Details
  14. Two Sided Matching

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and M. Sotomayor. "Two Sided Matching." In Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edited by Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, 485–541. Elsevier/North-Holland, 1992. View Details
  15. An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining

    Keywords: Negotiation; Economics; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "An Economic Approach to the Study of Bargaining." In Handbook of Negotiation Research. Vol. 3, edited by M. H. Bazerman, R. J. Lewicki, and B. H. Sheppard, 35–67. Research on Negotiation in Organizations. JAI Press, 1991. View Details
  16. Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence

    Keywords: Marketplace Matching; Two-Sided Platforms; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence." In Game Theory and Applications, edited by T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman, and Y. Tauman, 232–251. San Diego: Academic Press, 1990. View Details
  17. The Expected Utility of Playing a Game

    Keywords: Game Theory; Games, Gaming, and Gambling; Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The Expected Utility of Playing a Game." In The Shapely Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, edited by A. E. Roth, 51–70. Cambridge University Press, 1988. View Details
  18. Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory

    Keywords: Negotiation; Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory." In Laboratory Experiments in Economics: Six Points of View, edited by A. E. Roth, 14–41. Cambridge University Press, 1987. View Details
  19. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics

    Keywords: Economics; Research;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics." In Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth World of Congress, edited by Truman Bewley, 269–299. Cambridge University Press, 1987. View Details
  20. Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory

    Keywords: Economics; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Laboratory Experimentation in Economics, and Its Relation to Economic Theory." In Scientific Inquiry in Philosophical Perspective, edited by Nicholas Rescher, 147–167. Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1987. View Details
  21. Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining

    Keywords: Negotiation; Game Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Toward a Focal-Point Theory of Bargaining." In Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, edited by A. E. Roth, 259–268. Cambridge University Press, 1985. View Details
  22. Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory

    Keywords: Alliances; Balance and Stability; Theory;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Stable Coalition Formation: Aspects of a Dynamic Theory." In Coalitions and Collective Action, edited by M. Holler, 228–234. Wuerzberg: Physica-Verlag, 1984. View Details
  23. Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining

    Keywords: Negotiation; Information; Motivation and Incentives;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and J. K. Murnighan. "Information and Aspirations in Two Person Bargaining." In Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making: Proceedings, Winzenhohl, FRG, edited by R. Tietz. Springer-Verlag, 1983. View Details
  24. Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem

    Keywords: Risk and Uncertainty; Negotiation; Mathematical Methods;

    Citation:

    Kihlstrom, R., A. E. Roth, and D. Schmeidler. "Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem." In Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, edited by O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, 65–71. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1981. View Details
  25. The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining

    Keywords: Mathematical Methods; Negotiation Style;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "The Nash Solution as a Model of Rational Bargaining." In Extremal Methods and Systems Analysis, edited by A. V. Fiacco and K.O. Kortanek, 306–311. Springer-Verlag, 1980. View Details
  26. Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game

    Keywords: Power and Influence; Status and Position; Game Theory; Games, Gaming, and Gambling;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "Power and Position: The Utility of Playing a Simple Game." In Game Theory and Political Science, edited by P. C. Ordeshook. New York: New York University Press, 1978. View Details
  27. A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games

    Keywords: Game Theory; Balance and Stability; Cooperation;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E. "A Fixed Point Approach to Stability in Cooperative Games." In Fixed Points: Algorithms and Applications, edited by S. Karamardian, 165–180. Academic Press, 1977. View Details

Working Papers

  1. The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange

    It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e., by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has grown in practice, cycles among n>3 pairs have proved useful, and long chains initiated by non-directed, altruistic donors have proven to be very effective. We explore why this is the case, both empirically and theoretically. We provide an analytical model of exchange when there are many highly sensitized patients and show that large cycles of exchange or long chains can significantly increase efficiency when the opportunities for exchange are sparse. As very large cycles of exchange cannot be used in practice, long non-simultaneous chains initiated by non-directed donors significantly increase efficiency in patient pools of the size and composition that presently exist. Most importantly, long chains benefit highly sensitized patients without harming low-sensitized patients.

    Keywords: Networks; Complexity; Performance Efficiency; Medical Specialties; Health Care and Treatment; Giving and Philanthropy;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, David Gamarnik, Michael A. Rees, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Need for (long) Chains in Kidney Exchange." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 18202, July 2012. View Details
  2. Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

    As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has already started to be observed. We show that the cost of making it individually rational for hospitals to participate fully is low in almost every large exchange pool (although the worst-case cost is very high), while the cost of failing to guarantee individually rational allocations could be large, in terms of lost transplants. We also identify an incentive compatible mechanism.

    Keywords: Health Care and Treatment; Resource Allocation; Market Participation; Marketplace Matching; Organizations; Networks; Motivation and Incentives; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Ashlagi, Itai, and Alvin E. Roth. "Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16720, January 2011. View Details
  3. Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions

    This paper describes the unraveling of transaction dates in several markets, including the labor markets for new lawyers hired by large law firms and for gastroenterology fellows, and the market for post-season college football bowls. Together these will illustrate that unraveling can occur in markets with competitive prices, that it can result in substantial inefficiencies, and that marketplace institutions play a role in restoring efficiency. I'll conclude with open questions about the role of marketplace institutions and the timing of transactions.

    Keywords: Talent and Talent Management; Market Timing; Market Transactions; Marketplace Matching; Competitive Strategy;

    Citation:

    Roth, Alvin E. "Marketplace Institutions Related to the Timing of Transactions." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16556, November 2010. View Details
  4. Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

    Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

    Keywords: Labor; Marketplace Matching; Quality; Competition; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-095, May 2010. View Details
  5. The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective

    This paper provides an overview of the market for new Ph.D. economists. It describes the role of the American Economic Association (AEA) in the market and focuses in particular on two mechanisms adopted in recent years at the suggestion of our committee. First, job market applicants now have a signaling service to send an expression of special interest to up to two employers prior to interviews at the January Allied Social Science Associations (ASSA) meetings. Second, the AEA now invites candidates who are still on the market, and employers whose positions are still vacant, to participate in a web-based "scramble" to reduce search costs and thicken the late part of the job market. We present statistics on the activity in these market mechanisms and present survey evidence that both mechanisms have facilitated matches. The paper concludes by discussing the emergence of platforms for transmitting job market information.

    Keywords: Cost Management; Information; Surveys; Jobs and Positions; Job Interviews; Job Search; Emerging Markets; Market Platforms; Service Operations; Search Technology;

    Citation:

    Coles, Peter A., John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E. Roth, and John J. Siegfried. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 10-096, May 2010. View Details
  6. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

    Citation:

    Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 16028, May 2010. View Details
  7. Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation

    Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers' quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants.

    Keywords: Labor; Marketplace Matching; Quality; Competition; Balance and Stability;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, Alvin E. Roth, and M. Utku Unver. "Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 15006, May 2009. View Details
  8. The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices

    New gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, programs hired fellows earlier each year, eventually almost a year earlier than when the match was operating. It became customary for GI program directors to make very short offers, rarely exceeding two weeks and often much shorter. Consequently many potential fellows had to accept positions before they finished their planned interviews, and most programs experienced cancellations of interviews they had scheduled. Furthermore, without a match, many programs hired more local fellows, and fewer from other hospitals and cities than they did during the match. Wages, however, seem not to have been affected. To restart the match, we proposed a policy, subsequently adopted by the gastroenterology professional organizations, that even if applicants had accepted offers prior to the match, they could subsequently decline those offers and participate in the match. This made it safe for programs to delay hiring until the match, confident that programs that did not participate would not be able to "capture" the most desirable candidates beforehand. Consequently it appears that most programs waited for the match in an orderly way in 2006, when the GI match was reinstated. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.

    Keywords: Health; Employment; Marketplace Matching; Selection and Staffing; Job Offer; Compensation and Benefits; Health Industry;

    Citation:

    Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 13529, October 2007. View Details
  9. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism

    Citation:

    Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun Sonmez. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism." NBER Working Paper Series, No. 11965, January 2006. View Details

Other Publications and Materials

  1. Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set

    Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Strategy; Game Theory; Learning;

    Citation:

    Roth, A. E., and Ido Erev. "Modeling Repeated Play of the Prisoners' Dilemma with Reinforcement Learning over an Enriched Strategy Set." 2006. (Presented at the Dahlem Workshop on Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.) View Details

    Research Summary

      Awards & Honors

    1. Nobel: Awarded the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics with Lloyd Shapley for their research on market design and matching theory.

    2. Frederick W. Lanchester Prize: Winner of the 1990 Lanchester Prize for Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis (with M. Sotomayor, Cambridge University Press - both the paperback edition in 1992 and the 1990 edition).