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• Supplement | HBS Case Collection | 2013

  Jones Lang LaSalle 2001–2012 Video Supplement

  Ranjay Gulati and Luciana Silvestri

  Keywords: organizational structure; organizational evolution; strategy;

  Citation:

  Gulati, Ranjay, and Luciana Silvestri. "Jones Lang LaSalle 2001–2012 Video Supplement." Harvard Business School Video Supplement 413-704, April 2013.

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2013

  Independent Directors' Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China

  Juan Ma and Tarun Khanna

  In this paper, we examine the circumstances under which so-called "independent" directors voice their independent views on public boards in a sample of Chinese firms. First, we ask why independent directors dissent, i.e. how they justify such dissent to public investors. We find that when independent directors dissent, they tend to offer mild, subjective justifications. Overt criticism of the management team is rare. Next, we ask when an independent director is more likely to dissent and who is more likely to dissent. Controlling for firm and board characteristics, we find that independent directors' dissent is associated with breakdown of social ties between the independent director and the board chairperson, who is at the center of the board bureaucracy in China. Dissent is more likely to occur when the chairperson who appointed the independent director has left the board. Dissent also tends to occur at the end of board "games", defined as a 60-day window prior to departure of the board chairperson or departure of the independent director herself. The endgame effect is particularly strong, seeing 27% of the dissent issued at board "endgames" which represents only 4% of independent directors' average tenure. While directors with foreign experience are more likely to dissent, we do not find that academics, accountants and lawyers are significantly more active in dissenting. Lastly, we show that dissent is consequential to the director and the firm. For directors, we show that dissent is significantly associated with the likelihood of exiting the director labor market. For firms, we document an economically and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of -0.97% around announcement of dissent. Although the literature has suggested that dissent might be reflective of diverse viewpoints, and perhaps beneficial in and of itself through reduction of firm variability, we do not find this offsetting beneficial effect to be strong.

  Keywords: corporate governance; independent directors; China; China; Asia;

  Citation:

  Ma, Juan, and Tarun Khanna. "Independent Directors' Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed Companies in China." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–089, April 2013. (Revised May 2013.)

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2013

  Corporate Solutions at Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) (A)

  Ranjay Gulati and Luciana Silvestri

  This case describes the strategic and organizational challenges that Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) faced at the turn of the millennium. Until then, JLL sold piecemeal commercial real estate services to its corporate clients, who maintained relationships with a variety of vendors. In 2000, JLL's large corporate clients started globalizing their activities and seeking to outsource their real estate needs. They were looking for integrated solutions delivered through a single point of contact, and they cut their providers to a few strategic vendors. JLL's organizational structure, configured around largely autonomous service lines, was not well suited to supporting the development of integrated services. Executive Peter Barge is put in charge of a new team, called Corporate Solutions, whose mission was to draw connections between the service lines in order to foster integration. How should Barge structure Corporate Solutions to make sure it succeeds in its mission? And how should he configure the group's ties to the service lines to ensure their collaboration? The retention of JLL's most profitable clients was at stake. This case is the first in a case series that comprises cases B, C, and D, and collectively covers JLL's evolution between the years 1999 and 2012.

  Keywords: Organizational Structure; Strategy; Integration; Real Estate Industry; North America; South America; Central America;

  Citation:

  Gulati, Ranjay, and Luciana Silvestri. "Corporate Solutions at Jones Lang LaSalle (2001) (A)." Harvard Business School Case 113-114, March 2013.

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