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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2013 (Revised from original 2012 version)

  Persephone's Pomegranate: Crédit Agricole and Emporiki

  Dante Roscini, Daniela Beyersdorfer and Jerome Lenhardt

  In 2006 the French bank Crédit Agricole bought the Greek Emporiki bank, for €2.8 billion, at the peak of a bull market for bank takeovers. Six years, a major financial crisis, and €5.2 billion of losses later, in a context of great uncertainty in the European banking sector, what decision should Crédit Agricole take regarding Emporiki? Through the example of this European cross-border acquisition the case looks at the Greek banking system before and during the unprecedented Greek sovereign debt crisis; the efforts of Greece and the main actors of the European financial system to prevent the embattled country from having to exit the Euro zone; and the potential scenarios for Greek banks in mid-2012.

  Keywords: Business and Government Relations; Currency; Development Economics; International Finance; International Relations; Banking Industry; Greece;

  Citation:

  Roscini, Dante, Daniela Beyersdorfer, and Jerome Lenhardt. "Persephone's Pomegranate: Crédit Agricole and Emporiki." Harvard Business School Case 713-055, May 2013. (Revised from original November 2012 version.)

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• Article | Journal of Economic Perspectives | Spring 2013

  The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds

  Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner and Antoinette Schoar

  This paper examines the direct private equity investment strategies across sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and their relationship to the funds' organizational structures. SWFs seem to engage in a form of trend chasing, since they are more likely to invest at home when domestic equity prices are higher and invest abroad when foreign prices are higher. Funds see the industry P/E ratios of their home investments drop in the year after the investment, while they have a positive change in the year after their investments abroad. SWFs where politicians are involved have a much greater likelihood of investing at home than those where external managers are involved. At the same time, SWFs with external managers tend to invest in lower P/E industries, which see an increase in the P/E ratios in the year after the investment. By way of contrast, funds with politicians involved invest in higher P/E industries, which have a negative valuation change in the year after the investment.

  Citation:

  Bernstein, Shai, Josh Lerner, and Antoinette Schoar. "The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds." Journal of Economic Perspectives 27, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 219–238.

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2013

  Bay Partners (A)

  Josh Lerner and Lauren Barley

  In April 2010, Salil Deshpande has recently resigned from Palo Alto, California-based Bay Partners (Bay) where he had been a general partner. Although Deshpande had built a successful track record at the venture firm, he resigned with two other Bay general partners as disagreement about internal economics and governance continued among the Bay's six-member management team. This triggered the "key man" clause in the limited partnership agreement of Bay's most recent fund, Bay XI. The case considers the options that Deshpande and the Bay XI limited partners face as the firm and fund's futures are thrown into doubt.

  Citation:

  Lerner, Josh, and Lauren Barley. "Bay Partners (A)." Harvard Business School Case 213-102, March 2013.

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