| Quarterly Journal of Economics
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
Accommodating couples has been a long-standing issue in the design of
centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because
couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist
when couples are present. This article's main result is that a stable matching
exists when there are relatively few couples and preference lists are sufficiently
short relative to market size. We also discuss incentives in markets with couples.
We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in
which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of
Kojima, Fuhito, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. "Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets." Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 4 (2013): 1585–1632.