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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2012 (Revised from original 2012 version)

  Telecommunications Regulation and Coordinated Competition in Romania

  Arthur Daemmrich, Alex Radu and Ana Sarbu

  Leaders of the Romanian telecommunications agency must decide about a proposed international merger and how to structure bandwidth auctions critical to the telecoms market. The case is designed to teach about regulatory choices from the perspective of a regulatory agency, but it also describes the competitive standing of domestic and international telecoms providers in Romania and the challenges of operating as a "foreign" multinational, even in the European Union where protection of national champions is supposedly obsolete. Policy tradeoffs are developed among approving, delaying, or denying the proposed merger of domestic Romtelecom with Greek-based Cosmote. Likewise, tradeoffs are described for bandwidth auctions, notably among public transparency, maximizing revenue, preventing collusion, promoting efficient use of spectrum, broadening coverage, and fostering innovation in products and services.

  Keywords: regulation; Auction Policy; European Union; government policy; cell phone industry; Mergers and Acquisitions; Telecommunications Industry; Romania;

  Citation:

  Daemmrich, Arthur, Alex Radu, and Ana Sarbu. "Telecommunications Regulation and Coordinated Competition in Romania." Harvard Business School Case 713-016, December 2012. (Revised from original August 2012 version.)

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• Teaching Note | HBS Case Collection | 2012

  Telecommunications Regulation and Coordinated Competition in Romania (TN)

  Arthur A. Daemmrich

  Citation:

  Daemmrich, Arthur A. "Telecommunications Regulation and Coordinated Competition in Romania (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 713-017, October 2012.

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• Article | Trade, Law and Development | Summer 2012

  Epistemic Contests and the Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: The Brazil–USA Cotton Dispute and the Incremental Balancing of Interests

  Arthur A. Daemmrich

  The World Trade Organization (WTO) features prominently in studies of international institutions, often cast either as a tool of rich-world domination over the poorer South or as a neutral mediator facilitating a tariff-free world of economic prosperity. This article instead analyses how the WTO has sought legitimacy for itself and for the underlying institution of free trade in the midst of questions regarding its organizational mandate and management of international trade negotiations. Historically, legitimacy for GATT and later the WTO was understood to derive from expanding membership and success at major trade round negotiations. In the past decade, and despite a lack of progress in the Doha Round, legitimacy has been built through institutional deepening by means of dispute resolution processes. This shift, I argue, raises epistemic questions of expertise, the relationship of models to real-world outcomes, and methods for bounding disputes over scientific facts. Based on a case study of the Brazil-Upland Cotton dispute and a trend analysis of over 400 total WTO disputes, I find that the WTO dispute settlement process is helping to legitimize the institution of free trade through its public display of rational authority and neutral expertise. At the same time, dispute panels have begun to pass judgment on issues of econometric and scientific uncertainty. As a result, the basis for the broader legitimacy of the WTO is shifting from questions of representation that have long drawn attention to epistemic issues, especially concerning the design of international trade models. The article thus provides insights on the resolution of disputes in global trade while contributing to our understanding of the evolving role of modeling at international organizations.

  Citation:

  Daemmrich, Arthur A. "Epistemic Contests and the Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: The Brazil–USA Cotton Dispute and the Incremental Balancing of Interests." Trade, Law and Development 4 (Summer 2012): 200–240.

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