Publications
Publications
- 2012
- Making of Good Financial Regulation: Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture
Lessons for the Financial Sector from 'Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It'
By: Daniel Carpenter, David Moss and Melanie Wachtell Stinnett
Abstract
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007–09, regulatory capture has
become at once a diagnosis and a source of discomfort. The word “capture” has been used by dozens upon dozens of authors—ranging from
pundits and bloggers to journalists and leading scholars—as the tell-tale
characterization of the regulatory failures that permitted the crisis. In
addition, critics who doubt whether regulatory reforms will be sufficient
draw upon capture as a source of widespread scepticism (if not despair)
that nothing real can be changed. Seen this way, capture of financial
regulation appears not only as a significant cause of the crisis, but also as
a constraint upon any realistic solutions. Most of those solutions will, in
this view, be watered down or dashed by captured regulators in the future.
Keywords
Citation
Carpenter, Daniel, David Moss, and Melanie Wachtell Stinnett. "Lessons for the Financial Sector from 'Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence, and How to Limit It'." Chap. 3 in Making of Good Financial Regulation: Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture, edited by Stefano Pagliari, 70–84. Grosvenor House Publishing Limited, 2012.