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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2013 (Revised from original 2012 version)

  Colbún and the Future of Chile's Power

  Forest Reinhardt and Shon R. Hiatt

  This case is about Colbún, Chile's second largest electricity generator, which is facing significant uncertainty regarding the cost and availability of alternative energy sources. Problems with the contracted supply of natural gas and the volatility of oil prices, coupled with pressure from collective activists, force Colbún to revise its business strategy and its sourcing mix. The case also deals with the pros and cons of various energy sources in view of their perceived environmental impact. The company's CEO, Bernardo Larrain Matte, has to take all these different considerations into account when planning Colbún's future, especially in the light of new opportunities and challenges posed by global climate change. The case analyzes the operations of Colbún to illustrate the complexities associated with conducting business under the influence of global energy markets, political uncertainty, and environmental activism.

  Keywords: energy; Energy Industry; chile; environmental protection; Energy Generation; Energy Industry; South America; Chile;

  Citation:

  Reinhardt, Forest, and Shon R. Hiatt. "Colbún and the Future of Chile's Power." Harvard Business School Case 713-047, April 2013. (Revised from original November 2012 version.)

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2013

  Competing with Privacy

  Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Andres Hervas-Drane

  We analyze the implications of consumer privacy for competition in the marketplace. We consider a market where firms set prices and disclosure levels for consumer information and consumers observe both before deciding which firm to patronize and how much information to provide it with. The provision and disclosure of information presents tradeoffs for all market participants. Consumers benefit from providing information to the firm, as this increases the utility they derive from the service, but they incur disutility from information disclosure. This in turn benefits the firm providing an additional source of revenue, but reduces consumer demand for the service. We characterize equilibrium information provision, disclosure levels, and prices as a function of the consumer population's valuation for the service, and show that competition has three main effects on the marketplace. First, competition drives the provision of services with a low level of disclosure. Second, competition ensures that services with a high level of disclosure subsidize consumers. And third, higher competition intensity tends to increase the volume of consumer information disclosed by firms. Our findings are particularly relevant to the business models of Internet firms and contribute to inform the regulatory debate on consumer privacy.

  Keywords: Information Acquisition; information disclosure; Online Privacy; Privacy Regulation;

  Citation:

  Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon, and Andres Hervas-Drane. "Competing with Privacy." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13–085, April 2013.

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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2013 (Revised from original 2012 version)

  Olam: On a New Course

  David E. Bell, Forest Reinhardt and Mary Shelman

  From modest beginnings as a cashew trader in Nigeria, Olam, founded by Indian nationals in 1989, has grown into a leading global agricultural trading company, with annual revenues of $14 billion. The company recently has begun investing in farms and in the production of packaged goods, shifting from its traditional focus on the midstream of the value chain. The case raises questions involving competitive positioning, corporate strategy, sustainable development, and the management of business and political risk.

  Citation:

  Bell, David E., Forest Reinhardt, and Mary Shelman. "Olam: On a New Course." Harvard Business School Case 513-044, April 2013. (Revised from original December 2012 version.)

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