More from the Author

• Teaching Note | HBS Case Collection | 2013 (Revised from original 2007 version)

  Goodyear and the Threat of Government Tire Grading (TN)

  Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Dennis Yao

  Teaching note to 707494.

  Keywords: Rubber Industry; United States;

  Citation:

  Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Dennis Yao. "Goodyear and the Threat of Government Tire Grading (TN)." Harvard Business School Teaching Note 707-537, April 2013. (Revised from original March 2007 version.)

  CiteView DetailsPurchase

  Related

• Background Note | HBS Case Collection | 2012 (Revised from original 2006 version)

  Strategies Beyond the Market

  Felix Oberholzer-Gee and Dennis Yao

  Strategists are not alone in finding failing markets irresistible. Governments and social groups ranging from unions to the World Wildlife Fund also respond to market failures. Governments typically seek to fix failing markets, often with prescriptions of what companies can and cannot do. Activist groups are also out to change corporate behavior, but they rely on social pressure to reach their goals. Many companies that compete successfully in the market environment stumble when it comes to dealing with governments and social groups. Microsoft's near breakup by the U.S. Department of Justice and Wal-Mart's less-than-stellar performance against groups who oppose the retailer's stores are just two of many examples. "Strategies Beyond the Market" overviews an additional set of tools that strategists can use to contend with and exploit forces in a company's government, legal, and social environment.

  Keywords: Markets; Failure; Strategy; Situation or Environment; Social Issues; Government and Politics; Corporate Social Responsibility and Impact;

  Citation:

  Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, and Dennis Yao. "Strategies Beyond the Market." Harvard Business School Background Note 707-469, December 2012. (Revised from original November 2006 version.)

  CiteView DetailsPurchase

  Related

• Working Paper | 2012

  Delay as Agenda Setting

  James J. Anton and Dennis A. Yao

  We examine a multi-issue dynamic decision-making process that involves endogenous commitment. Our primary focus is on actions that impact delay, an extreme form of lack of commitment. Delay is strategically interesting when decision makers with asymmetric preferences face multiple issues and have limited resources for influencing outcomes. A delayed decision becomes part of the subsequent agenda, thereby altering the allocation of resources. The opportunity to delay decisions leads the players to act against their short-run interests when they have strongly asymmetric preferences. Two classes of strategic activity emerge: focusing (reductions in delay) and pinning (increases in delay). We characterize these equilibria, explore how strategic delay alters the benefits to agenda setting, and develop implications for settings where bargaining is feasible. Our analysis applies directly to group, hierarchical, and coalitional decision making settings and illuminates a range of multi-market competitive interactions.

  Citation:

  Anton, James J., and Dennis A. Yao. "Delay as Agenda Setting." Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper Series, No. 135, June 2012.

  CiteView DetailsSSRN

  Related