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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2013 (Revised from original 2011 version)

  Uptake of Malaria Rapid Diagnostic Tests

  Nava Ashraf and Natalie Kindred

  This case describes barriers to adoption of malaria rapid diagnostic tests in Zambia and highlights the importance of understanding end users in promoting product adoption. Rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) are simple, easy-to-use tools that provide a relatively reliable, inexpensive way to confirm diagnoses of malaria. In addition to ensuring that patients' febrile illnesses are properly diagnosed and treated, confirming malaria diagnoses has broader public health benefits, including promoting the efficient use of limited malaria medications and preventing increased resistance to first-line malaria treatment. However, despite the evident potential benefits of RDTs, many clinicians in Zambia do not use them or simply ignore their results. Why don't they trust these tools, and what can be done to improve adoption? Various barriers to uptake and methods to overcome these challenges are explored, with broad implications for technology adoption and health policy. A particular emphasis is placed on the role of behavioral preferences.

  Keywords: Developing Countries and Economies; Health Pandemics; Technology; Health Care and Treatment; Policy; Behavior; Prejudice and Bias; Health Industry; Zambia;

  Citation:

  Ashraf, Nava, and Natalie Kindred. "Uptake of Malaria Rapid Diagnostic Tests." Harvard Business School Case 911-007, February 2013. (Revised from original January 2011 version.)

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• Other Unpublished Work | 2012

  No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks

  Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera and Kelsey Jack

  Citation:

  Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Kelsey Jack. "No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks." September 2012.

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• Working Paper | HBS Working Paper Series | 2012

  No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks

  Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera and Kelsey Jack

  A substantial body of research investigates the effect of pay for performance in firms, yet less is known about the effect of non-financial rewards, especially in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents recruited by a public health organization to sell condoms are randomly allocated to four groups. Agents in the control group are hired as volunteers, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive a small monetary margin on each pack sold, a large margin, and a non-financial reward, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract, and are also the most cost-effective of the four schemes. Second, non-financial rewards leverage intrinsic motivation and, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not appear to crowd it out. Third, the responses to both types of incentives are stronger when their relative value is higher. Indeed, financial rewards are effective at motivating the poorest agents, and non-financial rewards are more effective when the peer group is larger. Overall, the findings demonstrate the power of non-financial rewards to motivate agents in settings where there are limits to the use of financial incentives.

  Keywords: incentives; non-monetary rewards; intrinsic motivation; Mission and Purpose; Research; Social Enterprise; Motivation and Incentives;

  Citation:

  Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Kelsey Jack. "No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 12–008, August 2011. (Revised June 2012, September 2012, October 2012.)

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