Article | National Tax Journal | December 2010

Do Strong Fences Make Strong Neighbors?

by Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala

Abstract

Many features of U.S. tax policy towards multinational firms-including the governing principle of capital export neutrality, the byzantine system of expense allocation, and anti-inversion legislation-reflect the intuition that building "strong fences" around the United States advances American interests. This paper examines the interaction of a strong fences policy with the increasingly important global markets for corporate residence, corporate control, and corporate equities. These markets provide opportunities for entrepreneurs, managers, and investors to circumvent a strong fences policy. The paper provides simple descriptive evidence of the growing importance of these markets and considers the implications for U.S. tax policy.

Keywords: Policy; Taxation; Multinational Firms and Management; Globalized Markets and Industries; Governance Controls; Interests; Opportunities; System; United States;

Format: Print

18 pages

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Citation:

Desai, Mihir, and Dhammika Dharmapala. "Do Strong Fences Make Strong Neighbors?" National Tax Journal 63 (December 2010): 723–740.

Deferral of U.S. taxes on foreign source income is commonly characterized as a subsidy to foreign investment, as reflected in its inclusion among "tax expenditures" and occasional calls for its repeal. This paper analyzes the extent to which tax deferral and other policies inefficiently subsidize U.S. direct investment abroad. Investments are dynamically inefficient if they consistently generate fewer returns to investors than they absorb in new investment funds. From 1982 to 2010, repatriated earnings from foreign affiliates exceeded net capital investments by $1.1 trillion in 2010 dollars; and from 1950 to 2010, repatriated earnings and net interest from foreign affiliates exceeded net equity investments and loans by $2.1 trillion in 2010 dollars. By either measure, cash flows received from abroad exceeded 160% of net investments, implying that foreign investment over these periods was dynamically efficient.

The article argues that U.S. taxation reform should reduce corporate taxes, incorporate an awareness of the global marketplace, and generate revenue-neutral incentives for innovation. According to the article, a reduction in corporate tax rates would be offset by a tax on noncorporate business income and an expansion of taxable income. Topics include tax-avoidance techniques, globalization, repatriation taxes, corporate social responsibility, and U.S. workers. Graphs are included, which compare the U.S. tax rate with other countries.

This paper analyzes the extent to which firms use trade credit to reallocate capital in response to tax incentives. Tax-induced differences in pretax returns encourage the use of trade credit to reallocate capital from firms facing low tax rates to those facing high tax rates. Evidence from the worldwide operations of U.S. multinational firms indicates that affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions use trade credit to lend, whereas those in high-tax jurisdictions use trade credit to borrow: 10% lower local tax rates are associated with net trade credit positions that are 1.4% higher as a fraction of sales. The use of trade credit to get capital out of low-tax, low-return environments is also illustrated by reactions of U.S. firms to the temporary repatriation tax holiday in 2005, when affiliates with positive net trade credit positions were significantly more likely than others to repatriate dividends to parent companies in the United States.

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