Case | HBS Case Collection | 2010 (Revised from original 2008 version)

The Sale of Citigroup's Leveraged Loan Portfolio

by Victoria Ivashina and David S. Scharfstein

Abstract

This case describes the sale of Citigroup's leveraged loan portfolio in 2008 to a group of large private equity funds. The portfolio was sold at a discount given difficulties at the portfolio companies and disruptions in credit markets. The case takes the perspective of a private equity firm evaluating the deal to determine whether buying leveraged loans is a good investment opportunity.

Keywords: Restructuring; Private Equity; Insolvency and Bankruptcy; Credit Derivatives and Swaps; Financial Markets; Investment; Banking Industry; Financial Services Industry;

Format: Print

9 pages

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Citation:

Ivashina, Victoria, and David S. Scharfstein. "The Sale of Citigroup's Leveraged Loan Portfolio." Harvard Business School Case 209-080, March 2010. (Revised from original November 2008 version.)

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