Article | Journal of International Business Studies | September 2009

Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-Listings for Emerging Economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico

by Jordan I. Siegel

Abstract

The last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably. To attract outside resources, these firms must often use external commitments for repayment. Research suggests that a common commitment mechanism is to borrow US securities laws, which involves listing the emerging economy firm's shares on a US exchange. This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment from Mexico to examine the conditions under which forming a strategic alliance with a foreign multinational firm is actually a superior mechanism for ensuring good corporate governance.

Keywords: commitment; inter-organizational relationships; emerging markets; economics; international political economy; Economy; Business Ventures; Information; Mexico;

Citation:

Siegel, Jordan I. "Is There a Better Commitment Mechanism than Cross-Listings for Emerging Economy Firms? Evidence from Mexico." Journal of International Business Studies 40, no. 7 (September 2009): 1171–1191. (The last decade of work in corporate governance has shown that weak legal institutions at the country level hinder firms in emerging economies from accessing finance and technology affordably. To attract outside resources, these firms must often use external commitments for repayment. Research suggests that a common commitment mechanism is to borrow US securities laws, which involves listing the emerging economy firm's shares on a US exchange. This paper uses a quasi-natural experiment from Mexico to examine the conditions under which forming a strategic alliance with a foreign multinational firm is actually a superior mechanism for ensuring good corporate governance.)