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Journal Article
| American Economic Review
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December 2009
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
by
Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth
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Abstract
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tie breaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions;
Secondary Education;
Marketplace Matching;
Performance Efficiency;
Mathematical Methods;
Motivation and Incentives;
Strategy;
Balance and Stability;