Background Note | HBS Case Collection | 2005 (Revised from original 2004 version)

Math for Strategists

Abstract

Great strategists rely heavily on numbers as they go about their work. Offers an overview of the high- and low-brow quantitative tools that students encounter during the Strategy course. The class explores high-brow tools in detail; the focus here is on low-brow calculations. Such calculations come up often in class but because they seem so simple, they get little airtime or explanation. From past class experience, roughly 20% of the students in each section come into the course with the intuition and experience to do these simple calculations themselves. The other 80% understand the calculations after they see them and grasp their value, but don't spot the opportunities to do the math themselves, before class.

Keywords: Mathematical Methods; Strategy;

Format: Print

18 pages

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Citation:

Khanna, Tarun, and Jan W. Rivkin. "Math for Strategists." Harvard Business School Background Note 705-433, April 2005. (Revised from original November 2004 version.)

In this paper, we examine the circumstances under which so-called "independent" directors voice their independent views on public boards in a sample of Chinese firms. First, we ask why independent directors dissent, i.e. how they justify such dissent to public investors. We find that when independent directors dissent, they tend to offer mild, subjective justifications. Overt criticism of the management team is rare. Next, we ask when an independent director is more likely to dissent and who is more likely to dissent. Controlling for firm and board characteristics, we find that independent directors' dissent is associated with breakdown of social ties between the independent director and the board chairperson, who is at the center of the board bureaucracy in China. Dissent is more likely to occur when the chairperson who appointed the independent director has left the board. Dissent also tends to occur at the end of board "games", defined as a 60-day window prior to departure of the board chairperson or departure of the independent director herself. The endgame effect is particularly strong, seeing 27% of the dissent issued at board "endgames" which represents only 4% of independent directors' average tenure. While directors with foreign experience are more likely to dissent, we do not find that academics, accountants and lawyers are significantly more active in dissenting. Lastly, we show that dissent is consequential to the director and the firm. For directors, we show that dissent is significantly associated with the likelihood of exiting the director labor market. For firms, we document an economically and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of -0.97% around announcement of dissent. Although the literature has suggested that dissent might be reflective of diverse viewpoints, and perhaps beneficial in and of itself through reduction of firm variability, we do not find this offsetting beneficial effect to be strong.

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