Article | International Journal of Game Theory | March 2008

Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

by Alvin E. Roth


The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a number of labor market clearinghouses around the world, and have recently been implemented in school choice systems in Boston and New York City. In addition, the study of markets that have failed in ways that can be fixed with centralized mechanisms has led to a deeper understanding of some of the tasks a marketplace needs to accomplish to perform well. In particular, marketplaces work well when they provide thickness to the market, help it deal with the congestion that thickness can bring, and make it safe for participants to act effectively on their preferences. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can have these properties, and this has sometimes allowed failed markets to be reorganized.

Keywords: History; Market Design; Labor; System; Practice; Performance; Theory; Boston; New York (city, NY);


Roth, Alvin E. "Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions." Prepared for Gale's Feast: A Day in Honor of the 85th Birthday of David Gale International Journal of Game Theory 36, nos. 3-4 (March 2008): 537–569.