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• Case | HBS Case Collection | 2012 (Revised from original 2011 version)

  Ganging Up on Cancer: Integrative Research Centers at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (A)

  Heidi K. Gardner, Edo Bedzra and Shereef M. Elnahal

  Dr. Barrett Rollins, Chief Scientific Officer of the Dana Farber Cancer Institute, attempts to engender cross-scientist collaboration by applying project management principles to medical research. The resulting innovation, Integrative Research Centers, are novel in this field and present a substantial challenge to the Institute's culture, which had previously allowed faculty scientists complete autonomy over their research. Center leaders are required to develop a business plan, adhere to agreed-upon performance metrics, and undergo regular progress reviews conducted by a peer-led oversight committee. The Center for Nanotechnology in Cancer, a new but crucial center in the program, has failed to meet almost all of its objectives in the first year. Furthermore, a heated dispute between two faculty members in the center has complicated matters significantly. Rollins is flummoxed by these problems because he thought he had provided resources and clear objectives to all of the centers. He must urgently diagnose the main reason(s) for the center's shortcomings and develop a plan of action so that this center's problems do not undermine the whole initiative toward greater scientific collaboration.

  Keywords: Problems and Challenges; Organizational Change and Adaptation; Change Management; Motivation and Incentives; Employees; Performance Evaluation; Leadership Style; Leadership; Collaborative Innovation and Invention; Innovation and Management;

  Citation:

  Gardner, Heidi K., Edo Bedzra, and Shereef M. Elnahal. "Ganging Up on Cancer: Integrative Research Centers at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute (A)." Harvard Business School Case 412-029, October 2012. (Revised from original September 2011 version.)

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• Article | Review of Financial Studies | June 2012

  A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods

  Jordan I. Siegel and Prithwiraj Choudhury

  One of the most rigorous methodologies in the corporate governance literature uses firms' reactions to industry shocks to characterize the quality of governance. This methodology can produce the wrong answer unless one considers the ways firms compete. Because macro-level shocks reverberate differently at the firm level depending on whether a firm has a cost structure that requires significant adjustment, the quality of governance can only be elucidated accurately analyzing a firm's business strategy and their corporate governance. These differences can help one determine whether the fruits of a positive macro-level shock have been expropriated by insiders. Using the example of Indian firms, we show that an influential finding is reversed when these differences are considered. We further argue that the conventional wisdom about tunneling and business groups will need to be reformulated in light of the data, methodology, and findings presented here.

  Keywords: corporate governance; mergers and acquisitions; business economics; firm organization; firm performance; Groups and Teams; Data and Data Sets;

  Citation:

  Siegel, Jordan I., and Prithwiraj Choudhury. "A Reexamination of Tunneling and Business Groups: New Data and New Methods." Review of Financial Studies 25, no. 6 (June 2012): 1763–1798. (One of the most rigorous methodologies in the corporate governance literature uses firms' reactions to industry shocks to characterize the quality of governance. This methodology can produce the wrong answer unless one considers the ways firms compete. Because macro-level shocks reverberate differently at the firm level depending on whether a firm has a cost structure that requires significant adjustment, the quality of governance can only be elucidated accurately analyzing a firm's business strategy and their corporate governance. These differences can help one determine whether the fruits of a positive macro-level shock have been expropriated by insiders. Using the example of Indian firms, we show that an influential finding is reversed when these differences are considered. We further argue that the conventional wisdom about tunneling and business groups will need to be reformulated in light of the data, methodology, and findings presented here.)

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• Article | JMR, Journal of Marketing Research | April 2012

  The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose

  Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John and George Loewenstein

  Two sets of studies illustrate the comparative nature of disclosure behavior. The first set investigates how divulgence is affected by signals about others' readiness to divulge. Study 1A shows a "herding" effect, such that survey respondents are more willing to divulge sensitive information when told that previous respondents have made sensitive disclosures. We provide evidence of the process underlying this effect and rule out alternative explanations by showing that information on others' propensity to disclose affects respondents' discomfort associated with divulgence (Study 1B) and not their interpretation of the questions (Study 1C). The second set of studies suggests that divulgence is anchored by the initial questions in a survey; people are particularly likely to divulge when questions are presented in decreasing order of intrusiveness. Study 2B suggests that the effect arises by affecting people's judgments of the intrusiveness of the inquiries; Study 2C goes further by showing that the effect is altered when privacy concerns are primed at the outset of the study. This research helps understand how consumers' propensity to disclose is affected by continual streams of requests for personal information and by the equally unavoidable barrage of personal information about others.

  Keywords: Judgments; Surveys; Consumer Behavior; Standards; Corporate Disclosure; Management Practices and Processes;

  Citation:

  Acquisti, Alessandro, Leslie John, and George Loewenstein. "The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose." JMR, Journal of Marketing Research (April 2012).

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