Journal Article | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | June 2008

Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game

by Julio J. Rotemberg

Abstract

I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).

Keywords: Giving and Philanthropy; Game Theory; Mathematical Methods;

Citation:

Rotemberg, Julio J. "Minimally Acceptable Altruism and the Ultimatum Game." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66, nos. 3-4 (June 2008).