More from the Author

• Book | 2013

  Judgment in Managerial Decision Making

  Max Bazerman and D. Moore

  Is your judgment influenced by personal biases? In situations requiring careful judgment, we're all influenced by our own biases to some extent. But, with Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, you can learn how to overcome those biases to make better managerial decisions. The text examines judgment in a variety of organizational contexts and provides practical strategies for changing your decision-making processes and improving these processes so that they become part of your permanent behavior. Throughout, you'll find numerous hands-on decision exercises and examples from the authors' extensive executive training experience that will help you enhance the quality of your managerial judgment. Past editions have been used in top universities, in business schools, and in public policy, psychology, and economics classes. In addition, the text has been widely recognized by practitioners in the world of behavioral finance.

  Keywords: Decision Choices and Conditions; Judgments; Management Practices and Processes; Management Skills; Managerial Roles; Performance Improvement; Prejudice and Bias;

  Citation:

  Bazerman, Max, and D. Moore. Judgment in Managerial Decision Making. 8th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.

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• Chapter | Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution | Forthcoming

  Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality

  Neeru Paharia, Lucas Clayton Coffman and Max Bazerman

  This article compares direct deception with deception via an intermediary in the bargaining context. It describes a growing experimental literature that suggests how perceived ethics surrounding transactions with multiple partners can encourage misbehavior. It is noted that causing harm indirectly through another can protect harm doers. Harm doers are apparently protected from punishment as well. The hypothesis that intermediation reduces punishment runs counter to predictions coming from a model in which solely unfair actions are punished. Experiments are also presented that show a phenomenon about the attribution of responsibility and subsequent blame (and praise) in negotiation and conflict resolution settings. It is believed that by making people more aware of their failure to notice and punish indirect unethical behavior, others can create a world where the use of intermediation will no longer provide harm doers an easy escape from public awareness.

  Keywords: Negotiation Process; Ethics;

  Citation:

  Paharia, Neeru, Lucas Clayton Coffman, and Max Bazerman. "Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality." In Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution, edited by Gary E. Bolton, and Rachel T.A. Croson. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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• Article | Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | 2012

  Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-reports in Comparison to Signing at the End

  L. Shu, N. Mazar, F. Gino, M. Bazerman and D. Ariely

  Many written forms required by businesses and governments rely on honest reporting. Proof of honest intent is typically provided through signature at the end of the document, e.g., tax returns or insurance policy forms. Still, people sometimes cheat to advance their financial self-interests—at great costs to society. We test an easy-to-implement method to discourage dishonesty: signing at the beginning rather than at the end of a self-report, thereby reversing the order of the current practice. Using lab and field experiments, we find that signing before rather than after the opportunity to cheat makes ethics salient when it is needed most and significantly reduces dishonesty.

  Citation:

  Shu, L., N. Mazar, F. Gino, M. Bazerman, and D. Ariely. "Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-reports in Comparison to Signing at the End." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 109, no. 38 (2012): 15197–15200.

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