BOWING BEFORE DUAL GODS:
HOW STRUCTURED FLEXIBILITY SUSTAINS ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY

Wendy K. Smith*
University of Delaware
smithw@udel.edu

Marya L. Besharov*
Cornell University
mlb363@cornell.edu

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* Both authors contributed equally
Organizations increasingly grapple with hybridity – the combination of identities, forms, logics, or other core elements that would conventionally not go together. Despite an expanding literature exploring how organizations engage hybridity in the short term, we still know little about how they sustain dual elements over time. Drawing on in-depth longitudinal data from the first ten years of a successful social enterprise, we induce an empirically grounded model of sustaining hybridity through structured flexibility – the interaction of stable organizational features and adaptive enactment processes. We surface two stable features – paradoxical frames, involving leaders’ cognitive understandings of the two sides of a hybrid as both contradictory and interdependent, and guardrails, consisting of formal structures, leadership expertise, and stakeholder relationships associated with each side – which together facilitate ongoing adaptation in the meanings and practices of dual elements, sustaining both elements over time. Our model of structured flexibility reorients research away from focusing on either stable or adaptive approaches to sustaining hybridity toward understanding their interaction, with implications for scholarship on hybridity, duality, and adaptation more broadly.
In November 2000, Jeremy Hockenstein visited the Angkor Wat temple in Siem Riep, Cambodia. While most tourists marveled at this wonder of the world, Hockenstein was more intrigued by the young, impoverished Cambodians flocking to local internet cafes seeking access to a better life. He wondered what he could do to help. In February, 2001, Hockenstein returned to Cambodia with four friends to explore possibilities. Three months later, they founded Digital Divide Data (DDD), an organization hiring the country’s most disadvantaged citizens into a data entry business, providing them on-the-job training and formal scholarships, and helping them “graduate” into higher paying jobs. Skeptics doubted DDD could sustain social and business demands in one organization, arguing that social impact costs would diminish their competitive edge in a commoditized industry or that financial pressures would force leaders to compromise key aspects of their social mission, such as hiring disadvantaged operators and opening offices in impoverished areas. Yet fifteen years later, DDD operated fives offices, employed over 1,200 people, and had graduated 900 operators into better jobs. DDD also received two prestigious million-dollar awards, from the Skoll and Rockefeller Foundations, to expand its social enterprise model. In his book, *The World is Flat*, Thomas Friedman (2005) described Hockenstein as “one of my favorite social entrepreneurs.”

DDD is not alone in striving to sustain ostensibly incompatible demands within one organization. In recent decades, organizations combining social and business demands have become increasingly common as corporations engage in social responsibility (Margolis and Walsh, 2003) and “conscious capitalism” (Mackey and Sisodia, 2013), charities adopt business practices (Hwang and Powell, 2009), and social entrepreneurs like Hockenstein form new entities to pursue social missions through commercial ventures (Battilana et al., 2012; Smith, Gonin, and Besharov, 2013; Battilana and Lee, 2014). Other organizations combine competing
demands from science and business (Murray, 2010; Powell and Sandholtz, 2012), public and private sector management (Denis, Ferlie, and Van Gestel, 2015; Fossestøl et al., 2015), or state-planned and market economies (Guthrie, 1999; Nee and Opper, 2012). Whether due to strategic choice or environmental constraint, organizations across a wide variety of fields incorporate competing demands at their very core (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).

To understand this phenomenon, scholars have drawn on the concept of organizational hybridity – the combination of identities, forms, or logics that would conventionally not go together (Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck, 2017). Hybridity can benefit organizations by enhancing legitimacy and access to resources (Wry, Lounsbury, and Jennings, 2014) and stimulating creativity and innovation (Dalpiaz, Rindova, and Ravasi, 2016). Yet organizations often struggle to sustain hybridity over time due to tensions between internal subgroups (Glynn, 2000; Battilana and Dorado, 2010) and divergent expectations of varied external stakeholders (Pache and Santos, 2010, 2013a). Existing research focuses on how organizations address these challenges in the short term (e.g., Jay, 2013; Besharov, 2014; Battilana et al., 2015), but shifting power dynamics (Ashforth and Reingen, 2014), environmental changes (Ramus, Vaccaro, and Brusoni, 2016), and persistent tensions (Benson, 1977; Schad et al., 2016) create new challenges in the long term. Addressing these ongoing challenges is critical to sustaining hybridity over long periods of time, yet how organizations do so remains poorly understood.

We explored this question through a 10-year longitudinal study of Digital Divide Data, building theory about how organizations sustain hybridity over time. Our qualitative, inductive analysis shows DDD’s leaders continuously adapting meanings and practices associated with their social and business missions through a dynamic process which sustained both these elements of the hybrid over time. Two stable organizational features facilitated this process:
**paradoxical frames**, which involve leaders’ cognitive understanding of the relationship between the two sides of the hybrid as both contradictory and interdependent, and *guardrails*, which entail formal structures, leadership expertise, and stakeholder relationships associated with each side. Integrating our findings with extant literature, we propose a model of structured flexibility which shows how stable features and adaptive enactment processes interact to sustain hybridity in the long term. Our model reorients hybridity scholarship away from focusing on either stable or adaptive approaches toward understanding the interaction between them, with implications for research on hybridity, duality, and adaptation more broadly.

**ORGANIZATIONAL HYBRIDITY**

Hybridity arises when organizations combine identities, forms, or logics that would conventionally not go together (Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck, 2017). Even as studies recognize dynamics of hybridity at the individual (McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015), relational (Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997; Besharov, 2014) and field levels (Haveman and Rao, 1997; Adler, 2001; Ruef and Patterson, 2009), much of the extant research, and the focus of our study, emphasizes organizational dynamics. Varied sources contribute to hybridity at the organizational level. In some cases, founders’ backgrounds and identities motivate them to proactively create hybrid organizations (Dimitriadis et al., 2017; Wry and York, 2017). In other cases, hybridity stems from unplanned shifts in organizational membership (Zilber, 2002; Delmestri, 2006) or changes in regulatory demands (Christensen and Laegreid, 2011), political context (Nee, 1992), cultural expectations (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005), or resource access (Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Dowell, 2006).

Whether its origins lie in strategic choice, external constraint, or a combination of the two, sustaining hybridity over time offers several potential opportunities. First, maintaining
commitments to multiple identities, forms, or logics can increase organizational legitimacy and access to resources from external constituencies who hold competing expectations, including customers (Smets, Morris, and Greenwood, 2012), professionals (Dunn and Jones, 2010), and the state (Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). For example, nonprofits that engaged in advocacy and service provision gain legitimacy from associating with existing organizations of both types (Minkoff, 2002). Second, tensions between the elements of a hybrid can fuel creative solutions to organizational or societal challenges and result in novel innovations (DiMaggio, 1988; Hsu, Negro, and Peretti, 2012; Jarzabkowski et al., 2013). For example, Jay (2013) finds that leaders’ responses to tensions between multiple logics in a public-private partnership generated new approaches to promoting energy sustainability. Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis (2011) highlight how the social enterprise Aspire spawned a new organizational form for addressing the societal problem of homelessness through commercial business ventures rather than nonprofits.

Yet sustaining hybridity also involves persistent challenges, in part due to conflicts over identity – who the organization is and who its varied internal and external constituents expect it to be (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Gioia et al., 2013). Internally, distinct values and beliefs held by different subgroups create contestation (Pratt and Rafaeli, 1997; Anteby and Wrzesniewski, 2014; Besharov, 2014), which can escalate into ongoing and often intractable conflict (Fiol, Pratt, and O’Connor, 2009; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). For example, Glynn (2000) describes how Atlanta Symphony Orchestra musicians and administrators formed distinct subgroups, each one holding a different understanding of the organization’s identity – either as an artistic or economic entity, respectively. These differences endured, creating ongoing tensions and conflict that became particularly challenging during salary negotiations. Hybridity also engenders competing expectations from external stakeholder groups who view the organization through the
lens of seemingly incompatible logics or social categories (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005; Hsu, 2006). Social enterprises, for example, confront business constituencies who value managerial expertise and financial performance as well as non-profit stakeholders who primarily care about social mission and impact (Pache and Santos, 2013a).

Two primary streams of research offer insight into short-term responses to the challenges of hybridity. One stream of work emphasizes organization-level strategies, structures, and practices that can mitigate conflict in hybrids. For example, Battilana and Dorado (2010) highlight the role of hiring and socialization. They find that microfinance organizations, which combine banking and development logics, can avoid conflict by hiring inexperienced employees and socializing them to focus on operational performance, rather than hiring former bankers or social workers who bring valuable experience but form competing subgroups. Pache and Santos (2013a) show how French social enterprises accommodate seemingly incompatible demands by developing structures and practices that “selectively couple” aspects of the social welfare logic with those of the commercial logic. Studying the same context, Battilana and colleagues (2015) find that “spaces of negotiation” mitigate conflict by enabling employees responsible for different sides of competing demands interact and work through disagreements. Other studies emphasize formalization and collaboration (Ramus, Vaccaro, and Brusoni, 2016), as well as sensemaking to navigate different understandings of performance (Jay, 2013).

A second stream of work surfaces group and individual dynamics of hybridity. For example, Ashforth and Reingen (2014) show how a natural foods cooperative attended to both the idealistic and pragmatic sides of its hybrid identity through oscillating shifts in decisions and power between subgroups associated with each side, as well as rituals to maintain and repair relationships. In another study of a natural foods retailer, Besharov (2014) unpacks how
“pluralist” managers mitigate conflict between frontline workers who value either the social or commercial sides of the hybrid but not both. At the individual level, studies detail how members flexibly draw from and enact multiple logics in different spaces and situations rather than rigidly adhering to just one logic (McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015).

While these two streams of research identify short-term responses to hybridity, challenges persist in the long term due to changing organizational dynamics and environmental conditions, as well as ongoing tensions between dual elements. For example, Ashforth and Reingen (2014) note that power shifts and dialectical relationships between idealists and pragmatists in the natural foods cooperative fostered tensions for at least a year following their 23 months of active data collection. External forces also create continued challenges, due to changes in stakeholders’ expectations and relative power (Townley, 2002; Dunn and Jones, 2010) and shifts in the market or social problem an organization seeks to address (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Smets, Morris, and Greenwood, 2012). Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis’ (2011) research suggests that if organizations do not adapt in response to such dynamics, they risk failure. Thus, organizations must evolve over the long term to sustain hybridity. Yet we lack an in-depth understanding of the processes involved in doing so. As Ramus and colleagues (2016) emphasize, explaining these dynamics would require “an ethnographic, longitudinal approach that explores how organizations’ members make sense of organizational tensions.” Our study of DDD takes a longitudinal approach to addressing this critical question of how organizations sustain hybridity over time.

**METHODS**

To investigate our research question, we used an inductive, single case research design appropriate for building theory about complex processes (Edmondson and McManus, 2007;
Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013). Our case study, Digital Divide Data, is an “unusually revelatory” context which enables us to surface insights that might not be as visible in other more “typical” cases (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Siggelkow, 2007; Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016). DDD’s social and business missions were both core to the organization yet they were seemingly incompatible, a form of hybridity that usually fosters extreme conflict and can lead to mission drift or organizational demise (Besharov and Smith, 2014). Despite these bleak expectations from the literature, DDD sustained its dual missions over the entire ten-year period of our study and has continued to thrive as a hybrid long after our investigation ended.

DDD launched in 2001 as a nonprofit information technology outsourcing business helping disadvantaged Southeast Asians access better economic futures through employment and on-the-job training as well as educational scholarships, health care, and other social benefits. When our in-depth data collection ended in 2010, DDD employed 500 computer operators and had “graduated” more than 400 into higher paying jobs, either within DDD or at an external organization. More than half of DDD’s operators sustained themselves economically while also contributing funds to support their family members. As a business, DDD earned $2 million in revenues and fully covered operational costs, while continuing to attract grants and donations to further expand its social mission. In 2015, five years after our study ended, these outcomes continued, with DDD earning over $11 million in revenues, employing over 1,200 people across five locations, and graduating a cumulative total of 900 employees, each earning an average of $175,000 more over their lifetime, roughly eight times the amount earned by comparable peers.

**Data Collection**

We collected multiple sources of data covering DDD’s first 10 years, giving us visibility into long-term organizational dynamics and allowing us to explore our phenomenon by both
“following forward” and “tracing backwards” (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010). We became aware of DDD at its inception, as one of the authors was a colleague and friend of the founder. This author conducted an initial set of interviews and observations in DDD’s early years (2000-2004), including travelling to Cambodia to interview local managers and operators. Collaboratively, both authors collected additional data from 2005 through 2010. During that time, one author took a second trip to Cambodia. These interviews and observations allowed us to follow events forward as they unfolded (Langley et al., 2013). To trace events backwards, we drew on over 3,000 archival documents. Table 1 summarizes the data we analyzed.

Interviews. We conducted 34 semi-structured interviews with the founder/CEO, managers, board members, operators, and an external advisor. Early insights from our data collection indicated that tensions between DDD’s dual missions primarily arose in strategic issues confronting senior leaders, in contrast to other studies of hybridity in which tensions manifest primarily among frontline workers (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Ashforth and Reingen, 2014; Besharov, 2014). We therefore focused our inquiry and subsequent interviews on senior leaders (managers and board members), using discussions with frontline operators and the external advisor to triangulate our emerging insights. To understand how DDD sustained hybridity, we asked interviewees to reflect on DDD’s social and business missions, the relationship between them, and practices for enacting them. To increase data trustworthiness, we adopted a courtroom interviewing style (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007), asking informants to describe specific, concrete events and how they unfolded over time. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. We recorded and transcribed 23 interviews. For the others, we took
extensive notes in real time, typed them within 24 hours, and when possible, compared notes across authors to increase accuracy.

**Observation.** One author travelled to Cambodia in 2004 and 2010 for five days each, observing DDD’s operations, meeting with local informants, and attending a three-day board meeting. Both authors observed a two-day board meeting and a one-day management retreat in North America in 2009-10. We took extensive notes at all meetings and typed them within 24 hours. For the North American meetings, we compared notes across authors to increase accuracy.

**Archival documents.** A particular strength of our data is over 3,000 archival documents. The founder gave us all the documents on his computer beginning with DDD’s origins during his November 2000 trip to Siem Riep. These materials include business plans, grant applications, diary entries, and personal correspondence between DDD’s leaders. We also had agendas and minutes for all board meetings from the organization’s founding through 2010. We categorized and reviewed all 3,000 documents, relying primarily on 295 documents that provided the most relevant and detailed insight into our research question (see Table 1).

**Data Analysis**

We adopted prescribed analytical techniques to move from raw data to theoretical interpretations, iterating between data collection, analysis, and existing literature to generate insights (Langley, 1999; Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2013; Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016; Gehman et al., 2017). While this process was not linear, for clarity we delineate three main steps in our analysis.

We first developed a rich case study that integrated the various sources of data. The case included a timeline of events, a list of stakeholders including managers, board members, and partner organizations, and a thick description of how events unfolded over time (Langley, 1999).
This step surfaced multiple conceptual lenses for interpreting DDD’s social and business missions. We observed DDD’s external stakeholders adhering to different institutional logics – socially constructed patterns of beliefs and practices that shape cognition and guide action (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury, 2012). We further noted that DDD combined aspects of multiple organizational forms – archetypal sets of structures and practices that are taken-for-granted as appropriate ways of organizing (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, 1993). Yet the data most strongly pointed toward DDD’s social and business missions as informing its identity – the central, enduring, and distinctive features that define who an organization is and what it does (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Gioia et al., 2013). In particular, the case revealed how insiders and outsiders understood DDD as having both a utilitarian identity as a business and a normative identity as a social mission-driven organization (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Foreman and Whetten, 2002; Ashforth and Reingen, 2014). This observation led us to explore how DDD’s dual missions created tensions around the organization’s identity and how leaders responded to and addressed these tensions.

Even as we observed DDD’s social and business missions as central to its identity, we noted continual shifts in how leaders enacted these missions. Leaders repeatedly reinterpreted the meaning of their dual missions and experimented with varied operational practices associated with different meanings. Yet leaders also maintained and strengthened their commitment to both missions. Our curiosity about the juxtaposition between ongoing adaptation in meanings and practices and stability in commitments led us to focus in more depth on what shifted and what remained stable over time. Re-examining the case, we found that major shifts in meanings and practices unfolded in three eras over the 10-year time period. From 2001 to 2004, leaders focused on helping the most disadvantaged citizens in Southeast Asia by identifying
underprivileged groups, hiring them to work in DDD’s fledgling IT outsourcing business, and supporting their further education and skill development. Between 2005 and 2008, leaders shifted their focus toward building a sustainable business, with the belief that they could best help people advance by ensuring the business they worked in was successful. In 2009 and 2010, leaders adapted meanings and practices again to expand DDD’s social impact while remaining operationally sustainable. These observations led us to focus our subsequent analyses not only on adaptation in meanings and practices within each era, but also on how this adaptation enabled broader shifts in the relative emphasis on the social and business missions over time.

In the second stage of the analysis, we returned to the raw data to unpack the processes associated with adaptation in meanings and practices. Building on our initial insights, we adopted a “temporal bracketing” technique (Langley, 1999), splitting our data into the three eras. We openly coded data within each era, asking how DDD senior leaders understood meanings and enacted practices associated with each of their missions. By comparing codes within and across eras (Eisenhardt, 1989), we identified common empirical themes. We iterated among empirical themes and between the themes and relevant literature in order to move from first-order themes to second-order conceptual categories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gioia et al., 2013). Where relevant, we drew on constructs from the literature to label our conceptual categories. For example, as noted above, we found that leaders interpreted and reinterpreted DDD’s social and business missions, and that these interpretations informed leaders’ sense of “who we are” as an organization. Drawing on existing literature on organizational identity labels and meanings (Gioia, Schultz, and Corley, 2000), we created the conceptual category of “(re)interpreting identity meaning” to capture these ongoing interpretive shifts.
In addition, in each era, we noticed that leaders’ cognitive framing of the relationship between the social and business missions seemed to inform how they managed the two missions. At a 2009 North American management retreat that we attended, the managers exclaimed: “DDD is essentially a paradox.” Based on our observations and this exclamation, we drew on the paradox literature as we further explored leaders’ framing of DDD’s dual missions, noting that leaders described the relationship between the two missions as both contradictory – i.e., distinct and prescribing alternative courses of action – and interdependent – i.e., synergistic and both necessary for long-term success (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Guided by the literature, we capture this understanding with the conceptual category of “paradoxical frames” (Smith and Tushman, 2005; Miron-Spektor, Erez, and Naveh, 2011). Another conceptual category, “guardrails,” emerged from three distinct empirical themes involving formal organizational structures, individual leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships associated with each mission, all three of which served a similar function: they acted as guardians of each mission, monitoring whether practices emphasized one mission at the expense of the other.

In the third and final phase of analysis, we examined the relationships between conceptual categories and integrated existing literature to build a theoretical model explaining how and why categories were related (Whetten, 1989). This analysis led us to understand one set of conceptual categories as key components of an adaptive “enactment process” through which leaders actively surface tensions and shift the meanings and practices associated with dual missions, and to identify two other conceptual categories as stable “enabling features” facilitating ongoing adaptation.

Throughout the data collection and analysis process, we took steps to ensure the trustworthiness of our findings. First, we became enmeshed with the organization over time,
allowing us to gain greater insight into subtle details (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Second, we used varied sources of data and interviewed informants at multiple organizational levels to triangulate perspectives (Jick, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989). Third, combining real time and retrospective data allowed us to gain more robust insights across the 10-year time period and minimized bias from any single perspective (Leonard-Barton, 1990; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Fourth, we wrote thick descriptions and shared them with key informants in DDD to integrate various sources of data, capture the rich context over time, and ensure the quality of our analysis (Langley, 2007). Finally, we sought feedback from colleagues on our emergent constructs and model to increase the reliability and validity of our interpretations (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

To aid the reader in following our analytical process, Figure 1 shows how we moved from empirical themes to conceptual categories and aggregate dimensions. To support the findings narrative, Table 2 summarizes the data by era. Table 3 offers additional “proof quotes” for each of our conceptual categories (Pratt, 2008).

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SUSTAINING HYBRIDITY AT DIGITAL DIVIDE DATA

Helping the Most Disadvantaged (2001-2004)

Paradoxical Frames. Jeremy Hockenstein visited the Angkor Wat temple in November 2000. As he recalled, the Cambodian people, not the temple, captured his attention and planted the seeds for DDD:

It was the people I met who were most striking. I saw internet cafes and English schools on many street corners. My taxi driver spent 25% of his $2 daily income on English lessons each morning in the belief that it would help create a better future for his family. I met leaders of local NGOs who had started with no outside help and had organized subsidized computer and English courses for poor Cambodians. In talking to these people, however, I learned that most of the graduates of the programs could not find jobs, as there were not many opportunities. The few that existed rarely went to disabled and disadvantaged people… I realized then that I had the opportunity and the obligation to do something to help the Cambodians I met rebuild [their economy after the consequence of genocide]. Digital Divide Data was born. (Grant2)
For Hockenstein, the plight of Cambodians reflected his own heritage, inspiring him to want to help: “My mother was born in a concentration camp [in World War II]… so there was a certain resonance, a connection for Jews because of the shared bond of genocide” (Media2). Hockenstein had worked toward achieving social missions as an international leader of a youth group during high school and later as a director in a nonprofit organization. Yet as the quotation above indicates, he observed the limitations of nonprofit training programs for helping Cambodians find jobs. Drawing on his recently acquired MBA as well as management consulting experience, he envisioned pursuing a social mission through a business.

Back in the United States, Hockenstein convinced four friends – two with a business background and two with a social mission orientation – to travel to Cambodia with him the following February to explore possibilities. The group volunteered at a local nonprofit training program, observing participants’ frustrations of not being able to find a job that used their new skills, and they talked with Cambodians who described large non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as wealthy, corrupt, and ineffective. Armed with these experiences and their nonprofit and business backgrounds, the group developed a funding proposal to combine nonprofit and business approaches in a single organization that would “create well-paying technology related jobs” in order to help people move out of poverty (Grant1). As this proposal reflects, the founders understood DDD’s social and business missions as relying on and informing one another. One of the first managers hired in Asia highlighted this interdependence, noting how operators could learn new skills on the job that ultimately improved their life chances: “If they try harder, they know that they will be able to do better in their future. If they know more English, and know more computer skills, then they should be able to get a better job after DDD” (M7).
Yet leaders also recognized distinctions and contradictions between their missions. For example, their initial funding proposal articulated separate and contradictory priorities associated with running a business and helping people:

Our first priority is providing high-quality services and therefore we require the best talent Cambodia has to offer; we believe this is essential in order to establish a strong reputation for excellence that will in turn bring more work to the country over time… Beyond this requirement, we would like to focus on individuals who, without our intervention, would have difficulty gaining well-paying jobs and joining the global economy. (Grant1)

The founders’ interactions with the media further illustrate their paradoxical frames – leaders’ understanding of DDD’s dual missions as contradictory and interdependent. In the early 2000s, news articles wrote about business as “part of the problem” rather than a potential solution to societal ills (Finder, 2005). Consistent with this perspective on social and business missions as adversarial, the Boston Globe ran a story in 2001 criticizing DDD for “exploiting low-wage, Third World workers as a source of cheap labor” by paying them only $.40/hour (Media1). Responding to the story with a letter to the editor, Hockenstein argued that DDD’s business could both generate profits and benefit their operators and the Cambodian economy, not just one or the other as the article implied.

Surfacing Strategic Tensions. As the co-founders launched DDD, they faced tensions around where to locate their first office and who to hire, with their social and business missions entailing seemingly contradictory approaches. Across the first three years, leaders actively surfaced and discussed these tensions. One of DDD’s early managers noted: “We always had a healthy debate between the social enterprise and business” (M34).

First, they grappled with where to locate their office. Over 80% of Cambodia’s population lived in impoverished rural villages disconnected from the global economy (World Bank). In their initial business plan, the founders described a vision to open offices in these villages, where they perceived the greatest need for economic development:
Our ultimate vision is to find a way to help rural villagers – in Cambodia and then beyond – to earn incomes through providing IT-related services to foreign companies. While we recognize that entrepreneurs are currently establishing data entry facilities in developing countries, we do not know of any attempts to do this in rural villages. We believe that it is necessary to establish a philanthropic entity which will ensure that the profits from this project are used to benefit the workers and village community. (BusinessPlan1)

Yet Cambodia’s two main cities – Phnom Penh, the capital city and commercial center, and Battambang, a smaller urban center – offered greater access to key resources for operating a viable business such as electricity, transportation, and the internet. Leaders decided to locate their first office in Phnom Penh to take advantage of these resources, but they continued to explore and debate rural expansion. A July 2001 announcement stated that “we plan to eventually expand to more rural settings” (Communication1), and the first board meeting in February 2002 included a discussion of “branch office plans” (Board1).

Second, the founders faced tensions around who to hire. Few candidates fit both criteria of being “the best talent Cambodia had to offer” and the “most disadvantaged” (BusinessPlan1). People from DDD’s target disadvantaged groups – orphans, rural villagers, women rescued from sex trafficking, and the physically handicapped – often left school at a young age to earn money and had limited English and computer skills. One manager noted that initial applicants typed approximately eight words per minute and knew very little about technology (M07). Another manager described many late nights in DDD’s early days redoing work from operators who did not even know the basics of technology, such as how to save their files (M34).

Interpreting Identity Meaning. As they grappled with these strategic tensions, the founders clarified who they were and what they did as an organization. DDD was initially one of many initiatives the founders envisioned to help disadvantaged Cambodians, and it was formally launched as a project within an umbrella organization called the Follow Your Dream. Consistent with broader understandings of social enterprise during this time period as an “entrepreneurial,
largely nonprofit” activity (Hunt, 2000), the founders noted in their first client proposal that “DDD is a nonprofit, which ensures profits go directly to poor people and supports our commitment to excellent working conditions (living wage)” (Client1). They further described DDD as helping “Cambodians from impoverished backgrounds, women (particularly those who are vulnerable to being drawn into sex-related jobs), [and] Cambodians who have lost legs to land mines (or have other disabilities)” (BusinessPlan1). In pitching their idea to funders, they emphasized that they would reach these populations and “connect underprivileged Cambodians to the global economy” by focusing on data entry projects requiring limited skills (Grant4).

These aspirations and identity claims, embedded within the Follow Your Dream, suggest leaders understood DDD as a social endeavor to help the most disadvantaged people in Southeast Asia “follow their dreams” through employment.

**Experimenting with Practices.** In addressing strategic tensions, the founders not only clarified their interpretation of DDD’s identity, they also experimented with different operational practices, without making extensive financial or cognitive commitments to any one of them. Responding to growth tensions, leaders continued to explore what they eventually called their “thatched hut dream” (M34) of operating in rural villages, while also investigating more urban locations. In February 2003, an American manager in Cambodia and the board chair conducted a feasibility trip to rural villages to explore opening an office there. Leaders also conducted feasibility trips to the cities of Battambang, Cambodia and Vientiane, Laos. To further explore Battambang, DDD piloted a partnership with Cambodia Business Integrated Rural Development, an NGO, to operate a temporary office out of rented space in the city. In August 2003, DDD opened its own office in Battambang, and in December, they opened one in Vientiane. Neither of these locations directly realized leaders’ “thatched hut dream,” but they fulfilled DDD’s social
mission in other ways. Battambang served as an urban center for nearby rural villages and allowed DDD to hire people from these locations. Laos was similar to Cambodia in its economic challenges and demonstrated “a clear need for the kind of job creation program that DDD offers” (InternalAnalysis6). Thus, even as DDD never opened a rural village office, leaders’ approach to growth prioritized expansion to spread the social mission to new locations where they could reach more impoverished people.

To experiment with hiring practices, the founders partnered with nonprofits that trained disadvantaged citizens. Struggling to find people who were both skilled and disadvantaged, they started working with NGOs that offered job training to disadvantaged citizens. DDD secured grants to support customized technology classes at the NGOs and then hired the most talented graduates from these programs. They first collaborated with Cambodian Volunteers for Community Development (CVCD) and based on the success of this program, they formed additional partnerships. For example, leaders obtained a grant from the United States Agency for International Development to train women rescued from sex trafficking in partnership with the Cambodian Women’s Crisis Center (CWCC), and hired 18 women from this program in 2003-4. These programs were intended to develop the skills of disadvantaged populations, but as DDD’s Cambodian HR manager noted, over time hiring decisions ended up prioritizing disadvantage:

I pick out the priority ones [to hire]. The disabled as a priority, or the orphans who are living at the Temple or Pagoda. And then I look at the rural migrants from the province. I look at the statistics in DDD and how many are from each province. So I have to balance. I look at their background and their family situation, and I have to make a short list… We don’t care about their skills or experience. When we get the new employees, we must train them for three months to use our software and other processes that we use. (M06)

**Guardrails.** As they experimented with practices, leaders also developed expertise, external relationships, and formal structures that eventually came to serve as stewards of their
social and business missions. We label these features “guardrails” because, similar to those on a road, they kept DDD from veering too far toward one mission.

Between 2001 and 2004, DDD engaged managers and board members with expertise in for-profit and nonprofit organizations. The co-founders included two business leaders and two social workers. Among the two initial expatriate leaders in the Phnom Penh office, one had worked in banking and the other had worked for NGOs. Similarly, among the first two local Cambodian leaders, one had been an entrepreneur and the other had NGO experience. The board of directors, established in 2004, likewise included people with business backgrounds, such as the former leader of a multi-million dollar business unit of a large public company in the US, as well as people with nonprofit experience, including a senior leader from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a division of the World Bank that specialized in supporting developing regions. In addition, as leaders established formal structures, they tasked the HR manager with primary responsibility for the social mission, while the general manager of each office focused mainly on business operations.

Leaders further built relationships with for-profit and nonprofit external stakeholders. They forged a partnership with Cyberdata, an Indian data outsourcing firm that helped DDD leaders learn the operational aspects of the outsourcing business. Cyberdata’s CEO sat on DDD’s initial advisory board, and leaders maintained a relationship with the firm over time, sharing work when client needs surpassed DDD operators’ capabilities. The co-founders also invited several nonprofit leaders to serve on the advisory board, including the Executive Director of CVCD, the training NGO with which DDD partnered in Cambodia.

**Bumping Up.** In 2004, stewards of the business mission created a moment of “bumping up,” raising concerns about hiring and growth practices that emphasized the social mission and
threatened DDD’s financial and operational viability. The General Manager in Phnom Penh questioned the efficacy of DDD’s hiring practices, noting particular problems with the women rescued from sex trafficking:

We have some problem with women who are from the [women’s training program]. They are very low education and skills, most are in bad mood. They are hardly improve English, computer, speed, etc. These make our income low too (-7%). (Board2)

The newly hired North American VP of Sales and Business Solutions, who held an MBA and had a business background, expressed ongoing frustration about project timeliness and quality due to operators’ low skills, which limited DDD’s ability to successfully compete for clients. Others raised concerns about growth. After learning more about rural locations, the board chair noted that their “thatched hut dream might actually be a thatched hut nightmare” (B09).

Concerns about financial viability peaked at the October 2004 board meeting, when a new board member who managed a multi-million dollar business reviewed DDD’s finances and cautioned that their inspiring social mission would not compensate for a dire financial situation:

[DDD] had good support from the World Bank and IFC for considerable funding. They won a prize through the IFC that gave them access to both the money and also some pretty good advice… [The founder] with his magnetic personality attracted a lot of really bright people, young people often times with very little experience, who were willing to work for almost nothing and would agree to go work in Cambodia for even less. But… I went to a board meeting where they presented some financial reports… and being somewhat experienced in the financial end of the world [I evaluated them] operationally as a business, and I said do you realize this company is bankrupt in less than three-months. That was a surprise to them. Bankrupt meaning they were out of cash, and they had no cash coming in. (B19, emphasis ours)

Building a Sustainable Business (2005-2008)

Paradoxical Frames. In order to fulfill its dual missions, DDD needed to address the financial viability concerns raised in 2004. Leaders’ understanding of the relationship between the two missions informed how they grappled with this challenge. The founders still recognized contradictions, with Hockenstein noting that “managing a social mission and keeping costs down – those can be in conflict” (C08). Yet they also continued to treat the missions as integrated,
describing DDD as a “nonprofit company.” Hockenstein explained: “We think of profitability and sustainability as a means to attain our social mission. It is through our own profitability that we will have the resources to continue to create opportunities in Cambodia” (C08).

Between 2005 and 2008, this paradoxical frame spread to other senior managers and board members. While many of these individuals had nonprofit or business backgrounds, they joined DDD because it combined the two. A new board member explained:

DDD has a sustainable business plan over time. They weren't just asking for donations for their operating expenses but rather for growth, and for [educational] scholarships, and [they] had a pretty sound business mission for long-term sustainability. That is what attracted me to it, the combination of a true business and figuring out how to be competitive in a for-profit world with this nonprofit with a social mission. (B19)

Similarly, the general manager of the Vientiane office, a recent MBA graduate, described DDD’s unique approach of pursuing a social mission through a business as motivation to take the job: “I wanted a job that I can use my business knowledge and also help society…We don’t have social enterprise in Laos, but I just told my heart I didn’t want to have to wait” (M07). These leaders were committed to pursuing social and business missions together in a single organization, even as they recognized trade-offs and tensions between them. Another new board member explained:

Everybody gets both sides, otherwise they wouldn't be asked to be on the board. Some people are sort of hard-nosed business guys, but it's all clearly understood… Both missions have to be served. One mission may have primacy at certain times, and one may have to have it at others, but both have to be served at all times.” (B20)

Leaders who valued only one mission left the organization. For example, in 2005, the general manager of the Phnom Penh office was asked to resign after he repeatedly prioritized efficiency over operator development.

**Surfacing Strategic Tensions.** Committed to their dual missions as both interdependent and contradictory, leaders did not abandon the social mission to focus on the business when operational and financial challenges arose. Instead, they actively grappled with tensions around how to improve business performance while maintaining their social mission. First, leaders
continued to debate who to hire as operators. DDD still partnered with NGOs in Cambodia to hire graduates of their training programs, but there were few potential partners in Laos, as the NGO sector was weak due to public skepticism. The Laos general manager experimented with internal training and with hiring more skilled college graduates, reasoning that in Laos even college graduates could be disadvantaged. This approach raised a question that DDD leaders active debated: should they hire university students more broadly? One board member noted: “I’m not sure how important it is for us to primarily hire from disadvantaged populations. I think growth may require expanding our hiring pool. I think we may soon strip the supply of ‘trained’ disadvantaged youth… and also we may need folks with stronger education and skills to build this kind of business” (Board3). Yet debate ensued, as other leaders remained committed to hiring the most disadvantaged.

Second, leaders grappled with new tensions about managerial hiring. As DDD grew in size, they needed more middle and senior managers. They could hire expatriates who had the requisite skills and experience for these roles, but leaders worried whether doing so aligned with their social mission. As one board member noted:

> How do we balance building capacity of local staff in Cambodia and Laos versus bringing in talent from outside of the country? … If we bring in an American or Singaporean to come in and be a senior manager in the organization and be there in a sort of permanent long-term staff [role], I think that it, to some extent, goes against our mission of how are we building capacity of people in Cambodia and Laos and potentially other developing countries to do this kind of work. (B23)

Leaders considered promoting operators or hiring locals who would not otherwise have management opportunities, but they struggled to find qualified individuals. A 2006 board packet stated: “The board is concerned that we have shallow management in every area” (Board6).

Leaders also surfaced new tensions about growing the organization. Whereas debates about growth previously centered on urban versus rural locations, this tension had receded by 2005, as experimentation convinced leaders that rural locations might not only diminish their
business efficiency but also lead to some detrimental social consequences (InternalAnalysis5). They concluded that urban locations could fulfill the social as well as the business mission, especially if DDD hired operators from rural locations who had relocated to the city. Yet leaders now faced and grappled with tensions about how quickly to expand. Opening two new offices within the first three years had enabled leaders to scale DDD’s social mission but also created operational challenges. At the March 2005 board meeting, they debated slowing growth to focus on improving profitability or expanding to additional locations to further scale DDD’s social impact and demonstrate the replicability of their model (Board3).

**Reinterpreting Identity Meaning.** In responding to these tensions, leaders revisited questions of “who we are” and “what we do” as an organization. Leaders had already started to shift their understanding of DDD’s identity, describing DDD as a “nonprofit business” (BusinessPlan2) and officially changing the organization’s name from the Follow Your Dream to Digital Divide Data in 2004. The formal vision and mission statements leaders adopted that year further reflect their emerging interpretation of DDD as a nonprofit-business hybrid with a mission to “provide growth opportunities for our staff and high-quality services to our customers through sustainable technology-related enterprises” (Board1). Following the October 2004 meeting, the board chair sent out a memo to the board explaining that “most of our time in our [next] board meeting will be spent clarifying DDD’s mission and social goals” (Board3). He invited reflections by email and used these responses to inform the conversation at the March 2005 board meeting. Noting that DDD’s dual missions were “understood by many of us in different ways,” the board chair identified five alternative meanings, which he used to launch the discussion at the meeting:

1. *Most disadvantaged:* Create opportunities for the most disadvantaged, especially employing and providing education for young people with disabilities, orphans, abused women, and the very poor.
2. Private sector development: Strengthen economic development in Cambodia and Laos, especially preparing young people to take on leadership roles in the IT sector.
3. Guaranteed employment: Promise to employ our operators until they are ready to move on, to ensure ongoing support for their education and their families.
4. Rural development: Create jobs and opportunities in rural areas, such as Battambang.
5. Expansion to other countries: Bring DDD to other countries such as Vietnam (Board3)

Leaders’ four-hour conversation about these alternatives concluded with a shared understanding that their primary goal was to build a sustainable business “with the objective of creating opportunities for the disadvantaged encompassed within that” (Board4). This marked an important shift in how leaders understood DDD’s identity: they clarified that their social mission did not imply hiring just because someone needed help and that their business mission entailed running a viable business that could cover its costs. As a result, DDD would focus on helping disadvantaged people who also enabled them to run a viable business.

Discussions about the meaning of DDD’s identity continued at the next board meeting in October 2005, when another board member facilitated a conversation about “What does it mean to be a social enterprise” and “What is DDD right now (in terms of a business and NGO)?” (Board5). Yet even as their interpretations of the social and business missions continued to evolve, leaders remained committed to both missions as defining features of who they were as an organization. As the board chair explained in 2006, DDD was a “company,” but one committed to helping people: “Jeremy and I need to make a living, but we can make a living in a lot of ways. The reason that we are in this is because we see this as an opportunity to help people out of poverty… We don’t want to just be another company” (B09).

Experimenting with Practices. As leaders continued to reinterpret DDD’s identity, they also experimented with new hiring and growth practices. In 2007, DDD developed a partnership with Center for Information Systems Training (CIST), a nonprofit whose employees traversed Cambodia, giving aptitude tests to 12th graders that assessed their skills and conducting “social
investigations” that assessed their disadvantage by asking questions such as how many sheep and goats their family kept and whether they owned a television. CIST invited people who were both extremely disadvantaged and highly skilled to attend a training program, and DDD hired operators from this program. This partnership helped DDD shift away from hiring based on explicit quotas for disabled people, orphans, rural migrants, and abused women irrespective of their skills, to instead hiring for both disadvantage and skill. The partnership further addressed DDD’s goal of supporting rural villages, as CIST found many potential operators from remote areas of the country who would ultimately send part of their wages back to their families.

Leaders also experimented with practices to address middle and senior manager hiring tensions. Up to this point, DDD’s model was to train operators and then help them “graduate” into higher paying jobs outside of DDD. However, as Hockenstein joked, “It seemed like it was a great idea to graduate all our employees... until we realized that we would be graduating all our employees [and losing their talent and experience]” (C35). As an alternative, leaders explored ways to prepare high performing operators to “graduate” into internal management positions. In 2007, DDD partnered with an American business school to offer a mini-MBA program for middle managers in Asia (Board9). Working in partnership with an Indian data services firm called Datamation, leaders also developed “Sustainable Partnership for Upscaling and Replicating IT-Enabled Services Businesses” (SPURS) to train internal DDD managers as well as outsiders seeking to start their own “impact sourcing” organizations. This program not only helped DDD retain operators and develop local managerial talent; it also helped them impact more people without directly employing them. As the initial proposal explained:

[SPURS] will provide training, including both skills training and hands-on experience, in operating an IT-services business to individuals nominated by a host organization in a developing country. The objective of the Partnership is for those individuals to return to their home country and start a successful IT services business... [DDD and Datamation] will provide a minimum of 10 hours per week classroom training in topics such as operations, accounting and financial
management, sales and marketing, pricing, human resources management… 30 hours per week of hand-on management experience… mentoring… as well as a follow up site visit (Board6).

DDD piloted SPURS with seven DDD junior managers and two people from Sri Lanka who returned to their home country after the training to replicate the DDD model.

To address tensions about how quickly to grow, leaders tried slowing the pace of expansion, committing in 2005 to not open any new offices for several years. Yet they continued exploring how to scale DDD’s social mission. In 2006, senior managers brought to the board a proposal for “Replicating Digital Divide Data Worldwide”:

Building on our success, the leadership of DDD proposes to take on an ambitious goal for our next 5 years: expanding DDD to 10 countries employing over 2,000 people. We plan to do this by creating the DDD Global Network. This network will be a set of sustainable social enterprises in developing countries providing socially responsible outsourcing services. Building on DDD’s current service offering of digitization, academic/NGO, and business process outsourcing, the new enterprises will specialize in offering different services. (Board8)

The proposal considered several ways to build a global network, noting: “We would like to experiment with some alternatives to the ‘owned and operated model.’” Possibilities included a joint venture approach in which DDD would partner with another organization to open an office in a new country and an affiliate model in which a local organization would pay a fee to access DDD’s brand, sales and marketing staff, and management training (Board8).

**Guardrails.** Between 2005 and 2008 leaders sought to strengthen leadership expertise and formal structures associated with each mission. Given DDD’s previous business challenges, they added board members and senior managers who could advise them on financial and operational issues. As one of the co-founders noted: “The social mission part we’ve always been kind of more on top of. So, I think Jeremy’s intent was to have people [on the board] who would help us from a business standpoint” (B22). Two business executives joined the board in 2006, a retired entrepreneur and a marketing specialist. In 2008, they added a former vice president of SAP labs who previously served as a computer science professor at Cornell and Stanford. New
senior managers with business backgrounds included the Director of Operations and the Vice President of Business Development in Asia.

Leaders also strengthened the formal structures associated with each mission, creating distinct goals, reporting systems, metrics, and roles. In 2005, they set three-year goals separately for the social and business missions. Social goals included “develop[ing] 400 young leaders with technology skills to support economic and social development in the Mekong region” and “graduat[ing] 100 additional data entry operators into jobs paying $100+/ month” (Board4), while business goals included increasing annual revenues by 40% a year to reach $1 million in revenues by 2008, more than doubling the number of employees, from 175 to 450, and achieving “business sustainability” such that business costs would be covered by client revenue (Board9).

In addition, leaders created separate financial statements in order to better understand the costs and revenues associated with the business mission as distinct from the social mission:

In our financial statements we now not only report on the whole organization, but report separately on our nonprofit activities and our business activities. The board [was] pushing us to really look hard at some of the costs within the organization and how we distinguish between what is a business cost and what is a cost of our social mission. (B23)

They also started tracking DDD’s social mission performance with a set of quantitative metrics, including the number of individuals hired from specific disadvantaged groups, scholarships offered and used, staff graduating to jobs outside of DDD, staff promoted within DDD, and the average salary of each group (Board6). They assigned a new “full-time social mission Director” to focus solely on these metrics (Board10).

**Bumping Up.** As leaders sought to build a more sustainable business, guardrails prevented them from losing sight of the social mission. For example, the regional manager in Asia and the new general manager of the Phnom Penh office, a former operator who had been promoted from within, voiced concerns about management practices that prioritized operational
efficiency over employee needs. As they wrote in a 2006 report to the board: “Staff members felt that managers did not listen to them. When there was a problem, the thing managers tried to do was to catch their mistakes and blame them, instead of helping them learn from their mistakes” (Board6). One operator found an article published in the Cambodian Daily Press that drew on the 2001 Boston Globe article, reporting that operators earned about 40 cents an hour versus the U.S. minimum wage of $10.40 an hour. In response, the operators created a union and complained to senior leaders that they were being “exploited” (Board7). After managers raised these concerns with the board, DDD changed its HR policies and communication with operators. Recognizing that most Cambodians knew little about social enterprises as the concept had not yet spread to Southeast Asia, leaders started more explicitly communicating the idea of a dual mission organization to operators, for example by posting vision and mission statements in the front of each office as a reminder to employees of DDD’s dual missions.

A planned 2008 assessment of the social and business goals set in 2005 created another, more major moment of bumping up. The review found strong business performance – DDD fully covered operational costs and employed nearly 500 people across its three Southeast Asia offices. On the social mission side, training, internal promotions, leadership, and staff development were strong, but there was little progress in spreading DDD’s “impact sourcing” model (Board11). In response, board members called for a renewed focus on expanding DDD’s social impact, highlighting the need to “reach farther to target populations that would most benefit from our mission” and grow beyond Southeast Asia (Board11). Outside stakeholders voiced similar priorities. The Skoll Foundation, which granted DDD $1 million in 2008, designated the money toward expanding DDD’s social impact, not just supporting current
operations, the International Finance Corporation was interested in making a low-interest investment to fund growth, and the Acumen Fund wanted to support expansion to India.

**Expanding Social Impact (2009-2010)**

**Paradoxical Frames.** As they responded to board member and external stakeholder concerns and considered how to scale DDD’s social impact, leaders grappled with new challenges. Their shared framing of DDD’s missions as both contradictory and interdependent informed these discussions. The board chair acknowledged the tensions:

> Well, it comes from the dual Gods that we bow before. You have a labor-intensive delivery system here, and you’ve got hundreds of people… A lot of companies would say, let’s see how we can do the same amount of work with fewer FTEs, because FTEs are icky and they are problematic and it would be much better if we could do it with machines. DDD is really just the opposite. How can we impact more people by doing the same thing and make sure that we don’t have to fire people down the road? (B20)

Yet he went on to insist that, for DDD, the two missions were inseparable:

> It would be a mistake to think that those [social and business missions] are totally distinct things… They are intertwined… If you’ve got a stated dual mission like this and they are not totally integrated, if you can’t think about one without immediately thinking about the other, you are headed for a problem... We do try to keep them integrated at all times. (B20)

Senior managers articulated a similar perspective at a 2009 North American management retreat, where they discussed skills needed to be a leader at DDD. One person identified “dealing with paradox” as a core managerial competency, a statement others in the room affirmed. As one noted, “Paradox! That’s our business.” Another reflected: “That’s what I think of as a core component to our management practice” (Meeting1).

Leaders’ frames were further evident in their communication with outsiders. Although social enterprises were more common by the end of the decade, many outsiders still viewed commercial for-profits as distinct from and contradictory to mission-driven nonprofits, and struggled to understand how a single organization could integrate business and social missions. A DDD manager explained: “To us [social enterprise] means something unique around a
Another described how he educated external stakeholders on DDD’s integrated approach:

First, I try to figure out who they are. Are they a Stanford type that wants the business side [or a nonprofit that wants the social mission side]? Most of the time, I start with ‘DDD is a for-profit/not-for-profit hybrid’ and then add something specific based on who they are. So I tell them, here is one world that you know and are a part of, and here is another world, and we bridge them together. (Meeting1)

**Surfacing Strategic Tensions.** In 2009, leaders confronted and actively debated new growth and hiring tensions. Growth tensions now centered on where to expand and how to maintain the social mission while doing so. Leaders discussed expansion within Southeast Asia to countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, which would allow for operational efficiency given the proximity to DDD’s existing Cambodia and Laos offices, but reach a less disadvantaged population. An Indian venture would similarly provide business benefits by allowing DDD to collaborate with its longtime partner Cyberdata, but here too leaders perceived more limited social needs (Board13). Kenya, in contrast, seemed to have greater social need and a sufficient infrastructure to build a viable business, as well as socio-economic diversity to enable DDD to develop local clients, something leaders had long sought to do to support and build local economies (Board16). Leaders also grappled with how to sustain social mission programs as they expanded (Board 13). At the March 2009 board meeting, they discussed whether DDD could continue providing formal educational scholarships to a larger employee base or “would need a [new] social benefit model” (B22). They could solicit more donations, but they were trying to diminish, not grow, the need for charitable contributions. A board member noted:

There is a question about… how long-term social mission costs will be supported. Most feel that, if we want to keep growing, we need to support some or even all of our social mission costs. More and potentially higher margin work is needed to allay this burden. (Board13).
Hiring tensions centered on manager positions. DDD’s mini-MBA program strengthened operator capabilities and prepared them for internal promotions, yet newly promoted middle managers still lacked critical skills. A senior manager in Asia explained:

If we look at what we want to do in the end, it’s trying to get the most operators out of the cycle [of poverty] and be able to move one socioeconomic class – even if it’s from upper lower class to lower middle class, it’s a leap into a different class – and be the first in their house to go to a university. If you define it as such…there may be some sacrifices that we’re making as far as middle managers. [We may need managers] that don’t come from within… My sense is that an organization has to be honest with itself about what it is and what it’s trying to accomplish. And if we try to accomplish too much, then it could strain all areas. (M32)

Board members surfaced similar tensions about senior management hiring, arguing that senior managers promoted from within lacked the skills to run and expand the business. At the June 2009 meeting, the board was “very clear that DDD should recruit an experienced COO from outside” (B15). Yet Hockenstein pushed back, emphasizing that staff development opportunities remained core to the social mission.

**Reinterpreting Identity Meaning.** In grappling with these strategic tensions, leaders again revisited the meaning of their dual missions. As Hockenstein reflected in 2009: “The social mission is to use IT employment to break the cycle of poverty, specifically through IT outsourcing work, and to bring these jobs to where they would not otherwise be. The question is, how can we have the biggest impact on this mission? To get there, we can’t just keep doing what we’re doing” (C11). Similarly, a board member noted:

How do you make it into something big? Is it simply the dedication of the board or managers that are going to slog through a social enterprise that will someday reach 1000 [employees], but then it’s kind of driven by the dedication of a group of people – you can’t take it and give it to someone else and have them run with it. That is the challenge people on the board are thinking about. (B22)

At the June 2010 board meeting, leaders considered what it would mean to expand their impact. The senior manager in charge of strategic planning asked the group: “How are we creating jobs for disadvantaged people in developing countries? How do we maximize the impact of this?” (Meeting2). Hockenstein pushed them to interpret DDD’s dual missions more
broadly, looking beyond their current business: “My lens going into this is whether there is a way to have a broader impact, without selling ourselves… Are we willing to do something different than creating jobs like we do today?” Board members expressed concerns about whether DDD could have a broader impact while sustaining their current business, but they agreed in principle to a more expansive interpretation of the dual missions.

**Experimenting with Practices.** As leaders’ interpretation of DDD’s dual missions shifted to include expansion to reach more people, they explored new practices for doing so. During the March 2009 discussion of expansion, they considered what social mission benefits to provide and how these could be funded with different combinations of business profits and philanthropic donations. Leaders agreed to try a middle ground approach of providing scholarships, leadership development, health care, child care, and other benefits to operators, funded by 20-25% profit margins and up to $500,000 of philanthropic donations (Board13). They further explored options for providing these social benefits at a lower cost, such as offering more targeted internal training and awarding loans rather than scholarships for operators to pursue education outside of DDD through a partnership with the Oltre Development Fund (Board14). A board member explained:

> We are looking at some things now where we may have to change our scholarship involvement, because when we are a thousand people, the amount of money that it would take to do that if we fully fund the scholarship, or nearly fully fund it, we just couldn't afford to grow. (B19)

Leaders also explored multiple possible growth options. At the March 2009 meeting, they discussed growing sales through new locations in Southeast Asia or globally, moving into related IT services, and taking on advocacy and consulting roles to help other organizations emulate their “impact sourcing” model (Board13). To further explore possible new locations, a board member conducted feasibility trips to Vietnam, Thailand, and Kenya. Ultimately, DDD applied for a Rockefeller Foundation grant and received $1 million to develop a plan for a Kenya office,
with the goal of exploring how DDD’s model could rely on local clients. Looking beyond their current business to other types of IT services, leaders also created a subsidiary venture fund to invest in new social enterprises and made an initial investment in a video-tagging social enterprise started by one of DDD’s co-founders, with a similar model of providing economic opportunities to Southeast Asians through employment and training (Board14).

**Guardrails.** In the final years of our study, leaders built stakeholder relationships with individuals and organizations committed to dual social and business missions, not just those who adhered primarily to one or the other. Whereas audiences in the early 2000s understood social enterprise as a primarily nonprofit endeavor, by the end of the decade the term referred to “ways for businesses to tackle big issues like poverty and the environment” (Gardiner, 2007). As one article noted: “It used to be that people who wanted to solve a social problem created a charity. Today, many start a company instead” (Alboher, 2009). In tandem with these shifts in meaning at the field level, top business schools opened research centers and launched executive education programs on social enterprise and social innovation, and charitable foundations increasingly supported social-business hybrids not just traditional nonprofits. Drawing in part from individuals associated with these initiatives, DDD leaders cultivated a group of “critical friends” which included “individuals drawn from business, philanthropy, non-profit world and academia, with a demonstrated interest in DDD and experience in investment, international business, social enterprise, technology and philanthropy” (Board16). As we noted previously, DDD also built ties with and received substantial grants from the Skoll and Rockefeller Foundations, both of which funded social enterprise activities that could become self-sustaining.

**Bumping Up.** Feedback from these new external stakeholders was pivotal in 2010, when leaders proactively sought reactions to their dual missions through a formal strategic planning
process. After first soliciting input from managers and board members on possible approaches to expanding social impact, leaders convened four meetings of “critical friends” (Board16). At the first meeting, senior managers presented four possible expansion scenarios: continuing to grow in Southeast Asia, providing consulting services to other organizations seeking to replicate the DDD model, launching a venture fund to invest in other social enterprises, and developing an advocacy group to promote the concept of “impact sourcing.” Feedback from this session led managers to eliminate the consulting, investing, and advocacy scenarios and develop three new options which involved expanding their current business instead of starting new businesses. They then held three more “critical friends” meetings for feedback on the new scenarios.

Responding to the feedback received in these conversations, leaders once again surfaced tensions and revisited the meaning of DDD’s dual missions. The senior manager leading the strategic planning initiative explained:

The mission is to bring people out of poverty through IT-related work. There are a variety of ways we could do this... But not all board members are okay with that. For example, some think the advocacy approach we’ve been talking about doesn’t fit [with who we are] because it would not be income generating. (M36)

To clarify these issues, this manager led a discussion at the October 2010 board meeting where leaders came to a new understanding of DDD’s identity, agreeing that “we must continue to expand our reach by providing direct services to more young people” and “as a social enterprise we have an additional imperative to operate a profitable business that supports this transformative work” (Board16). Yet even as they agreed on these new meanings, leaders recognized there was not just one way to enact them. The manager facilitating the conversation noted: “Part of the secret sauce may be having some flexibility around these issues” (M36).
Coda

Follow-up conversations with DDD leaders over the five years since our in-depth data collection ended suggest they continued to sustain hybridity through ongoing adaptation of meanings and practices. For example, they experimented with locations beyond Southeast Asia, opening an office in Kenya with the continued support of the Rockefeller Foundation and launching a subsidiary in the United States that hired military spouses who had difficulty finding employment. Leaders also proactively created additional social and business guardrails that strengthened the boundaries within which adaptation took place. In 2015, DDD hired a former corporate executive to serve as president and charged him with growing the business. Unaware of the findings of our study, he asked the board and senior management team: “What are my guardrails?” In response, leaders created a document outlining the social mission constraints within which the new president had to operate as he grew the business, and they established two new dedicated social mission roles, Executive Vice President of Social Impact and Vice President of Human Resources, to counterbalance the business focus of the president.

HOW STRUCTURED FLEXIBILITY SUSTAINS HYBRIDITY

Integrating the findings of our 10-year longitudinal study with relevant literature, we propose a model of structured flexibility which describes how organizations sustain hybridity over time through ongoing adaptation in meanings and practices, enabled by stable organizational features (see Figure 2).

--------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------

Hybridity embeds inherent tensions in the very core of an organization (Smith, Gonin, and Besharov, 2013; Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck, 2017). At DDD we observed strategic tensions such as whether to hire operators based on disadvantage or skill, and whether to grow in
locations with greater social need or more business infrastructure. In social-business hybrids more generally, tensions are likely to emerge around the divergent goals, structures, practices, and identities associated with social and business missions (Smith, Gonin, and Besharov, 2013). The specific content of tensions varying based on where within the organization the social mission is embedded – for example in who is employed versus what is produced versus who is served (see Litrico and Besharov, 2017). Structured flexibility starts with leaders’ responses to these tensions. In many organizations, leaders avoid such issues (e.g., Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997) or become mired in conflict as they try to adjudicate between competing demands (e.g., Glynn, 2000; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). In contrast, as conflicts arose between DDD’s social and business missions, leaders actively surfaced strategic tensions, inviting discussion among board members and senior managers and using these conversations as opportunities to explore new approaches to engage their dual missions. Actively surfacing tensions may not be surprising in the early years of an entrepreneurial venture, as uncertainty in nascent organizations often challenges leaders to address ongoing strategic issues (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). At DDD, however, leaders continued to surface and collectively debate strategic tensions across the entire ten years of our study.

Actively surfacing strategic tensions provokes a search for responses, offering an “invitation to act” (Beech et al., 2004). When competing demands continually recur, leaders cannot eliminate or resolve tensions but must instead navigate through them, finding approaches to move forward even while accepting the ongoing tensions (Luscher and Lewis, 2008; Jay, 2013; Ashforth and Reingen, 2014; Smets et al., 2015). Our model posits that leaders do this by interpreting and reinterpreting identity meaning and experimenting with practices. Interpreting identity meaning involves leaders clarifying who they are and what they do as an organization,
which they then reinterpret by questioning, reconsidering, and shifting their understandings over time. At DDD, we observed leaders revisiting and adjusting their interpretations of the social and business missions, even as both missions continued to define the organization’s identity. While strong identity beliefs can serve as a form of cognitive inertia, preventing adaptation and change (Levitt, 1986; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003), reinterpreting identity invites innovation and experimentation (Fiol, 2002). Experimenting with practices then involves leaders making low-cost investments to try out possible ways to accomplish their missions. We intentionally use the language of “experimenting” to describe these actions, because they involve exploring multiple different options to address strategic tensions, each one requiring a relatively small resource outlay. At DDD, for example, leaders conducted feasibility studies, launched pilot programs, and partnered with other organizations to explore and implement varied hiring and growth practices. Such “bootstrapping” practices often help to launch ventures founded on a limited budget (Bhide, 2000; Alvarez and Barney, 2007), and DDD leaders may initially have experimented out of necessity. However, whereas bootstrapping usually occurs in the startup phase of an organization, experimenting continued throughout the entire 10 years of our study, even after DDD became operationally sustainable.

Trying out multiple, low-cost practices through experimenting minimizes the risk of leaders becoming committed to any single approach (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003; Gilbert, 2005) and allows for ongoing adaptation and change (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Instead of experiencing structural inertia, leaders make ongoing shifts over time in how they understand and enact their missions. In our model, leaders continue to shift meanings and practices until they *bump up*, becoming aware that their adaptations emphasize one side of the hybrid to the detriment of the other. Bumping up reminds leaders of the other side of the hybrid, and in doing
so, resurfaces strategic tensions (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Putnam, Fairhurst, and Banghart, 2016). Bumping up is therefore not an endpoint in the enactment process, but rather fuels another cycle (Lewis, 2017; Tsoukas and Pina e Cunha, 2017). Over the 10 years of our study, leaders engaged in three cycles of enactment, each time surfacing new tensions, reinterpreting identity meanings, and experimenting with new practices. Across these cycles, we observed leaders learning to more effectively and efficiently manage tensions between their dual missions. In particular, they noticed meanings and practices shifting toward one mission at the expense of the other earlier within each successive cycle, such that the duration of the enactment process became shorter and swings toward one side or the other became less extreme. In Figure 2, we capture the decreasing duration with enactment cycles that become shorter in length horizontally, and we depict less extreme swings with enactment cycles that are shorter in height vertically. Figure 2 also depicts movement from one cycle to the next in the emphasis on alternative sides of the hybrid. While the substantive emphasis in each cycle will vary across organizations, our data support other accounts of social-business hybrids (e.g. Jay, 2013) that initially emphasize the social mission, with a subsequent shift toward the business mission.

We surfaced two stable organizational features that enable the adaptive enactment process. Paradoxical frames are a cognitive understanding of dual elements as contradictory and interdependent. In contrast to frames that depict the elements of a duality as either contradictory, conflicting, and in competition or as interdependent, synergistic, and in cooperation, paradoxical frames treat dual elements as both (Lewis, 2000; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Miron-Spektor, Erez, and Naveh, 2011; Smith and Lewis, 2011). At DDD, such frames initiated with the founding team, whose experience working in a mix of for-profit and nonprofit organizations inspired them to commit to both social and business missions, while also actively seeking ways
that these contradictory demands could benefit one another. Over time, other managers and board members adopted paradoxical frames, as the founders selected and retained leaders who shared their perspective or learned to do so, and leaders who emphasized one mission at the expense of the other left DDD. In this way, paradoxical frames diffused through an attraction-selection-attrition process (Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstein, and Smith, 1995).

Paradoxical frames depict competing demands as persistent and pervasive, inviting leaders to live with rather than resolve tensions (Luscher and Lewis, 2008). As such, these frames facilitate adaptive enactment in several ways. First, they imply that the relationship between competing demands is dynamic and uncertain (Smith and Tushman, 2005; Miron-Spektor, Erez, and Naveh, 2011). They therefore invite leaders to revisit and reinterpret the relationship between dual elements, looking for new points of connection and distinction (Rothenberg, 1979; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Second, because paradoxical frames involve accepting contradictions between competing demands, leaders are more comfortable surfacing tensions rather than avoiding them (Miron-Spektor et al., 2017). Third, accepting contradictions encourages leaders to search for “workable certainties” – temporary, negotiated responses that enable leaders to move forward rather than trying to permanently resolve tensions (Luscher and Lewis, 2008). Thus, paradoxical frames facilitate experimenting with practices and encourage novelty and creative thinking (Rothenberg, 1979; Eisenhardt and Westcott, 1988; Miron-Spektor, Gino, and Argote, 2011). Instead of making long-term commitments to a course of action, leaders adopt provisional approaches, recognizing that these approaches will shift and evolve over time (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Smith, 2014). In Figure 2, we depict these enabling influences with an arrow from paradoxical frames to the rounded rectangle representing the enactment process.
Guardrails are formal structures, leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships associated with each side of the hybrid. At DDD, leaders created structures in the form of metrics, goals, and roles dedicated to each mission. They also recruited board members and managers with backgrounds, skills, and expertise to advance the social or business missions, and they forged ties with external stakeholders from the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. In other contexts, guardrails could also include affiliations with professional organizations (DiBenigno, 2017) or visible symbols such as those conveyed through distinct dress codes or attire (Pratt and Rafaeli, 1997; Smets et al., 2015). The guardrails we observed at DDD initially served a tactical function, helping leaders to effectively implement each mission. Over time, leaders became more aware of the impact these features had in setting boundaries and redirecting meanings and practices, and they proactively added structures, leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships. In this way, guardrails intensified over time, even as they continued to represent distinct and separate missions. In Figure 2, we capture these characteristics of guardrails with parallel horizontal lines that become thicker as they run left to right across the figure.

Guardrails create a bounded space within which leaders experiment with alternative approaches. In the absence of guardrails, meanings and practices remain unchecked, risking “mission drift” as the organization moves toward enacting just one side of competing demands (Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair, 2014; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). Guardrails prevent this drift by setting boundaries on how far meanings and practices shift. As studies of group decision making (Nemeth, 1986; Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan, 1986) and innovation (Gilbert, 2006; Smith, 2014) suggest, having representatives for each side of competing demands can keep one side from dominating. In our model, guardrails serve this role throughout the enactment process, but they are most critical to sustaining hybridity when they create moments of bumping up, in which
dedicated structures, leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships make leaders aware that meanings and practices over-emphasize one side of the hybrid and remind them of the importance of the other side. Guardrails thereby prompt leaders to revisit meanings and shift practices, facilitating a new cycle of enactment. Figure 2 depicts this process with arrows running from the guardrails lines to each moment of bumping up.

In addition to their individual enabling roles, paradoxical frames and guardrails support one another in facilitating ongoing adaptation. Paradoxical frames help transform dedicated structures, expertise, and stakeholder relationships from detrimental guards to productive guardrails, as they diminish leaders’ defensiveness toward one element of the hybrid by asserting an overarching identity that integrates both elements (Sherif, 1958; Sherif et al., 1961; Fiol, Pratt, and O’Connor, 2009) and foster leaders’ appreciation that, over time, oscillations between the two elements of a hybrid will address the needs of both (Knight and Paroutis, 2017). Likewise, by delineating the distinct needs of each element of a hybrid, guardrails protect paradoxical frames from blending elements to obscure hybridity (Dalpiaz, Rindova, and Ravasi, 2016), over-emphasizing synergies and creating detrimental complexity (Gilbert et al., 2017), or yielding “false synergies” in which one element dominates (Smith, 2014).

In summary, our model of structured flexibility depicts how organizational structures, processes, and cognition interact to sustain hybridity. Paradoxical frames and guardrails reinforce one another; together these two stable features work to enable ongoing adaptation; and collectively, this combination of stability and adaptation sustains hybridity over time.

**Theoretical Contributions and Implications**

Our model of structured flexibility contributes a more nuanced account of sustaining organizational hybridity. Whereas prior research either emphasizes stable organizational
strategies, structures, and practices to engage hybridity (e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Pache and Santos, 2013a; Battilana et al., 2015) or focuses on adaptive processes that shift relationships between dual elements (e.g., Jay, 2013; Ashforth and Reingen, 2014; Dalpiaz, Rindova, and Ravasi, 2016), our model highlights the critical interaction of stability and adaptation to sustain hybridity over time. Adapting meanings and practices associated with dual elements minimizes direct conflict between them by continually developing novel approaches to ongoing tensions, while stable features such as guardrails and paradoxical frames work together to both facilitate and bound this adaptive process such that shifting meanings and practices sustain both elements of the hybrid rather than emphasizing one element at the expense of the other.

In this way, our core contribution reinforces and extends scholarship that explores the relationship between stability and change (Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine, 1999; Leana and Barry, 2002; Farjoun, 2010). As Farjoun (2010) argues, institutions, limits, structures, and routines can foster inertia and constraint, but also facilitate variation, change, and innovation. Extending this research, our model shows how stability and change show up in the context of dualities. For example, we find that in a hybrid, stability may involve leaders’ cognitive understanding of the relationship between dual elements, and adaptation may be a response to tensions between them. Our model also resonates with theories of systems dynamics (Forrester, 1968; Senge, 1990; Sterman, 2000), cultural-historical activity theory (Sannino, Daniels, and Gutierrez, 2009; Engestrom, 2014) and configurational analysis (Fiss, 2007, 2011; Misangyi et al., 2017) that emphasize that organizational outcomes depend on constellations of multiple features within social systems, rather than on a single feature in isolation. In doing so, our research challenges hybridity scholars to move beyond considering discrete features in isolation to explore interactions among multiple stable and adaptive aspects of organizations.
Four key theoretical implications follow from this more nuanced understanding of sustaining hybridity through the interaction of stability and adaptation. First, our insights challenge core assumptions about the nature of hybridity. Much research depicts the elements of a hybrid as fixed, akin to two solid objects such as stones or bricks, whose rigidity creates friction and resistance when they collide. For example, Glynn (2000) describes the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra as comprised of two subgroups, each of whom rigidly committed to a distinct interpretation of the organization’s identity, leading to persistent, intractable clashes over strategic decisions. Sustaining hybridity in this context depends on structures, practices, and processes to mitigate or work through conflict (e.g., Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Battilana et al., 2015). Alternatively, other studies understand dual elements as adaptive and flexible, akin to silly putty or dough, whose malleability enables them to morph into a new, synthesized entity in which the constituent elements blend together upon collision. For example, Dalpiaz, Rindova, and Ravasi (2016) describe how the household goods manufacturer Alessi combined the logics of industrial manufacturing and cultural production to develop novel approaches to product development. Such blending challenges hybridity by obscuring its distinct elements or creating “false synergies” in which one element dominates at the expense of the other (Smith, 2014).

In contrast, our study shows how the elements of a hybrid can be both fixed and flexible, akin to cloth, elastic, or rubber. When materials of this nature collide, they bend or yield without losing their original form – i.e., shifting the enactment of dual elements while sustaining both. At DDD, for example, leaders maintained commitments to social and business missions, even as they made ongoing shifts in the meanings and practices associated with these missions. This conception of hybridity as both fixed and flexible resonates with and extends ideas about organizational identity and routines. Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2000) argue that identity labels
may remain fixed, yet their underlying meanings can be more fluid, while Kreiner and colleagues
(2015) show that identity is both a stable state and an ongoing process. Similarly, scholars
distinguish between stable, “ostensive” aspects of routines and dynamic “performative” aspects
which create subtle changes in routines over time (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Howard-
Grenville, 2005; Pentland, Haerem, and Hillison, 2011; Turner and Rindova, 2012). We join
with other recent scholars (D’Adderio, 2014; Salvato and Rerup, 2017), to extend these ideas to
the context of dualities. In doing so, our study challenges hybridity research to explore in more
depth what is fixed and what is flexible in the dual elements of a hybrid.

Second, by advancing a model of stability and change to sustain hybridity, we further
challenge existing assumptions about the organizational features that impact hybridity. Scholars
have begun to theorize about the critical role of paradoxical frames for managing competing
demands (Smith and Tushman, 2005), particularly in the context of social-business hybrids
(Smith et al., 2012; Hahn et al., 2014). Much of the empirical scholarship adopts an etic
approach in which paradox is a label and frame introduced by the scholar (e.g., Jay, 2013;
Ashforth and Reingen, 2014; see also Schad et al., 2016). In contrast, we surface paradoxical
frames held by leaders as a critical enabling condition for sustaining hybridity, illustrating an
emic approach in which paradox emerges from the data. Our findings about paradoxical frames
call for greater attention to how informants themselves experience and interpret the multiplicity
of core organizational elements and the implications of these frames for action (Smith and
Tracey, 2016), as well as the conditions under which paradoxical frames benefit organizations
(Luscher and Lewis, 2008) or perhaps add too much complexity and become detrimental (Gilbert
et al., 2017). With increased attention to operationalizing paradoxical frames, (Miron-Spektor,
Gino, and Argote, 2011; Zhang et al., 2015; Miron-Spektor et al., 2017), future studies can adopt experimental approaches to test these questions.

We also challenge assumptions in the literature about the components of guardrails - formal structures, leadership expertise, and external stakeholder relationships associated with each side of the hybrid. Existing research suggests that organizational members with leadership expertise and commitment to one side of competing demands serve as constraining guards, staring menacingly at one another ready to protect and defend their own identity (Glynn, 2000; Fiol, Pratt, and O’Connor, 2009; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). Studies further emphasize the constraining effect of external stakeholders (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Gioia and Thomas, 1996; Corley and Gioia, 2004) and find they exert competing pulls on an organization (Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005; Binder, 2007; Pache and Santos, 2010), reinforcing the tendency toward rigidity and conflict in hybrids. In contrast, we show how these features can serve as enabling guardrails rather than constraining guards. In the context of paradoxical frames, internal leaders and external stakeholders create a bounded space within which experimentation and change take place. This insight resonates with theories of how boundaries and stability facilitate change (e.g., Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 1999; Klein et al., 2006), and challenges scholars to consider conditions under which dedicated representatives of competing demands can support, rather than deter, hybridity.

Third, our model implies a more complex and dynamic conception of how the elements of a hybrid manifest at the individual and organizational levels, which shifts research from treating these elements as either segregated or integrated to considering how they can be both. Extant literature treats professional background and past experience as constraining (Besharov and Smith, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013b), leading individuals to either adhere to one side of a
hybrid (individuals as segregated) (e.g., Glynn, 2000; Pache and Santos, 2010; Almandoz, 2014) or represent both sides (individuals as integrated) (e.g., Golden-Biddle and Rao, 1997). For example, Besharov (2014) categorized front-line employees of a natural foods retailer as “idealists” advocating for the social mission, “capitalists” reinforcing the business mission, or “pluralists” integrating both missions. Leaders at DDD were more multi-faceted. They fiercely advocated for one or the other of the organization’s missions, in this way serving as a guardrail for that mission, while simultaneously valuing and committing to both missions and exploring points of synergy between them. Expanding on prior work that shows individuals shifting between competing demands (Dane, 2010; McPherson and Sauder, 2013; Smets et al., 2015), these insights call for scholars to treat professional background and past experience as informing, but not fully determining, individuals’ cognitive perspective on the dual elements of hybrid and to explore the organizational contexts and individual capabilities that enable people to flexibly engage both sides of competing demands.

Our study surfaces similar complexity in how the elements of a hybrid manifest at the organizational level. Existing research primarily depicts hybrids as either differentiated, with separate units and sub-groups corresponding to each side, or integrated, with both sides represented across the organization (Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck, 2017). In the identity literature, for example, Albert and Whetten (1985) distinguish between ideographic hybrids in which separate units reflect each element of the hybrid and holographic hybrids in which all organizational units hold both elements. Institutional theorists similarly describe hybrids as either structurally differentiated or structurally integrated (Greenwood et al., 2011; Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair, 2014). In contrast, our data suggest that some features of a hybrid can be differentiated while others are integrated. At DDD, leaders created an integrated organizational design to
pursue the social mission through the business rather than in a separate organizational unit. Yet within this integrated organization, they developed distinct roles, metrics, and goals associated with each mission. Moreover, the integrated and differentiated aspects of the organization emerged and strengthened over time through leaders’ actions, rather than being fixed a priori (cf. Albert and Whetten, 1985; Greenwood et al., 2011). These findings challenge scholars to move beyond depicting organizations as either differentiated or integrated, and to explore combinations of the two. In addition, instead of treating the differentiated/integrated distinction as static, studies can explore how these characteristics emerge and are strategically altered by leaders.

Finally, in showing how the interaction of stability and adaptation sustain hybridity, our model offers implications for understanding adaptation more generally. Organizations must adapt to survive, particularly in a more complex, highly networked, knowledge-based world (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Bodrozic and Adler, 2017). Yet doing so is difficult as change requires learning, creativity, and novelty which clashes with, and is limited by, pressures for performance, rationalization, and bureaucratization (March, 1991; Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine, 1999). Past research has argued that dualities can serve as a motor of adaptation (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), as the juxtaposition of competing demands creates uncertainty and ambiguity, provokes a search for new opportunities, and enables change (Rothenberg, 1971; Seo and Creed, 2002; Engestrom and Sannino, 2011; Engestrom, 2014). Our study offers an empirically grounded model of how organizations engage dualities to institutionalize adaptation over time. Our model also extends past research by showing not only how duality is a catalyst for adaptation and change, but also how adaptation serves to maintain duality. In hybrids, rigidity of cognition and action can lead to intractable conflict or surrender of one mission. Shifts in
meanings and practices associated with dual missions address these challenges, and allow an organization to accommodate both missions and preserve hybridity over time.

By unpacking this relationship between adaptation and duality, our model helps to elucidate and integrate divergent theories of competing demands. Dialectical theories, spawning from insights of Hegel and Marx, argue that competing demands emerge and evolve, transforming the underlying duality over time (Benson, 1977; Engestrom, 2014; Engestrom and Sannino, 2011; Farjoun, 2016). Paradox theory, drawing from both Eastern and Western philosophy, also suggests competing demands interact in ongoing cycles, yet emphasizes that the underlying dualities persist over time (Smith and Berg, 1987; Cameron and Quinn, 1988; Lewis, 2000; Schad et al., 2016). Our data offer an integration of these approaches, showing dialectical processes that are nested within and serve to address persistent paradoxical tensions (Farjoun, 2016; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017). DDD leaders committed to the “strategic paradox” of achieving both a social and business mission – contradictory and interdependent demands that persisted over time and fostered specific tensions, such as who to hire and how to grow (Smith, 2014; Smith, Gonin, and Besharov, 2013). Addressing these tensions involved a dialectical process in which meanings and practices associated with each mission shifted, even as, and in fact in the service of, maintaining both missions. The details of our model therefore extend research by showing both the evolution and persistence of competing demands, and by implication, the nested and interlocking insights between paradox and dialectical theories.

Limitations and Future Research

While DDD successfully sustained its dual missions, we do not mean to imply that doing so is easy or common. We studied DDD because their success was “unusually revelatory” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007: 27) – a feature that allows us to unpack novel dynamics but
raises questions about generalizability (Siggelkow, 2007). Indeed, many hybrids studied by organizational scholars waver between success and failure (Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis, 2011; Jay, 2013) or drift toward one mission at the expense of the other (Ebrahim, Battilana, and Mair, 2014; Ramus and Vaccaro, 2014). Given such complexity, we encourage scholars to explore the replication, extension, and boundary conditions of our insights.

In particular, our study suggests that an organization’s leaders, and the cognitive frames they adopt, play a critical role in sustaining hybridity, a finding which raises several important questions for future research. For example, studies can probe in more depth how cognitive frames spread from an individual leader to become shared across a senior team or entire organization, as we saw at DDD. Research on imprinting (Baron, Hannan, and Burton, 1999; Almandoz, 2012, 2014; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013) and on the role of founders’ identities in the creation of hybrid organizations (Wry and York, 2017) finds that early leaders significantly impact subsequent organizational features, including culture and cognition (Schein, 2004). However, the complexity and seeming ambiguity of paradoxical frames provoke resistance and defensiveness (Vince and Broussine, 1996; Lewis, 2000; Ashforth et al., 2014), and leaders often respond by offering clarity to reduce confusion (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). In contrast, our findings suggest the value of leaders engaging others to adopt paradoxical frames and raise questions about how leaders can effectively do so. Future studies can also examine the extent to which complex cognitive frames, as well as other key enabling features for structured flexibility, depend on a single leader such as the organization’s founder. In the case of DDD, even as the central components of structured flexibility became embedded in the organization’s culture and routines, Hockenstein remained a critical influence in the organization. At the time of writing this manuscript, he was still DDD’s CEO, begging the question of how central he was to
reinforcing structured flexibility over time and what might happen if he left. Complementing this line of inquiry, research can explore conditions that limit leaders’ impact. For example, the more that formal structures, organizational members, and external stakeholders align around separate elements of the hybrid rather than embracing both, the more fixed the elements of a hybrid may become (Besharov and Smith, 2014), minimizing leaders’ influence on structured flexibility.

Future research can also explore the applicability of our model to other settings. One important question concerns how structured flexibility operates when hybridity is not a proactive, strategic choice by organizational founders but instead emerges from external stakeholders’ demands (e.g., Townley, 2002; Glynn and Lounsbury, 2005; Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014). Studies can also explore how structured flexibility applies in larger and older hybrids. As organizational size and complexity increase, practices become formalized, making ongoing shifting more difficult due to multiple sources of inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gilbert, 2005). In addition, efforts to alter the cognitive frames held by entrenched leaders may generate resistance and conflict (Kaplan, Murray, and Henderson, 2003; Kaplan, 2008), making it harder for established hybrids with long-tenured leaders to adopt paradoxical frames. How such organizations can develop a more flexible approach to meanings and practices is a critical question for future research. Similarly, studies can explore how structured flexibility applies to organizations operating in established rather than nascent fields, where it may be harder for leaders to influence and enlist stakeholders to serve as guardrails. At DDD, leaders may have had particular latitude to do so as the nascent stage of the social enterprise field meant there were few institutionalized templates for combining social and business missions, enabling leaders to forge their own path.
In our rapidly changing global economy, organizations increasingly pursue competing goals and face multiple internal and external tensions (Smith and Lewis, 2011; DiBenigno, 2017; Salvato and Rerup, 2017), with the potential to address some of the world’s greatest challenges (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). We hope our model of structured flexibility inspires future work to continue exploring how organizations can thrive in the context of such multiplicity.
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Smith, K. K. and D. N. Berg  

Sterman, J. D. J. D.  

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Townley, B.  

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Tripsas, M., and G. Gavetti  
Tsoukas, H., and R. Chia

Tsoukas, H., and M. Pina e Cunha

Turner, S. F., and V. P. Rindova

Van de Ven, A. H., and M. S. Poole

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Whetten, D. A.

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Wry, T., and J. G. York

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Zilber, T. B.
Table 1: Summary of Data Analyzed

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\(^1\) Labels in parentheses indicates our notations in the text. For example, when quoting from the interview data, we assign each interview a number from 1 to 34 and use the prefix C to refer to the founder and CEO, B to refer to board members, M to refer to managers, etc. We use similar notions for our observation and archival data.

\(^2\) We analyzed these 295 documents in depth, from among the over 3,000 documents collected.
Table 2: Summary of Findings – Three Eras of Sustaining Hybridity at DDD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paradoxical Frames:</td>
<td>• Founders committed to pursuing social mission through business rather than NGO, yet establish distinct, contradictory social and business priorities</td>
<td>• New board members and senior managers value DDD’s dual missions, yet recognize and accept the challenges they create</td>
<td>• Senior managers communicate integration of social and business missions to outsiders who see separation and contradictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Features</td>
<td>• Founders, board members with nonprofit or business experience • Relationships with nonprofit training organizations, for-profit outsourcing firm</td>
<td>• Additional business executives join board • Separate goals, metrics, financial statements for social and business missions, dedicated Social Mission Director</td>
<td>• Relationships with social enterprise funders and “critical friends” who have social enterprise experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surfacting Strategic Tensions:</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Hire expatriate vs. local managers • Grow slowly for profitability vs. quickly for social impact</td>
<td>• Hire managers externally vs. promote internally • Expand scale vs. maintain benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreting Identity Meaning:</td>
<td>• Stop the cycle of poverty through employment in a technology business</td>
<td>• Run a viable business that helps disadvantaged people</td>
<td>• Spread social impact outsourcing model more broadly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimenting with Practices:</td>
<td>• Develop partnerships to train and hire disadvantaged operators • Conduct feasibility trips and pilot programs in rural areas</td>
<td>• Develop partnerships to hire for skill and disadvantage • Train operators for manager positions • Explore new offices through joint ventures</td>
<td>• Provide lower cost benefits • Use grants to fund expansion • Launch venture fund to invest in other social enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bumping Up:</td>
<td>• Board members, senior managers voice concerns about financial viability</td>
<td>• Planned evaluation finds social goals not met, prompting board members to call for renewed focus on social impact</td>
<td>• “Critical friends” refocus expansion on profitable options related to core business</td>
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</table>

Guardrails:

Surfacting Strategic Tensions:

Interpreting Identity Meaning:

Experimenting with Practices:

Bumping Up:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conceptual Categories</th>
<th>Representative Data</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Enactment Process</strong></td>
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| Surfacing strategic tensions | Leaders discuss ongoing challenges about hiring in board meetings, informal conversations, and written reports  
When DDD expanded to Vientiane, leaders faced new hiring tensions, as the partnership approach used in Cambodia was not feasible due to lack of viable partners. The report from the Vientiane feasibility trip surfaced this issue for discussion at the next board meeting: “There are a limited number of training programs in Vientiane targeting disadvantaged people. Only some of the existing training programs currently offer training in typing skills and only one (CSD) specifically includes specialized typing training to develop typing speed. Some of the students in these training programs are from outside of Vientiane and may not stay in the city for employment following training. Private training programs are relatively expensive, especially for disadvantaged people. English proficiency in Lao is generally less than in Cambodia and there are fewer English language training programs.” (InternalAnalysis6)  
“One of the things we think a lot about is growing our own management talent vs. hiring outside talent. There’s enormous potential for us to grow our own talent. But there are limitations. Someone who has a high school education or less than that, there might be some emotional issues... If you have someone in a key management role, how do you have them go to an educational program?” (B09) |
| (Re)interpreting identity meaning | Leaders discuss meaning of dual missions, clarify social and business goals in business plans and grant proposals, at board meetings, in one-on-one conversations, and by email  
“There has been, at least over the last two years, this conversation about… how do we replicate and or scale what we're doing. I mean does it have potential to do much, much more? I think we kind of recognize that it does and that we need to figure out some other mechanisms to do that because our core management team is so focused on growing this core DDD, it's hard to have the bandwidth and the resources and to be able to figure out how to kind of do that other work… I think that is where the conversation shifted within the board.” (B23) |
“From a social mission standpoint I think we weren’t really sure what we wanted to do [when we first started]. We kind of wanted to just help people as much as possible. We didn’t really think a lot about, well, what is the very long-term goal besides just giving people a job and training them. That eventually we had to revisit. Our initial idea was, let’s be as daring as possible in terms of who we try to train to do this work, and get the people who are the most desperate. So, that was kind of our social mission.” (B22)

Leaders reflect on and acknowledge changes in social and business missions over time

“It’s taken us a while to focus. What caused us to focus over time was the goal and necessity of being a self-sustaining organization. Because of that, it limits how broad you can be… For example, we had a training program for women who were sex trafficked. Problem was that they weren’t literate in Khmer. We had to train them in being literate in a foreign language, even when they weren’t literate in Khmer, so we realized that this wasn’t a good idea. This focused us to realize that we wanted to help people who were poor, but they needed a few steps in between.” (B22)

“We’ve also evolved what it means to be sustainable locally. We thought we would eventually move all the management to be local in Cambodia and Laos. But then we realized [we] would lose out on important resources to connect outside, and we would be missing a lot of skills. So we changed our initial expectations that we wouldn’t have an expat at the VP level. And we’ve gone from one person to eight people in the New York City office.” (C11)

Experimenting with practices

Leaders explore alternative possibilities by volunteering at local organizations, conducting feasibility studies, and launching pilot programs

Concerned that the board not get distracted from its role as “the guardians of this core organization of DDD and our business,” leaders consider using outside organizations to pursue expansion: “Increasingly in the last three-years [2006-2008] it's been, okay, how do we think about what some people external to the core DDD organization can do to consider expansion.” (B23)

At March 2008 board meeting, senior managers discuss possible joint venture in Delhi, India, to be developed in partnership with Cyberdata, from whom DDD’s co-founders had initially sought guidance in February 2001. As the proposal explained, a Delhi office would enable DDD to take on client projects requiring greater skills or capacity than their current offices could provide, and it would advance DDD’s social mission by hiring operators from “some populations in Delhi – such as Burmese or Tibetan immigrants [sic] and girls in slum areas – who have completed grade 12 educations… but do not advance into jobs in the IT sector.” (Board10)

Leaders develop provisional practices through internal programs and partnerships, affiliations, and joint ventures with other organizations

Partnership with Wat Than to train and employ “56 additional workers, comprising of mine victims, physically handicapped, polio victims, abused women, and orphans.” (Grant3)

Board member describing one approach to expansion: “We found some people who were interested in this from Sri Lanka and they weren't able to pay DDD for it but they found enough money to support them to come and spend some time with us in Vientiane and to participate in one of DDD's [SPURS] management trainings. Then they just spent some time interning. Then after a couple of months they went back to their village in the north of Sri Lanka and they started their own outsourcing business, and they are still doing it. So, we saw, that was one concept of replication.” (B23)
| Bumping up | **Managers, board members, and outside stakeholders raise concerns about whether DDD is fulfilling social mission**  
“Mai and I took a trip to Bhutan and we looked at the possibility of working there. The Bhutanese government was very welcoming and interested in the possibility… But when we had the board meeting about it, the piece I recall that was really powerful for me was that our Cambodian manager at the time said, ‘What is the average income of a person in Bhutan? What is the average income of a person in Cambodia? Where do you want to create more jobs?’… For me it was a very powerful moment about why had we included our Cambodian and Lao managers on our board, to speak up [about] core decisions but also to help us think about okay, what is the case for expanding and how do we think about where do we expand. It was the moment I realized that as a person from the West, the more countries that you are in the better… and [he] just kind of pushed back and said, ‘Maybe we keep score by the number of people that we employ and we are going to be better off just staying where we are.’” (B23)  
Stakeholder from IFC raises concerns about social mission at October 2004 board meeting: “He said, ‘You know you certainly can think about expanding to other countries but if you just set your sights on becoming a large company doing what you are doing in this part of the world it would be a pretty great thing, and a pretty rare and unusual thing.’” (B23)  
**Managers, board members, and outside stakeholders raise concerns about business viability**  
Upon learning that the Vientiane office manager hired operators who could type just eight words a minute, senior managers and the board chair express concern, writing in an email: “How can you run DDD with people typing eight words per minute? We can't understand. Can you find someone who can type faster than this?” (M18).  
“I remember over the time that I was in Phnom Penh we thought we were doing well in Phnom Penh and the next year we were going to expand to five more offices, and the next year we were going to expand to ten more. We had this vision of sort of where we were headed and how well it was all going, and I think that bringing on a board that asked some hard questions about that and said: ‘How well are you doing what you are doing? Are you really ready for that kind of expansion?’” (B23)  
**Managers seek feedback on dual missions through regular reviews of social and business performance and conversations with board members and outside stakeholders**  
In February 2001, Hockenstein seeks feedback on DDD’s rural expansion plans from a Harvard-trained doctor who has been volunteering in Cambodia. “Anne cautions that I ensure that whatever I and others are doing here, we are doing for the right reason: to help people with what they truly need; not what we need. She thinks that creating jobs through technology is great; although is fairly mystified at the idea of providing computers with solar panels for rural villages which have still not conquered basic childhood diseases.” (InternalAnalysis7)  
Board member describing feedback from donors on how DDD should approach growth: “You can get a lot of excitement from donors when you say ‘let’s go to Africa’ or something like that. That gets them very excited. Some sort of eventual scaling other countries moving to other countries I think would be seen as very positive. I don’t know if it’s an expectation, but it’s certainly a hope.” (B22) |

| Enabling Features | **Leaders value both social and business missions**  
“We see [the social mission and the business] as already part of the strategic plan. It’s like we set the rule, and there’s the model. We are not making choices about whether we can support either the social or financial agenda.” (M12) |
“[At the foundation I work for] we feel very strongly that just giving grants hasn’t really gotten the world to a place where these countries can be prosperous and grow. So we really believe that supporting entrepreneurship rather than just giving money away is the right business model… Cambodia [has] terrible corruption, terrible government, but if there is an organization and a group of young people who are really trying to help and also develop a new business model, it would be worthy of supporting them.” (B24, describing why she joined DDD)

Leaders who value only one mission leave the organization
General Manager in Phnom Penh asked to resign after operators complain he is “exploiting” them to improve efficiency rather than helping them develop. (Board6)

New board member with business background joins in 2008 but leaves the board in 2010 after repeated comments suggest she valued business mission at the expense of social mission. (Meeting2, B15).

Leaders perceive interdependence and synergies as well as distinctions and contradictions between social and business missions
“How do you train your operators? Do you just train them for the job, or do you train them for future skills also, which really may be outside the scope of your needs, but the social mission people really want to do that, or even other people may want to do that… so they’re more prepared when they leave DDD. At a team leader level, how much leadership training do you do, and how much management training do you do? … Do you make it based for the market, or do you make it based for building people, or find a compromise in between that’s sustainable for the organization? And that goes on through every level, basically, and I think in every department.” (M32)

“Integrating the two [social and business missions] is important, and it is also hard. It’s the central tension we have… So many young people will go through [training programs run by NGOs], but they won’t have the chance to actually do it in the workplace. [At DDD] there’s a real client that wants to see quality work delivered. If we were just a learning program, it wouldn’t work. If it was just about a business, we could staff this with expats and not have the costs [of training disadvantaged workers].” (B09).

Leaders communicate both interdependence and distinctions of dual missions to stakeholders who emphasize only distinctions
“In the early days and maybe even now customers will say, ‘Well why would we give business to a training center? We want this business for our purposes and you’re one of the people that we’re considering, but why would we hire you rather than somebody who has been in business for a long time and has very experienced people? You want your people to stay four or five years and then leave, and these are people that [it’s] the first job that they ever had.’ … The response that we generated was: ‘We’ve got people who are very bright and are very motivated. They won’t get into a rut of mediocrity as people who have these jobs—which are very low skill jobs relatively speaking—and don’t aspire reasonably to anything else.’ I believe our quality is as good as or better than our competition and that our management is more professional and creative from a marketing standpoint than our competition is.” (B19)

“We’ve had discussions at the board level to separate [DDD’s] social activities into an NGO and have a separate organization for its business. One of the drivers of that has particularly been…[a funder that] had this vision that this was the way that you could most successfully grow and scale what you were doing, that there were different structures for financing the business and those were only going to be accessible to you if you had a separate legal structure, a separate governance structure, and financial reporting that was distinct and separate for your business activities… There was pressure put onto us over a period of a couple of years to make those changes in DDD…
| **Guardrails** | *Dedicated formal structures, such as leadership roles, goals, and metrics, associated with social and business missions*

Board sets distinct goals for social mission investment and profit margin, deciding on a “medium” level of investment, funded by a 20-25% profit margin on the business and $500,000 in fundraising. (Board13)

Hockenstein’s summary of an organizational structure review conducted in 2009: “Our discussions have centered around identifying what functions we need in order to meet our dual goals of building and sustaining a growing, profitable business, and maximizing our social impact. In effect, we need the functions of both a business and a nonprofit. While there is some overlap – such as HR and finance – there are also unique functions of each we need to have – such as sales, fundraising, and social impact measurement.” (Board14).

**Leaders with expertise in social or business missions**

Strategic Planning Associate hired in 2005 has background in foundation work and social impact measurement. (M12)

New board member with business and venture capital experience in Asia joins board in 2010. (MeetingObserved2)

**Stakeholder relationships with nonprofit, for-profit, and hybrid social enterprise organizations**

“[When we started] we had this training partnership that we put together [with data entry firms in India]… We just kind of threw some basic guidelines. We wanted them to be able to understand how to run a data entry operation and use data entry software.” (B22)

“Critical friends” meeting in 2010 invited six stakeholders to evaluate DDD’s expansion scenarios, including two foundation leaders, one social enterprise researcher, the former vice president of a global insurance company, the managing partner of a hedge fund, and an investment manager for high net worth clients. (InternalAnalysis8) |
Leaders value both social and business missions
Leaders who value only one mission leave the organization
Leaders perceive interdependence and synergies as well as distinctions and contradictions between social and business missions
Leaders communicate both interdependence and distinctions of dual missions to stakeholders who emphasize only distinctions

Dedicated formal structures, such as leadership roles, goals, and metrics, associated with social and business missions
Leaders with expertise in social or business missions
Stakeholder relationships with nonprofit, for-profit, and hybrid social enterprise organizations

Figure 1: Data Structure

Empirical Themes

- Leaders discuss ongoing challenges about hiring in board meetings, informal conversations, and written reports (e.g., hire for skill or social need, promote internally or hire externally)
- Leaders discuss ongoing challenges about growth in board meetings, informal conversations, and written reports (e.g., grow where there is reliable infrastructure or greater social need, grow slowly to be operationally sustainable or quickly to spread social impact)
- Leaders discuss meaning of dual missions, clarify social and business goals in business plans and grant proposals, at board meetings, in one-on-one conversations, and by email
- Leaders reflect on and acknowledge changes in social and business missions over time
- Leaders explore alternative possibilities by volunteering at local organizations, conducting feasibility studies, and launching pilot programs
- Leaders develop provisional practices through internal programs and partnerships, affiliations, and joint ventures with other organizations
- Managers, board members, and outside stakeholders raise concerns about whether DDD is fulfilling social mission
- Managers, board members, and outside stakeholders raise concerns about business viability
- Managers seek feedback on dual missions through regular reviews of social and business performance and conversations with board members and outside stakeholders
- Leaders discuss ongoing challenges about growth in board meetings, informal conversations, and written reports (e.g., grow where there is reliable infrastructure or greater social need, grow slowly to be operationally sustainable or quickly to spread social impact)

Conceptual Categories

- Surfacing strategic tensions
- (Re)interpreting identity meaning
- Enactment process
- Experiencing with practices
- Bumping up
- Paradoxical frames
- Enabling features

Aggregate Dimensions

Guardrails
Figure 2: A Model of Sustaining Hybridity through Structured Flexibility