

Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War II. *By Patrick J. Hearden.* Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002. xv + 418 pp. Notes, index, and bibliography of primary sources, published papers, and diaries. Cloth, \$39.95. ISBN: 1-557-28730-9.

Reviewed by Patrick D. Reagan

American geopolitical strategy and economic planning are not issues at the center of most scholarly interpretations of U.S. intervention in World War II. Purdue University historian Patrick J. Hearden convincingly shows that they should be. Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, planners in the Department of State began thinking about policy alternatives and recommendations for Secretary of State Cordell Hull and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Uppermost in their minds was the vision of postwar stability achieved through an international collective security agency and the spread of the American dream of liberal capitalism and free trade throughout the world. Peace and prosperity became the bywords of such policymakers as Adolph A. Berle Jr., Isaiah Bowman, Norman Davis, Edward Stettinius, Myron Taylor, and Sumner Welles. Yet rapidly changing military, diplomatic, strategic, and economic conditions in the midst of global war left these foreign-policy planners with a decidedly mixed record at the end of World War II.

Revisionist interpretations of American foreign and economic policy by historians William Appleman Williams, Walter LaFeber, Lloyd Gardner, Thomas McCormick, Michael Hogan, and others argue that economic self-interest, international trade expansion, and the creation of a truly free-market world economy served as the core of U.S. diplomacy after 1898. Hearden follows up these earlier works with this moderated postrevisionist interpretation of U.S. geopolitical thinking in the context of the Grand Alliance led by President Roosevelt, working in concert, conflict, and compromise with British Tory prime minister Winston Churchill and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin. Using primary sources from the Hoover, Roosevelt, and Truman presidential libraries, the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Council on Foreign Relations, and a range of personal papers held by various university archives, Hearden gives a

comprehensive, exhaustively researched history that pays attention not only to economic concerns of State Department staffers, diplomats, politicians, private business leaders, and a host of advisers who crisscrossed between public and private institutions but also to the perspectives of high-level diplomats and political leaders of the Big Three. He presents as well the viewpoints of countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East as they pursued their own national interests, and he describes the postwar situations that would face the defeated powers of Germany and Japan.

Perhaps the strongest element of this work is its comprehensive presentation and understanding, based on detailed archival research, of a host of complex issues in postwar planning. Hearden discusses the origins of such economic institutions as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the World Bank) created at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, outlines the planning for global free trade under the Trade Agreements Acts of 1934 and 1940 that resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system (1947) with rounds of trade negotiations, and reveals the delicate balancing act of demilitarizing, readjusting industrial production, and promoting free trade in postwar Germany and Japan that would create an American-dominated world economy in the generation after the war. Individual chapters detail the postwar vision of international free trade intended to replace the autarkic nationalism of the 1930s, postwar reconstruction in Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, decolonization efforts in Asia and Africa, the intermingling of oil, politics, and nationalism in the Middle East, the creation of the United Nations Organization, the reintegration of postwar Germany into the world community, stabilization efforts in China and Japan, and the complications to the Eastern European political economy caused by the redrawing of the postwar borders of Poland and the Soviet Union. Rather than adopting the traditional approach of wartime conference-by-conference narrative and analysis, Hearden employs a topical organization to address the larger interpretive issue of the interrelationship among American, British, and Russian strategic interests in the postwar world and America's economic self-interest in expanding free trade and U.S. markets, stabilizing postwar currencies, and promoting peaceful economic development as the engine of world growth to replace the aggressive fascist and nationalist policies pursued in the prewar years.

Some scholars might wish that Hearden had addressed the intellectual and institutional background of the State Department planners in the 1920s and 1930s prior to their arrival in key positions of policymaking in the World War II years. Did pre-1941 institutional capacity and state building in the Department of State allow for the successful committee system that worked well for advocating postwar trade policies, while less well-developed diplomatic capacities in the Roosevelt administrations led to more limited success in creating postwar geopolitical security and stability through the United Nations? How did changing international conditions affect postwar policy implementation in the light of the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early cold war years, the explosive conflict between Arabs and Israelis in the oil-rich Mid-East, the unpredictable postcolonial nationalist rebellions in Southeast Asia and Africa, and pent-up nationalism in the Baltic states, Poland, and the socialist republics of the Soviet empire?

Hearden brings together in this sweeping work a massive amount of archival research, reading of personal memoirs, and thinking about key secondary accounts of the last thirty years. *Architects of Globalism* succeeds in laying out the history of a second-generation Wilsonian internationalism that goes beyond older obsessions with the Open Door policy while pointing to the wartime roots of such international postwar policymaking bodies as the IMF, the World Bank, the UN, and the GATT system and their latter-day incarnations in the G6, G7, and G8 summits, the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the World Trade Organization. Wartime Department of State planning, diplomacy and geopolitical positioning by the Big Three—FDR, Churchill, and Stalin—and liberal capitalist advocacy along with Lend-Lease aid replaced social Darwinian nationalism and economic autarky as the movers of the post-1941 world economy. World war ironically led to peace and relative economic prosperity, as persuasively argued in this superb history.

Patrick D. Reagan is professor of history at Tennessee Technological University. His recent works include Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890–1943 (2000) and entries on planning in Encyclopedia of the Great Depression, edited by Robert S. McElvaine (2004).

